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INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In Australia there has been little, if any, academic 
study of non-life insurance. The same is true of the U.K. 
Most of the literature available in both countries is either 
technical - descriptions of methods, policies, legal 
decisions etc. - or consists of company histories sponsored 
by the companies concerned. The latter, while often useful, 
are as a rule not notable for their impartiality. 
The purpose of the present study is to describe the 
institutions and history of the Australian non-life 
insurance market. The work is concerned with market 
structure and performance, rather than investment polj.cies. 
The latter are mentioned only when they seem to be relevant 
to the principal purpose.. The approach adopted has been 
influenced by economic theories of firms and markets, 
particularly discussions of oligopoly to be found in the 
theoretical literature.< 1> 
(1) In particular: 
Paul M. Sweezy: Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly, 
Journal of Political Economy, 1939, Vol.XLVII. 
E.H. Chamberlin: The Theory ot Monopolistic Competition, 
6th Edn., Harva1:-d University Preas, 1950. 
R.L. Bishop: Elasticities, Cross Elasticities and 
Market RelatioMhips, American Economlc ReView, 
December 1952. 
R. Hieser: The Conditions for Oligopolistic Price 
Interdependence, Economic Record, August 1959. --
XI 
In Australia, as in England, there is a quite different 
attitude towards insurance than that which prevails in the 
United States and in many other countries. In these 
countries, especially in the U.S.A., insurance has long 
been considered an industry "affected with the public 
interest" and as such has been subject to detailed state 
regulation. Thus, in opening the investigation in 1958 of 
the U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee into 
insurance, the Chairman said: 
••• The method of public hearings of the facts that 
affect matters of public concern is the greatest 
guarantee that free government can be maintained~ 
It is far better to have the representatives of the 
industry come before a committee of the elected 
Congress of the United States to present their 
facts in public, than to have these facts and their 
problems discue~eQ in private Chambers, behind 
closed doors ••• \2) 
In England, in contrast to this view, the desire of the non-
life insurance market to manage its own affairs "behind 
closed doors" has been respected. This is perhaps in part 
attributable to the conservatism of the City and its 
attachment to traditional procedures, but a potent reason 
is the fear that a more open attitude would lead to adverse 
consequences for the large internationa~ business of British 
(2) U.S. Senate. The Insurance Industry. Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and MOnopoly of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
1958-59· Part 1, p.6. 
l 
{' 
companies and underwriters. In countries in which British 
insurance companies have been influential, particularly 
Australia, the same general line has been. followed. Here, as 
elsewhere, the argument is that as little as possible should 
be disclosed; any information would be subject to "uninformed 
criticism", and, worse still, bring deoisions into the arena 
of public and political discussion • 
. 
As a result of this policy the present stu'lr has been 
written under disadvantages that would not be present in 
other countries. In particular it has not been possible to 
undertake detailed statistical studies on the lines of work 
done in the United States. Nevertheless it has been 
considered worthwhile to attempt to organise the figures 
which are available in a more or less coherent manner, and 
in fact much of the material presented is fairly elementary 
and of a kind that, in other circumstances, would be merely 
a starting point for academic study. Attempts were also 
made to obtain statistics on some specific topi~s by 
directly approaching insurance companies and the FAUA 
Council, but these met with very limited success; they are 
mentioned in the relevant chapters. 
Despite the comments made above, the writer has 
benefited greatly from conversations and assistance from a 
.large number of individuals in the industry or concerned 
with it, both in Australia and England. It would be 
I 
invidious to refer to individuals but the following broad 
groups of o~ganisations should be mentioned. 
The Canberra and other branches of the CBCS, for making 
available certain unpublished statistics. It should be 
noted, however, that the CBCS at no time departed from its 
rule against the disclosure of individual company 
statistics; nor did it make available various analyses, such 
as the separation of tariff and non-tariff insurers or of 
Lloyd's brokers. 
The FAUA and Marine Councils, Melbourne, for full 
access to records before 1916, and limited access to 1942. 
State Underwriters' Associations, for access to early 
records and information regarding current practices and 
rules. 
Various insurance companies and brokers, for access to 
records, including letter-books, usually up to about 1910. 
Also for very many helpful discussions. 
The Government Insurance Offices of New South Wales and 
Victoria, ror inrormation concerning current practices and 
their own policies. 
I 
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PREClS 
The London market is characterised by wide inter-
' 
national connections, a large number of independent insurers, 
and an important volume of reinsurance business. Brokers 
are very influential and there are many specialised institutions 
which make their services av.ailable to the entire market. 
Both at Lloyd's and in the company market oligopoly factors 
are largely in abeyance, but there are imperfections due to the 
connections of brokers with particular syndicates and companies, 
and their operations in overseas markets. The power of 
Committee of Lloyd's to restrict entry and underwriting 
capacity is probably not significant in the long run. 
In contrast to London, in the Australian market brokers 
are less important, market institutions less developed, and 
tariff agreements the rule. Insurers have "special markets" 
which are provided by non-insurance organisations, and chief 
agency and directorship appointments. Further developments 
in this direction occurred in the late 19501s with the entry of 
I 
. 
the life companies into non-life insurance, and the acquisition 
of indirect interests by the banks. 
XYI 
The Australian market has been characterised in most 
periods by large numbers of new entrants relative to the number 
of companies operating. Australian-owned companies, (but not 
overseas companies in Australia} failed in large numbers in the 
' 
18901s and 19301s depressions. They have at all times been 
extremely vulnerable to underwriting losses, investment and 
liquidity problems and takeovera by overseas companies. In the 
20th century chances of survival were increased by association 
with a strong non-insurance organisation or firm. 
Underwriting margins in the 20th century in Australia 
have been considerably higher than those of U. K. or U.S. 
companies. This is mainly attributable to high margins in fire, 
marine and miscellaneous lines, over which tariff influence has 
been greatest. Profits on shareholders' funds over 1948-59 
were greater for Australian than U. K. insurance companies, 
but not significantly higher. than the average of Australian public 
company profit rates. 
The Australian tariff system was established during 
1898-1909 by British companies. A vigorous Australian-owned 
market was not able to survive the expansion to Australia of 
I 1 
I I 
large overseas companies in the latter half of the 19th century, 
and the 1890's depression. In 1909 the tariff system was all-
embracing, but in later years it was not possible to prevent 
new entries and the development of a significant non-tariff 
sector. After 1909 non-tariff pressures led to many changes 
in tariff rates and covers, but these were probably less rapid 
and far reaching than they otherwise would have been. There 
were fewer changes in commission and agency rules, and these 
remain significant obstacles in the way of the development of 
a freer market. New tariff members by 1960 were threatening 
the domination of the system by British companies. 
Government policies regarding solvency supervision, 
rate fixing, Government competition and agency rules can be 
criticised in many respects and should be re-examined. It is 
desirable that the industry be brought under the supervision of 
a Commonwealth Insurance Commissioner, and restrictive 
tariff rules abandoned. The Commissioner should be respons-
ible for the collection and publication of more adequate statistics 
than are at present available. 
I 
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PART A : PRESENT STRUCTURE AND TRENDS . 
CHAPTER I 
THE LONDON MARKET 
1. Introduction 
Before discussing non-life insurance in Australia 
certain aspects of the London market are desc~Pbed. The 
reasons for doing· this first will become clearer below, but 
they may be briefly summarised as follows: 
(1) London companies, brokers and reinsurers are 
important in Australia. 
(2) Many London practices are followed in Australia. 
(3) Some important features of the London market are 
much leas marked in Australia, and vice versa. 
Most of the companies which operate or are represented 
on the London insurance market have offices in an area 
of the city of London centred on Lloyd's 
' 
f 
I 
two 9uildinga. The institutions and working of the 
market have been described in many books and articles, 
and no attempt is made here to give a detailed descrip-
tion. ( ?) The intention is merely to set out some 
aspects of the market which seem important in view of 
the foregoing discussion. 
2. An International Market 
Insurance of risks in nearly all parts of the 
world is undertaken in London. This comes about for 
the following principal reasons. 
First, many of the direct writing British 
companies operate, through branches, agencies or 
subsidiary or associated companies, in many countries 
throughout the world. Muoh business written direct 
in other countries is reinsured in London. 
(7) Some books which the writer has found useful are: 
H.E. Raynes : Princibles of .British Insurance 
V. Dover : A Hand ook to Harine IiiSurance 
D.E.W. Gibb : Lloyd 1s of London 
W.M. CJ.arke : !he Oity 1s Invisible Earnings, 
Oh. 6. 
W.A. Dinsdale: History of A£cident Insurance 
in Great Britain 
M.M. Beeman : Lloyd 1s London h d 
E. F~~e (editor) : Handworterbuc es 
Versioherungswesens 
Vols. 1 and 11 • 
Many descriptive articles and papers are to be 
f Ulld in the Journal of the Chartered Insurance ~~titute, in the Review, and the gost Magaz;tne 
and Insurance Monitor. The article on Lloyd-s in 
the German D1ctionary_1 by Dr. Leberecht Funk, is 
especially usefUi. 
I 
Secondly, many insurance companies of other 
countries either operate direct or a.re represented 
in London.CB) 
Thirdly, London is the head office of several 
medium-sized professional reinsurance companies. 
Larger continental reinsurera are also represented in 
London. 
Fourth, London brokers (especially LloydB 
brokers) are represented in many parts of the world, 
and business flows from them both to Lloyds and the 
compa11y market. The U.S.A. and Commonwealth countries 
are particularly important fields for brokers. 
Because of the large size of the market, 
London is especially important as a centre for risks 
requiring large capacities, notably marine hulls, 
aviation insurance, and. catastrophe and liability 
"excess of loss 11 reinsurance. 
Finally, largely because of the many connections 
described above, the state of knowledge concerning 
conditions in world insurance markets is highly 
developed. 
The fact that L1ondon is such an important 
international insurance centre dietinc""Uiahes it from 
(8) 
/_ 
T.his includes many of the principal United States 
companies, and the Soviet insurance organisation 
11 Ingosstrakh". 
I 
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other markets in the important sense that the total 4 
business flowing on to the market is probably more 
sensitive to rates and condit}ons obtainable. Low 
rates in London may attract business from other markets 
in whi~h London insurers are represented. 
3. Number of Insurers and Market Shares 
A large number of independent insurers operate 
in London and it appears unlikely that any of them 
have a very significant share of total business. 
Although the two have many interconnections, it is 
useful to distinguish two principal sub-markets -
} 
Lloyds and the Company market. 
I (a) Lloyds. During 1958 business was written at 
Lloyd's as set out in Table I.1. Since all Lloyd's 
TABLE I.1 
Class of Insurance 
Motor Vehicle (within 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, 
excluding reinsurance) 
Marine, Aviation and 
Transit 
Other 
TOTAL: 
• 
l?rems.(less 
disc. and 
c 1ss1on etc.) 
£m. 
11. 8 
121.3 
159. 1 
292.2 
No. of 
~writing 
vem era 
1,241 
4,208 
4,600 
ap_prox • 
No, of 
Syndi-
c at ea 
21 
185 
94 
300 
approx. 
Sources: u K Board of Trade Returns 1959. Premiums 
a;e.total premiums received during 1958 (year ended 31st Dec.), on account of .under-
writing -years 1958, 1957 and 1956. Sm({!..t:) 
- I 
-' 
t~e same unde~riting members may belong to 
different syndicates the total figures for 
numb:rs of underwriting member~have been 
obtained separately from Lloyds• publication 
L~o d's Underwritin S ndicates 1 8. The 
~igure of. or ota num er o syndicates 
is approxl.lllate only, as it is Wlcertain how a 
"syndicate" is defined by the Committee of 
Lloyd's for the purposes of the Board of Trade 
returns. F•> r 111 • 1111u111 i, 6 r • 2 J ••e 
·e3 'w. 
business must pass through Lloyd's brokers, and the 
premium figures are net of all brokerage and commission, 
in order to make comparisons with Company figures for 
non-marine bLlSiness it is necessary to make some 
addition to the figures as they stand. Adding an 
arbitrary 15 per cent gives £197.6 n. for non-marine 
and £318.9 m. for total business. From this it 
, 
appears that on the average Lloyds syndicates wrote 
about £1 m. of premiwn volume each year. Their 
average market share was about 0.33 per cent. 
The number of syndicates given above appears 
to be on the basis of numbers of underwriters and 
underwriting agents; the number of these at the 
beginning of 1958 was 318.(1) On a somewhat different 
basis, counting separately sub-groups having the 
same underwriting agent, Funk made the following 
size classifications o~ syndicates in 1955.(2 ) 
These are set out in Table I.2. 
( 1) 
(2) 
Lloyds Underwriting Syndicates 19~8. 
L. Funk, article Lloyds, in Handworterbuch ••• 
op. oit., cols. 1361-2. 
5 
I 
TABLE I.2. 
Llold's 1955 : Sizes of Syndicates 
SySdioate 
izes 
No. of Syndicates No. of Names 
~o. of Names No. Per Cent No. Per Cent 
- -
1 15 2.3 15 0.11 
2 
- 10 238 36.5 1,440 10.65 
11 
- 25 228 34.8 3,846 28.44 
26 - 50 122 18.7 4,200 31.06 
51 
- 100 41 6.3 2,834 20.95 
101 
- 150 8 1.2 986 7.29 
Over 150 1 0.2 203 1.50 
TOTAL: 653 100.0 13,524 100.00 
He found the members of syndicates operating 
in specialised fields to be(3) 
Marine only 
Marine and non-marine 310 
Non-marine 220 
Employers' Liability 
Aviation 81 
Motor 30 
Credit 8 
Life 2 
Livestock 2 
653 
-
He estimated that the largest syndicate, with 203 
Names, had a premium income in 1955 of about £4..28 m. 
Taking into aooount associated syndicates with 
(3) Ibid. col. 1364. 
I 
substantially the same membership and represented by 
the same underwriting agents, he estimated that 
combined total annual premiums were about £7.97 m. 
In 1955 this was about 3.5 per cent o~ total Lloyd's 
premiums. It thus seems probable that no single 
syndicate had a very large market share. This may 
not however be the case for particular lines, as 
suggested by the list above of syndicates in 
specialised fields. However this again is subject 
to the qualification that the term "non-marine" 
embraces all non-marine classes of business, and 
the 5~0 syndicates concerned to an unknown extent 
wrote the "speciality" lines listed even if they did 
not specialise in them. All syndicates are in any 
case indirectly involved with others by writing 
guarantee insurances on members, and more directly 
through the treaty arrangements within the 11Room 11 ,< 4 l 
which are common for certain classes of business. 
(b) The Company Market. In 1958 there were 
ap~roximately 162 independent(5) U.K. companies 
registered as writing non-life insurance in the U.K.( 6) 
(4) i.e. the underwriting room at Lloyds. 
(5} i.e. not subsidiaries of other companies in 
the U.K. 
(6) Board of Trade Returns 1959. 
.. 
7 
-~----
I 
In addition there were 104 independent companies 
with head offices in 24 other countries. The principal 
countries represented were: 
U.S.A. 
India 
Switzerland 
Australia 
France 
Holland 
20 
13 
11 
11 
7 
6 
_ No figures are published of premium income on U.K. 
business only. Total premiums in ali countries of 
the above companies are set out in Table I.3. 
TABLE I.3. 
Non-Life Insurance Companies in the U.K. 
Class of 
BUsiness 
Prems.(£m.) of Oomoanies with Head 2=fficee 
Accident 
Fire 
Marine, Aviation 
and Transit 
Motor Vehicle 
Miacl. 
TOTAL: 
in U .K. 
w 
26.0 
266.4 
78.1 
266.7 
184.0 
821.2 
Overseas 
111. 9 
304.2 
94.1 
188.9 
157.2 
856.3 
Source: Board of Trade Returns 1959. 
About 40 per cent of the premium income of 
Total 
137.9 
570.6 
172.2 
455.6 
341.2 
1677.5 
.British companies ca.me from U.S •. and Canadian branches 
and subsidiaries, and probably the bulk of the overseas 
I ' ' 
I 
companies' premium v~lume is due to the inclusion of 
business written in home or other overseas markets. 
The business actu__ally written in London is likely to 
be considerably smaller than the global figures in 
~able I.3. Allowing for reinsurance in London of 
premiums written direct elsewhere, at the maximum it 
seems unlikely that more than 40 per cent of U.K. 
company business and 20 per cent of overseas company 
business would have in some way involved contracts 
made in London; i.e. £328.5 m. and £171.4 m. 
respectively. Combining these figures with the 
estimates for Lloyds gives the following.results: 
' 
Mo. of Oos. Estimated Prems. 
or oyndfcates in '.London lii. 
• 
I Lloyds 300 ;19 
U.K. Cos. 162 :;29 
Other Cos. 104 171 
-
566 819 
-
Even though the company premium f igur~s are at the 
b~st very rough guesses only, the combined result 
does suggest a market with both a relatively high 
premium volume and a relatively large number of 
underwriting units. Counting Lloyd's syndicates, 
the average market share of the latter .is less than 
0 2 t If the largest Lloyd's eyadicate had • per oen • 
- ·--··-----
-
3.5 per cent of Lloyd~ premiums, this may have been 
as low as 1.5 per cent of total market premiums. 
Unfortunately it is not even possible to make· a 
reasonable guess of the market shares ?f companies, ~ 
but it is important to note that a large number of 
foreign companies, although not coming under the 
Board of Trade definition as "carrying on business" 
within the U.K. were represented in London, mainly 
by brokers caring tor their reinsurance treaties. 
All these compan~ea should probably be counted as 
part of the effective market for reinsurance, and 
also as potential entrants into direct writing in 
London. The number of such companies in 1958 was 
at least 50, and in fact probably considerably 
greater. Vt) 
4. :Brokers~ 
All writers and observers are agreed that 
' 
perhaps the single most important distinguishing 
feature of the London insurance market .is that 
nearly all busin&ss is handled by brokers. Unfor-
tunately no financial information whatever is 
I .l 
published by brokers, since they are for the moAt 
part private companies, partnerships or sole 
(7) Estimated from advertisements by~reinsuranc~ broking firms during 1958 in the Post Magazine 
Year Book and The Review. 
II!(; 
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proprietorships. In the few cases where this is not 
so the results of brokerage operations are merged 
with those of other activities in published reports. 
Accordingly the observation made above can only be 
supported by lnferences·from other facts. 
The first of these is the large number of 
insurance brokers doing business in London. In 1958 
the Stone and Cox Year Book listed 840; the majority 
of these had addresses in the City insurance area.(8) 
Secondly, all business with Lloyds must pass 
through accredited Lloyds brokers. Stone and Cox 
listed 199 Lloyds brokers in 1958. The premium 
volume passing through these 199 firms in 1958 was 
therefore at least £319 m., the estimate made above 
of total Llo~rds premiums before deduction of 
brokerage, commissions, eto. 
Thirdly, indirect evidence suggests that 
Lloyd's brokers alone have a relatively large number 
of employees. Funk estimates that this may have been 
about 18,000 in 1943(1) and this number is likely to 
have considerably increased by the 1950's. 
In the industry literature more has been 
(8) 
( 1 ) Handw6rterbuoh •.. op. cit., col. 1324. 
I 
-------
1T 
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I ' 
written about Lloyd~ brokers than others.{2) In 
connection with their dealings with Lloyds, and 
probably also with the London company market, these 
brokers perform most functions which elsewhere are 
usually undertaken by insur:ance companies. These 
include: 
(1) Issue of cover note and policy. 
(2) Collection of premium. 
(3) Settling of claims. 
(4) Keeping of statistics of claims experience. 
(5) Arrangement of reinsurance. 
(6) Routine correspondence, inspections, etc. 
Since all premiums to Lloyds are channelled 
through Lloyds brokers, they' have, a·t least 
potentially, considerable influence on the composition 
and policy of underwriting syndicates. Many syndicates 
are in ef£ect broker-controlled since (1) the broking 
firm is the "Underwriting Agent" for most of the 
syndicate Names, (2) the principals and perhaps 
employees of the broking firm are members of the 
syndicate, (3) the broking firm, in its capacity 
as "Underwriting Agent" may collect statistics to 
guide the syndicate's underwriting policy,(3) 
e.g. M. Beeman op.cit., L. Funk.op.cit •. 
The tlparent" broker ar a ~on-ma~ine syndicate 
whose underwriter was interviewed by the 
writer kept statistics in 75-80 categories. 
l/!!fl!' 
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(4) a large proportion of the premium volume of the 
syndicate may flow from the broker. In 1958 eight 
brokil'lg firms which were estimated to probably be 
among the 10 largest in London acted as underwriting 
~gents for 63 syndicates; 28 of these arrangements 
were joint with other underwriting agents, and in 35 
cases the broker was the sole agent. Of about 15,000 
Names, the eight brokers represented 1829 directly and 
1 091 jointly. ( 4) 
Both Lloyd's and other brokers place business 
on the company market, but where a broker not accredited 
at Lloyds wishes to place business there, he nrust 
charoiel it through a Lloyd's broker, who ch~ges 
an overriding commission. The volume of business 
flowing ·through brokers to the company market, as 
mentioned above, is unlmown. Beeman writes: "there 
is no doubt that a very large amount of business, 
both Marine and Non-Marine, is arranged by Lloyd's 
,(5) A"' • d• t' brokers with Insurance Companies.' .l'UL in ica ion 
of how important this volume may be is given by the 
fact that numbers of insurance companies are in 
effect controlled by brokers. In 1958 at least 17 
(4) 
(5) 
Sources - private enqu.iry and Lloyd's Underwriting 
Syndicates 1958 op. cit. 
Beeman op. cit. p.36. 
seemed to be "broker dominated" in the sense that 
(a) most of their business came from particular 
broking firms, (b) nearly all the functions normally 
performed by an insurance company were carried out 
in the office of the broker, (c) Boards of directors 
were largely made up of the pri~cipals of particular 
broking firms, (d) particular broking firms were said 
to have large shareholding interests, (e) in many 
cases the broking firm or its principals were respons-
ible for the promotion of the company.(6) 
5. Market Institutions 
The London market is characterised by a large 
number of specialised institutions which act on 
behalf of competing underwriting groups. Among 
the most important of these are the broking firms, 
but many others exist, particularly in regard to 
the operations of Lloyd's syndicates. 
Lloyd's syndicates underwrite· only in the 
"Room" at Lloyds, .and their operations are practically 
confined to the quoting of rates and terms to brokers, 
and the authorisation of claims payments. They have 
no connection~ with the insured except through the 
(6) Souroe: private enquiry, The Review (various 
articles), Post Magazine Year Books. 
I 
t 
i 
brokers. Some of the institutions which perform 
various functions on their behalf are now listed.(7) 
The Committee of Lloyd~ enforces the "rules of 
the game" for the conduct of business at Lloyd~. 
It is elected by Underwriting Members and deals with 
such important matters as solvency supervision of 
members, entry of new members, accrediting of new 
brokers, and general questions of policy. 
Lloyd's Policy Signing Office (established 
in 1915), signs all policies on behalf of the 
syndicates. In doing this it carries out a continuous 
supervision to ensure that all policies conform to 
~he various regulations. Most important of all it 
extracts accounting and ~tatistical information on 
behalf of syndicates. Thus the whole of Lloyd's 
premium volume is dealt with by one central (punch 
card) accounting system. 
Lloyd's Survey Department carries out 
surveys of U.K. fire risks and circularises recom-
mended rates. In 1959 underwriters accepting risks 
surveyed, whether at the recommended rates or not, 
(7) For a more detailed description see ~ op.cit. 
_/ 
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paid 5 per cent of the premium to this Department. 
Lloyd's Agency System, To deal with marine 
claims Lloyds has a large network of agents and sub-
agenta throughout the world. Funk gives the 
following list.(8) 
Continent 
Eu.rope 
Africa 
Asia 
Australia and 
Oceania 
America 
Total: 
No. 
and 
674 
236 
162 
72 
346 
1490 
No. of countries 
en ts or co!onies in .. 
whicn reEresented 
25 
40 
26 
16 
32 
139 
In connection with marine business at Lloyd~ 
there is a Claims Office, Average Department and 
Intelligence Department. For international ocean 
marine insurance Lloyds has been historically and 
undoubtedly remains the principal international centre. 
Complete lists of world shipping movements and 
casualties are kept. The Lloydfu form of marine 
insurance policy is recognised throughout the world, 
(8) Funk op. cit. ool. 1383. 
~ 
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as is its famous Register of Shipping. Numerous 
standard clauses and forms of agreement are provided 
for the use of brokers and underwriters. 
Where marine insurance functions at Lloyds 
are not carried on by special Departments or brokers, 
they are dealt with to a large extent by Lloyd's 
Underwriters' Association (established in 1909). 
In the other principal fields similar arrange-
ments exist, and underwriters act through 
Lloyd's Fire and Non-Marine Underwriters' Association 
Lloyd's Motor Underwriters' Association 
Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters' Association. 
In the London company market the separation 
of underwriting from other functions is also most 
noticeable. It has proceeded furthest in marine 
and aviation insurance. Here many of the company 
underwriting rooms are within Lloyd's building or in 
close proximity to it. Joint underwriting by one 
underv{riter for a number of companies is the rule. 
• I The same informal procedures as obtain at Lloyds are 
followed. Since 1942 a policy signing Bureau similar 
to the Lloyds Policy Signing 0£fice has signed all 
policies and prepared accounts on behalf of the 
companies. As at Lloyds combined policies are used 
I '''"l!t<'I••:" ... ___ ,.,,.. - _ .. _ r - -- -
I 
when more than one company is on the same risk. 
Brokers handle and settle all claims. Some companies 
even use the Bureau facilities for branch and agency 
business. 
In non-marine business the market is not so 
highly centralised, but again brokers are undoubtedly 
dominant. On matters of common interest, especially 
inspections and rating, the companies act to a large 
extent in concert. Some of the principal organisa-
tions are: 
British Insurance Association (B.I.A.), estd. 1917. 
Includes all classes of company insurers and represents 
their interests "whenever the business transacted by 
members of the Association may be affected by the 
action, or proposed action, of any Government or other 
authority at home or abroad."(1) 
Fire Offices' Committee (F.O.C.), estd. 1868. 
l rating and tariff organisation for fire insurance. 
Accident Offices Association (A.O.A.), estd. 1906. 
A rating and tariff organisation. 
lffigineering Offices' Association, estd. 1920. Rating 
and tariffs, etc. 
International Union of Aviation Insurers, estd. 1934. 
A central organisation for the international exchange 
of information, etc., on aviation insurance matters. 
Aviation Offices' Insurance Association, (estd. 1949). 
A tariff,,intelligence, etc., organisation for aviation 
companies in London. 
(1) Post Magazine Year Book 1959~60 p.36. 
• i8 
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Federation of Plate Glass Insurance Societies estd. 1920. 
To promote the interests of mutual plate glas~ insurers. 
Does not deal with rates. 
i·1utual Insurance Companies 1 Association, estd. 1942. 
To promote the interests of mutual insurance companies. 
Institute of London Underwriters (I .L. U.), estd. ·1 aa4. 
'The marine companies' trade association. Many 
important functions, including the drawing up and 
distribution of standard marine policies and clauses. 
It controls the policy signing Bureau mentioned above. 
Co-operates with Lloyd's Underwriters Association on 
various technical matters. 
There u::-3 a large number of specialist firms 
associated with the London insurance market. Most of 
these also belong to Trade Associations, and the 
following list gives some indication of the range 
available: 
Association of Fire Loss Adjusters 
AsGociation of Burelary Insurance Surveyors 
Institute of Automobile Assessors 
Corporation of Insurance Brokers 
Association of Insurance Brokers 
Lloyds Insurance Brokers' Association 
Corporation of Insurance .Agents 
Incorpor£ted Association of Architects and 
Surveyors (Fire Surveyors' Section) 
London Salvage Corps 
Fire Offices' Committee Fire Protection Association 
The Chartered Insurance Institute (C.I.I.) 
estd. 1897, is an educational and exarninir1e body 
(·with which the Australian Insurance Institutes are 
affiliated). Its facilities are available to the 
entire market, including Lloyds. 
Apart from the numerous publications of Lloyds 
I . ' ~ ' ... ,,. 
I 
ancl. the I. L. U. in the field of marine insurance, 
various journals are published in London - notably 
~Review and the Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor 
and contain surveys of companies, market conditions, 
legal decisions and other matters affecting insurance 
in many parts of the world. 
The point intended to be brought out by the 
description of the above institution is that many 
functions that might otherwise be carried on within 
firms, in London are performed for all firms by 
organisations whi~h consequently operate on a 
relatively large scale. If there are advantages in 
large scale performance of these functions, in London, 
I 
most notably at Lloyds and in the marine market, they 
are equally available to small and large firms. The 
functions to which these observations apply in 
varying degrees are: 
Policy issue and renewal 
Accounting operations 
Statistics 
Routine correspondence 
Claims settlements 
Risk surveys and classification 
Intelligence 
Reinsurance 
Training and education 
Negotiation with Governments and other 
organisations. 
In addition, experts in many fields are available to 
115 
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the market, including specialised loss surveying and 
assessing and reinsurance. In the latter connection 
several professional reinsurance companies and 
a number of specialist reinsurance brokerage firms 
exist; various Lloyd~ syndicates also specialise 
in particular classes of reinsurance cover. 
6. Conditions for Entry 
The Lloyd's and company markets are again best 
discussed separately. 
Entry into the Lloyds market as an "Under-
writing Member" requires: 
(1) Nomination by six existing Underwriting Members. 
(2) Willingness of a syndicat~ to accept the new 
Member as a co-subscriber. 
(3) Approval by the Committee of Lloyds~ 2 ) 
(4) Payment of entrance fee - in 1955 £500. 
(5) Initial payment towards Premium Trust Fund -
in 1947 at least £1,000.(3) 
(6) Payment of deposit. In 1958 the minimum 
was £5,000 for marine business only, 
£11,000 for marine and non-marine.(4) 
In 1959 it was required to be invested at 
The writer is unable to aso~rtain whether t~is 
approval must be by majority vote or unanimous. 
Beeman op.cit., p.101. 
Funk op.cit., col.1347. 
~ 
21 
- ,,._, 
least 60 per cent in gilt-edged securities, 
40 per cent in other securities approved 
by the Committee. 
Since the liability of underwriting members 
in unlimited, the Committee examines the personal 
assets of applicants. Funk comments: "Only wealthy 
and influential persons have any hope of fulfilling 
the conditions, except for a certain leniency with 
regard to candidates who have been working in Lloyd's 
market for some time and have proved themselves."(5) 
The latter include employees and principals of broking 
firms, but in addition brokers typically introduce 
(5) ibid., col. 1346, In 1959 the required personal 
estates of new names not introduced by brokers 
was said to be of the order of .£50,000 - £75,000. 
Most members in 1958 were prominent business 
men, - industrialists, bankers, merchants , 
shipowners, etc. There were also three Cabinet 
Ministers and five Ministers not belonging to 
Cabinet (including the Minister of State for the 
Board of Trade). Of 874 members of the House of 
Lords, 115 were Underwriting Members of Lloyd's. 
Source: tloyd's Underwriting Syndicates, 1958,. 
compared with a list of members of the House of Lords. 
• ,f. 
,. 
their clients, and again the same scrutiny of 
personal assets would usually not be required, since 
it is assumed that the broking firm would in effect 
act as guarantor. Probably most .new members in 
recent years have been introduced in this way. 
Once admitted new members must take out 
guarantee policies. These policies, subject to 
certain rules, are underwritten by other Lloyds 
underwriters. In non-marine business, the value 
of the policy plus the non-marine deposit, must 
equal non-marine premiums written by the under-
writer during each year.(7) 
As well as taking into account all the 
factors mentioned so far, a prospective new member 
of Lloyds must look on his entry as a medium or 
long-term investment because: 
I 
(1) All premiums are paid into a Premium Trust 
Fund and profit distributions are made at 
' ~~ 
(7) 
( 8) 
the earli.est in the third financial year of 
the underwriting account, when an audit 
certificate is required that the profits 
are "Established Profits.n(S) 
Beeman op.cit., pp.101-103. Funk op.cit., 
cols. 1347-48. i 
Funk op.cit., col.1349. 
(2) The deposit, which is held in trust for the 
member:' s underwriting liabilities at Lloyds 
only, may only be released when all these 
liabilities have been discharged. This 
requires at least three years and possibly 
lor~er from the date of cessation of under-
writing. 
The a.mount of the deposit depends on the 
premium volume intended to be written by the member. 
At the end of 1955 the average deposit per member 
was £8,526 and the total sums deposited against 
total premiums were(1) 
De~osits Prema. De12ositLPrems. 
£000 - E1000 per cent 
Harine and Aviation 15 ,879 102,770 15.5 
Non-Marine 18,317 126,024 14.5 
Total 34' 196 228 ,794 14.9 
Since a high percentage of the deposit must 
be invested in bonds, other things being equal, 
underwriters will tend to expect a higher rate of 
return from underwriting operations during times of 
inflation. Against this must be set possible capital 
gains on underwriting fundsn 
( 1 ) SOllr6es: Funk op. cit., ool.1367, Board of Trade 
Returns, 1956. 
Underwri tirig income is sub_ject to U .K. personal 
tax, including surtax.(2) However in 1949 the Govern-
ment decided.that underwriting profits carried to 
Special Reserve Funds administered by Underwriting 
Agents would be liable to the ·compaiw Profits Tax 
rather than personal.surtax.(3) 'Members were thus 
. . . 
placed in an analogous position to shareholders in 
companies with respect to their ability to accumulate 
reserves and to avoid the full incidence of personal 
taxation by converting income into· capital gains when 
investments are appreciating. 
As regards the Lond9n company market, entry is 
open on equal terms to both British and Foreign 
companies, subject to certain requirements of the 
Board of Trade. These are: (1) that the company 
has a minimum paid up capital of £50,00o(4), (2) that 
at time of entry and subsequently the company keeps 
. . 
a "solvency margin" of assets in excess of liabilities 
of £50,000 or 10 per cent of annual premium income, 
·., whichever is· the greater. ( 5) Special provision is 
made for smaller deposits by mutual insurance 
(2) It is classed as income from ~roperty,,except 
when the underwriting member is an active under-
writer or is employed in some capacity at Lloyds 
or with a Lloyd's broker. 
·Funk op. cit., c'?l· 1350. ~ ?( )· 
Insurance Companies Act 1958, Seen. ~ 1 • 
ibid., deon. 13(1). 
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associations.(6) 
J ~ f ere are no restrictions on the entry of 
~ brokers: no licence is required and no official or 
l f unofficial tests are applied. However to gain direct I access to the Lloyd's market, the approval of the 
i 
t Committee of Lloyds as an accredited Lloyds broker 
f 
f is needed. Once approved, certain sureties must be 
f provided and a yearly revision of commitments with 
[ 
1 Lloyd's syndicates must be made. Membership of the i I Corporation of Insurance Brokers is restricted, but 
~ other brokers belong to the Association. Non-, 
! 
f membership of either of these two bodies would [ 
probably not significantly hinder a broker as long 
as he had profitable business to place in the market. 
7. Market .Agreements 
Although London companies have historically(?) 
been able at various times to draw up and enforce 
tariffs in overseas markets, effective tariffs and 
market agreements on rates are not important in 
London itself. The principal agreements which exist 
concern U.K. business and a few foreign markets only. 
They are: 
(6) ibid., Second Schedule. 
(7) Especially through the F.O.C. - see Ch. IV. 
Fire and allied lines administered by the F.o.c. 
Accident - including Employers' Liability 
11 Motor Vehicle 
11 Public Liability 
II 
(drivers) 
Livestock 
administered 
by the 
A.O.A. 
Engineering administered by the .Engineering 
Offices' Association. 
In 1959 114 British and overseas companies 
were listed by the Post Magazine Year Book as "Tariff 
Accident Offices, 11 258 as "Tariff Fire Offices 11.( 8) 
Despite the apparent large number of these companies 
the actual volume of business at tariff rates in 
London is probably small for the following reasons: 
(1) Little, if any, foreign or reinsurance 
business is subject to tariffs. 
(2) Many miscellaneous accident classes are 
not tariffed (e.g. burglary, all risks). 
(3) There are no tariff rates for marine 
business. 
(4) Numbers of important companies do not 
subscribe to the agreements.( 1) 
(5) The whole of the Lloyds market is excluded. 
(6) For .fire insurance, coinsurance is allowed 
between the tariff and non-tariff markets. 
-----------------------------------·-----~---.y-
(8) 
( 1 ) 
The l"ists i:uclude the names of many oompa~es not 
counted by the Board of T~ad~ ~s transacting 
business "within Great Britain , and others 
subsidiaries of companies on the same lists. 
Notably the General Accident and the Eagle Star. 
At one time the tariff rule was that no 
fire insurance would be accepted by a 
subscriber to the tariff if a non-tariff 
insurer covered part of the same risk,(2) 
but this has been altered and the position 
in 1960 was that the same risk could be 
insured 65 per cent in the tariff and 35 
per cent in the non-tariff market. 
In some fields particularly where high values 
are involved, market agreements embracing Lloyd's 
underwriters have been reached from time to time. 
Probably the most important of these is the cToint 
Hull Understanding which is "an arrangement ••• to 
maintain hull business on a sound basis, premiums on 
vessels within the Understanding being fixed in 
accordance with formulae based in the main on past 
loss experience." It is maintained by a joint 
Committee of the I.L.U., Lloyd's, and the Liverpool 
Underwriters' Association.(3) Rates are also jointly 
agreed in marine insurance for Riots and Strikes and 
War Risk covers. Since 1960 there has also been an 
(2) 
(3) 
A similar rule still applies in Australia.~ 
~ 36 V. Dover op. cit., pp. 35- • 
agreement concerning high value aviation hulls. 
In most instances where rate agreements have 
been possible in London, the insurances involved 
have usually been such that a significant portion of 
total market capacity has been taken up. Clearly 
there is little incentive for an underwriter to reduce 
a rate if (1) he is already writing up to his own 
and his reinsurers' limits on the risk, (2) others 
insurers, from whom he might otherwise hope to obtain 
reciprocal business, are also "full" on the same risk. 
It is basically because this kind of situation occurs 
that there has arisen the convention, both at Lloyd's 
and in the company market, of "followirig the lead"; i.e. 
following the rate quoted by the Underwriter with whom 
the broker first makes a definite contract. The fact 
that a particular "lead" is followed does not 
necessarily indicate however that the rate is not 
close to or the same as a "competitive" rate. Where 
the size of the risk is relatively small compared to 
the capacity of the market, numbers of alternative 
"leads" may be available, and in addition the broker 
may be in a position to place the business in some 
other national market. His bargaining power is there-
fore relatively strong. It is weakened the larger 
the size of risk relative to total market capacity, 
I 
because other underwriters know that they will 
probably obtain a share of the risk, either directly 
or by reinsurance, at whatever rate is eventually 
agreed. In this connection the possibility of 
understandings between national markets is clearly 
of great importance. As regards aviation and ocean 
hulls the evidence presented to the U.S. Senate 
enquiry in 195a(4) strongly suggests that at least 
informal agreements on "spheres of influence" and 
rates have been reached between the New York and 
London markets :from time to time.CS) 
(4) 
(5) 
I 
u.s. Senate, The Insurance Industry, op. cit. 
United states compan;es have always refused to 
f lly become parties to agreements - such as ~h~~oJiit Hull Understanding - because of the 
U.S. anti-trust laws. 
(8) Summary. 
In section A it was suggested that oligopoly 
relations between firms are typical in insurance 
markets, but that, if certain ( nditions hold the 
situation may in fact be much closer to so called 
''pure competition•. It is evident that in the London 
market oligopoly factors are to a large extent in 
abeyance. 
First, because of its international connections, 
the·total volume of business may be responsive to rate 
changes. 
Second, insurance buying is concentrated in the 
hands of professionals in constant contact with the 
market. 
Third, brokers probably spread most business fairly 
widely over the market. 
Fourth, a large volume of business is 
reinsurance which can be retraded to take advantage of 
rate differentials. 
Fifth, the market is large, there is a large 
number of sellers, and it is unlikely that any seller 
has a significantly high market share. 
Sixth, many market institutions make economies 
of scale and specialisation available to relatively 
I 
small underwriting groups. 
Finally, there are few serious barriers to entry 
by new companies and underwriters, provided the 
Board of Trade requirements are met (in the case of 
companies) and the Committee of Lloyd's is satisfied 
(in the case of Lloyd's underwriters). More is said on 
this below. 
In addition, largely arising from the central 
place of Lloyd's in the London market, there are a 
number of other important characteristics. 
The first is that, because of the peculiar 
organisation of the Lloyd's market, price discrimination 
between the principal risk classes is probably less 
common than in other markets. This is because most 
syndicates are specialised to particular classes, and 
composite syndicates are typically made up of 
specialised sub-syndicates of which the numbers are 
usually not identical. There is thus some pressure 
against the acceptance of "bad business for good•. 
Secondly, although arrangements differ, most 
active underwriters at Lloyd's are paid by salary el~s 
a substantial commission on syndicate profits. (6) 
(6) In 1960 15 per cent was mentioned to the writer as 
a typical non-marine profit commission. 
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Moreover, nearly all underwriters are Names in the 
syndicates for which they write. The contract of 
syndicate members with the underwriting agent 
typically allows the agent a great deal of latitude. 
Now if the underwriter him·self is the underwriting 
agent {and assuming that members of his syndicate wish 
to maximise the return on their investments) his 
attitude will tend for these reasons to coincide with 
'1.J 
the interests of his syndicate members. Moreover, he 
will wish to maximise total profit over the year, !lQ! 
the profit margin or some other variable. His long 
I!:!Jl interest in profit maximisation is also unlikely to 
contradict his short 'run interest, because the 
underwriting capacity of his syndicate depends on the 
amount of deposits of members, and existing members will 
be unwilling to introduce fresh capital or new members 
join if the syndicate makes a loss or has a profit rate 
significantly lower than the rate of return to members 
of other syndicates. 
The qualifying word •tend" is used above to 
indicate that the argument is subject to certain 
reservations. The first is that much depends on the 
level of the basic salary and the valuation which the 
underwriter attaches to incomes above and below this 
level. The second concerns the underwriter's attitude 
towards decisions involving uncertainty. This is likely 
to differ ~rom that of syndicate members because: 
(1) the underwriter's share of Rrofits is likely to be 
higher than the share of individual non-active 
'nembers. 
(2) his share of profits will be higher than his 
share of losses. 
In terms of Diagram I.! this implies that for the 
underwriter the safety margin ih may be lower than for 
the other syndicate numbers. However, the incomes and 
preferences of the other members would have to be taken 
into account in assessing any actual situation. If, as 
is probably common, the syndicate members have 
considerably higher incomes than the underwriter, their 
valuation of a loss may be less than his, and to this 
extent they may be more willing to take chances. 
So far the market has been discussed from the 
point of view of rate competition only. The institutions 
described have been such as to suggest that this is 
likely to be relatively free. By the same arguments a 
competitive situation is likely to exist with respect 
to "product• variation (i.e. the scope of policies issued) 
and •selling costsn (i.e. commissions). Depending on the 
kind of risk, competition in any one of these three 
.. 
variables may be the most significant. Moreover, the 
size of the market and the availability of reinsurance 
are likely to facilitate the introduction of new 
classifications of risks and new forms of cover. 
Despite the great significance in London of 
institutions which greatly modify the parameters of the 
oligopoly model, a number of "imperfections" exist. 
One of these obviously arises with risks which 
strain the capacity of the market, described in B.7 
above. Another is more fundamental. It has been 
suggested that brokers typically place business more or 
less at random over the entire market, having no 
preference for particular companies or syndicates. If 
this is so rate or "product• variations by an 
underwriter spread their effects relatively widely, and 
no other underwriter is particularly affected. Some 
authors have in$isted strongly on the independence of 
action that this would imply, especially as regards 
Lloyd's. Thus Beeman writes:(?} 
• 
•rhe Agent has the widest powers to conduct 
this business along whatever lines he thinks fit without 
any kind of interference from his Names ••• If an 
(7) Op. cit., PP• 64-65. 
• 
individual has been elected as an Underwriting Member 
and at the same time is. for example, a Partner in a 
firm of Lloyd's Brokers, then the Agreement which he 
enters into appointing some named party (whether a firm 
or an individual) as his Underwriting Agent is signed by 
him in a purely personal and individual capacity and this 
agreement has nothing to do with the firm in which he is 
a partner.• 
While it is true that this is the legal position, 
for the reasons given in B.3(a) above, in fact most 
brokers do !!.2.:t. chose syndicates entirely at random. In 
the cases where the broking firm is itself the Under-
writing Agent for a syndicate it would be irrational for 
it to insure in this way rather than prefer the syndicate. 
This is especially so when the underwriting members of 
the syndicate are clients of the broking firm. But if it 
both prefers the syndicate, and is the underwriting agent 
for a majority of the syndicate Names it would be \ 
unrealistic to say that it cannot (and does not) influence 
the policy of the underwriter. 
For these reasons there are definite connections 
between broking firms and various syndicates at Lloyd's; 
within the Lloyd's market preferred sub-markets exist. 
There are similar relations between brokers and companies, 
most obvious in the cases of the broker-promoted or owned 
. 
' I 
~ 
• 
companies alreaay mentioned. Outside these connections, 
factors such as compatibility of temperaments, 
acco1J1modation of unusual risks, "ex gratia" claim 
payments,and so on, while not as important as in less 
highly organised markets, should probably not be over-
looked altogether.(S) 
Next, both brokers and companies operating in 
London have •preferred markets• of their own .for the 
general reasons given earlier in the present chapter. 
As Beeman writes:( 9) 
" ••• there is perhaps rather a tendency for 
certain Brokers to become especially associated with 
'\ certain kinds of buainess or to build up a clientele 
from amongst certain sections of the public.• 
Perhaps the most important and obvious basis of 
such differentiation is geographical. In the foreign 
markets in which London brokers and companies operate 
oligopoly considerations may be important, collusive 
(8) Another is the simple physical proximity of broking 
and underwriting offices. Since the most important 
brokers are also Lloyd's brokers, the value is 
obvious of an underwriting office, if not in the 
Lloyd's building itself, at least in the close vicinity. 
{9) Op. cit., P• 35. 
I; 
arrangements the rule and Government fixing of rates 
and other regulations may create quite a different 
environment from that of London. In such circumstances 
it may not be necessary to quote the best London terms 
or rates to hold business, and conversely in some cases 
even the very finest quotations may not be sufficient. 
The overall effects of these kinds of situations are 
difficult to assess, but it is probably a reasonable 
first approximation to say that high profits in overseas 
insurance markets will tend to be reflected in 
relatively high profits in London and at Lloyd's, and 
vlce versa. 
It has been mentioned that the Committee of 
Lloyd's has important powers with respeet1D the admission 
of new members. In addition it regulates increases of 
capital by existing members, and lays down the premium 
volumewhich his deposits entitle each member to write. 
By these means the Committee is able to exert a strong 
i.nfluence on the annual supply of insurance cover 
available at Lloyd's.Cl) If this is so, is the Committee 
0 likely to act as a profit maximiser on behalf of the 
entire market, by appropriately restricting capacity? 
The possibility is reinforced by the consideration that 
the Committee may wish to avoid the creation of "excess 
capacityw, in the sense of capacity to write a premium 
(1) The influence is clearly not entirely direct, for 
premium volume is related to deposits, and not some 
measure independent of the rate level. 
volume greater than is possible at profitable rates.(2) 
In fact during the period 1946-51 it is said to have 
limited the number of new entrants, but it is not known 
whether it placed restrictions on the expansion of 
capacity by existing members. (J) 
Even if such restriction has been considered a 
possibility at times, it is evident that what can be 
achieved must be strongly circumscribed by quite obvious 
consequences. If, for example, capacity were to be 
restricted during a time of significant expansion, the 
result would be an increase in the size of outside 
markets relative to the Lloyd's market. Most significantly, 
this is likely to occur in the London company market, where, 
as explained, only a minimum capital and compliance with 
solvency standards are required of new entrants. Indeed, 
such a movement may be actively encouraged by brokers if 
they wish to "tieM clients by providing them with some 
form of underwriting interest. If this cannot be 
achieved by introducing them as members of syndicates at 
~ (2) 
(3) 
The fact that the deposit is required to be invested 
in a manner determined by the Committee, and that it 
is not available until three years after the cessation 
of underwriting, involves a notional fixed cost which 
may turn an apparent small unQerwriting profit into a 
loss. 
Such restrictions at this time would have been compat-
ible with (1) fears of a post-war slump similar to 1920-1 
and afteD (2) the rule, (in this time of inflation) that 
the .entire deposit was to' be in . gilt-edged securities. 
--
\ 
Lloyd's, it may be done by forming new insurance companies 
in which the broker and his client have predominant 
interests. Moreover, capacity restrictions may seriously 
damage the long-term prospect of Lloyd's by reducing its 
ability to absorb relatively large or dangerous single 
risks. It. is on its ·ability to underwrite such risks that 
Lloyd's has largely built its reputation, and much 
profitable "routine 0 business undoubtedly flows to it 
because of the services which it is able to perform in 
these respects. 
I 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN MARKET 
1 fl Introduction 
During 1959-60 the Australian non-life insurance 
industry received £180.9M in premiums and paid £107.BM in 
claims. Expenses of management cost £29.9M, and £17.4M 
was paid to agents and brokers. The number of employees 
in the industry is not lmown; indirect evidence suggests 
that it may have been in the region of 22,000-28,000 in 
1960.<1> In 1953 about 40 per cent of tariff company 
employees were women, and it is likely that a similar 
pattern would be found in other sections of the industry. 
In 1961 in Queensland 16,533 agents and brokers were 
licensed;(2) if the relation of commission to numbers of 
agents and brokers were the same in other States as in 
Queensland, there would have been about 250,000 in 
Australia in this year. 
Non-life insurance in each of the Australian States 
centres on particular areas of the capital cities, and in 
a sense there are six different markets. However, although 
(1) Estimated from the number of full-time salaried 
employees at 30th June, 1953, in Tariff insurance 
offices. Figures supplied by the Council of Fire ard 
Accident Underwriters. 
(2) Information from Queensland Insurance Commissioner. 
I 
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conditions do differ between States, nearly all companies 
and the larger broking firms have Head Offices for 
Australia in either Sydney or Melbourne, and the insurance 
areaaC3) of these two cities can properly be referred to as 
the principal centres of a single Australian market. The 
chief Government control over entry - the deposit require-
ment - is administered by the Commonwealth and entitles 
the insurer to operate in all States; the majority of 
companies in Australia in fact do so. Moreover, the most 
important tariff organisation - the Council of Fire and 
Accident Underwriters - is a federal body and has extensive 
powers over State tariff associations. 
As far as the writer is aware, the~e are no secondary 
sources which describe in a broad way the institutions and 
working of the non-life insurance market in Australia. 
Accordingly, in the present section, the discussion is 
somewhat more detailed than in Chapter I. This is also 
made necessary by the fact that a number of most important 
changes took place between 1955 and 1961, and at the time 
of writing the market was still, in certain respects, in a 
transitional phase from which no more or less settled 
pattern had emerged. 
(3) 
1 
In Sydney the vicinity of Pitt, Bridge, and Hunter 
streets; in Melbourne Collins and Queen Streets. 
\ 
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The chief references which have been found useful are 
the Australian Insurance and Banking Record (A.I.B.R.), 
the Insurance Year Book of Australia and New Zealand, and 
the statistics published by the .Commonwealth Bureau of 
Census and Statistics (CBCS) in the Finance Bulletin and 
various State GoverntD11nt statistical publications. 
2. Relations with other national markets. 
Australia is not an important international centre for 
insurance such as London or Switzerland. Nevertheless its 
connections with other markets are important; they can be 
discussed from five principal viewpoints. 
~ 
(a) Overseas companies in Australia 
As described in sub-section (3) below, many overseas 
companies operate in Australia; in 1959-60 they wrote about 
50 per cent of Australian premiums before overseas 
reinsurance. To some extent the results of operations in 
other markets must affect policies in Australia. However 
the Australian market is not used for the reinsurance of 
.......... 
non-Australian business by these companies. With few 
exceptions, reinsurance treaties are handled by Head 
Offices, or special departments or agencies in London or 
other centres. Moreover, reciprocity for Australian 
business which finds its way into the treaties of over-
seas companies is also dealt with overseas. 
I I 
(b) Australian companies overseas 
The international interests of Australian owned 
companies are small. Only two - the Queensland and the 
Bankers and Traders - operated on a probably significant 
scale outside Australia in 1961.(4) Probably the most 
important market outside Australia is New Zealand, but in 
1959~60 the combined premium income of 10 Australian 
companies there was only N.Z. £748,800, less than o.6 per 
cent of total premiums in Australia during this year.(5) 
In 1959 there were two Australian companies in South 
Africa, but their premiums were insignificant;C6) premium 
volume in Canada was also sma11.C7) Many have operated 
from time to time in London; in 1960 11 had branches or 
agencies there, and 9 were represented by brokers for 
reinsurance business only. (B) Neither the Board of Trade 
(4) The Queensland had underwriting branches or agencies 
in London, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Nairobi, 
Mombasa, India, Pakistan, Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Fiji, Papua and New Guinea. 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Report on Insurance Statisticsi 1260. 
of Statistics. 
N.Z. Department 
S:A: £160i000 only. >.r-~u~l Raport or Registrar of 
Insurance 1959, South Africa. 
Annual Reports, Superintendent of Insurance, Canada. 
Insurance Year Book ••• , op.cit., and The Review, 
December 23, 1960 - Annual Reinsurance Number, 
pp.1448-49, The London Reinsurance Market: overseas 
Companies and their Representatives. 
I I 
nor the companies separate U.K. business, and so it is 
impossible to judge its significance. However it is 
likely that most Australian companies use London 
principally as a matter of convenience for reinsurance, as 
is suggested by the 9 companies represented by reinsurance 
brokers only. Of the remaining 11, only 3 had fully 
equipped London branches in 1960, and 5 were small recently 
established subsidiaries of life companies which the life 
parents were assumed to represent, even though no business 
may have been in fact written. 
(c) ~don brokers in Australia 
In 1961 there were at least 23 brokers or agents in 
Australia placing business- direct in overseas markets. 
This connection was almost entirely with London, and in 
London principally with the Lloyd's market. The position 
of brokers in Australia is more fully described in sub-
section (7) below. Here it is merely noted that their 
presence has been extremely influential in Australia, and 
that their market share, especially in lines such as fire 
and marine, may be quite high. However, as in the case of 
overseas companies, it is practically unknown for London 
brokers to place overseas business in Australia. 
(d) Reinsurance of Australian Companies 
A fourth connection of the Australian with overseas 
markets is via the reinsurance treaties of Australian 
companies. In making their reinsurance arrangements 
such companies have the following basic choices: 
(1) Local Facultative reinsurance. 
(2) Local Treaty reinsurance. 
(3) Treaty reinsurance with other direct writing 
companies not in Australia. 
(4) Treaty reinsurance with professional reinsurera (including Lloyd's). 
In early times, especially in fire insurance, much 
reinsurance was placed facultatively in local markets. 
However this was both administratively expensive and 
revealed details of business to competitors. Alternative 
(2), although less costly, may also suffer from the second 
disadvantage. For these reasons Australian companies 
have always sought to obtain reciprocal reinsurance under 
alternative (3), and to the extent that they have been 
successful their results have been significantly influenced 
by non-Australian business in particular years. Alterna-
tive (4) is however important when reciprocity with 
suitable companies cannot be obtained, or is not desired 
e.g. excess of loss and catastrophe covers. For these 
reasons, the ability to insure at Lloyd's and with 
professional reinsurance companies may be extremely 
important. In both instances - at Lloyd's by a rule of 
the Committee, with the professional reinsurers because of 
the nature of their operations - full reciprocity cannot 
be expected. 
Under both alternatives (3) and (4) the state of 
competition, capacity etc. in world reinsurance markets 
will directly affect the results and so the policies of 
Australian companies. 
Except in Queensland, no useful statistics of 
reinsurance transactions are available in Australia. The 
Queensland Insurance Commissioner publishes figures of 
cessions to and recoveries from reinsurers outside the 
State. Over the years 1955-58 cessions by Australian 
companies (not including the Government Insurance Office) 
with annual premiums over £100,000 in Queensland were as 
follows: ( 9) 
Business 
Class 
Fire 
HH 
LP 
Marine 
MV 
OTP 
Other 
Total 
RLI cededtNet Prems. 
within Queensland 
per cent. 
48.9 
18.5 
65.2 
18.8 
21.5 
9.7 
12.6 
24.0 
The figures unfortWlately have a number of defects for the 
present purpose: 
(9) Source: Annual Reports, GIO Queensland. 
( 1 ) Reinsurance with companies "outside the State" 
mal include reinsurance with companies in other States, 
although most is probably overseas reinsurance. 
(2) Reinsurance commission is not given by lines. 
(3) Some "Australian" companies were fully owned 
subsidiaries of overseas companies. 
(4) No inwards business is recorded. The reason for 
this is that the Head Offices or most Australian companies 
were in Victoria or N.s.w., and so no reciprocal 
reinsurance would be recorded by the Queensland branches. 
(5) Under the Act of 1916(1) no reinsurance was 
allowed with insurers not licensed by the Act for 
business in Queensland unless ~he State Government 
Office was unable to accept a part or the whole or the 
amount to be reinsured. This did not apply to treaties 
in force on 1st February 1917. Depending on its inter-
pretation and the manner in which this requirement has 
been enforced by Queensland Insurance Commissioners, 
reinsurance outside the State may have been less than it 
would have been under freer conditions. However, it 
seens likely that the Act has not been very effective in 
this respect. Firstly, reinsurance in other States or 
overseas with insurers licensed in Queensland is not 
precluded. Second, serious difficulties must arise in 
(1) The Insurance Act 1916, 7. Geo.Vt No.27. 
I 
enforcement. This applies to treaties administered by 
overseas head off'ioea, but also to Australian company 
treaties. For example, a company with an allowed treaty 
wishing to expand its facilities could (1) arrange for 
companies with branches or agencies in Queensland to come 
on the treaty (2) arrange for a company already on the 
treaty to take larger lines and retrocede the balance 
beyond its own previous limit. The same remarks apply 
even more forcibly to reinsurance With Lloyd's, since 
the Lloyd's broker, let alone the original insurer, is 
unlikely to keep track of all the Names involved. If 
on the other hand, Lloyd's as a whole is defined to be a 
single reinaurer, the limitation is practically 
meaningless owing to the large size and capacity of the 
Lloyd's market.(2) 
Table II.1 shows cessions by principal lines by 
Australian companies (including the Government Office) 
for selected years since 1920. Subject to the 
qualifications made above, the figures suggest that the 
(2) The detailed administration required of the U.S. 
"surplus line" laws is an indication of how 
difficult legislation such as this may be to 
enforce. In order to achieve its apparent purpose, 
the Queensland legislation would probably need to 
be supplemented by a premium tax ditferentiating 
between specified "admitted" and "non-admitted" 
reinsurers. Even then the efficacy of the u.s. laws 
is doubtf\11. See: u.s. Senate: The Insurance 
Industry ••• op.cit. 
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percentage of cessions to total premiums within Queensland 
did not change greatly between 1920 and 1959. On the 
average 18-22 per cent, less 4-6 per cent exchange 
commission, waa paid, except during the 1930 1s. It is 
notable that the proportion of fire business reinsured 
tended to increase, especially after 1946. However the 
relatively high percentage of MV cessions in th.e 195o•s 
was probably influenced by reciprocal exchanges(3) within 
Australia. Taken with the fact that Workers' Compensatior 
reinsurance was low and is not included in Table II.1, 
e~fective overseas cessions as a percentage of total 
business in Queensland probably fell over the period, even 
though for some lines they may have remained the same or 
even risen. The reason for this is that the proportion of 
both MV and w. Comp. to total premiums increased. If it 
is assumed that overseas cessions of 14V business were 
10 per cent, in 1959 the ratio of total overseas 
reinsurance to Queensland premiums was about 7-'0 per cent 
after making an allowance for exchange commission. 
In order to throw a little more light on this (in 
Australia) almost completely unknown aspect of insurance, 
the writer attempted to obtain details of reinsurance 
transactions by directly approaching 21 Australian 
(3) Usually quota share. 
~ ') il ,Tl, 
companies. The companies varied from small to relatively 
large and had a oombined net premium income in 1957-58 of 
about £40M. For each principal business class 1 for a 
number of specified years, each one was asked to supply: 
Gross premiums in Australia. 
Local reinsurance(4) ceded and received. 
Overseas reinsurance ceded and received. 
Of the 21 companies, 5 did not reply or were unwilling to 
supply any information, 16 promised to co-operate but only 
8 actually did. t All emphasised that they regarded their 
reinsurance figures as highly confidential, and were only 
willing to allow them to be used in aggregated form. There 
were considerable differences among the 8 in the ways in 
which information was organised.(S) For these reasons 1 t 
has not been possible to reproduce any statistics, nor ctm 
generalisations be made with any confidence. However, 
taken with the writer's conversations with executives of 
16 of the 21 companies, and with othe~s, the figures do 
seem to war~ant a few observations: 
(4) 
(5) 
I 
As defined by the CBCS; see Ch.III, P• 3tC(. 
In no case were statistics of inward facultative 
reinsurance kept, at least at Head Offices; premiums 
were typically "net at branch 11 • The definitions of 
class es and of "local" and "overseas" reinsurance and 
the treatment of reinsurance commission also differed 
between companies. 
(1) Cessions of OTP and w. Comp. business were 
relatively low. Reinsurance in these lines was almost 
entirely excess of loss with Lloyd's or professional 
reinsurers. Underlying retentions varied considerably 
with the scale of the business written. In w. Comp. 
c~ssions ranged from 5 per cent of gross premiums to less 
then 1 per cent for large volumes. In OTP some small 
companies paid about 8 per cent, some large ones less than 
1 per cent. 
(2) Excess of loss reinsurance was not written by any 
of the 16 companies, and almost certainly by no other 
Australian companies. 
(3) Quota share exchanges between companies within 
Australia on MV business seemed to be common. In these 
cases cessions were as high as 50 per cent. Otherwise 
·MV cessions were relatively low, ranging from 15 per cent 
to less than 1 per cent for large companies. For some 
small companies quota share contracts on MV business were 
with professional reinsurers,Lloyd's or overseas direct 
companies. 
(4) Cessions in fire and allied lines and marine 
insurance varied considerably with the nature of the 
business; the general levels suggested by the Queensland 
figures above were supported. There was no evidence in 
the figures of the 8 companies alone of any tendency for 
reinsurance to decline with premium volume. 
I 
(5) For individual companies which had grown in 
particular lines over varying periods, cessions to gross 
premiums had in most instances fallen in these lines. 
(e) Professional reinsurers in Australia 
Until 1949 there were no professional reinsurance 
companies represented in Australia. Most arrangements 
were negotiated overseas by the executives or represen-
tatives of Australian companies, or by the representatives 
of the overseas reinsurers, who would travel to Australia 
for the purpose. Some of the latter used to visit 
Australia regularly in order to maintain their contacts, 
often as part of a general tour of Asia and the Southern 
Pacific.< 6) In 1949 Sterling Offices Ltd., an old 
established firm of London reinsurance brokers, opened a 
branch in Sydney. The firm, described as "reinsurance 
managers and intermediaries", represented direct writing 
companies for reinsurance purposes in London and elsewhere. 
By opening in Australia the negotiation of treaties by 
Australian companies was much facilitated. Between 1 95 O 
and 1960 it commenced accepting local fire reinsurance on 
(6) 
_/ 
Thus one London broking firm is described as follows: 
"This firm, established 40 years ago, has been 
closely associated with Australian and New Zealand 
Reinsurance Affairs for over 35 years ••• a Director, 
who joined the firm in 1928, has visited Australia 
annually for many years." Insurance Year Book, 1961, 
p.138. 
behalf of three companies - the Union Fire of Paris from 
1950, the Irish National (Dublin) from 1951, and the 
Hibernian (Dublin) from 1960. At first there was no 
reaction from professional reinsurers, but in 1956 the two 
leading London companies opened in Australia, and others 
quickly followed. By the end of 1957 the following 
professional reinsurance companies were operating in 
Australia: 
Victory Ins. Co. 
Ltd. 
Mercantile and 
General 
Reinsurance Co. 
Ltd. 
Swiss Reinsurance 
Head 
Office 
London 
London 
Year of 
openiilg 
in Aust. 
1956 
1956 
co. Zurich 1956 
Copenhagen 
Reinsurance Co. Copenhagen 1957 
New Reinsurance 
Co. Geneva 1957 
Munich 
Reinsurance Co. Munich 1957 
Net Percent. 
PreiiiS: in of total 
1 959 World R/I 
£M.Stg. prems.1959 
9.0 
2.2 o.6 
o.B 
10.5 
155. 9 40.1 
The total net premiums of all world reinsurance or 
principally reinsurance companies, estimated on the basis 
of figures published by the Review, was about Stg.£389M in 
I 
1958-59.(7)_ The percentages shown in the final column 
of the above list indicate that the presence of the 
Swiss Re and the M!!!!ich Re is particularly important. 
Both these companies are capable of providing particularly 
strong support for new or small direct companies.CB) 
By 1961 at least 7 more London broking firms 
advertJ.sing as specialists in reinsurance had also entered 
Australi~. Most had facilities for arranging reinsurances 
at Lloyd's. 
In 1959 an Australian reinsurance company - the First 
National Reinsurance of Australia - was floated with the 
backing of the hire purchase firm, Custom Credit 
Corporation. This is the first Australian company to 
specifically aim at the international reinsurance 
market.(9) 
(f) Conclusion 
In its relations with other markets, Australia 
differs very greatly from London. Australia is not an 
international market; Australian companies do not operate 
(7) 
{8) 
(9) 
I 
The Review, op.cit., Reinsurance Number, 23 December 
19~0. 
The Swiss Re reported gross non-life Australian 
premiums in 1959 of A.£2M approx. Ibid., p.1469. 
It may be hampered to some extent by its association 
with the direct writing subsidiary of Custom Credit, 
the National and General. 
' 
, 
~ 
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tb any significant extent in other countrieR. Rnd neither 
overseas companies nor brokers use the Australian market 
for t.he reinsur~nce or overseas risks~ except as 
reciprocity for Australian business. Nevertheless. 
Australian insur~nce is not isol~ted frum developments in 
other marketf;, due to the or>eration in Australia of many 
overseas direct insurers. "md increasingly, brokers nnd 
professional reinsurance cony;,_1anies. Cessions overse8s 
by Australian companies are also impor b=tnt. especinlly if 
recipr'ocal business is received; but due to the increasing 
importance of accident lines the percentaee of such 
reinsurance to total premiums in Australia h~s probably 
tended to fall. On the other hand., the presence in 
Aust.rRlia of the professional reinsurers ·1nd brokers 
encout'ages the formR ti on of new. small compRni es which tend 
to cede a re1Atively high proportion oft.heir premiruns. 
The professional reinsurers heve n vested interest in a 
r elB ti vely fpagmented m·· rket of smnll uni ts, si nee large 
companies nre not neBrly so dependent on th~ir services. 
3. Number of Insurers and .Market Shares. 
(a) Premium volume and clas~ composition 
In 1959-60 the principal lines in the total 
Australian non-lire premiums of £180.9M were: 
I 
; 
' J 
r 
The 
w 
w. Comp. and Empl. 
Liab. 
Fire 
OTP 
HH 
Marine 
PA 
Loss of Profits 
Television 
Public Risk 
Burglary 
Other 
Total 
Distribution was 
N.s.w. 
Vic. 
Queensland 
S.A. 
W.A. 
Tas. 
Total 
as 
£M 
-
48.7 
38.9 
31.9 
19.8 
9.4 
8.o 
6.2 
3.0 
2.6 
2.6 
2.3 
7.5 
180.9 
follows: 
fil! 
71.4 
58.1 
22.2 
13.8 
10.8 
4.6 
1ao.9 
Per cent ot 
total ;erems. 
26.9 
21.5 
17.6 
10.9 
5.2 
4.4 
3.4 
1.7 
1.4 
1.4 
1.3 
4.1 
100.0 
Per cent of 
total prems. 
39.5 
32.1 · 
12.3 
7.6 
6.0 
2.5 
100.0 
Annual premiums in non-life were greater than in l:i.fe 
insurance; total ordinary and industrial life premiums in 
1959-60 in respect of business within Australia were 
£126M approx.(1) In contrast, life companies held larger 
(1) Report: Insurance Commissioner, 1960. 
I 
I 
:~unds in Australia. In 1959-60 net interest earnings 
on funds in Australia of non-life companies was £8.4M, 
life companies approximately £44.2M.{2) 
Before the Second World War, Workers' Compensation 
and MV insurance had already assumed considerable 
importance relative to the traditional fields of fire and 
marine insurance. After 1945 the growth of MV and CTP 
premiums was greatly accelerated and in 1959-60 these two 
lines and w. Comp. accounted for almost 60 per cent of 
total premiums. Table II.2 shows the share of the 
principal classes in total business for selected years 
after the CBCS began the collation of total Australian 
business in 1930. 
TABLE II.2 
Australian non-life ~remiums: distribution bz 
principal lines, per cent 
Year Total Fire M MV CTP w.comp. OtheI' 
- -;Erems .£M etc. 
1930-31 11.6 49.4 5.8 16.5 18.2 10.1 
1934-35 11.5 ~.6 6.6 16.8 19.8 12.2 
1939-40 17.7 32.6 a.s 22.1 24.5 12.3 
~
1944-45 20.1 36.7 9.0 9.3 5.0 28.9 11.1 
1949-50 li6. 7 30.3 9.2 17.6 5.1 24.7 13.1 
1954-55 109.2 26.9 6.1 26.9 9.6 20.3 10.2 
1959-60 180.9 25.5 4.4 26.9 10.9 21.5 10.a 
(2) Estimated from the Report of the Insurance 
Commissioner for 1960, p.6, from the average interest 
rate on funds and the statement of assets held by 
life companies in Australia. 
_/ 
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Al though after 191.~5 total Australian premium volume 
grew very rapidly, so that in 1959-60 it was about nine 
times as great as in 1944-45, the Australian market was 
still small in comparison with the annual premium 
turnover of British companies, Lloyd's, and the probable 
annual premiums written in the London market. In 1959-60 
premiums written in the Room at Lloyd's were about two 
and a half times as great as total Australian premiums. 
The premium income of the largest British group, Royal-
Globe, was alone almost 10 per cent greater than total 
Australian premiums in 1957-58. 
(b) Number and nationality of insurers in Australia 
Table II.3 sets out the approximate number of 
independent insurers operating in Australia at the end of 
1961. Although the apparent number was over 230 (there 
wet'e 218 separate licenses issued in Victoria for 1961) 
many were owned by others also in Australia. In other 
cases companies or brokers acted as Australian agents for 
independent companies; the approximate number of these is 
indicated by the difference between the first two columns 
of Table II.3. 
It will be seen from the Table·that the total world-
wide premium income of the 27 British companies far 
exceeded that of the Australian companies. Taking into 
account a number of important mergers which took place 
- I 
·' t~ 
. 
' 
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TABLE II.3 
Independent Insurers in Australia, 1961 
Number of Cos. Approx. 
Head Office Approx.total market Total Independently prams. world share in 
~ted in wide, 1960 Australia 
AtiSti'alia. Spg. £M 1959-60, 
per cent 
Auat.-private Cos. 
Aust.-Government 
Cos. 
U .K. 
N.Z. 
Continent of 
Europe 
U.S.A. 
Other 
Total 
Brokers or agents 
for Overseas 
70 
5 
27 
4 
9 
5 
4 
124 
Insurers 33 
Companies for R/I 
only 9 
68 
5 
22 
4 
4 
3 
1 
102 
33 
5 
40-48 
20 
830 
22 
65 
391 
10 
1377-1385 
-
180 
28-32 
14 
46-54 
4-8 
n.a. 
Notes: No. and ownership of companies: writer's card 
index of non-life insurance companies in Australia. 
Prems. Austn. rivate and Government com anies: 
surance Year Boo 1 1, an A.I ••• , company 
reports. 
Prems., Overseas Cos: The Revie~, company reports. 
lirket-ahare, brokers ana agents: Estimates from 
industry sources. 
between British companies during 1958-61, the total 
premiums on the basis of 1960 accounts of some of the 
larger groups were: 
1
---
, 
' 
J 
Royal-Globe (including London 
and Lancashire and Western) 
Commercial Union - North British 
Northern - Employers' Liability 
General Accident 
Royal Exchange - Atlas 
Guardian - Union of Canton 
Sun - Alliance 
Phoenix 
Norwich Union - Scottish Union 
London - Sea 
APprox. World-wide 
premiums 1960 
Stg. £M. 
197.4 
112.7 
80.9 
74.9 
50.7 
47.3 
45.5 
40.9 
34.1 
32.4 
In terms of total premiums the U.S. companies were 
next in importance to the British, but in Australia they 
were probably not as influential as this might suggest, 
as they had not built such extensive networks of agencies 
and subsidiary companies as the British groups.{3) 
(3) On the other hand the premium :f'igures may understate 
underwriting ca[icity, as four were represented by 
the two organisa ions, American International 
Underwriters and American Foreign tnSurance 
Association. Only the premiums of the companies 
actually registered in Australia have been taken 
into account, but the capacity of these two bodies 
is probably greater than this would suggest, since 
they are in effect foreign underwriting agencies for 
a larger number of u.s. companies in each case. 
..,_ ___ _.___~~"-----~----
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(c) Market shares of overseas insurers 
The estimates in Table II.3 of shares in the 
Australian market are approximate only, sinoe (1) not all 
Australian companies publish their annual premiums (2) the 
Australian premium income of individual overseas insurers 
is not available. They do however agree with figures 
obtained from the OBOS, described below. 
In connection with balance of payments calculations 
the CBCS divides companies by location of head office. 
On this basis the market share of overseas companies 
declined slightly between 1930 and 1950, and rapidly 
between 1950 and 1960. Percentage shares calculated from 
statistics published in Queensland and others made 
available to the writer b~ the Canberra branch of the ) 
CBCS are shown in Table II.4. 
Unfortunately there does not appear to be uniformity 
in the interpretation of place of "head office" by 
companies. In lists which the writer was able to check 
some Australian subsidiaries of overseas companies said 
their head office was overseas, ·others that it was in 
Australia. For the present purposes it seems most 
useful to take the term "overseas" to refer to ownership 
and control o~ the underwriting organisation, but in a 
classification made by the OBOS in 1956 about 12 fully 
owned subsidiaries of overseas companies and 9 brokers 
__ ._ ____________________ ~ 
. -,: 
TABLE II.4 
Market Sh.ares of Overseas Insurers in Australia 
Year Australia Percentage shares in 
I 
,-
Total 
Prems. 
.£M. 
Share 
per cent Vic. !'!.!.§~ Qld. W.A. S.A. Taa • 
-
1919-20 x 
1924-25 x 
1929-30 13.7 
1934-35 11.5 
x 
x 
58.4 
60.9 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
47.1 x 
45.3 x 
46.6 x 
45.5 x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
6 
1939-40 17. 7 
1944-45 20. 1 
1949-50 46.7 
1954-55 109.2 
1959-60 180. 9 
55.9 
54.7 
53.5 
49.0 
42.a 
59.7 53.5 41.3 59.4 67.2 56.4 
69.6 54.0 42.3 62.6 62.7 59.4 
·60.5 50.41 40.1 51.6350.a4 x 
57.a 43.12 43.9 47.a 49.5 x 
so.a 3a.a 34.1 40.2 47.1 40.4 
Notes: x Not available. 
1, 3, 4 - 1950-51. 
2 - 1955.56. 
Sources: Information supplied by CBCS, Canberra, and ~Ann __ u_al 
Report~, State Government Insurance Office, 
Queensland. 
dealing principally with Llo1d's were counted as 
"Australian". For this reason Table II.4 underestimates 
the market share of overseas insurers. In 1959-60 10 
subsidiaries of overseas companies published Australian 
accounts; their premium income in this year was £6.1M, net 
of all reinsurance including treaty. Assuming that they 
-
were again treated as "Australian" b1 the OBOS, this would 
mean that the overseas share in this year was understated 
by at least 3 percentage points. Assuming the range of 
understatement to be 3-5 percentage points, and that the 
probable Lloyd's share was in the region of 4-8 per cent, 
the total overseas share may have been understated by 
1-13 percentage points. This gives a range for the 
overseas share in 1959-60 of 49.8-55.a par cent, compared 
~ 
with the estimate below (Table II.3) of 46-54 per cent. 
The assessment of similar corrections for earlier years 
would require much det~iled work{4) which the writer was 
unable to undertake, but overseas company premiums were 
almost certainly again underestimated. It seems probable 
that the percentage understatement was less in earlier 
years, but it is doubtful whether this difference would 
be sufficient to explain the overall decline in the 
overseas share.CS) 
It will be noted that the overseas share in Queensland 
was considerably lower during 1930-45 than in other States. 
The basic reason for this appears to be that after 1916 
w. Comp. business in Queensland was a statutory monopoly 
of the GIO. Table 11.5 shows that in other lines the 
(4) At each of the six branches of the OBOS. 
(5) 
I 
This is a general impression gained from published 
accounts of Australian-owned companies. 
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TABLE II.5 
ueensland: Percenta e Market 
Overseas Insurers es. 
Year Fire etc. Marine MV OTP 
- -
1919-20 69.9 60.3 69.6 
1924-25 64.8 61.3 57.6 
1929-30 62.a 64.6 54.1 
1934-35 62.4 66.3 70.2 
1939-40 65.9 68.4 
1945-46 70.4 60.5 
1949-50 64.0 67.3 62.2 48.2 
1954-55 60.7 71.2 67.7 47.8 
1958-59 54.3 68.9 36.2 40.7 
Sources: Annual Reports, Queensland GIO 1920-40. 
OBOS Returns 1940-60. 1945-46 n.a. 
share was considerabl.1' higher and declined most in MV and 
OTP business. This suggests that the probable reason 
for the apparent decline in the overseas share in total 
Australian business was the failure of overseas companies 
to maintain their shares in these two lines, the most 
rapidly growing after 1945. In N.s.w. also the overseas 
share 1n MV and OTP was relatively low (Table II.6). Here 
the share in fire and marine was again high, and also in 
other miscellaneous classes apart from Personal Ac1cident 
(PA). Overseas insurers also had high market shares in 
some of the principal sub-classes: 
I 
A. HH 
LP 
Hail 
F. Livestock 
Aviation 
Premiums 
£ 1000 
3858 
1027 
794 
148 
257 
TABLE II.6 
Overseas share 
;per cent 
47.8 
72.6 
53.3 
83. 7 
76.7 
N.s.w.: Peroentase µarket Shares of overseas 
Insurers by ;principal Lines 1959-60 
Class of Insurance 
A.. Fire etc. 
B. Marine 
C. MV 
D. w. Comp. 
E. PA 
F. Other 
Total 
Premiums 
£m. 
17.0 
3.5 
19.7 
8.8 
14.4 
2.2 
Market Share of 
Overseas Cos. 
per cent 
6.8 
38.8 
Source: Information from CBCS, Canberra. The letters 
A, B, C, D, E, F,_ refer to the principal 
statistical classes adopted by the OBOS; they are 
described in detail in Ch.III. 
(d) Market share§ - individual companies 
Without knowing the figures of individual companies 
it is not possible to discuss satisfactorily probable 
" I 
6R 
market structure. However, the analysis of Victorian 
statistics undertaken by the OBOS and discussed in 
Chapter III does allow some inferences to be drawn. First, 
there were for total business and by individual lines, a 
large number of' companids writing less than 1 per cent of 
Victorian premiums in 1957-58. Secondly, the average 
market shares o'f "large" companies was in the region of 
5 per cent, and the maximum possible share for any one 
company for total business was 15.5per cent. (G) Since 
the respective Government Offices of N.s.w., Victoria and 
Queensland are almost certainly the largest in their 
States, but none operated in other States, it seems 
unlikely that any single company in Australia would have 
a market share in excess of 10 per cent. This is 
supported by the following considerations: (1) The market 
share of the 5 Government Offices combined was about 14 
per cent in 1959-60. (2) The share of the largest 
Australian owned company, the Queensland, was 2.8 per cent 
approx. (3) The share of the only large British group for 
which figures are available - the Commercial Union - was 
3.9 per cent approx. in 1958-59· The Commercial Union 
was probably (judging by years of operation, number of 
( 6) See Ch. I II, P• 3 'B'' · 
branches, subsidiaries etc.) in Australia one of the most 
important overseas groups, and even allowing for 
reinsurance and adding in the figures of the North British, 
a subsidiary whose accounts were not published, it seems 
highly unlikely that it would be necessary to add more 
than 3 percentage points to this figure. The conclusion 
is that the ~robable pattern in Australia is that of 
about 1 O companies with market a hares ranging from 2-8 
per cent, plus about 90 with shares less than 2 per cent, 
and most considerably less than 1 per cent. The leading 
10 or so companies would probably include the State 
Government Offices of N.s.w. and Queensland, 3 or 4 
British, 2 or 3 Australian companies, and possibly one of 
the principal Lloyd's brokers. However it must be 
emphasised that while the CBCS follows its policy of not 
revealing individual company-returns and no requirements 
exist for the publication of Australian business by 
overseas companies, this must largely remain guesswork. 
It has been pointed out above that a relatively lar~ 
number of companies probably wrote a small premium volume 
in Australia. In 1960 the following was the size 
distribution of premiums of independent Australian-owned 
companies (including Government Offices) on the basis of 
• 
l 
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published accounts: (7) 
Net Premiums No. of 
£M Cos. 
- -
O'\ter 6 2 
5-6 2 
4-5 4 
3-4 1 
2-3 4 
1-2 4 
0-1 ~5 
-
42 
-
Of the 25 companies with net premiums leas than £1M, 
16 had premiums less than £100,000, 7 less than £10,000. 
In relation to the sizes of many insurance companies, 
as illustrated by the above distribution, the insurances 
placed by many buyers are large. On the basis of balance 
sheet information and assumed rates for fire, loss of 
profits, marine, MV, and w. Comp. insurances, the following 
figures indicate the probable order of magnitude of the 
1960 non-life premiums payable by a few large and medium 
sized firms. 
(7) Sources: Insurance Year Book, 1961. 
A.I.B.R., Company reports. 
Est~. mates by the writer for two oompaniet 
which dia not publish premiums. 
The figures are with one exception for 
financial years ending during 1960. 
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The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. 
Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd. 
Tooth & Co. Ltd. 
Jamee Hardie Asbestos Ltd. 
Drug Houses of Australia Ltd. 
The National Bank of Australia Ltd. 
Bond's Industries Ltd. 
£ 1000 
500 
180 
120 
50 
45 
30 
25 
It must be emphasised that these.are again no better 
than guesses, but they are for the moat part minimum 
guesses owing to the assumption of minimum rates with 
respect to the nature of the operations of the firms 
conceI'lled, and also to the probability that balance sheet 
values are leas than values for insurance purposes, 
especially fire and loss of profits. The 7 firms were 
all among the 133 largest listed by the Sydney Stock 
Exchange Investment Service for F~bruary-March 1954(B) but 
a considerable number of subsidiaries of overseas companies 
must fall within a similar size range.(9) To these must 
be added large buye~a such as State Government Departments, 
various public corporations such ss the State Electricity 
(8) 
(9) 
E.L. Wheelwright: The Ownershi;Jand Cor1trol of 
Australian Companies, p.21. (S n~Yl9~7). 
The Wheelwright companies had unconsolidated 
Shareholders' funds of over £2M at the time of his 
study. 
v 
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Authorities, and small or medium sized firms or 
organisations which pay high premiums as a result of 
engaging in risky occupations or controlling risky assets. 
If there were in total 300 such organisations, paying on 
the average £50,000 - £100,000 in insurance premiums, th-3y 
would alone account for about 8-17 per cent of total 
Australian premiums. It is evident that such buyers are 
large in comparison with many insurance companies. Thus 
only 22 of the 42 insurance companies above had annual 
premiums greater than the probable premiums payable 
annually by one firm, B.H.P.( 1) Even to a relatively 
large Australian insurance company, such as the Queensland, 
annual premiums from one client of the order of £150,000 -
£200,000 would represent almost 10 per cent of its total 
premium volume. Smaller compan1.es would be much more 
dependent than this. If such large insurances are in 
fact placed with individual insurers it is to be expected 
that considerable importance would be attached to their 
retention. 
(e) Market shares - tariff and non-tariff 
As described below, the Australian insurance market 
is characterised by a sharp division between tariff and 
non-tariff insurers. This division has come about as a 
(1) B.H.P. insurances are in fact placed in London. 
• 
result of the growth of a non-tariff market outside the 
tariff area, and the maintenance by tariff Associations 
of comprehensive rules regulating their members' business, 
and above all forbidding intercourse with non-tari:rf 
companies. In mid-1961 the two markets were made up as 
follows: 
Tariff 21 (21) Australian private Cos. 
43 (30) Overseas Cos. 
Non-Tarif'f 49 (47) Australian private Cos. 
5 (5) Australian Government Cos. 
6 (4) Overseas Cos. 
33 (33) Brokers and agents of overseas 
insurers. 
The bracketed numbers represent companies independently 
represented in Australia. Although there was a relatively 
large number of Australian non-tariff companies, most of 
these were small and many were specialised to particular 
lines or areas. Only 6 had net premiums in 1959-60 of 
over £1M; these were: 
Year Net Prems. £M 
-Estd. 
N.R.M.A. Insurance 1925 5-6<2 > 
Ajax 1934 4.5 
Transport and Genet'al 1938 3.1 
(2) Estimate only. 
'13 
· 1 
Victorian Automobile Chamber 
of Commerce Insurance Co. 
Federation 
Automobile Fire and General 
Year 
Estd. 
1930 
1927 
1922 
Net Prems. £M 
2.6 
2.0 
1.1 
The total premiums of these companies plus six others for 
which figures are available were £19. 5M - £20.SM in 1960. 
The premiums of the Government Offices were: 
Year Net J2rems. 1959-60 
Estd. £M 
GIO of 
-N.s.w. 1926 11.7 
Queensland 1916 7.2 
Victoria - Motor 1941 2 .. 0 
- Accident 1914 2.7 
W.A. 1926 1. 0 
Tas. 1919 0.4 
25.0 
Other Government or semi-government insurance arrangements 
were: 
State Savings Bank of Victoria - Insurance 
Net Prems. 
1929-60 £14 
Trust Fund, estd. 1920 0.2 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust of W.A. 
Department of Social Services (Cwlth.) -
War Service Homes Insurance Scheme 
o.a 
0.2 
-1.2 
-
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Nearly all overseas companies belonge0 to the tariff, but 
the few exceptions were important. 
Head Total Prams. 
Office - Stg. £M History in Australia 
General Accident 
Ine:.:. rani;: t" Co ,. ,., 
North :'.:'' )~"'ioa 
London ~ ... n.f.I Over•seas) 
London 
) 
National ~~~~oyers'lLondon 
l.1utual ) 
75 (1960) Opened in Aust. in 
1904: left tariff 
in 1930. 
121 (1959) Estd. in Aust 1920-
22, 1948 and after. 
Left tariff in 1961. 
10.5 (1960) 
Eatd. as non-tariff 
1958 -
Estd. as non-tariff 
1933 -
Both represented by 
:Edward Lumley & 
Sons (Aust.) Pty. 
Ltd., a subsidiary 
of a London firm of 
Lloyd's brokers. 
tn 1958-59 the total non-tariff market share was about 
40 per cent. The same share in 1960 would be about £72M, 
and by deduction from the above figures this waa divided 
approximately as follows: 
5 Australian Govt. Cos. 
Other Government schemes 
12 Australian private Cos. 
37 small Australian Cos.) 
6 Overseas Cos. ~ 
33 Brokers and a gen ts ~ 
25.0 
1.2 
20.0 
72.0 
Percentage of 
total Iustn. 
premiwns. 
12.8 
40.0 
• 
I 
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'I ~ 
I 
:1 
I 
I 
Satisfactory statistics were not available to the 
writer, but it seems certain that at least after 1945, and 
probably before, the non-tariff market share was growing 
steadily. The following are shares of total business for 
a few years for which statistics have been made available: 
!!§LE Ir.z 
Australia: Percentage Market Shares of Non-Tariff 
Insurers 
Year 
1947-48 
1948-49 
1957-58 
1958-59 
Govt. Offices 
and Schemes 
15.7 
11.5 
15.7 
14.4 
Other Total 
14.3 30.0 
18.6 30.1 
23.1 38.8 
25.2 39.6 
Sources: Information supplied by the Industry. 
, Annual Reports, Government Insurance Offices. 
By far the most important line written by Government 
Offices was CTP. In N.s.w. and Victoria in particular 
this was written at a loss in moat years after 1945, and 
the bulk of the loss was carried by the Government 
Offices. Next in importance was w. Comp., but in other 
lines GIO market shares were relatively small, and did not 
increase in the period 1948-49 to 1957-58. ThJ details 
of changes in shares by lines over this period are set 
out in Table II.8. 
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TABLE II.8 
Aus tl'a lia: Non-Tariff Market Shares bl Principal 
Lines, per cent 
1948-49 1957-58 1948-49 1957-58 
Tariff Fire etc. 87.0 82.4 Marine 75.5 68.7 
GIO's 2.4 3.4 1.0 0.9 
Non-Tariff 10.6 14.2 23.5 30.4 
Tariff MV 57.2 53.2 OTP 51.2 40.0 
- -
GIO's 5.0 6.5 21.9 49.2 
Non-Tariff 37.8 40.3 26.9 10.8 
Tariff w. Comp. 59.5 57.0 Othel' 58.4 53.5 
GIO's 28.9 28.0 1. 7 1.3 
Non-Tariff 11.6 15.0 39.9 45.2 
It is apparent from the Table that both tariff and 
non-tariff companies reduced considerably their share of 
unprofitable CTP business. The tariff share fell in all 
other lines, and this was almost entirely accounted for 
in each case by corresponding increases in non-government 
non-tariff shares. 
Table II.9 gives non-tariff shares by States. In 
all States except Queensland the tariff share fell over 
the period, most significantly in N.s.w. and Victoria, by 
far the two largest markets in terms of annual premium 
volume. In all States except Queensland and S.A. (the 
latter having no effective Government Office) the shares 
I 
of both the GIO's and other non-tariif insurers increased 
at the expenee of tariff companies. In Queensland the 
fall in the GIO share waa however mainly taken up by an 
increase in the other non-tariff share. 
TABLE II.9 
Australia: Tariff and Non-Tariff Market Shares 
by States, per cen~ 
Tariff 
GIO's 
Non-Tariff 
Tariff 
GIO's 
Non-Tariff 
Tariff 
GIO's 
Non-Tariff 
4. Brokers. 
N .s. W. 
Qld. 
S.A. 
J948-49 
69.0 
a.a 
22.2 
-
1957-5a 
55.4 
15.5 
29.1 
46.5 
33.3 
20.2 
-
Vic. 
-
W.A. 
-
Taa. 
-
1948-49 1957-58 
76.7 68.7 
6.1 
17.2 
67.7 
13.5 
18.8 
78.1 
7 •. 9 
14.0 
a.7 
22.6 
64.2 
16.6 
19.2 
10.4 
It has been mentioned above that an important factor 
in the Australian market by 1961 was the presence of agents 
of overaegs brokers placing insuratLCe direct in London, 
especially at Lloyd's. This had not always been the aase. 
After the formation of the Australian tariffs in 1898 the 
power of brokers was severely restricted by agreements they 
were required to sign in order to be able to deal with 
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tariff companies. The main features of these agreements 
were as follows : 
(1) No tariff companies were to pay commissions to 
brokers not registered by State Underwriters' Associations. 
(2) Registered brokers were required to agree to 
operate in accordance with ta~iff rules and at tariff rates. 
(3) Maximum commission rates were set, and brokers 
were required to undertake not to rebate commission to the 
insured. 
(1+) Registered brokers were forbidden to accept 
commission from non-tariff insurers. 
(5) Companies were not to extend "brokers' covers" 
i.e. in effect agency powers, to registered brokers. 
(6) Brokers were not to be paid by companies for the 
settlement of claims. 
(7) Members of broking firms were not to be appointed 
agents or directors of insurance companies. 
(8) !!2, brokerage was to be paid on marine business. 
In return to~ these very stringent restrictions the 
companies agreed to limit the number of new brokers 
registered; in the Victorian fire tariff the agreement was 
one new broker for every four retirements. 
The freedom of action of brokers working under these 
.agreements was obviously severely limited; they were in 
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theory unable to perform their natural function ae 
professional insurance buyers, which was to search for the 
cheapest and most favourable terms for their clients. In 
fact the tariffs were seldom clear cut on many points, and 
the brokers became experts at finding favourable inter-
pretations in obscure cases. Moreover,. before 1932, some 
had arrangements 1n London, although they were probably 
not very extensive. 
In 1932 Commonwealth legislation required brokers 
placing business overseas to put up a substantial 
deposit,(3) and this inhibited the use of the London 
market unless it was regular e.nd a substantial volume 
of business was placed each year. However in 1917 the 
firm of Bennie s. Cohen (now kno\\111 as Edward Lumley & Sons 
Pty. Ltd.} was formed in Australia to place business 
principally with Lloyd's through a parent broking firm in 
London. Three other firms with similar Lloyd's connec-
tions were established in the 1930's, notably Harvey 
Trinder Pty. Lt?• (estd. 1938). No statistics are 
available, but jud~ing from contemporary comment, and 
especially from the concern shown by the Underwriters' 
Associations, these firms grew very rapidly and were 
probably extremely profitable. 
(3) Tne Insure.nee Act, 1932, sections 6(2) and 11. 
disoussion Oh.V. 
See 
.. 
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It is surprising that, despite the obvious< 
success of .firms like ·Edward:Lumley_·and Harvey Trinder, 
and·the rapid growth·and high profitability of ~the 
Australian. market during and after the Second World War, 
no other London b~oking firms opened for direct . 
bu~iness until 1952. However about this, time Atistralia 
appears to have been' 1tdiscovered1* and brokers commenced 
to open in relatively large numbers. The approximate 
numbers of independent broking firms placing business 
outside Australia, inciuding at Lloyd's, have been as 
follows: ( 4) 
Pre 1919 nil 1941-51 7 
191,7-25 1 1952 10 
1925-29 2 1955 15 
1930-37 3 1958 20 
1938-39 5 1961 33. 
1,94,0 .. 6 
Where·the initiative came from London, as it usually 
did,·the.method·was to·set··up a subsidiary or' 
associatedcompany, take over an existing·broklng'firm, 
or enter·: into a'. working arrangement with an 
Australian broker •. The new. entrants included'· a·:·high 
P3:.qP()rt~on~ of·; the largest and most influential:; London 
brcik~~~~ ·~or-~i~~~~~: ··-~-
............ ,;._· ·.: ~.· '- :' .. , 
(4) sour~iis'Writer's card index of insurance companies 
and brokers in Australia. 
Entry date 
.. 
C.T. Bowring & Co. (Insurance) Ltd. 
Gray Dawes & Co. Ltd. 
J.H. Minet & Co. Ltd. 
Price Forbes & Co. Ltd. 
Andrew Weir(London)Ltd. 
Willis Faber & Dumas Ltd. 
Stewart Smith & Co. Ltd. 
Sedgwick Collins & Co. Ltd. 
Muir Beddall & Co. Ltd. 
1954 
1954 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1959 
1961 
1961 
1961 
Other arrangements were initiated in Australia, with 
the formation of new Australian broking firms or the 
reorganisation of existing ones. An agreeme~t would 
be reached with a London-broker to channel Australian 
~ 
business to the London company market and to Lloyd's. 
Access to Lloyd's was most important, because many of 
the new London brokers in Australia (including those 
listed above, and Harvey Trinder and Edward Lumley) 
were Lloyd's brokers in their own rights. (5) 
The premium volume flowing through brokers in 
Australia is unknown. Estimates mentioned above are 
that 4-8 per cent of Australian premiums are placed 
overseas by brokers in Australia, but there is no 
' ' j : 
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(5) More accurately, the parent London firms were Lloyd's ,. 
brokers. , 
J J 
I f 
information as to the business placed by brokers within 
Australia. However it seems certain that, despite the 
influx of the 1950's, brokers have not nearly attained 
the dominant position held by them in London. 
Nevertheless they have become a factor of greatly 
increased importance in the market; in particular the 
arrival of the London brokers was probably decisive 
' 
in the decision to dismantle large sections of the 
marine tariff in 1957.(6) Most significantly, one 
alteration was to allow the payment of marine 
commission (previously forbidden) by tariff companies 
to registered brokers, and in November 1957 registered 
, 
brokers were officially permitted to accept commission 
on marine business from non-tariff insurers. No 
change similar to the latter was made in the accident 
and fire tariffs; in these fields incoming brokers 
had to make a choice between dealing with the 
Australian non-tariff and the London markets, or 
confining their dealings to Australian tariff companies 
on tariff terms.(?) Most new brokers have in fact 
not registered with the tariff market. Of the 33 
brokers placing.business outside Australia in 1961, 9 
(6) See Ch. mi=- .:Kf. ~ 
(7) Provided-the Underwriters' Association would be 
willing to elect them. 
belonged to the tariff and 24 operated outside it. 
The 9 tariff firms placing business outside Australia 
were presumably doing so under the dispensation for 
marine business. 
The position in 1961 may be summarised as 
follows. Victoria may be taken as an example. Here 
there were about 80 brokers recognised by the 
Victorian FALV\;approximately half of these were 
"registered brokers", and the ot~r half so called 
"associate brokers". Both sets had signed agreements 
along the lines described above. •Associate" differed 
from "regist~red" brokers in that they were usually 
smaller, not specialised to insurance, and often had 
offices in outlying Melbourne suburbs and in country 
towns rather than in the insurance area of the city. 
Their commission rates were identical, except that 
they received 10 instead of 15 per cent on fire. 
business. 
Of the 40 or so registered brokers, 9 were 
recent· arrivals from London. The paxent or 
associated companies of 6 of these were large Lloyd's 
brokers in London. 
Outside the tariff there were the 24 firms 
mentioned above placing business overseas, probably 
• lff 
• i I "" ''ML , 
principally.at Lloyd's, and an unknown number of 
smaller Australian brokers dealing with the Australian 
non-tariff market and with Lloyd's via the brokers with 
Lloyd's connections. The 24 firms dealing with London 
were of course free to u~the Australian non-tariff 
market. Two - Edward Lumley and Harvey Trindet - in 
fact operated their own captive companies. (B) 
5. Market Institutions. 
As in London, a number of institutions have grown 
up in the Australian market. These are now briefly 
described. 
Council of Fire & Accident Underwriters of Australia, 
(FAU«\ Council) estd. 1909. This is the controlling 
tariff organisation for non-marine insurance. It 
consists of the controlling off ice~s in Australia of 
tariff companies, who each year elect an executive 
committee of 12. Its principal functions are the 
(8) Harvey Trinder since 1938 has been associated with the 
Steadfast .(H.O. Melb.estd.1938). Edward Lumler is 
associated with the following companies: 
National Employers' Mutual : a U.K.,non-tariff Co. 
represented in Australia since 1933. 
Security & General : promoted by Lumley in~erests 
in 1937. (H.O. Sydney). 
Medical & Dental : associated with Security & 
--- General and absorbed by it in 1951. (H.O. 
. . _Sydney est_d •. 1938). 
Comm'onwealth Life Amal amated ) 
C tizens and Graziers Life ) 
Taken over by 
Lumley interests 
in 1961. 
awn di Fii a i LU 
drawing up, supervision and interpretation of tariff 
agreements. It administers various pooling 
arrangements and represents the companies in negotiations 
with Governments and public bodies. It has a public 
relations department and a statistical bureau. The 
latter is equipped with punch card and electronic 
machinery, used principally in connection with the 
preparation of statistics for submissions to various 
rate fixing bodies. 
Council of Marine Underwriters of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. Originally established in 1900 but in its 
present form since 1932. Members are again controlling 
officers of tariff companies. There is a committee of 
10. It controls the State Marine Associations and 
otherwise performs functions in marine insurance similar 
to those carried out by the FAUA Council in fire and 
accident. 
State Underwriters Associations. In each State there 
are two tariff associations, one for fire and accident 
and one for marine business. Subject to the 
overriding powers of the Commonwealth Councils, they 
draw up and administer certain tariffs, represent 
member companies in matters of common interest, organise 
underwriting pools, carry out inspections ·and surveys, 
and so on. 
Non-Tariff Insurance Association of Australia, es~a. 1941. 
Lloyd's Insurance Brokers Representatives Association Ltd., 
estd. 1945. In June 1961 members were representatives in 
Australia of 8 Lloyd's broking firms. 
Corporation of Insurance Brokers of Australia, estd. 1959. 
An organisation of tariff brokers with affiliated bodies in 
Victoria, N.s.w. and Queensland. 
Institute of Fire Loss Assessors of Australia, Inc., 
estdfl 194-/. 
Association of Burglary Insurance Surveyors, Australasia, 
Estd. 1960. Membership both tariff and non-tariff. 
Australian Fire Protection Association, estd~ 1960. For 
the dissemination of information concerning fire protection 
• 
methods etc. Backed by fire appliance companies. 
Australian Society of Insurance Buyers, estd. 1958. Members 
princip?lly officials of industrial firms responsible for 
insurance buying. Monthly journal, The Insurance Buyer. 
Australian Insurance Staffs Federation. First award 
(Federal) 1924. 
The Incorporated Australian Insurance Institute, estd.1919. 
The Australian equivalent of the British Chartered 
Insurance Institute. It is supported by the tariff and 
non-tariff markets,brokers and the life offices. It is 
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. th q basically an educational and examining body,carrying on ese ~ i 
functions through affiliated Institutes in each State. On the : I 
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~ basis of lectures and a series of examinations industry 
"' 
members may become "Associates" of the Institute,(9) 
and "Fellowsq on the submission of an original paper 
on an insurance subject.(l) 
As well as these industry bodies there are a 
number of Government or semi-Government organisations 
with which insurance companies are concerned. These 
include Fire Brigade Board~ in all States. Levies on 
fire premiums imposed by State Governments provide the 
principal source of revenue for fire brigades. In 
N.s.w. the N.s.w~ Workers' ,Comee11,s~~ion Comrnissig,Q has 
controlled workers' compensation business since 1945. 
All State Governments fix CTP premiums, and insurance 
company representatives are usually consulted. 
There is no comprehensive Government control of 
insurance except in Queensland. The guee.nslaQS! 
Insurance Commissioner, under legislation enacted in 
1916, has extensive powers with regard to the 
licensing of companies, agents and· brokers, and the 
fixing of rates and commission scal~s. The 
Commonwealth Insurance Commissioner has power ever life j 
• 
insurance only. The only Commonwealth Government concern 
(9) Signified by the letters A.A.I.I. 
(1) F.A.I.I. 
~/ 
with non-life insurance consists in certain deposit 
requirements administered by the Treasury. 
In all States except South Australia, as 
mentioned already, Government insurance offices compete 
in the market; however the Victorian and West 
Australian offices are limited;in the classes of 
business they may write. In Western Australia all · 
CTP business in written by a Government sponsored pool 
established in 1949; insurance companies in the State 
at that time are the backers of the pool. 
The principal sources of statistical 
information are the figures collected by State branches 
of the CBCS and aggregated at its Canberra head office. 
Unfortunately, as will become evident, they are not 
very comprehensive, in particular no balance sheet 
details are collected. 
The Australasian Insuranc~ and Bank~ng ~~cord 
. . -
(AIBR) is the trade journal for Australian insurance. 
Unfortunately.it has declined in quality and coverage 
since the 19th Century and especially since 1940 has 
been far inferior to similar English and American 
journals. 
By comparison with London, it is evident that 
the importance and variety of market institutions is 
I 
less in Australia. There is no equivalent to the 
vast Lloyd'~ market with its separation of procuring, 
underwriting, accounting and administrative functions. 
In the Australian tariff market brokers are in fact 
precluded by their agreements from carrying on the 
many routine tasks assumed by brokers in London. 
There is no equivalent to the I.L.U, Specialis~d 
services are available but not on nearly the same 
scale or over so wide a range as in London. 
Nevertheless important functions are carried 
on jointly. Probably th~ most significant of these 
are the risk classifications, scales of rates and 
commissions, uniform policies and clauses etc. drawn 
up, circularised and administered by the FAUA and 
Marine Councils and the State Underwriters Associations. 
These bodies lay down a basic framework which is 
largely followed by all insurers in Australia. In 
theory tariff publications are restricted for the use 
of tariff members only, but in fact for many years 
there has been a thriving black market and most non-
tariff insurers use tariff rates and conditions as the 
basic guide for their own operations. Also, as in 
London, negotiations with Governments and other fuodies, 
training and education, and the production of 
statistics are to some extent joint activities.· 
I 
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Common procedures have also been adopted for 
certain kinds of business. For example, since 
1940, when large risks are spread over the market 
by a broker, it has been necessary to issue only 
one policy; in loss settlements all insurers-,signing 
such a Hmaster policyn agree to follow the lead of 
the company with the largest share of the risk. 
6. Conditions for Entry. 
. '-· --
The only Commonwealth Government requirement 
,concerning non-life insurance companies is that they 
should make deposits with the Commonwealth Treasury, 
For companies not in Australia before 1932 the 
requirements are:( 2 ) 
Foreign c~mpanies: £100,000 
Australian companies: £5,000 plus £1,000 for 
every £5,000 of premiums 
exceeding £25,000. 
Maximum: £80,000. 
The deposit can be in Australian, U.K. or other 
Commonwealth Government securities, or in other forms 
including fixed deposits, debentures, bank guarantees, 
unencumbered freehold titles in Australia and first 
mortgages on freehold. 
(2) Insurance Act, 1960, Seen. 6. See discussion, 
cfia:tn. 
Foreign companies wishing to avoid an initial deposit 
of £100,000 can register a subsidiary in Australia 
and so come under the requirement for Australian 
companies. Special provision is made for a single 
deposit by agents and brokers acting on behalf of 
"one insurer or a group of insurers" outside 
Australia, (e.g. Lloyd's).(3) 
The requirements described are clearly very 
lenient, and are not in any way a serious barrier to 
entry by either overseas or local companies. In 
addition the way is smoothed for English and U.S. 
insurers by Double Taxation Agreements; insurers 
from countries which do not have such agreements may 
be at some disadvantage, but this would of course 
. 
depend on the treatment of foreign earnings under the 
taxation laws of the country in question. 
At the State Government level restrictions on 
entry are again minimal, except in Queensland. 
Licences are required for the transaction of W. Comp. 
and CTP business in most States, but in the absence 
of statutory criteria for assessing whether they 
ought to be granted, in practice they have been given 
virtually automatically to all companies applying. 
(3) Insurance Act, 1932-1937, Seen. 6. 
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Licences are needed for all classes of business in 
Victoria, but these are in effect the method of 
administering the State premium tax, and are granted 
without investigation provided the company pays its 
tax. In Queensland,however, the Insurance Commissioner 
will only grant or renew·annual licences after 
inspection of each company's (global)accounts. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, Queensland w. Comp. 
business is a statutory monopoly of the GIO.Entry 
is also blocked into CTP business in Western 
Australia, where no new member companies have been 
admitted to the underwriting of the CfP pool. 
None of the Australian laws subject insurers 
to detailed solvency supervision such as is followed 
by the Committee of Lloyd's with regard to 
underwriting members, or in the United States and 
other countries with respect to companies. Even 
minimal requirements such as the U,K. solvency margin 
are not applied. As a result, except in Queensland, 
where the Commissioner evidently pays some attention 
to financial condition insurance companies and 
' 
brokers may arrange their finances in any way they 
please subject only to the Commonwealth deposit 
and the payment on time of the \~arious licence fees 
and taxes. 
1 
So far the discussion has concerned official 
regulati?n of entry. However the tariff rules m~y 
have an important influence. Entry as a tariff 
insurer requires a two-thirds majority ~ote of 
existing ~ariff companies •. Once elected, dealings 
. . 
with the non-tariff market in Australia ·are 
forbidden. This applies to the acceptan.ce of· business 
from non-registered brokers (no commission to b~ paid) 
and to reinsurance and coinsurance (not allowed with · 
any non-member carrying on direct busine~s in·the · · .. 
Commonwealth)! 4 ) Cle?rly, if non-tariff new.entrants 
need reinsurance support they must look to the · . 
Australian non-tariff market, or to markets overseas.· 
·As regards brokers and a~ents there are-no 
Government restrictions except in Queensland, where 
licenses must be obtained from the Commissioner. 
However, entry as a tariff broker requ1res. th~ approval 
of the tariff associations. As described above 
approved brokers ~re limited to dealing with t~riff 
companies in Australia, except in marine insurance. 
Tariff agreements also regulate the number o.f agents 
each company may have. 
In t.he London market it was· pointed out that 
market relations 'were such as to ~ake oligopoly-type 
reactions to new.entrants unlikely. It is suggested. 
~ 
(4) These regulations are discussed-in greater detail 
in -Chapter m :e:IITc 
' 
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below that these factors are relatively important 
in Australia and that accordingly they may be 
significant deterrents to newcomers. 
7. Market Agreements • 
• 
In contrast to London, market "tariff" 
agreements are important in Australia. The formation 
and evolution of the Australian tariffs are described 
in some detail in Chapter IV; in the present section 
only the main features are summarised. 
The agreements are between tariff companies 
only, and are administered by the Marine and FAUA 
.. 
Councils and the Underwriters Associationsin each 
State. The essentials of the agreements were laid 
down at the time of the formation·of the State 
Associations over the period 1897-1900. 
The basic purpose is to regulate rates. The 
Associations set and circularise minimum rates on 
/ 
nearly all forms of risk, including alt miscellaneous 
accident classes· such as burglary and television. {5) 
Following a series of relaxations in the 1950's, marine 
is however far less comprehensively tariffed than other 
lines. 
[5} Classes such as these have never been tariffed in 
England. The only form of non-marine cover which 
the Australian tariffs allow, but for which there is 
no tariff, is "C~ntractor's All Risks", i.e. 
comprehensive or "package" ~b!icies for contractors 
such as builders and construction firms. 
7 il'S 
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Permiss~ble forms of cover are also laid down. 
In most li~es there are standard proposal and policy 
forms which must be used by all members. Certain 
wordings and classes of contract are forbidden 
altogether; for others minimum extra premiums are set. 
In order to prevent the circumvention of 
tariff rates maximum di6counts, commissions and 
brokerage allowances are set for all classes of 
busines$. 
Tariff companies may deal with approved brokers 
' 
only. 
The number of "chief agents ", agents, 
canvassers, "directors" etc. that each tariff 
company may have in each geographical area in 
Australia is limited. All agents, directors, brokers, 
etc. must sign an undertaking not to "rebate" 
commission to the insured. 
Where a company operating in Australia is 
absorbed by another, no more agents or directors of 
the absorbed company may be appointed beyond the 
number existing in Australia at the time of the 
preliminary takeover agreement. 
Reinsur~nce with direct non-tariff insurers. 
". 
in Australia ~~ forbidden. Maximum exchange 
commissions for local reinsurance cessions·are set. 
\ 
/ 
Advertising is not to be such as to suggest 
that any particular advantages attach to insuring 
with a company, which would not be obtainable from 
any other tariff company. 
When Government, semi-Government or Municipal 
bodies call for tenders for insurance, tariff 
companies must refer to the Council or State 
Association for ratings. 
)/' 
Where non-tariff competition is encountered 
and in order to retain the business a rate below 
tariff must be quoted, or an otherwise non-
permi tted extension made to the policyt the case 
must be referred to the Committee of the Council, 
which decided on an appropriate concession. 
Coinsurance with non-tariff companies 
is not allowed within the principal classes 
except marine.(6) This contrasts with the London 
65/35 rule anq a similar rule in South Africa. 
It is of importance matl.f.lly in connection with large 
fire risks. 
(6) 
/ 
i.e. a tariff company is prevented from insuring 
a portion of a fire risk ij' part.is insured.~y 
a·non-tariff company. Howevar, 1f.the:non7 
tariff company held, say, the public risk insurance 
of a firm, a tariff company would be free.to 
·underwrite its· fire or worker's compensation 
business. 
-~-------------
While in marine insurance tariff rules are 
far less comprehensive and more flexible, the 
Australian tariff market follows the London 
Joint Hull Agreement and London War & Strikes.rates. 
The latter are periodically,cabled by the I.L.u. 
to the Marine Council. 
The agreements so far described place severe 
restrictions on the activities of tariff companies 
• 
and brokers. However they must be viewed in the 
light of the important non-tariff market share in 
Australia. Among non-tariff companies and brokers 
rates and conditions are quoted relatively freely, 
often using tariff rates and policies merely as a 
starting point. Moreover, within the tariff are 
companies which declare bonuses on the basis of 
underwriting results : these include the Government 
Offices, which for the most part are willing to 
follow tariff rates subject to this proviso. Added 
to this are important a~~as of Government rate fixing, 
in particular rates for CTP and Workers Compensation 
in all States, hire purchase motor vehicles in N.s.w. 
and nearly all classes in Queensland. These and 
other modifications of the scope. an~ effectiveness 
of tariff arrangements are discussed in Chapter IV. 
~ . ' 
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B'. , Summar¥ 
In'the discussion so far comparisons have 
from time to time been made with the London market. 
To some extent this is misleading, because the 
L'ondon market is in many ways unique, and most other 
insurance markets probably more nearly resemble the 
Australian. Nevertheless~ the procedure is 
COJlSidered useful, because it emphasises the very 
important connections which exist between Australia 
and London, and' points up cer·tain characteristics of 
Australian insurance. 
It has been shown that while little oversea5~ 
business is written in Australia, a relatively high 
proportion 'of Australian business is written direct 
or reinsured overseas. The total volume actually 
underwritten in Australia may be responsive to rate 
variations for this reason. This possibility is 
principally relevant to· the operations of brokers 
wit~ ~~erseas connections, but in some instances 
direct placing of insurance in overseas markets may 
be possible, particularly for large foreign owned 
fi~fus. That· this actually happens is suggested· by 
the reports of "the various fire brigade authorities. 
Thus in 1959 the N.S.W. Fire Brigades Board listed 
55 Hfirms~, as distinct from insurance companies, 
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w~ich paid fire insurance premiums to insurers 
outside the State.(7) About 40 of these were not 
insurance brokers; they included Australian 
subsidiaries of such large intern~tional 
organisations as Goodyear Tyre & Rubber, Caltex 
Oil, Nestl~, Shell Oil & Standard Vacuum. 
The total volume of business written in 
Australia is small by comparison with London and 0 t 
a few companies probably have somewhat higher 
market shares than do individual companies or 
syndicates in Londo~. However, the total number of 
sellers is relatively large, and most write less 
than 1 per cent of total premiums. 
The probable volume of insurance premiums 
paid by large organisations and firms is high in 
comparison with the premium incomes of individual 
Australian companies and the Australian branches of 
overseas.companies. Moreover, since brokers are 
relatively less important, business is probably more 
commonly,att~~red to particular insurers rather than 
spread evenl,Y over the market. Where brokers are 
more influential, in the non-tariff market, { sinc,e 
~ 
they are able to use their expertise to seek out ~he 
(7) Board of Fire Commissioners of N.S.W.: Annual 
Report, 1959. 
I 
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best terms and rates) most of the business is 
probably eventually placed in London,. not Australia. 
Although official barriers to entry are 
negligible, the market institutions which ease the 
way of new entrants in London either do not exist 
or are far less comprehensive and sophisticated. Of 
, 
particular importance are the tariff restrictions 
on the activities of brokers, which as a result are ~ 
not able to of fer to companies nearly the range of 
services available in London. The tariff '~on-
:intercourse" rule is also a potential deterrent 
to non-tariff entrants, while if entry is achieved 
as a tariff insurer, a wide range of competitive 
tactics are precluded as a method of achieving early 
expansion. 
Because the basic rating framework is fixed by 
the Associations and by G~ernments, marked 
discrimination between risk classes is possible. Thus 
in most post war years fire and marine lines have been 
extremely profitable, but CfP, and on ~ccasions motor 
vehicle and workers' compensation, have brought 
serious underwriting losses. Most companies write 
all classes of business, and tne balancing of losses 
in some lines with profits in others h~s undoubtedly 
I 
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lessened the urgency of pressure for rate revisions. 
' ' 
The separation of the tariff and non-tariff 
., ' 
markets, and the tariff non-intercourse rules, ha.ve 
' - ' 
rreant that.rate cutting is likely to be severe. If 
' 
a non-tariff company or broker attacks a tariff 
connection, the tariff market stands to lose the 
entire account; therefore it is willing to make 
considerable special concessions in defence. This 
tendency is reinforced if the account is with a 
particular tariff company. If the business is 
important to it, such a company is likely to exert 
strong pressure on the appropriate tariff committee, 
and will in all probability find support, since other 
companies will very likely soon find themselves in a 
similar sltuation. The tariff market as a whole must 
also consider that if it allows the non-tariff market 
to grow by not meeting such competition, it will 
weaken its own future position, especially if it allows 
transfers to occur at rates showing good profit 
margins. Much of its own defensive strength in turn 
lies in business which has not been subject to non-
tariff attack. 
Wi~hih the tariff system competition on the 
basis of rate and 0 product" variation is forbidden. 
I 
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Accordingly, the most obvious openihg for expansion 
lies in the fostering of 0 goodwill", the creating 
of "captivett markets, and the appointment of agents. CJ, 4f' }·~.., ..!!I 
Stcl i1111 A below proceeds to a discussion of the 
methods used and the resulting market structures. 
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CHAPTER III 
SPECIAL MARKETS 
The Australian insurance market is to a large extent 
fragmented into smaller sub-markets with which particular 
companies are associated. Some of the more important bases 
of these sub-markets are: control of insurance companies by 
non-insurance organisations, chief agency appointments, and 
directorial appointments. These are now discussed in turn. 
1. Control by Non-Insurance Organisations 
Nearly all Australian-owned companies, at least at some 
stage of their career, have had the backing of some firm or 
organisation outside insurance. This can be seen from the 
list presented in Table II.10. The list includes all 
-
Australian-owned companies with net premium incomes in 1960-61 
exceeding £1m; the companies are shown in order of dates of 
es tab lishmen t. 
The "outside" backing of these insurance companies 
is in nearly all cases of great significance to them, 
except perhaps in the cases of the relatively old 
Victoria, Mercantile Mutual, Queensland and Bankers 
and Traders. However, outside support was certainly of 
great importance to these companies in their early years; 
thus the Queensland developed from the insurance 
department of Burns Philp, and the Bankers and Traders 
I 
TABLE II, 10. 
Princi al Inde endent Australian Non-Life Insurance 
m anies and their Non-Insurance Conne~tions, 1961. Comoany 
Victoria 
Mercantile Mutual 
Queensland 
Manufacturers' Mutual 
Chamber of Manufactures 
State Accident ) Insurance 
Motor Cor.) Offices 
State Govt. Ins. Office, Qld, 
Cooperative 
Bankqrs and Traders 
.-iutomobile Fire and General 
~.R.M.A. 
~.s.w. Govt. Insurance Office 
Federation 
'/ictorian Automobile Chamber 
of Commerce Insurance 
Southern Pacific 
Transport and General 
t.la ti on al and Genera'! 
Sources and Notes: 
Date 
estd, 
1849 
1878 
1886 
1914 
1914 
1914 
1941 
1916 
1918 
1921 
1922 
1925 
ii~~ 
1930 
1934 
1935 
1938 
1954 
I 
Net Premiums 
1961 (£ 10]0I 
2B81 
6343 
5651 
n.a, 
3059 
5519 
7705 
1678 
2044 
1072 
n.a. 
10985 2488 
3032 
4071 
1071 
2698 
3495 
Percentage of 
Austn.Prems.1961 
l.45 
3,19 
2,84 
n.a. 
l.54 
2. 77 
3.87 
0,84 
1.03 
0.54 
.n,..a .. 
5,52 
l .:?5 
l.!:17 
2.05 
0.54 
1.36 
1. 76 
Controlled br or 
associated w th 
Burns PhM4J and Co. Ltd. (Large t~ading and holding Co.) 
Chamber of Manufacturers, N.s.w. 
Chamber of Manufacturers, 
Vic. 
Victorian Government. 
Queensland Government. 
Various rural cooperative 
societies. 
Burns Philp and Co. Ltd • 
General Credits Holdirg; 
Ltd. (Melbourne hire 
1,urchase Co.). 
N.R.M,A.~N.S.W. 
NMgtori83 tOrganisations) 
•• w. v • 
Victorian Employers' Fed'n. 
Vic. Automobile Chamber of 
Com~erce (Motor ~ehicle 
retellers' trade assocn.) 
Industrial Acceptance 
Corporation (large hire 
purchase finance Co.) 
W.R.Carpenter and Co. Ltd. (Trading firm) 
Aust•n. Guarantee Corp. (large hire purchase 
finance C-Ompany). 
Custom Credit Corp. (large hire purc~a se 
finance Company). 
Writers card index of Insurance companies in Australia. Also various 
co~pany reports, AIBR, and The Review,Apl.2i,1962, article, 
The Nat1onal Insurance Markets: Australia. Although N.R.M.A, Ins. and 
the Manufacturers' Mutual do not publish their premium f1gures, they 
are known to write annual premiums considerably in excess of £lm. 
~-------- ------------ - -- -- -- =---................. 2 .... •z•-
was promoted by Burns Philp,and the Queensland. Both the 
Victoria and the.Mer~antile Mutual had important directorial 
links with building societies during the 19th century~ As 
later discussion will make clear, many Australian companies 
whose shares were not closely held by some other organisation 
have succumbed to takeover bids by overseas companies. Others 
have been wound up or .sold because of weakness (especially the 
need for liquidity) on the part of the supporting interests. 
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It will be noticed that companies of relatively recent 
origins - the National and General is an outstanding example -
have quickly come to rival or exceed in size companies 
established 50 or more years earlier. This early rapid growth is 
very easily expla~ned by the ready made market provided by the 
backing organisation. and of course is accentuated if-this is 
also in a stage of rapid development. Again a case in point is 
the National and General, whose parent, Custom Credit, e~pand,ed 
very quickly in its early years.(!) 
(1) 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958· 
1959 
1960 
1961 
Many of the companies listed, while their share of total 
Custom Credit -
total loans 
outstanding, £m. 
·11.1 
21.6 
30.l 
42.7 
61.l 
84.0 
83.7 
• 
National and General 
- net erems. earned, 
£1000. ·. · 
295 
1282 
1988 
2353 
2944 
3495 
Australian premiums is not perhaps very great, nevertheless 
have significant shares of th~ particular segments of the 
market in which their associated organisations are 
influential. Thus the N.s.w. GIO writes about 16 per cent 
of all N.s.w. non life business, and a considerably higher 
proportion of N.s.w. CTP insurance. Ajax has about 8.4 per 
cent of Australian MV business; N.R.M.A.Insurance had about 
25 per cent of N.s.w. MV business in 1960. (2) Similarly 
the Manufacturers' Mutual and Chamber of Manufactures are 
-
important respectively in N.s.w. and Victorian Workers' 
Compensation insurance, the Victorian Government Offices 
in Victorian CTP, MV and Workers' Compensation, and the other 
hire purchase subsidiaries in the field of hire purchase motor 
vehicle insurance. However, it is likely that all these 
. -
companies would find expansion both difficult and slow if 
they were to venture into fields where the influence of the 
backing organisation is less direct; for example, ff the 
various State Government Offices were to open in other States.( 3) 
Unfortunately, except for the Government offices, !!.Q. 
Australian companies publish the class composition of their 
business, which can only be obtained in th~ case of a few . 
which operate in the UeK. and are obliged to make. statutory 
---------------------------------~----------------(2) Information supplied by the company. 
(3) Quite apart from political crises! 
I 
returns to the Board of Trade. In the case of the 
National and General, for the year ended 31 March 1959, 
these revealed a portfolio divided as follows:( 4) 
Motor 92.5 per cent 
Miscl. 4.5 
" 
.. 
Fire 3.0 II ft 
If similar information were available, the accounts of the 
other hire purchase subsidiaries would undoubtedly show a 
similar concentration on MV business. All these companies 
would undoubtedly find expansion into fire, marine and 
other lines of insurance relatively slow. 
2. Chief Agency Appointments. 
Of crucial importance to any insurance company is the 
volume and quality of business directed to it by its agents. 
In Australia the struggle for agen~y outlets has long been 
one of the important fe,atures of insurance co·mpeti tion. This' 
.. 
was recognised by the early tariff b~ilders, who hot only 
imposed restrictions on commissi?ns, but lim~ted the number 
of agents each tariff company might ha~e in each place. 
" . 
Broadly speaking the restriction .was an absolute maximum in 
the clties (e.g. in Sydney originally 123, now 173) plus one 
(4) u.K. Board of Trade : Summary of statements of Insurance 
Business, 1960. 
agent in each town with a post office. However it was 
' 
necessary~t~·make ex~eptions of particularly important 
agents, designated by the tariff as "chief agents••. Under 
the tariffs the number of these that each company might 
appoint was limited (e.g. to seven in Victoria,and one only 
in N.s.w.) but there was no limit on commission. (5) 
The most desirable typesof firm to appoint as 
agentsare those which, in the course of their business, 
are likely to be in contact with people wishing to make 
insurance arrangements: estate agents, motor vehicle 
retailers, stock and station agents are obvious examples • 
. 
Especially in view of the tariff limitations, another 
desirable aspect of an agency appointment concerns its size 
and number of branthes. For tariff purposes, the appointment 
of an agent with branches in 50 places counts only as a 
iinql~ appointment. On the other hand, since there are 
probably re~atively few such firm~, compared to the number 
. ) 
of insurance companies competing_for their services, it 
is probably necessary in most cases to appoint them as 
1
•chief agents" on relatively high commission terms. 
The ·nchief agency" appointments of insurance companies 
in Australia are not publicised by the companies concerned, 
(5) For details of the tariff agency rules see Ch.IV, Seen. B. 
lfl -
except in a few ·fields. One of these is that, of the wool 
• ?' 
selling brokers, and these indeed provide an excellent 
example of the use of this method to "tie 0 areas of the 
I insurance market to particular insurance companies. The 
following is a list of the wo~l selling brokers·in ~ictoria 
in 1962 and the companies for which they acted as "chief 
agents••. 
Wool Selling Broker 
Australian Estates eo: Ltd. 
Australian Mercantile Land 
and Finance Co. Ltd. 
Dalgety and Co. Ltd. 
Dennys Lascelles Ltd. 
Elder Smith and Co. Ltd. 
Goldsbrough Mort and Co. Ltd. 
New Zealand Loan and 
Mercantile Go. Ltd.· 
Strachan and Co. Ltd. 
Victorian Producers 
Co-operative Ltd. 
Younghusband Ltd. 
Associated Insurance Comeany 
,. 
Royal-Globe (U.K.) 
Northern-Employers (U.K.) 
Commercial Union (U.K.) 
(Royal-Globe (U.K.) (Northern-Employers (U.K.) 
Commercial Union (U.K.) 
Royal-Globe (U.K.) 
Commercial Union (U.K.) 
(Royal-Globe (U.K.) (Commercial Union (U.K.) 
Cornhill (U.K.) 
~oyal Exchange-Atlas (U.K.) 
Many of these appointments were actually with 
subsidiaries of the insurance companies shown; howev~r only 
the parent companies·are given in the above list. 
I 'I 
I 
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It is evident from this list that English companies 
occupy a predominant place in the Australian wool trade; 
in fact not one of the principal wool firms acts for an 
Australian owned insurance company.(6) 
The business possibilities opened up by connections 
such as these are considerable; there is involved marine 
insurance on exports and imports, fire insurance on large 
warehouses and wool stores, and insurances of all kinds on 
country properties. The principal firms have large branch 
organisations: for example in 1962 Elder Smith and 
Goldsbrough Mort were reported to have throughout Australia 
211 and 192 country branches respectively. (7) Dalgety, 
New Zealand Loan, Elder Smith and Goldsbrough Mort between 
them handled about 52 per cent of the Australian wool clip 
in 1961. (S) The position of the Commercial Union is 
particularly strong, and was further strengthened in 1961 
by giving "substantial" shareholding interests in 
Commercial Union. Assurance of Australia Ltd. ( a company 
•. 
·formed to take over the Australian interests of the 
Commercial Union,) to Dalgety, Elder Smith, and New Zealand 
Loan, and to the gueensland Primary Producers Cooperative Assoc-
(6) The only other large wool firm, Winchcombe Carson Ltd, acts 
for the Royal Exchange-Atlas grol.!.Q.. 
(7) §ydnev Morning Herald, 24.2.1962. 
(8) Ibid. 
~ 
112 
iation Ltd., and Robert Stewart and Co Ltd (T · )(9) 
. • .. • . asman1a. 
3. Directors and Local Directors. 
(a) Historical background and tariff rql~· Probably one 
of the most important methods of creating or maintaining 
special or preferred markets is to appoint individuals with 
the power to decide the direction of insurances to positions 
such as "directorships" or as "local advisors" of the 
insurance company. Since this is a subject of which very 
little is known in Australia, it has been considered worth~ 
while to discuss it in some detail. Before doing so, it is 
useful to distinguish three kinds of function which may be 
performed by the director~ of insurance companies. 
(1) They may be ttactive", in the sense of being genuinely 
concerned with the policy and running of the company. They 
may meet regularly and take genuine policy decisions. 
(2) They may be ''figureheads" - appointed mainly because 
~hey are well known, and perhaps have a reputation for 
integrity, soundness,and so on. 
(3) They may be appointed for the business they can 
influence to the company. 
In practice these three classes of function may be 
difficult to distinguish; for example, an eminent retired 
General may ~ell be both "active" and a successful busi~:__ 
T9)--.z\.nrrr-f900,p.354. The Commercial Union (London) retained 
a majority holding in the new company~hin 1962 a.merger 
between Goldsbrough Mort and Elder Smi~h also raised 
the possibility that the Royal group m~ght l?se the 
Goldsbrough Mort· agency to the Commercial Union, although 
some precedents exist for double agencies. 
.. , 
introducer. Nevertheless, it is felt that if the details 
of many appointments were known, it would be possible to 
classify them as belonging predominantly to one or two of 
these categories. A somewhat cynical view along these lines 
has evidently been taken by the Commonwealth Statistician, 
for all payments to directors other than those elected by 
the shareholders are classified with ~Agents' Commission".(!) 
The most obvious examples of presumably "active" or 
"functionalH directors are the 19Head Office" Boards of 
Australian-controlled companies. In the 19th century such 
boards were concerned even with the details of day to day 
und~.rwriting. (2) In early times, too, the "Local Boards" 
of overseas companies often had important responsibilities • 
(1) 
(2) 
.. 
CBCS, Canberra Branch. Form A - Statistics of Fire 
Marine and General Insurance. 
For example, before 1850 the directors of some companies 
would meet once or twice a week to consider proposals 
for insurance, claims and investments. e.g. see 
.advertisements in Teqq's N.S.W. Almanac, 1839. The 
Victoria, in its first few years after 1849 employed 
a permanent secretary and a clerk only, the Board meeting 
about twice a week to consider applications for insurance. 
Until 1879 at least all insu~ances were written in t~e 
Board Minute Book, and in 1849 and 1850 a formal motion 
was moved for the acceptance of each separate proposal! 
Victoria Insurance Co. Records: Minute Book 1849-1879, 
and company history: Held Covered. 
These included powers with respect to investments, 
appointment of agents, engagement of office staff, payment 
of claims, a~d so on. (3) The value of a Board of 
reputable businessmen could be very great for control 
over distant. branches •. Without some such arrangement 
the powers g~ven to local agents or managers might either 
tend to be fairly limited, perhaps at the co~t of 
flexibility and effective operations; or extensive, but 
with the ris~ of careless underwriting or even 
embezzlement. When English companies decided to take the 
Australian market seriously and replace agencies with 
branches, or commence the local investment of funds, they 
(3) The Commercial Union in 1880 had standard rules under 
which local boards were constituted; some of these were: 
!. Board to meet each alternate week throughout 
the year. 
2. Half of the salaries to be paid in proportion to 
number of attendances. 
3. Quorum of three. 
4. Minutes to be kept and copies forwarded to 
Head Office. 
5. Powers: (a) General supervision over it~ district •. (b) Operate local banking account. Cheques to 
be signed by two members. Two directors 
to sign all drafts to Head Office • 
. (c) Control over agents in the region, including 
suspension and remuneration, subject to 
Head Office approval. (d) Engaging of clerks a~d assistants other than 
· the Manager and Assistant Manager. 
Source: Commercial Union records, London. 
• -2: 
almost invariably appointed such Boards. Similarly, 
Australian companies expanding to other States often 
made similar arrangements. 
As communications improved during the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, however, it became possible for 
English head offices to exert more detailed control over 
their operations in Australia, and in particular, over 
long years of regular correspondence and perhaps 
occasional visits, strong relationships were built up 
with local managers.( 4 ) In many cases more and more 
functions passed to the local manager, until he became 
responsible for all matters except a very few questions 
of broad policy. Included among his prerogatives was 
often the selection of the membership of "Local Boards", 
and considerations other than sound administration tended 
to become dominant in such selections. The same was true 
of Australian companies as regards their activities in 
other States. 
The growing tendency to look on directors as 
a species of super-agent was reinforced over 1897-1900 
by the widespread adoption in Australia of tariff rates 
on nearly all classes of business. After this time there 
(4) The Australian - Head Office letter books of five 
British companies have been examined by the writer. 
Each manager, (during and.after the ~880's) wrote 
at least once a week to his Head Office. 
---- m I1 I II ELL £~-Mh ,-~ olier.v~: ._ ~ 
· lrh 
~ ·~i~ 
·-:-r t l :1 
11' [! hi.~ n 1,i ,1 
was quite specific recognition of Local Directors as •,!
1
/jij 
"business introducerstt and indeed they were treated as fl1lj 
r(r 
such by the tariff agreements themselves. This is very ;;!~ 
obvious from contemporary letter books of insurance !Jjlf~ 
l f 1 
company managers. Whereas before 1896 complaints were !~, 
tit I: 
concerned with "ridiculous" or "absurdu rates, the :H !' 
~·~I ,j typical view afterwards was well expressed as follows: 1!1/1· 
ltll 'h 
" 
"Nearly every big customer we used to have has ,i1; 
ijl; 
"' been appointed an agent or Director of some ., 
( ) ;i, 
company ••• " ~ ~ 
~~1, 
"' or again: 1li; 
'"l 
"The services of a man who has plenty of money 1~ 1 
lent out, especially on buildings, is always 
in request as a Director of a Fire Company. In 
fact some companies appoint every man they can 
lay their hands on who lends on mortgage either 
. Ad" t in(6) as a Director, Referee, Adviser or even JUS er. 
Records have not been found of the actual terms of 
appointment of Directors before 1897, but after this date 
·they were quite openly regarded in the same terms as 
(5) Victoria Letter Book, 27.5.1907. 
(6) Ibid. 29.8.1905 
:re; 
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agents, in the sense that their fees were carefully 
calculated alongside the business they were supposed 
to have "influenced0 • In addition, payments by 
commissiQn on business influenced were openly made and 
indeed allowed by the tariffs. Appointmentsof these 
"Directors" were made informally by letter,and it seems 
in many cases were simply tt.at the pleasure of the 
company". Thus the Royal controlling manager set out 
for the benefit of a local manager a suggested form of 
appointment of an "Advisern. In it the remuneration 
was to be a fixed sum per annum but "in no case to 
exceed 25 per cent upon the amount of net premium 
influenced by you". In addition: 
11The position does not entail upon you any 
responsibility over, or vest you with any control of, 
the business of the Company or its administration ••• 
It is stipulated that the appointment is at the 
pleasure of the Company, that the terms may from time 
to time be varied, that it may be terminated at any 
time without notice, and that all remuneration shall 
• t• II (7) cease upon its termina ion • 
In other cases it was thought better to make appointments 
"without the terms being specified - it is better for 
d u(B) them to be understoo • 
(7) Roxa! Letter Book, 17.11.1899. 
(8) Ibid, 28.12.1899. 
Apart from the appointment of directors or owners 
of firms with insurances to place, ex-managers or 
directors of absorbed insurance companies were often 
appointed. Thus E. S. Watson, the Manager of the 
Australian Alliance, wasi~pointed to its Board when it 
was taken over by the 1.Qr~do~ and Lancashire in 1909. (9) 
Similar ideas were probably not absent in the common 
practice or appointing retiring managers to Local 
Boards. Also, where companies were very dependent on 
the goodwill of agents in particular places, and it 
was decided to open branches, the agents would often 
be appointed to a "Local Board" set up for the purpose. 
The obvious potential of directorial and 
similar appointments as a competitive device was 
recognised by the tariffs, and various regulations were 
made concerning them. These, described in some detail 
in Chapter IV, have been subject to various changes 
since they were first agreed, and vary somewhat between 
States. Broadly speaking, the present tariff position 
is that the number of directors who may be appointed in 
(9) He must have been exceptionally influential with his 
clients for he was also paid £5000 cash in return 
for an ~ndertaking not to be interes~ed.in any . 
insurance business in Melbourne or within 300 mile? 
of Melbournet for six, months! London and Lancashire 
Letter Book, 3.3.1910·~ 
1!t"!~W SWZ l!Ml I 
each State is limited, and the method of payment is 
fixed. In N.s.w. a company may not have more than 
6 directors, (all in the Sydney metropolitan area). 
They may be paid by a fixed fee if elected by the 
shareholders or if they fulfil the ordinary duties of 
a director; such directors not elected by the 
shareholders may not be paid less than £25 or more 
than £200 per annum. All other directors may be paid 
by commission not exceeding 20 per cent (except on 
CTP, Workers' Compensation and Engineering business). 
It is forbidden to appoint individuals in various 
specified occupations as directors (e.g. insurance 
agents, brokers, bank employees). Directors are 
required to sign an agreement not to "rebate" fees or 
commission, except to proprietary companies not 
subsidiaries of public companies. The Victorian and 
other State provisions are similar, except that the 
number of appointments allowed varies; for example in 
Victoria up to 6 directors may be appointed in the 
Melbourne area, plus 3 in each of Ballarat, Bendigo and 
Geelong. In all States, under the so called "Acquired 
Companies Agreement'', directorial appointments in 
existence at the time of preliminary takeover 
agreements may be continued. 
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(b) Extent and nature of local directorships. In 
order to obtain some idea of the extent of "local 
director" appointments, it was decided to compare the 
boards of large compenies in Australia with such 
information as is available concerning the ttlocal boards~ 
of insurance companies. For convenience the boards of 
98 of the 102 companies studied by E. L. Wheelwright 
were chosen. (l) Wheelwright selected all companies 
with unconsolidated shareholders' funds of over £2m. 
listed by the Sydney Stock Exchange Investment Service 
for February-March 1954; he eliminated 31 because they 
were registered outside Australia or were subsidiaries 
of companies already in his list. The remaining 102 
companies at the time of his study had (unconsalidated) 
shareholders' funds of £554.9 m., compared with the 
Commonweal th Bank's estimate1' for all public compan5.es 
(831) of £1044.0 m. in 1954.(2) 
In order to bring the study rathe~ more up 
to date, the boards of these companies were looked up 
in the 1959 Jobson '.s .I.nves_tment Digest, and all directors 
(1) E. L. Wheelwright: The ONnershiR and Control of 
Australian Com2anies, Law Book Co., 1957. 
(2) statistical Bulletin 195~, Commonwealth Bank of 
Austral fa. 
.. 
listed. Four companies in the original Wheelwright list 
were excluded.(3) There were some amalgamations, 
takeovers, and changes of name among the others between 
1954 and 1959, but these were disregarded and the directors 
of ~he new or newly named companies were included. 
The list obtained was then compared with Jobson's 
~Directory of Directors" for 1959,(4 ) and the "Index 
of Directors and Executives" of the 1959 Insurance 
Year Book. {S) 
Of the 98 companies, 68 had at least one director 
also the director of an insurance company. The results 
can be summarised as follows: 
(3) They were: 
Commonwealth Oil Refineries, Ltd:.., Name changed to 
B.P. Australia, Ltd. Not mentioned by 1959 Jobsons. 
Carlton Brewery Ltd. - all board members - also 
directors of Carlton and United Breweries, Ltd., 
Mercantile Mutual Ins. Co. Ltd., 
M.L.C. Assurance Co. Ltd. 
(4) This also appears in Jobson's Investment Digest~a.,,... Boot, 
1959. 
(5) The "Index" was discontinued after,195?• Both 
the Insurance Year Book and Jobson s lists 
refer mainly to 1958. 
No. of public Companies 
(excl. all Insurance 
Companies) 
30 
23 
25 
7 
7 
6 
Number of directors also 
directors of an Insurance 
CompanY, 
None 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 or more 
Of all the 30 public companies without a director also 
on the board of ~n insurance company, 9 appear in 
Wheelwright's list of "Overseas Controlled ... companies (6) 
and one (Walton-Sears Ltd.,) in 1958 had a .substantial 
overseas interest in it. (7) 
7 of the 98 had directors in common with 
predominately life assurance companies only. Thus 61 
of the 98 sample public companies had directors of non-
1 ife insurance companies. 
In Table 11 ll the insurance companies 
represented on the boards of the 68 public companies 
are listed. The list referss to the position in 1958, 
and since the operation of life companies in general 
(6) Wheelwright op. cit. Table V.C P• 77. 
(7) Jobson's Investment Digest, 1959. 
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TABI,E II .11 
Representation of Insurance Com~anies on B~ards of 68 
Large Public Coml2_ani es ,_1258. 
Tnsurnnce Co. 
(1) 
.. ;ndon & Lancashire 
. -· p 
• !·! ' • Society 
)}vnial Mutual Life 
11eensland 
'._,;·'" J Exchange 
·_·, -~J oyers' Liability 
, · lional Mutual Life 
··ni ted 
-,,, C'J nti le & Genl. Re. 
· ~url Life & Citizens 
-ictoria 
·· 1 l::ts 
'f .nguard 
'':· :u1sDor t & G enera.1 
..., • & G. Life 
1s tn. & In terna ti onal. 
Head 
Office 
(2) 
U.K. 
Au8t • 
AtlS t. 
U .K, 
U.K. 
Aust. 
U.K. 
U .K. 
U.K. 
Aust. 
Aust.. 
U.K. 
1\us t. 
Aust. 
U.K. 
Life 
or 
Non-
Ltte 
NL 
L 
L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
L 
NL 
NL 
L 
NL 
NL 
Trieste NL 
Aust. NL 
Aust • L 
Aust. ML 
Aust. NT.1 
No. of 
Sanmle 
Cos. cm 
which 
rep:res-: 
ented 
---wy 
·10 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
.3 
3 
2 
2 
No.of 
CIT;e"C-
tors b~ 
wbom 
r eur es-
ented 
(5) 
10 
6 
5 
5 
8 
9 
3 
4 
4 
.7 
3 
i2 
1 
2 
5 
3 
3 
8 
Subs id • 
of one 
of the 
"bB Cos. 
(6) 
s 
s 
s 
I' 
I 
lj 
J 
,I 
( 1 ) ( 2) 
. "ters & Traders 'Aust • 
•' 1 Jber of 111anuf'ac tur-
ers Aust. 
. •1hern U.K. 
J ii)nal & Gene.::al Aust. 
·kshi11 e U K ~ 
- . . . 
·tpalian Provincial Aust. 
; tr1 0.lian Equitable At~s t. 
t r9.lian & Eastern Aust. 
l l 2 s ta1"1 u JTT . ,)..  
.., J s.rn States Aust. 
U.K. 
tr',.'?.c tur er s ' 1\iu tua 1 A us t. 
<'.)~~_c·:il & Dental _.I\ us t. 
• -~'1UR;1 ton & Co. 
- (Broker) U.K. 
:,-,tory Heins. Co. U.K. 
(3) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NI.1 
L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NJ.J 
NJ.1 
NL 
(4) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
( 5) 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
-2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
s 
s 
·-------
No. of Ins. Cos. 
-
l-1•a li an Life Cos. 6 33 
63 
25 
41.J. 11.i. 
L~alian Non Life Cos. ;15~----__.;;4~1=--~--~ 
35 137 114 All Companies 
~""es : .... __ _
- _1 r c es: 
Directors of each InsuPance Co. include di~ectors of all 
subsidiaries. L = Life, NL = Non ~ife 
Insurance Year Book, 1959 
Jobson's Investment Digest, 1959 
1 'I 
insurance and vice versa was not by then very significant, 
the companies have been characterised as predominantly 
ulifeu or "non life". 
On the average, the insurance companies were 
represented by about two directors on each of the 68 
public companies. Many directors were however directors 
of more than one of the public companies. The ratio 
of col. (6) to col. (5) is a rough measure of relative 
concentration. Thus Ajax (8 directors on 2 boards) 
and Transport and General (5 directors on 3 boards) 
were strongly represented in a few of the sample 
companies, whereas e.g. Colonial Mutual Life (5 
directors on 9 boards), Commercial Union (5 directors 
on 9 boards) and Atlas (1 director on 3 boards) had less 
concentrated representation. As would be expected 
representation is high for most insurance subsidiaries 
of public companies among the 68. 
It is evident that there exist many directorial 
• 125 
links between insurance companies in this particular 
sample of large public companies. The previous discussion 
has suggested that this has probably come about - as 
concerns the non-life companies - as a result of 
efforts to build up "goodwill" and "preferred" markets 
I 
I 
l' 
'I' ' I 
:1 
I 
or outlets for insurance. However an opposite view 
which has been frequently expressed, (B)is that 
insurance company representation on other boards 
comes about because of the role of insurance companies 
as external financiers, (mortgage loans, debenture 
holdings, etc.) and holders of large parcels of shares. 
On this view such appointments are merely the reflection 
of the strong financial power of the insurance companies. 
One way of testing this hypothesis would be to 
examine the actual circumstances and timing of 
appointments which result in this kind of link. At 
least as regards non-life companies in Australia, it 
would almost certainly be found that the links are ~ 
created in almost all cases by the appointment of 
manufacturing, tr.~ding,finance etc. company directors 
to insurance company boards and not versa. Another 
more direct method is possible using information given 
by Wheelwright. This is to examine the ownership 
of shareholdings in his sample companies and their 
correlation (if any) with insurance directorial 
links. This has the obvious weakness that it takes 
no account of "external" finance, on which no detailed 
information is available. However, it is probably 
8 e.g. Richard M. Titmuss: The Irresponsible Societ~, 
Fabian Tract 323, London 1960. -
unlikely that directorship appointments would be made 
on the basis of external loans only, W~thOu~ some 
significantly large equity holding, and in any case 
such external finance is probably of greater relative 
importance for life companies. 
As regards shareholdings the Wheelwright study 
gives details separately of 11 Yoting shares" and llnon-
.voting preference shares 11 • It is pointed out that 
"the great bulk of preference capital comes from small 
shareholders - 99.66 per cent of shareholdings 
accounting for 75.69 per cent of total preference 
shares held. Thus in relation to preference capital, 
the insurance and assurance group has supplied only 
9. 55%n. ( 8) These figures are based or1 an anaiLys is 
of non-voting preference shareholdings of £10,000 
nominal value and over only. On the same basis, the 
holdings of predominantly non-life companies were 
even less significant. According to Wheelwright ' 
insurance and assurance companies held 2,463,629 
1 2 . (9) preferen~e shares in 34 of the 0 companies. 
(9) Ibid. Table ~ B P• 69. 
Of this total:~") hon-life companies held only· 127, 500 
shares in 6~of the sample companies. (1) 
On the other hand the non-lif~ companies appear 
at first sight to be more important suppliers of what · 
Wheelwright defihes .as "voting capital" i~e. ordinary 
shares and prefer~nce shares with voting rights. 
Considering 96 of Wheelwright's 102 companies, the 
position is· as follows: (2 ) 
Total no. of voting shares 
of-which 
held by 
~ · Life ins~ cos. 
1Non~life· ins. cos. 
159,853~664 
3,903,480 
4,002,45~ 
7,905,938 
In arranging his statistics Wheelwright 
recorded separately only individual shareholdings of 
a nominal value of £10,CXX> or over, and of course to 
the extent that insurance companies had smaller holdings 
they are excluded from the above figures. However 
( 1) 
(2) 
Calculated from Wheelwright, op. cit., Appendix. 
The-102 companies less the 2 mentioned above plus 
the Australian Gas Light Co~ and the Bank of N.S.W. 
(non~life holdings not available) •. Th~ figures . 
are obtained from the detailed statistics of holdings 
in individual .companies given in.Wheelwright's 
Appendix,:but they may be somewhat understated 
as the complete list of la~ge shareholders is not 
published for three companies. 
___ ;:;:.-
~ 
111 I ilZiMCl!W!'.i ! !:: f 
his object was 11 to seek for those holdings which are 
large enough to give effective control over the 
appointment of directors".( 3) The above figures 
suggest that the combined holdings of voting shares 
were on the average probably not surficient to explain 
the insurance link. Whereas large insurance holdings 
of the voting shares were 4.1 per cent of total voting 
shares, 16.1 of all directors of the 96 companies were 
also directors of insurance companies. This impression 
is reinforced if the surprisingly large( 4) non-life 
holdings are examined in more detail. 
Non-Life Ins.co. 
Union of Canton 
General Accident 
Queensland 
Pearl 
All other 
All non-life Cos. 
No. of Voting Shares 
held in samgles Cos. 
2,348,171 
400,905 
284,134 
254,838 
714,410 
4,002,458 
No.of samele 
Cos. in which 
voting shares 
held 
27 
16 
8 
6 
24 
43 
-------------------------------------------(3) Ibid. p.33 
(4) · L.f company holdings would normally be expected i.e. 1 e 
to exceed non-life holdings. 
,.._-:-'" • ,· '• • 'I 
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I Jhe:four .. specified companies, except the Queensland, 
are large.Br~tish:-owned.companiesoperating 
internationally, ,and by portfolio investment of 
funds accruins 1from their overseas as well as 
Australian o~erations ~hey could easily have a rather 
disto:i:-ting effect on figures such as these. However, 
the signi,ficant fact is that none of the three are 
represented .on boards of th~ sample companies. In 
the cases of the Union of Canton and the Pearl the 
reason is jqui te simple - Australian directors (if any) 
are not list.e.d in Jobson' s or the Insurance Year Book. 
Hence, th_e large number of non-life .. directorial 
appointments was .associated with overall voting strength 
of only 962,544 shares, or less than one half of one 
per cent of the total number of voting shares. 
' . ~ 
The discussion so far has suffered from the 
weaknesses that: {!) even though average non-life holdings 
cwere low, particular cases of high holdings and 
associated directorships might still be possible {2) the 
' ' 
shareholdingsanalysedGwere fo'r dates during 1953 .and 
1954, .·whereas the directorships were mostly .for dates 
duri~g. 1958. To test these weaknesses the (very few) 
non-life insurance companies.s~eciii~ally mentioned by 
Wheelwright as holding significant voting rights in.the 
sample companies were examined.( 5) None of these 
had directors also directors of the sample companies, 
either in 1958, 1953 or 1954. 
I 
The discussion !it! f 1;r has proceeded on the 
basis of insurance directors, as published by the 
Insurance Year Book and Jobson's. These lists are 
however, far from complete, as relatively few companies 
which undoubtedly had local directors published their 
names. Thus in the 1959 Year Book, of 122 private, 
independent non-Government insurance and reinsurance 
companies listed, only 30 gave the names of local 
directors. Of 57 Australian compamies apparently 9 only 
J 
had 15 local boards with 62 local directors. (This 
excludes all boards elected by the shareholders of 
independent companies.) Of 65 overseas companies, 
. 
21 had 53 local boards and 217 local directors. 
The only relatively complete source of 
"' 
information on this subject (as regards tariff companies) 
is the FAUA. Council, with which, under tariff agreements, 
details of directorship appointments must be lodged. 
However, the Council treats these lists as highly 
confidential, {6) and individual companies are 
(5) 
(6) 
Wheelwright op.cit. Table VI. PP• 86 ff. 
This fact is itself an indication of the 
nature of most appointments. 
11 agency" 
---
- -~------
reluctant to reveal them. Some idea of their possible 
extent may be gained by considering the probable numbers 
if all companies were to make appointments on the scale 
of, say, the Queensland and London and Lancashire • 
In 1959 the former, had 22 local directors on 8 local 
boards; the London and Lancashire and its subsidiaries 
had at least 9 local boards and 42 local directors 
throughout Australia.(?) In earlier years, too, 
companies were less reluctant to publish details. 
Thus the Insurance Year Book for 1942-43 showed 26 
companies as having 104 local boards and 333 local 
directors, out of a total of 84 companies listed. 
In the cases of the large public companies 
so far discussed, it would perhaps be misleading to 
place too much emphasis on the direct business-getting 
aspects of appointments. As mentioned before, such 
factors as the desire to inspire confidence in the 
company by associating with it a well known name 
and the need-for advice on such matters as local in-
vestment~ policy may be important. Moreover~ many 
insurance directorial appointees are directors of 
quite a number of companies, and if they are 
instrumental in influencing insurance it may be from 
one or two of the companies only. In addition, 
(7) Insurance Year Boo_!t, 1959. 
appointments overlap. 
directors of the Bank of N.S.W. sat on the board 
of a different insurance company; of the seven 
directors of Dunlop Rubber, four were board members 
of the same insurance company, but each of the three 
others was a director of a quite separate insurance 
company. Because of the complexity of these 
arrangements and the obvious difficulty of obtaining 
specific information, it is difficult to arrive at 
very certain conclusions. Where a director of a 
public company influences the insurances in a 
particular direction, and is paid a commission, it 
is also difficult to see ho.whe would be able to avoid 
passing his commission on to the firm, or perhaps 
sharing it with his fellow directors, where they do not 
also hold similar insurance appointments. As regards 
the tariff, dividing commission in this way would be 
a breach of his undertaking. For these reasons it is 
probable that a high proportion of public company 
appointments are made for "prestige" reasons; the 
fact that they are published probably also indicates this. 
On the other hand appointments of directors of 
proprietarl companies, which are not publicised, and 
to which no "rebatil\9 11 prohibition applies, are 
----~ .. ----.. ~-- .. --.-... _ "'"'"'"""'~ ............ ._,..,_ ... --...~ ... -·~ 
almost certainly predominantly made to obtain or hold 
particular insurance accounts •. There is also, of 
course, the possibility that directors of public 
companies may also be concerned with private companies, 
and are appointed principally for this reason. 
4. "Goodwill" and. new Developments in the 1950' s. 
It is evident from the discussion so far 
that the creation of a network of agency and 
directorship links is one of ~the chief aims of many 
companies operating in Australia. The importance of 
"goodwillu in a similar sense is also well illustrated 
by the many absorbed companies whose separate identity 
has been kept. (9) In Victoria in 1957/58 for example, 
180 separate licences for non-life insurance were 
granted; of these at least 65 were for non-independ.ent 
companies. Again, these connections are oftep not 
publicised; indeed, in the past, takeovers have been 
accomplished without notic• appearing even in the 
insurance press! As concerns overseas parent companies, 
there is probably also some preference for subsidiaries 
(8) Despite the fact that operating economies would probably have resulted from more rapid and complete 
amalgamation into parent company organisations. 
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with a locfll-so11nding name. Thus in 1961, 16 of 
approximately 29 companies in whose titles the word 
"Australia" or "ComrnonweaJth" appeared were subsidia.ries 
of overseas companies. 
To indicate the extent of this nractice. the 
~ . 
subsidiaries of three British eroups are listed below. 
All were operating apparently independently in 1962. 
The dates of absorption are also indicated. Most of 
these subsidiary companies had separate boards of 
directors in Australia, and separate agency 
organise ti ons. Other activities are to varying degrees 
integrated e.g. renewal and policy printing~ Other 
overseas companies operate in a similar manner, although 
the three companies listed provide the leading examples 
of t.he practice. Australian companies ~lso have 
oper~ting subsidiaries, but not on nearly the same scale 
as the larger overseas groups. 
One of the most obvious ways of creatine "tied 11 
insut~ance markets is to make insurance with a 
particular insurance company the condition of a loan. 
In this connection hire pUl'.'chase companies, bAnks and 
l:i.f~ a::;S'urance companies are of great potenti'al 
significance. Some of the successful Australian 
,insurance companies have in fact had the backing of 
' ,1 
ua::&-
I >Ji~ ~'.Ii I 
Royal - Globe 
Lancashire 1901 
Central 1908 
British and Foreign 1909 
Thames and Mersey 1911 
Mutual of Tasmania 1912 
Legal 1916 
Liverpool, London ) 1919 and Globe ) 
Assuranc~ and Thrift 1933 
. ( . 
Royal - Globe Groue 
London and Lancashire (1960) 
City Mutual Fire 1897 
Standard Marine 1907 
Australian Alliance 1908 
Australian Plate Glass 1910 
Derwent and Tamar 1912 
Adelaide Fire Office l 
Brisbane Fire Office 1916 Sydney Fire Office 
Melbourne Fire Office 
Marine Insurance Company 1917 
Law Union and Rock 1919 
Colonial Mutual Fire 1927 
Farmers and Citizens 1933 
Commercial Union Group 
Commercial Union Ass. of Aust. (estd. 1960) 
Cornwall 1898 
Palatine 1900 
Union 1907 
Australian Mutual Fire 1920 
British General 1926 
Australian Union Ass. (estd. 1954) 
The London Assurance Group 
Master Builders 1926 
Guildhall 1930 Federal Mutual 1931 
Commercial of Australia 1931 
Real Australia 1932 
Sea 1960 
Western (1961) 
l 
British America (1833) 
North British and Mercantile (1959) 
Ocean Marine 190';' 
Fine Art and General 1917 
Insurance Office of Aust. 1922 
hire purchase firms, as indicated in Table II 10 
above. However, neither the banks nor the life companies 
. 
until recently took any specific interest in non-life 
insurance. They were for many years content to allow 
borrowers to insure with any company chosen from 
lists of "approved~ insurers. These lists included 
virtually all companies in Australia, tariff and non-
tariff. 
As regards banking this position has not changed, 
but during the 1950's, by the purchase of substantial 
interests in finance companies, the trading banks 
bec~me indirectly linked with particular insurance 
companies. These connections are set out in Table 
IT 12,. 
It seems clear that if the Banks were to use their 
influence as lenders and their very extensiv~ branch 
organisations, to develop insurance connections, they 
.. th f. ld {9) could become very important in ese ie s. 
(9) The same is true, of course, of the Commo~wealth 
Bank and the various State Government Savings 
Banks. In assessing the reasons why the Banks 
have not in fact taken such steps, it would 
propbably be important to notice that there 
is a particularly clear linkage of Bank boards 
with the boards of the insurance companies 
which would probably stand to lose most. 
., ... ! ·~ . - - . -------· ~· • . 
TABLE II. 12. 
Links of Australian Trading Banks with Insurance Companies. 
National Bank of Aust. 
Commercial Bank of 
Australia 
New South Wales 
Australian and New 
Zealand 
Commercial Banking 
Co. of Sydney 
Finance Company 
Custom Credit 
General Credits 
Holdings 
Australian Guarantee 
Corp. 
Industrial Acceptance 
Corp. 
Commercial and General 
Acceptance 
Interest and year of 
acquisition 
40% (1954) 
42% (1956) 
40% (1957) 
14.3% (1957) 
40% (1958) 
Insurance Subsidiaries 
National & General,Custom Life Ass., 
First National Reins. 
Automobile Fire and General,. 
British Medical,Regent. 
Transport and General 
Empire Insurances 
Transport and General Life 
Ajax,Surrey, 
Commercial and General Insurance. 
~: Information from Australian Financial Review, 27,2.1962, and writers Card Index of insurance subsidiaries.The first mentioned company is in each case the parent of 
the others. The Bank of Adelaide and the English, Scottish and Aust~alian Bank 
also have hire purchase affiliates, but these do not appear to have insurance 
subsidiary companies. 
'fB 
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This must however be considered in the light of possible 
legislation along the lines of the State Acts passed 
in 1959 and 1960 regulating Hire Purchase agreements. 
These Acts gave hirers the statutory right of insuring 
with an insurance company of their own choice. 
Another important group of lenders are the 
life assurance companies, and in most countries there has 
long been a tendency for life and general insurance 
companies to be associated. In Australia, between 
the 1890's and the mid l950's no such connection 
existed. Over this period of some 60 years it is 
broadly true that life companies kept out of non-
lif e insurance (except personal accident) and non-
life companies did not write life insurance. As did 
the Banks, the six principal Australian mutual 
life offices allowed borrowers to insure with any 
companies approved by them. Their lists included 
most companies operating in Australia. 
The .fact that the life companies made no 
attempt to enter the general field is somewhat 
surprising, since fire insurance - especially of 
private homes - was exceptionally profitable over 
most of the period. Moreover, the City Mutual Fire 
and the Colonial Mutual Fire, both of which had been 
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originally associated with life offices, were allowed 
to be taken over by a British non-life company. (1) 
On the other side, the many British non-life companies 
in Australia nearly all wrote life business. i~ Britain 
and other markets, yet no attempt was made to enter 
this field in Australia. One possible explanation 
is that a number which had started to develop Australian 
life business in the 1880's, had their life as~ets 
badly caught in the 1890's depression. On the other 
hand, relatively convenient opportunities for 
developing life business by takeovers were passed by 
on numerous occasions, especially in the 1920's. 
one British company which actually purchased an 
Australian life account, did so in the expectation 
The 
of being able to resell it, and when this did not prove 
possible made no attempt to develop it. (2) Perhaps 
more significant is the fact that a number of the 
British companies writing non-life business in Australia, 
in Britain were principally important as life companies. 
These included the Norwich Union, the Legal and General, 
(1) 
(2) 
By the London and Lancashire in 1897 and 1927 
respectively. 
This refers to the purchase of the Australian 
Alliance by the London and Lancashire in 1909. 
Information from London and Lancashire records, 
London. 
and the Pearl.· The NorwicQ_Union Fire, which entered 
Australia in 1865, was associated in England with the 
Norwich Union Liff!, by which it was absorbed in 1925. 
Th~ Leaal and General ore rated for fire and marine 
insurance only between 1925 and 1931. In 1934 it 
absorbed the Gresham, a British .fire company which 
had been in Australia since 1911. In 1950 it 
reopened on its own account, but for non-life 
business only. The Pearl whose life business was of 
--
far greater significance to it than general insurance, 
again operated in Australia for non-life business only 
from 1929. 
ta 
1(t 1 
The apparent reluct~nce of the large British 
companies to enter life business in Australia left 
the field open for the principal Australian mutual 
life offices. They took good advantage of their 
opportunity, and the five largest in 1958-59 still 
received just under 9·oper cent of all life premiums 
paid in Australia during this year. (3) On the other 
hand the dominance of British companies in the non-
life field was not seriously challenged until the 
1950's. Before then there were only a few occasions 
on which this apparent balance was threatened. In 
the 1920's a number of local companies were promoted~ 
--
(3) Commonwealth Insurance Commissioner: Annual 
Report, 1959. 
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to write both general and life insurance., Some 
were fraudulent from the start; others found the initial 
cost of developing life business too high. Nearly 
all had been wound up or sold by the l930's. More 
significant, the Queensland Government Office 
commenced life business in ''/IB , the N.s.w. GIO 
in 1945, and the Prudential of London, which had 
opened for general business in Austral~a in 1926, in 1931. 
With these exceptions, in 1946, .when life 
insurance came under new uniform Commonwealth 
legislation, (3 ) there were no significant life 
' 
insurers also writing non-life business. The 
Insurance Commissioner noted that the following 
companies, which were all represented in Australia 
for life insurance, while still having life policies 
on their books, had "long ceased0 to write new life 
business in Australia. (4) 
Australian Alliance 
London and Scottish 
Northern 
-
Head Off ice 
Subsidiary of London and 
Lancashire, U.K. 
Subsidiary of Northern - U.K. 
U.K. 
(3) The Life Insurance Act, 1945 
(4) Commonwealth Insurance Commissioner: 
Annual Reports, 1946, 194?, 1948 • 
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Royal Exchange 
Royal 
Western Australian 
Yorkshire 
-
-
Liverpool, London and 
Globe 
Eagle Star 
Head Off ice. ,, · .· · ..... 
,,,,,_ -- ---
U.K. 
U.K. 
U.K. and Perth (W.A.) 
U.K. ~ •• 1 '"'.,. .. 4.~ ,1,,. II CJ 
-. ' . .. ~ ......... _, \... l. 4 • ..... 
Subsidiary of Royal - U.K. 
U.K. 
Apart from these the only lif~ companies in general 
insurance were small in both fields. Indeed their 
non-life business was neglible. They were: 
Australian Provincial Assurance 
Australian Catholic 
Commonwealth General 
Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) 
Equitable Probate and General. 
In 1948 two non-life companies - the Norwich Union 
and the Transport and General - applied for registration 
under the Insurance Act, but the Commissioner noted 
that neither was actually transacting business. In 
1952 the I.ransport and General had not written life 
business "and now has stated that it does not intend 
to do so" (4 ) 
(4) Commonwealth Insurance Commissioner, 
Annual Repor~, 1952. 
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In 1954 the Commissioner commented: nA 
feature of the last few years has been the number of 
enquiries received from ••• overseas companies ••• 
Even though rao more registrations have been made, 
there ·is apparently some interest in Australia as a 
further fie.il.d for insurance activity". (5) 
This remained the position until 1956. In 
this year the Legal and General, already operating 
in the general field, registered and commenced writing 
life insurance. This action immediately had an 
electrifying effect in both the life and non-life 
markets. In the following four years 18 new companies 
were registered for life insurance, all representing 
companies already active in non-life insurance in 
Australia. By 1958 each of the "big-five" life 
mutuals had entered general insurance by setting up 
s~hsidiary companies. By 1961, 6 of the smaller life 
offices in existence in 1956 had been purchased by non-
life companies. 
Announcing the formation of the A.M.P. 
Fire and General in 1958, the Chairman of the A.M.P. 
Society said: 
"One of the reasons the A.M.P. has decided 
to form the new company is to provide fire insurance 
(5) Annual Report; 1954. 
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in connection with properties mortgaged to the society 
as security for home purchase loans or otherwise -
The Society also feels that the establishment of the 
A.M.P. Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., is an 
important step which will str•engthen the local insurance 
market and the Australian economy". 
(6) 
If this was so in 1958. it is a reasonable 
question to ask whether it was surely not also the 
cnse many years earlier. The quickness of the reactions 
to the move by the Legal and General s t:rongly suggests 
that it was t.he expectation of these reactions. bringing 
~owerful new competitors to both the life and non-
life rn~rkets, that had long been feRred. No evidence 
of a written agreement between the FAUA Council 
and the Life Offices' Association has been discovered, 
but it seems reasonable to infer at least fue existence 
of some kind of tacit understanding. The only 
~lternative explanation (offered by executives from 
both the life and non-life offices), is that their 
principal f'ields were "traditional" to the companies 
concerned, and being "conservative" they were unvrilling 
to go outside them. In view of the quite different 
(6) AIBR July 1958, p. 387. 
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behaviour of the English offices in countries other 
than Australia, these· reasons alone seem to the 
writer inadequate. 
The consequences of these changes for 1ife 
insurance were still not clearly apparent in 1962, 
but it seemed. likely that in Australia the "big five" 
would no longer hold quite the dominant position they 
had achieved in the past. In 1958-59, on the basis 
of ordinary and industrial premiums, market shares 
were:(?) 
Australian Mutual Provident Society 
Colonial Mutual Life 
Mutual Life and.Citizens 
National Mutual Life 
Temperance and General 
Prudential 
City Mutual Life 
12 Australian controlled Companies 
9 Overseas controlled Companies 
per cent 
31.2. 
15.4 
14.3 
14.l 
12.2 
87.2 
4.0 
3.5 
3.8 
l .5·-
100.0 
(7) Insurance Commissioner: Annual Repor~, 1959. 
~-
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However the recent companies had a higher share 
of new business. The Insurance Commissioner published 
the following percentage shares of new sums insured 
written: 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
By Companies registered 
for less than 10 years 
5.0 
9.0 
By o_verseas 
owned Companies 
9.1 
10.3 
10.8 
Many of the non-life companies entered life insurance 
by setting up subsidiaries to take advantage of the 
Australian taxation laws. The dates and method of 
entry of the principal companies are set out in 
Table II. 13. Most British companies brought out 
expert life insurance executives and actuaries from 
England, but many staff members of the new companies 
. 
came from the old Australian life offices. 
A further important development was that the 
professional reinsurers, who were opening in Australia 
at about this time, entered life reinsurance as well. 
The Swiss Reinsurance Co. operated its life business 
.;;;..:;..:..::;..=.-....:..-;;;.;.o.....,_ ..... _ 
as a branch from 1956 and the CoRenhaqen Reinsurance c~. 
' I 
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~of Principal Non-Life ComQanies into 
~{raf!an Cife Assurance, 19~6:f9b'I";::::: 
!12.n..hife Company 
Legal and General) 
'Jresham ) 
~orwich Union Fire 
Seneral Accident 
~ational and General 
~orthern 
Sagle Star 
Transport and General 
~ueensland 
3ankers and Traders 
(-
'\;,yal - Globe 
,,1uance 
L'ndon and Lancashire 
?hoe nix 
:entury 
-ustralian and Overseas 
Switzerland General 
lurich Insurance Company 
'lercantile Mutual 
~~ward Lumley group companies 
Head Office 
U.K. 
U.K. 
U.K. 
Australia 
U.K. 
U.K. 
Australia 
Australia 
U.K. 
U.K. 
U.K. 
U.K. 
U.K. 
Australia 
ZUrich 
zi.irich 
Australia 
U.K. and Australia 
Year and Method of Entr~ 
1956 
1957 
1957 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1959 
1959 
1960 
1960 
1960 
1960 
1960 
1960 
1961 
1961 
Legal and General - branch, 
Norwich Union Life - branch. 
General Life Ass. Co. ) English Ins. co. ) branches. 
Customlife Ass, - subsid, 
Norther•: Life of Aust, • subsid. 
Eagle Star • branch 
Transport and Geriaral Ufa - subsid. 
With Burns Philp took over Equitable Probate 
and General Life. 
Royal - Globe Life - subsid. 
Unity Life - subsid, 
Friends 1 Provident and Century Life - branch. 
Australian and overseas Life - subsid. 
Switzerland Life • branch. 
Took over Commonwealth General Ass, 
Took over Australian Metropolitan Life. 
Took over Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) and 
Citizens Graziers Life. 
Notes and Sources: Insurance Commissioner, Annual Reports and writer's Card Index. 
The London and Lancashire, a shareholder in Unity Life, was 
taken over by Royal - Globe in 1961. 
,. 
from 1957. The M_ercantile and General Reinsurance Co. 
(London) set up an Australian life reinsurance 
subsidiary in 1957, the Victory Re~nsurance Co. 
(London) in 1959. As in general insurance, the 
presence of professional reinsurers in Austr~lia is 
likely to be of relatively greater assistance to small 
or newly established offices. (S) The same is probably 
true of the development of life insurance broking. 
Certain of the new London broking firms accustomed 
to handling life business in London decided to deal 
in life assurance in Australia. (9) 
The motive for the entry of the non-life 
companies was undoubtedly ~rincipally the protection 
of their interests in non-life insurance, and in 
particular the highly profitable fir~ insurance lines. 
_, 
In 1955, before the movement started, the value of 
total assets held in Australia by life companies was 
£675.Bm. and included: (l) 
(8) 
(9) 
(1) 
As well as helping develop the market for certain 
less usual forms of risk, such as sub-standard 
and highly insured ~ives. 
e.g. J.H. Minet (Superannuation Services) Pty. Ltd., 
Insurance Commissioner, Annual Report 1956. 
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Landed and House Property 
Loans on Mortgages 
Loans on Companies' Policies 
£m. 
22.3 
197.7 
25.7 
245.7 
If the total value of these loans and property were 
insured against fire at, say, 4/- per £100, the 
annual premium would be about £491,000, or only about 
1.7 percent of total Australian fire (incl. HH) 
premiums in this year. However the non-life companies 
had to consider that: (1) where a mortgage was held 
it was likely that more than the mortgaged value 
would be insured (2) other life assets - especially 
equities - might be used to influence insurance 
(3) non-fire lines e.g. MV, Workers' Compensation -
might follow the fire insurance - (4) the life 
offices had contacts with many private householders 
and large field staffs which could easily turn to 
selling non-life lines when discussing life insurance 
(5) they would be at a disadvantage if they were 
unable to offer a full range of insurance policies, 
including life policies. Moreover the life companies 
especially the Ar.M.P Society and the National Mutual -
would be strengthened by having similar opportunities 
-
in other countries, notably New Zealand and Great Britain. 
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The early development of the new 
subsidiaries of the _life companies was in fact quite 
rapid. Table II. 14 gives details regarding their 
formation and the latest premium figures available. 
Four chose to operate in association with established 
Australian and New Zealand non-life companies. The 
South British (N.Z.) became~ the managing agent in 
Australia and New Zealand for the A.M.P. Fire and 
General( 2), the New Zealand in both countries for the 
-... ··-
M.L.C. Fire and General. The CML Fire and General 
~ 
15t 
and the Perpetual Gen~~ are managed by the Merqantil~ 
Mutual and the Victoria respectively, both Australian 
owned companies. If the links thus created were to 
become closer, local groupings in non-life insurance 
comparable in size and financial power to the large 
British companies would be created for the first time. 
5. SummarY.!_ 
It has been suggested in the present section 
that insurance companies in·Australia typically 
operate within "submarkets 0 which are to a large 
extent sustained by relations with organisations outside 
insurance itself. For many Australian owned companies 
(2) In Australia this is via the South British 
subsidiary, the United. 
'. . \, ! 
Table II. 14. 
Entry of Principal Australian Life Companies into Australian 
Non-Life Insurance, 1957-1959. 
Life Comeany 
National Mutual 
Mutual Life and Citizens 
Colonial Mutual Life 
Australian Mutual 
Provident Society 
Temperence and General 
Life 
City Mutual Life 
Year and Method of Entry 
1957 Set up subsidiary, 
National Mutual Fire 
1958 Set up subsidiary, 
M.L.C. Fire and General 
1958 Set up subsidiary, 
CML Fire and General 
1958 Set up subsidiary, 
tk.M.P. Fire and General 
1958 Set up subsidiary, 
T & G Fire and General 
1959 Purchased Perpetual General 
from the Victoria. 
Net non-life 
aremiums, £'00.Q. 
348 (1960-61) 
627 (1960-61) 
n.a, 
440 (1959-60) 
n. a. 
79 (1960-61) 
... 
--...... ..... ......_.....,....., ___ .._.i..--~ , 
-- __ ........ ..__t-.,. --~' ~ 
these relations are.with controlling firms, trade 
associations, cooperative societies, and so on. 
Both Australian and overseas owned companies have 
also endeavoured to ntie" particular areas of the 
market by agency, and especially ttchief agency", 
appointments. The hold of a few British companies 
over the insurances connected with the wool trade 
and country pastoral properties is a good example 
of the s~ccessful achievment of this objective. 
Another method has been the appointment of directoRs 
and "local directors" both in the interests of creating 
a favourable "imagett and with the more direct purpose 
of "influencing" particular insurance accounts. 
Until the 1950's two groups of institutions 
with a potentially powerful influence over the non-
life insurance market - the banks and the life companies 
had steered clear of involvement. In the late 1950's, 
indirect links were created between insurance companies 
and the banks, and the life companies entered the non-
life market directly. However, the corresponding 
entry of powerful new competitors into life insurance· 
may in the long run diminish the· relative influence 
of the estab~ished life offices in the non-life field. 
One of the obvious reasons for the importance 
attached by insurance companies to non-insurence 
associations is the tariff regulation of competition 
by r~te and policy variation. With these two methods 
of expansion largely precluded, competition has tended 
to take the form of a ~emi-political struggle for 
0 influence" and ttgoodwill". Restrictions on agency 
relations have not been sufficient to eliminate 
the possibility of expansion in these ways, particularly 
as a result of concessions it was felt necessary to 
grant concerning "chief agency" appointments and 
acquired companies •. By allowing the retention of ·the 
agency and directorship networks of absorbed 
comp:a~ies, the tariff puts a premium on expansion by 
takeover and leads to the retention of the previous 
identities and (to varying extents) the old 
organisations. 
This view of the market must be modified in 
accordance with the size of the 0 non-tariff 11 sector. 
However, account must be .taken of the·fa~t that 
significantly large areas of this sector are 
d 'b d (3 ) d themselves "tied" in the ways escri e , an 
that the "non-intercourse" rules in theory should 
prevent the spread of rat'e competition to the tariff 
market •. 
f3) e.~. Toe MV business of the·Ajax, a-non-tariff su~sidiary of a hire purchase company. 
~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
ENTRIES, EXITS AND PROFITS 
The preseut section is devoted to a brief discussion of 
some aspects of the statistics collated in appendices A and 
B, and illustrated in Charts II.1 to II.9. Little of this 
information has previously been available in Australia, and 
its collection has involved a large number of sources. 
Detailed descriptions of these, and of definitions will be 
found in the appendices. 
1. Independent Companies - Entries and Numbers Operating 
Entries and exits of independent insurers in Australia, 
and numbers operating, are shown in Tables II.15 to II.18, 
and Charts II.1 and II.3. ,-An "independent" insurance company 
is defined as one not owned by another company operating in 
Australia. The statistics are based on the writer's card 
index, described in Appendix B. 
It is felt that these statistics give a good 
indication of activity and trends in the market, although 
f) 
it would be valuable to have information about branches, 
agencies and market shares of individual companies by lines. 
Unfortunately none of this information is available except 
the total business of some Australian companies. 
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Table II.15 
-
Australia: Entries and Exits of Insurance Companies, 
1830-1961. ii Period. All Companies 
/ All Insurers, end of period, 
Ii 
-No.at Entries Exits Companies GIO's Brokers Total ,, beginning Gen- Absor-
1: - -er al bed 
f/ ! - -
"1 1831-40 JI 12 1 ll I , JBU-50 11 10 B 13 I 1851-60 13 25 10 2 26 
~ 1861-70 26 38 13 3 48 1871-80 48 58 12 6 88 l j 1881-90 BB 77 43 17 105 j, 
·1 ' 
11 
1891-1900 105 21 28 29 69 ! I 
1901-10 69 27 6 lB 72 !I 
' 
19ll-20 72 46 18 22 78 3 1 82 
/: 
1921-30 7S 81 38 20 101 6 3 no 1931-40 101 23 22 12 90 5 6 101 
6 99 6 7 ll2 fl 1941-50 90 15 i jl 
' 
1951-61 99 60 12 21 126 6 33 165 I 
l' 126 
,! 1962-
li 
II 
Notes: "Companies" excludes Brokers and G!O's. :f 
"Brokers" refers to all brokers placing 
l1 insurance outside Australia. 
JI 
! Writer's Card Index. tl Source: 
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Table II.16 
Australia: Entries' and Exits of Insurance Companies, llJ20-1961. 
Period. Australian Cos. Overseas Cos • 
No. at ~ntries Exits No.at Entries Exits 
1831-40 
1841-50 
1851-60 
1861-70 
1871-80 
1881-90 
1891-1900 
1901-10 
1911-20 
1921-30 
1931-40 
1941-50 
1951-61 
1962-
beginning_ ~- Absor- beginning Gen- Absor-
eral bed e;ai bed 
-- - -
ll 
10 5 
9 17 
18 16 
24 1a 
35 47 
: 49 1 
13 
'"' 12 20 
26 58 
52 15 
4.1 8 
47 43 
72 
1 
6 
7 
8 
2 
20 
16 
2 
24 
15 
2 
9 
1 
2 
5 
13 
21 
3 
6 
a 
11 
9 
1 
4 
8 
24 
53 
56 
56 
60 
52 
49 
49 
52 
54 
Notes: Excludes GIO's and Brokers. 
Source: Writer's Card Index. 
: 
1 
5 
a 
22 
40 
30 
20 
23 
26 
23 
a 
7 
17 
2 
3 
5 
10 
23 
12 
4 
1a 
14 
7 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
4 
a 
15 
16 
12 
1 
12 
Table II.lz 
Australia: Entries and Exits, Tariff and non-Tariff Insurers,1901-1961. 
Period. 
1901-10 
1911-20 
192l-30 
1931-40 
1941-50 
1951-61 
1961-
No. at beginning Entries Exits 
!· N.T. !!· !· N.T. !!· .'.!'.· N.T. -
- -
69 27 24 
72 36 13 1 37 3 
71 10 1 43 41 2 39 19 
75 32 3 10 13 3 20 15 
65 30 6 12 4 1 3 3 
74 31. 7 27 33 11 26 7 
75 57 16 
Notes: T. = Tariff companies. 
N.T. =Non-Tariff companies, including GIO•s. 
B. = Non-Tariff Brokers placing business 
outside Australia. 
Source: Writer 1 s Card Index. 
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Table II.18 
Australian: Entries and Exits. 
Fire and Marine Insurance Companies, 1831-1900. 
A. Fire 
Peri1.l 
--
1 Australian Companies Overseas Companies 
No. at Entries Exits 
Beginning No. at Entries Exits Gen- Absor-
-eral bed 
--
Beginning Gen- Absor-
eral bed-
1831-40 
1S41-50 7 
1851-60 7 
1861-70 10 
H171-80 16 
1881-90 26 
1891-190 34 
1901- 11 
.1831-40 
1841-50 
1851-60 
1861-70 
a 
a 
12 
7 
4 
8 
12 
13 
28 
a 
5 
9 
10 
4 
4 
5 
3 
12 
8 
5 
,5 
1 
a 
15 
B. Marine 
0 
1 
4 
6 
13 
30 
32 
32 
5 
5 
12 
26 
15 
13 
,. 
2 
2 
2 
3 
5 
8 
10 
5 
1 S7i-8o 
1881-90 
1891-1900 
1901-
20~ 
21 
5 
23 
2 
2 
6 
6 
1 
2 
a 
1 
2 
11 
23 
26 
23 
10 
18 
12 
4 
8 
6 30 
12 
Notes: 
14 8 
An entry or exit may refer to the particular 
line of insurance only. It does not mean 
that the company concerned necessarily entered 
or left Australia. After 1900 nearly all 
con:panies wrote both fire and marine insurance, 
and separate tables have not been continued. 
Brokers excluded. 
Source: Writer's Card Index. 
3 
8 
2 
1 
5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I• 
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'From.Cha1 .. t II.3 it will be seen that the rate 
of growth of c·ompany ·nurnber-s exceed.ed that of Gposs 
Domestic Pi•oduct up to 1890·, but the1 .. eafter was less 
·rapid, exce11t duping a few. periods. Whereas G.D.P. 
in 1960 was almost 6 times its 1890 level, the1"e had 
been an increase of only 60 per cent approximately 
in the number of' insuPers. This disparity is even 
,1 
-mope niai~ked ].f C1)mpap is on is made with t.~e i ncr ease 
of Pl1 emium income after 1920. Between 1920 and 1960 
' ·. 
p.raemium income incPeased almost 12 times, but the number~ 
of insure.~"S only doubled. On both f·.hese counts it 
is obvious that 8fter 1890 there was eri almott 
continu0ns inc.rease in t.he si.7'e of the average insuper 
as measw.'1ed by constant-price G.D.P. or premium income. 
·rn the main, numbers of insm~ance companies 
followed the principal outlines of Australian trade 
cycles. Pe1 .. iods of inci"(~asing numbers associated 
1:1ith expansion of G.D.P. were: 
1861 
1883 
1908 
1919 -
19Li5 
1880 
1890 
1912 
1929 
1960 
h · Plso .veru-r.r,, :marked res11onses to the depressi·ons T ere·were -
of. t:he 1890's and 1930's. Many minor fluctuations. in 
P ·ar'1e a.lso reflected e.g. 1870-71, 1881-~2, 1921-23. G .D·. • 
.. 
' 
' 
' ' 
.. 
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The numbers of' Aus tr·a lian-0wned companies in 
operation were app~rently far mo~e responsive in these 
riespects than overseas companies.· Dtuiinr, 1:he 1890's 
rlep1
1
ession and afte11 , ovePseas co111l-,anies ke~t entef'ing 
Australta, end in 1910 their numbeyi x•eached a level not 
sgain exceeded (if' bP0ke11 s· a1"e not counted). After this, 
un ti 1 abc>u t 1950, thePe were net exits in each decade 
until the 1950's ('f1abJ.e II.16, Chart. II.1). 
Du.ring li1ost period8 thepe wc.s a hi·..,h 'tuPnover' of 
comp~nies, .. i.e. a laraee numbeyi of cumpanies entering 
or leaving the maPkr--t relative to the numbe1• in oy.ie1,ation 
at the beginninc OP end. For exam~le, during each 
dec~de 1851 to 1880 :=:_nd duriin~ 1921-30; there were mo1"'e 
newcomers than con~nnies in o~cration ~t the beginninc of 
the l)eriod. ~~ntries i'lel'e also vr:;;1•y hi::11 in this sense 
in 1881-90 G.nd l.951-61 (rrable II.15). Large numbe1"s of 
comnanies lef't the m8r>k:e~ in :881-90, 1891-1900, 1921-30 ~ 
o.nd 1931-40. The decades of createst tPanquility 
were 1901-10 and 1941-50. 
After 1910 the numbei-i of n0n-t.ariff companies grew 
more rapidly than tapiff c0mpanies, especiallJ' in 
1951-60 (Table rr.17). Uenv new tariff companies 
. " 
enteraAd t:-i<':: market, but e.l111os1·. as many J:eft, and in 1961 
ther>e wePe only 6 more independent- t.nPiff companie::> than 
· J 901 011· the other hand thePe v1&PA no tbere had been in . · 
\ \ 
. : 
non-tariff companies in 1901, and 57 in 1961. ~he1,e 
was ~lso ~ sienificnnt increase in the number of 
brokers placing business outside Australia and not 
dealinc with the te.i-•iff market. 
Huch of this contrast is the result of larne numbers 
of take~overs by tRrtff cmn~anies of other tariff 
cornryanies. Thus, between 1901 and 1961, 93 independent 
companies disar)pearied b~1 abs011 :pti.on and only 13 of these 
we1,e not tariff' com;;anies. 80 of' the .. 93 wer><· absorbed by 
companies with head offices ove11 se1s, and the majorit:y of 
those absorbed (56 of the 93) were also overseas 
priobably had little to do with developments in ihe 
Australian mgrket alone. For exam~le, the relatively 
lo.rge number which ocr:u1 .. ;-•ea. durin~, 1901-1920 wepe 
connecte<l with the divFrsification of British fire 
durine 1951-6I with 2mRlnnmqtions aimed at streng~henine 
Rr i tiBh compr,ni es in the TTni t ed States. In ].Q.!l§ of the 
56 cases did the take-over involve actual ~ithdr~wal from 
Aus traliu ~ ~l th01:1€h the ab.:; 01'1bed comp~ny s om: times Jost 
its id en t.i ty. 
2. Failures of A11~ tr~lian Cornnani~ 
In terms oil numbe_·s of' independent. compe.nie::;, the 
Australisn-0wned sector,r• h:io1i: a lone time to r•ecover 
l < 
. 
\ 
! 1 
-, I 
I : I 
t I j ~ 
! 
I I 
I I I 
I : 1' 
I I 
I , ! 
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frc>ID both the 1890 IS O.nd 1930 I$ depresSi•)~e; r''::>OUt ~ 
~ ' 3? and 25 years respectivel~'· Friom 1890 Australian '~ 1t 
it 
company nurnbe11 s v1en t on declining un ti 1 1909 (Chart II .1), ~ ~ 
even 1huU!~h a strong recovery in G.D.P. began in 1904. 
A:t'tei• 1930, the11 e vm.s no really sustained increase until 
:.~1 s 1:~f.L' •"'O. ·.~:;. •• .:.es, Aus ttia lian owned companies 
tenL1f:J '":> hc-.v0 '3hor• t lives. At the beBinning of 1962 
only 3 01' r,ne 72 Aust.r•alian c0mpani.es in existence \7ere 
eRtablisn-~ before 1910. About half had been 
estab:.. 1 •• hed in the Dre,rious 10 yeaPs. By contrast, 
19 of the 54 ovei-aseas compnnies hnd been operating in 
Austral i.P bef'c1r•e 191 O. Dn tes of establishment in 
A us ·~.i.· ) lin. were: 
had 
are 
Aus tralinn Overseas 
ComnaniM Comrmnies 
1951-61 35 18 
19Lil-50 7 4 
1931-LiO 6 6 
1921-30 12 6 
1911-20 9 1 
P1.,e 1911 3 19 
72 54 
t 1 . comnanies which left. the rnaPket Many Aus ,ra ian i.J 
been estqblished less than 5 years; the following 
the ar;es of exi t.s betvreen 1871 and 1961. 
I I 
J ) 
J ! 
- I 
I 
. Ii 
l I 
I I 
;; 
.. 
16!1 
Age on derrr ture 
· . · Years) 1871-1910 1911-5.0 1951-61 
0 
- 5 
.36 30 5 
6 -10 13 21 3 
11 -20 12 8 2 
21 -30 10 1 3 
Over 30 11 6 5 
Total 82 66 18 
What were the reasons for the relative weakness and 
instability of t;he Australian section of the market? 
In order· to thl"ow some light on this, infox,ma ti on Vias 
collected concerning the failure of Austl'•alian companies, 
as explained in Chairmen's Addresses and Annual RepoPts. 
Note was also taken of unde~writing losses shown in 
revenue accounts in the ~;ears inm1edia. tely pr•ecedina 
abso1"'ption, anc1 of c0mments in the financial journals 
which su~ g es ted that the company was f!'~;udulent or 
"semi-fraudulent" i.. e. o.ppa1,en tly gross l.Y i ncompe tent 
management bordering on the fraudulent. (4) The 
principal reasons which emerged were: 
( 1) Company pr•ofi table and financially sound, but 
taken over by anotheP company wishing tJ entera 
part.iculai-i section of the market, Ol"' to expand. (E.) 
----(li) s.)urces: Pl"incipally Ail>R 1 and as for Card Index, 
App.end.ix B. 
' ' 
-... 
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(2) Underwriting losses in Austra~ia (L. Aust.) 
(3) Undei~w.ri tin11 losses overseas (L.o.) 
(4) Weakness in assets (A.) 
(5) Desire for liquicU ty by majo.r shar·~holders (Liq.) 
(6) High costs of promotion (P.) 
(?) Incompetent. 0r semi-fraudulent management (M.) 
(8) Fraudulent companies (F.) 
'1'he frequency of thr-!:;e factors v1a.s as follows: 
A.1:!-?t.ralian companies absorbed or wound u12. 
1a71]_Jg61 .!§z1-121q l..911-29 1951-61 
'l"otal Number o 82 66 18 
Information available 
for: 
-
ReasoQ.§__J3_i V~l] 
E. 
L.Aust. 
L. o. 
A• 
Liq. 
P. 
M. 
F. 
78 
17 
42 
11 
11 
7 
8 
4 
10 
I 
I 
I 
34 
8 
15 
4 
B 
4 
5 
28 
4 
17 
5 
3 
2 
8 
4 
5 
Of the 17 cases o -f takeover' O.LJ:J "healthy 11 comn .... anies, 
a number in the 1950's resulted from the move of non-life 
insurers vv 1• n +.., 11· fe business, t.he corrrpnnies taken over 
16 
5 
10 
1 
- l 
I • 
l66 
also writing a little non-life business. Ho111ev er, the 
Peason for most of the others seemed to be expansion 
in non-life insurance. They included: 
Year C 0m1)a ny 
A be orbed Net P11ems. Absoribing £'000 k Compan~ 
1880 Sydne~ Ins.Co. 16.2 
(Syd.) 1885-1880 
1881 N.s.w. Llarine 24.5 
(Syd. )1851-1881 
1885 Sydnev Jrari ne ll~ .1 
(Syd.) 1881-85 
1912 Derwent & Tamar 22.2 
(Hobart)l838-1912 
1912 J.~utual Fire & 6.4 
General of rras. 
(Launceston) 
1873-1912 
1920 Aus tn. r.tu tu.a 1 Fit1 e 77. 4 
(Syd.)1872-1920 
1927 Colonial Mu·u~l 326.7 
Fire (Helb. ) 
1878-1927 
1960 United (Syd.) 3106.0 
1862-1960 
k In year preceding takeover. 
Commercial Union (U.K.) 
Commercial Union (U.K.) 
Alliance Marine (U. B) 
London ~ Lancashire (n.K.) 
Royal (u .K.) 
CommerciR.1 Union (U.K.) 
London & Lancashire (U. K.) 
South British (N. z.) 
Apart fx•om the 17 "E" comp!3.ni es, 59 other Australian 
coinpanies disappeared by absorptlun oveP the pe..,iod, but 
in all cases for which inforrration was obtained, it seemed 
certain that the company would have been wound up had an 
orfer not been received. 
, I 
• 
In the periods 1871-1910, and 1911-50, fire and 
marine business were the most freGuent cause of 
undervwitinr, losses in Australia, but '1n the 1950's 
motop vehicle and G'PP bnsiness v1ePe mentioned in 7 
of the 10 cases. 
As regarids unclerwrii ting, in the 19th Cent.ur y it 
became evident that dependence on particular regi0ns 
was dangerous. By 1912 thet'e were in faci no 
independent Australian com~anies with head offices 
_ry_qt in either Uelbourne OP Sydney, even t,h011eh in the 
167 
1880 's nnd earlier many nposperious c0mpanies had based 
their OPP"ations 0n the smqller capital cities. Nearly 
Rll found tmdePv1ri tinp, veP~' difficult. when 0om}")et:i t.ion 
intensified in the~r Areas, nnd bece~e easy targets 
Adeln ide Comnanies 
Adelaide IIarine & Fire 
1864-88 
Commercial M~rine 1877-84 
Equitable Fire 1867-90 
I\fercantile Marine and Fire of 
S.A. 1869-90 
Mu tua 1 Fire of S. A. 1880-84 
National Marine of S.A. 
1868 (? )-1880 
South Australian 1846(~97 
Pri ems. A bsor_bed~-
C~ '_ooo )_ 
before 
absorn. 
---
50.2 South British (N.Z.) 
15.1~ South British (N. z.) 
2.Li Liquidated. 
30.2 Commercial Union 
(U. K. ) 
4.0 Colonial Hut.ual 
(I.ielb.) 
n.a. Liguideted. 
23.2 (China Trade~s (Hong 
( Kong) 
{Ho!'wich Uni on (u ... ,. . ) 
l · 
.!_nsma111r·n ..Q_omnani_es 
-
Cornwall Fire and Harine 
1841-98 
Hob~r t 'Pawn and L~nnces ton 
1836-83 (?) 
Mutnn.1 MArine of Tas. 
1889-98 (?) 
I.fu tu.a 1 Uni on l 385-9li 
Tasmanian ~ire and Life 
1835-92 
Derawent and 'T'S"1:1cro 1838-1912 
Mutual Fitie and Genei-.al of 
'ras. 1873 ... 1912 
Queens land Fire 1861-83 
Queens Janel General 1888-91 
Queensland Hutual 1891.:98 
Commercial 
12.2 Union (U.K~) 
n.a. Liquidated (?) 
n.a. Manchester (U.K.) 
(?) 
9.6 
2.6 
22.2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
J .... ,.. .:; • :J 
SoathBritish (N.Z.) 
Alliance (U.K.) 
r,ondon and 
Lancashi~e (U.K.) 
C)mmercinl 
Union (U .. K.) 
~New Zealand (H.Z.) 
~London Guarantee (u .r:.) 
Queensland rtutl. 
(Br isb .) 
I1anches teP (U .K.) 
In orderi to lessen their deT)endence on the 
Aus tro.lian marl<:et, man;y· companies opened agencies or 
br-anches in other countries, par ticulaI•Jy in England. 
As all.,eady pointed out, in 1960 ovepsens business was_ 
still J.nsig?Jificant, but many of tbe attempts 'Droved 
• I 
' I 
' I 
I I l: 
'l I 1 
I 
disastrous. rnhe ""'oll . 
i owing ~ompanies attributed their 
i'ai ltn1e' wholly OJ' in part, to IJ011don 
.Australasian 
Adelaide Hari ne and J?ire 
Australian Generial 
I.1ericantile l.Iar1 ine and 
Fipe of S.A. 
Pacific Fir•e and i11arine 
Sou therin 
Cominonrrno.l th 
Insurance Office uf 
At1s tra lia 
Australian PPovi ncial 
• 
1857-72 
1864-88 
1836-90 
1869-90 
1862-93 
1865-98 
1903-11 
1910-22 
(non- '2.if e b11Bi nesc) 1912-23 
FcdePfll Mutual 1912-. 31 
Southe~"n Union· 1912-31 
under wr i ti nr, : 
Pr ems. before 
:exit. ~4 ~ooo] 
32.3 
50.4 
l-th. 1 
30.6 
LiB.2 
35. 1 
37.4 
213.3 
75.)+ 
176.7 
155.5 
Reasons (3) ond. (4) v1ere nm-i tici.,_ln.rl~r irnnor t-gnt. 
for comp3nies rni lin~ between 1893 nnc1 1909. A fev1 
v1er1 e unable to survivG the 1893 crisis~ Others were 
left ver~r v1enl: ?.nd were not nble to vii t.hntand periods 
of bad unde1"'writin13 riesnits. Thus, 11 number revenled 
large c3pital losse:::; in 189'7-98, althou.r;h they must 
I 
,} 
r 
} ' 
I \ 
I I 
' 
' 
' ' 
' l 
I 
I I 
' l 1 
l 
' I " I 
I \ 
l 
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I I 
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' f1 
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4 
'I l p 
l 
' " I 
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I 
have occur1-aed some a b P ( 5) 
·- ye rs c .... ore. Specific evidence 
of investment losses is lesb ~re~1cnt in lRter years, 
but it is probubJ.y sieni.fican t that t1 of' the companies 
which failed in the 1950's \'lePe Rssocinted with 
hiPe pu.rchase fiPms vihtch vreP e also v10und un or sold. 
"' 
Reason (6), high r1.,om.)tion costs, was impot'tant 
in the 1920's, rnqinly in e0nnecti0n 11·1ith f"!Oinpanies 
l1Pomoted f01-a life business~ w~1ich also en1·ered eeneral 
insui.,ance.. liumbct>s of these WGPe s~d~=:.led r1i th heavy 
11 estnbl.ishment" accounts con'li::if·inr of pro.11oto1·s' 
( 5) 
·--·------------- - .-.. -.. -~ ..... --·--- ------L--,. .. -... 
'I1h.e Austl'alian .Alli?-nce, in 1893 the largest 
Ausfraiian compan~,r next to the United and the 
Victoria had t .. J write almost £300,000 off 
total assetn valued in 1890 at £573,000. 
For 15 yeaP s it. wro f~e off' the loss against 
reserve acc0un J s, \'Ii thou t shorrinG the 
J>elevant trqnBfePs in ii:s o.1')pronriation account 
or mentionin[' the fact of' the loss to 
sha;~eholriePs. It also continued f;o pay 
dividends! In 1908 an underwriting losn 
coincided wi tb the ex!1n113ti.on ?f t.he resepve 
fund, foJ'cine it to make. publ1.c \'1hat ha~ 
occurred for t1e first time. ~t wa? t~i\.~n 
oveP by the Lqndon -~nQ._Lancash1r e ~ in tihls 
year. 
, I 
' 
' 
J 
l" 
r ' 
' ' 
' I I ) l 
I 
commis::Jion un shares, o.nd Vrr:' of1cn enrl~f losses 
on both life arn.l 0,enePnl buslhess were added on to (6) 
the so.me 11asHet". 
rri11e thiri teen fN1udulent O"' '1semi-f'11 audulent 11 
companies were o.11 pr•,Jr:ioted in ... he H380's nnd 1920's 
boor1s, but mos I:, operated fuP a numbeP o.£' yeo.ro and 
mm t be c0untecl rts effective r,om11ei·itiol'R :i.n .1..he 
(7) 
It is evident fh~t manv of +he comnanies which 
... . 
fA.iled )!rob:Jbly c1id no fon ~0?1bin·1 t·i.1.ms of the reasons 
discussed and not only hec~use of +hose offered in 
Annual ~e:Jorts. Hovrr·wcp in f·ne Pbnence of detailed 
c0mpo.ni es, the c1iscuPston must, }•emain a. t th:.s 
s0mev1hnt impressionistic level, 
(6) ThePe were frequent cornyjbints by the .AIBR about 
these companies e.g. AIBR 1922. P• 827 • 
(7) See list, Appendix B. 
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The next step is to note some characterisitics 
of Austro.linn companies v1hich vrere r.ible to survive 
for significant pcrioda. The first of these is that, 
(8) 
ot leo.st in the 20th. cent11ry, nearly all v1ere connected 
with some non-insurnnce oPef-l.nisat.ion. For· example, 
in 1961 there wei-•e 30 comp~nies whtch had been in 
existence for motle than 20 years; all except i'our of 
these had 11 outside 11 connections as follorJS: 
Non-InsuPance 
-OPga nisa ti ons 
rrrade Associations 
Chu:-· r hes 
Finance Conn.)anies 
Rur-al Coopepn. rives 
Em~loyer Oreanisntions 
Large Non-Insurance 
Pi r-ms 
I.!obr in~ Or-15R ni so ti on 
Friendly Society 
Insurance BPol{e11 
Ho. of Ins. 
--Co..§.. 
7 
L~ 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
"!:.?.!:£ e" 011 11Smal l" 
All small. 
All smnll. 
All large. 
1 large, 2 smalJ. 
All laree. 
.411 large. 
Ln11 ge. 
Small. 
Smnll. 
~he compnnies for which outside links were not 
discovered v1ere: 
Victoria 1849-
Mercan tile Mutual 1878-
S ou thern C1,oss .Assu1,ance 1921-
-
Cap Owne11s r i1~u tu.al 1926-
Large. 
J4arge. 
Small (mainly life). 
Small. 
infornn ti on svailable for l?th Oen tury 
links seem to be relatively 
( 8) Insufftcient 
Cos., but outside 
less impoI1 tant. 
. 1960 cn,€ater or less than £500,000. ( 9) Net pr ems • l n ·.=. - ~ 
(9) 
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A similap p · t 01n. may bo made i'n 
"" --~ 11 e v ei., s e • A t th e 
beginnin13 of 1931 there we11e .52 companies in 
. existence; 24 of these SlU.,vi ved in 1961. rrhus: 
Su1'lvi VuPs 
---
With outside links 
Without 11 11 
Jiqn Sui" vi vors 
(-also failino 
With o~tside l!nks ~-not rniling 0 
f-no i nfopmq t.ion 
Without outside link;J -
Business mainly life 
No info!"m!3.ti.on 
2~ 
3~ 
51 
6~ 
7) 
5~ 
28 
This· also Sll[?;>ests th'.lt n1· o.ny "Doint. or time 
9 
5 
14 
Pelativel,y leree companies hnd a betteP chance of 
survival tban smaller ones. Comparison of 
survivors in 1911 f11 om 1891 sur>ports this idea, if a 
"large" company is now defined as one with net premiums 
in 1890 g11 eater than £20,000. 
( 1) Defined. as net annual premiums in 1930 over £100,000. 
I 
~ 
; I 
I j 
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1 I 
Small Total 
No. of Cos. in 1a91 
No. or survivors in 1911 
11 
6 
30 
2 
In 1961, only 12 of the ~o 
J companies in existence 
for more than 20 years belonged to tariffs. HoweveP a 
largei-• number of compnnies f(li 11· n:: a shot, t 
!:; time ar te.r• 
commencement were t non- .ariff companies • 
Age on 
DepartUr.ie 
(years)-
0 - 5 
6 10 
11 - 20 
21 
- 30 
Over 30 
'J'o tal 
Bxi ts 
1911-50 
1· N. T. 
6 24 
9 12 
4 4 
1 
6 
26 4?. 
3. Unde:~wri tine Surpluses in Au::itralia. 
1251-:.6Q 
.T. II N. rr:.~ 
2 3 
., 3 -
2 
1 2 
2 3 
--.-
5 13 
Charts II.2, II.5 Rnd II.6 illustrate underwriting 
surpluses in the Australian market since the 1870 's. 
A.}.l a.re based on the 'I'ables in Appendix A, V1hePe 
details o.f sources and definitions will be found. 
Chart II.2 refers to N.S.rl. and Victoria only, but over 
the pei~iod these two States accounted for about 70 per 
cent or total Australian premiums. Some of the more 
41 
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imper tan t as"l"'\e t f t ~ c ·8 Q .hese statistics are now discussed. 
(a2 Firie. Chai-a ts II• 2 and II. 5 show underwriting 
Slll1pluses according to the conventional manner used in 
t:1e insm.'ance industry i.e. as a percentage of earned 
P1-a emi ums • 'Ph e f i' nur e t h Q s SU8gee igh sui1 pluses in 
Australian fi1le unclei-iwr'itinn in the 1870's, relatively 
low in the 1880's, snd much i1l11)11 oved f'esuJ.ts aft.eJ'l 1891. 
This contrast is particularly mai-iked in the riesults of 
the Cofil}}ercial Union, which made exceptionally hi2h 
profits on its Australian fire business from '1 t least 
1894. ( 3 ) After 1908 no Aust11alir-m companies sepnPated 
fip~ from of:her clnsses in 1')ublished accounts, and the 
(2) Except foP l898. The nccuunt·s r·eflect the Melbourne 
Flinders ~arr~ fire in this year. 
(3) The Commercig). Union_ was the only British compan¥ 
whose Au.st.ralirm statist.ics (for' A. limited period) 
the wPit.er was able to obtain. Its hinh surpluses 
after 1898 sugeest that it may have benefited 
rela ..... ively more than Aust.rolian companies from the 
uost 1897 tririffs. On t·he oth8r hand it ai1pears · 
to have lost heavily follo~·ting the bPeakdown of 
tariffs after 1880. This t·1ould be compatible vii th 
relative concentration by British companies on 
"heavy 11isks" - wa.rehouses,woolstore?,_c~ty sto11 ~s 
etc. Hov1eve.r statistics of other Bri tisn companies 
vrould be needed to confirm this. The Commercial 
Union naid a large claim in the "Flinders Lane 11 fire, 
but ex~entionally good results elsewhe11 e \•1ere mo::•c 
than sufficient to offset it in the year's res11lt'3. 
(2) 
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statistics on which Chart rr.2 is based nre agB~gated 
results of all companies in N.s.w. and Victoria, as 
t"EJPOJ.,t.cd to the State StA.tistical BuJ'1eaus (until 1941) and 1 
the CBCS. Befope 1916 only Victorian figuPes ape 
av'-:lilable, but these tend to confirm the Commercial Union 
ra esul ts, exce't)t tha 1; they show a more ma1-.ked decline (4) 
over 1912-14. 
In b·')th Cha11 ts II.5 and II.2 the Australian 
I sm,pluses ape C1)nsiderabJy hinher in most yea:rs than the 
surpluses (\'!OP ld Viic1e) of Bri ti~h compRnies, notably 
after 1940. ri,he exceptions nPe the 1880's anc1 1920's 
and five individunl yen"s: 189~, 1913, ~914, 1936 and 
1939. In the 4l~ years 1916-1959 Pesults v1ere clistribut;ed 
as follows: 
Underwri tinR Sur.J2.~_qn_ 
Prems. per cent. 
-10 - 0 
1 - 10 
11 - 20 
21 - 30 
Over 30 
3 
11 
8 
18 
6 
J44 
22 
22 
44 
(4) See .Appendix A, r'flable A.6. 
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These differences are so strikine th~t it is of 
interest to search for possible rieasons in the statistics. 
There seem to be two principal possibilities. 
Tne fir's t conc~rns t.he ;)as t 19hl results only. 
It. is that the n.s.w. nna. Victoi-ii::tn results are befo11 e (5) ---·-
taxation including s tn~:lp L1uties, llcence fees as well 
as income tax. It is assumed that taxes a.re not inclnded 
und.eri "expenses of manaeement. 11 in the Board of ryit•ade 
ste.tistics, but if some taxes~ included and 
Aus ~-1~a li an taxes n t1e J1 ela t.i vely hi.~h, the .results of the 
comparison may look different. mhis is true or the 
]?Pe 191+1 fiqut•es, bl1t. in the op~Josit.e sense, as the N.S.W. 
and Victorian surpluses nl"e nfteP all taxes, including 
income tax. 
In order to tes+. ft-1e post 19}11 comparison, the 
stat.istics of N.S.Vl., Vict.orin and of~h.::r st.f-ltes were 
dealt Vlith separntel~r with estirre.tes for stamp duties 
and licence fees as regards the first two. 'T'he results 
nre shown in Tnble II.19. 
·-----·----------~------------
(5) But not fire brigade charges. 
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riiable II.12__ 
Fire Unde"'' · t · 
·- - .1. ,vr1 ino Surnluc:-E~1rned nF· t-..:......--.....0...:.:-~ on Premiums 
- ,__,r c en ,. U y Cot'.' d A States, _12LtJ_-6b. ·- ~-·-~.!-~ll__u~_tr1llif!.!] 
Pe· 1 iod U.K • F ~ 'V 
--
--.. 1 •V • ~ • Vic. S.Aus t. Qld. Cos. B -----·-- --e.for e Afte11 ---S.D. S.D. 
- r~~=tJ. 
( 1) (2) (3) (l~) (5) (6) ( 7) 
1942-45 11.0 26.1 21.1 21.2 22.7 23.3 
1946-50 9.4 14.4 8.4 30.8 17.7 22.0 
1951-55 1o.5 20.0 13.0 2l~. 6 
-8.3 22.t) 
1956-60 5.8.X 16. 0 6.o 26.1 27.0 18.~ 
Sources: CBCS and U.K. Bo·.3.1 .. d of' rrrade s ta tis tics, 
Noi-.es: 
and as for A-•}.Jendix A. 
k = 1956-59 only. 
+ ::: 1945 onl:,r. 
S.D. = s h'1mr• duty. 
In N.S.W. tho rate of stamp duty on fire 
noltcies was 6rl. per .£100 cuvep 1939-55, ond 
9d. ,Per £100 o.fteI' 1955. -On +-he basts of 
st:::ttisi·ics 1Jf ["Je! 1age fi-c•e Pates (H.s.w. · 
Stntistical ReQister - st~tistics'discontinued 
in J.'.970in) '···5r. peY1 zn 00 was about 7. 6 of pi"emi urns 
in 1940. A 110\·tinr, for' n higher' o.verane level 
+ 
of HH rai·es (nof· includec'l above) 3nd assuming 
that rates declined over the period, t:he 
folloi'1ine pcl'centages w611 e assumed and dednc ted 
fpom pre-tRx suropluses (col. (3)) to obtain 
col. ( l~) . 19L~2-l~5, 5 pel" cent; 19Li6-50, 6 :per cent; 
1950-55, 7 per cent; 1956-60, 10 per cent. The 
Victo.rian rrit.es (col. (5)) r1e1"'e cnlcula ted simply 
by deducting f:>om pre-tnx surpluses the licence 
fee in f'orce ove1" ~he period, 3 pe1" cent of 
Pl" emi ums. ri:he Suu th A us tra li nn and Que ens land 
surpluses nre after £11 taxation, incI~dJ...112_ 
nlloca tions of inc0me tax as t1nde by companies. 
west Aus ti~~li::tn and Tt:tsmani.'1n sh:d·istics a1'c· 
not nvailable in a suitable form. ( Co_nt ._) 
' 
' .. 
·' • f l 
·. 
I• ' 
~ ~ .,, 
! • 
In ench case th;:: ner• ··t· 
1 ... ,_ ce, .-1oes re}<::l 1 °' 1·o t t. 1 stir1; us en '.."ln ..... in"· t ,._. ·..., · I..• ~- ,o .a 
pc.r.iod :1-...,'"f-Lt·o ·~h iotnl enrned pren5_tm1s fox• the 
' . "' , r P. v er ri.r• o - ,, ... h 
of individu«l v ,-_ .-· · '\·"' 1.JJ t .e percentt.13es 
v edP& ~~l" ~io ·1· d t • 111ables belOV/. ~ • .. ' uO ~"lP~> 1.C ,() sirn1l;;p 
It is evident that t'1e rouch adjuRtmf'ni mRde fop 
H.s.vr. does in fac·t b1"1inn 1r.~.\~' (6) u ·1 ..., v. s11ripluses rnor•e into 
line with U.K. ones. !I O\'/eV et• in f~e 0ther States, 
the ratios anc more t~sn ~ouble the U.K. ra~ioa, except 
l• n Q OU ~-h A l. , • ,, • ( 7) v t,. un 1 raJ.lt: m1 11 1nn 1951-55. l'flhis is eDJ)ecii:J.11;/ 
nota.ble in Sou f·h Aus tpalia anc1 C:ueenslnnd, a~~ the 
(8) 
suP-pluD es ·::r c 11f tc.i' r:. lloc:1 4·i ons of income tnx. 
mhe second posi:.liblP explr.mB ti on of hloh s1u1 ->luses 
is thn t the Br•i tish comprin:,1 fi"ur>eG Dl'e net of nll 
r ei nstu•n nee t"' 'tns·1c 'ti ons. r1heref1.s the Aus ~- 1,~ liA.n 
take Recount of "J.or'11 11 (r1ifhin .~usirnJia) reinsu11ance 
only. A ccordi n81Y, \'i1i l~ th; fi 0 1.lt' es 1)rob11 bly '1.ccur•a te ly 
(6) 
( 7) 
(8) 
Sugge: ting th'1t the ·1 eJ:t:ivc1~1 henvy H.S.W. 
stswp duties h·1vs noi· been IJ'.l"'sed on. 
This clefici t is due to nn ecir• thquake r1i1ich caused 
conside•1 able danmze in l\c1elaicle. After t.he 
ear t:hquake the taei fi' exh•s. p:1 er1:1:u1n f'o;1 eqp th qu'1ke 
cover w~w increased beyond the gene!•al Australian 
level, and this i1robo.bly pep tl~r explains the hier. 
sUl1 plus duping 1956-60. 
The CBCS s ta tis tics r11.J:.1ld be much impri ov ed if 
income tux \"rere sepo.patcd frurn taxes such as stamp 
duL.ies :ln~ lici;nce fees. 
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show profits waa~ b -1 
•
1
' Dl ..... inr.'l.H'ex•s concerned vii th 
Australinn risks 
' 
the profits of direct vritinr 
.... 
c01npani 0s I>Ulilis'ri nv i nf'o11rn'1 ~i vn · 'i nJ 1 cunceri ni n~~ 
to make ra0f·11Pns to .1.11e "U.E. Bor.rd of l'j1pade and since 
rinble II.20 
- ........... -----
Li A us f· "'it li ·rn C 0111ri'"1 ni es ,:?ire .JI.pr. EH'\7t' 1:...t.iPJl 
Snnnlii'SeS on PPe1:iiu1:1s er1Pned. 11en cent., 19-bt§-59. 
- .. --.. -...- ~ .. --·------_____ ............... ______ ,_, ........... _,__ - -·--
U. K. 0'lnnd .fi!.!D~~:§ VictoriaUni+-ed 1L£~uS1._~!.~ 
COS. fi-is:-Go. {~_rr£nderis Cos!. 
(1) (2) 
19'48-50 9.4 
1951-55 10. 5 
1946-59 5.8 
Source: 
Hotes: 
I ' ) \ 3, (4) (5) (6) 
9.4 Ui •. 2 11.5 x 20. :~ + 
10.2 19.5 :21. 2 16.4 
4.7 20.8 28.Lt 15. 7 
U.K.Boo.11 d of 'r11 ade Retur•ns. 
x 19h9-50 only• 
( 7) (8) (9) 
J.6.1 ll1. ~ 
5.6 15. 0 lL~. 9 
2.1 15.8 15. it 
+ 1950 onlJ' • 
All statistics except cols.(21 and (8) '1r1 ?'"l>n 
basis 0 1~ c011!Kmies' 0vm trinnsJ. eps to Piiof1 ,, 
and Loss f:.C'C•Ji.mh:;, und eAl'ned prewiur;s 
( companiec' own p ... erilium i 1 eserves). Col: .. (2) 
and (8) are calculated on ~he basis 0~ n 40 
peI' cent premium r·ese11 ve. 
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Except for the Q.nJ 't_eq 1·hen e s tu ti.c 1 ics SUQf! ec f~ a 
profit i·a te 50 to 1~~) per cent gri ea teri them the i~a te 
for U.K. companies. 
Bef'ore 19Li2 thP State statistics refeP to fire 
buniness only, but the CBCS statistics in 19b2 and after 
include Sprinkler T.eaJrnge, Loss of Profits, Hail nnd 
Househ0ldePs' Com:wehensive. No stntistics of 
commission or exnennes nre c.:,J1ected b<l' these sub-
classes, hut loss ratios sun~cot that all were 
extremely profitable. with the cxce-tion of hqil. 
Fil"'e nnd SL HH LP Hail 
1942-45 29.7 23.7 18.3 54.8 
1946-50 26.0 24. 5 27.2 116.4 
1951-55 31.6 hO.l x 16.5 66.9 
1956-60 31.6 21. 9 17.7 80.7 
source: Calculated frJm CBCS Stats., E,inance BulletiQ. 
Hot,es_± x Ear thqunke in Adelaide. 
SL = S:pPinkler Leaka~e. 
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(9) 'J'he Unit ea fi GUI' es are 
expense alloce tions to 
i"la tios /..fira e eXJ)e_n.eer.~, 
\total exr>enses 
were: 
heavily i nflnenced by hi eh , l 
the fire nccoun t. In 1959 the 1 1: I 
divided by (fire PI'e_mi:ms. \ ; :f 
total p'!'emiums J · ~ 
. ' 
t 
I 
1 .11 f" 
1.20 'I 
! I 
Bankers and 
Victoria 
1~ueensle nd 
Uni t.ed 
1.40 
1. 5Li I 1 i , 
} 
) 
\ 
r 
• 
..(]2) Marine • Undepwr,it'ing surs11luses on maPine 1 business 
are shown in C~arts II~2 and II.6, based in ~ables 
A. 2 and A. 7 in Appendix A. 'Phe mos f-, notable aspects of' 
the Australian results ape the very heavy losses during 
1895-98 and the exceptionally high sm•pluses, by 
comparison with British comp~nie~, f11 om 1918 at"least. 
Again, af tep 1898 no Aus t,,_~alian com:rinnies separated 
their marine operations in published accounts, and so 
. , , , ( 1) 
Chart II.'2 Pelies on officially collected statistics. · 
During the 42 yet•l'S 19·18-59 .the dis tPi bu ti on of 
surplUGCS was: 
Undsg:_'!-:~~1.t~_n[1_Surn.!: 1\f q_! of ·Years 
1,T S '"/ 
. Q.K. . Pr- ems. ner cent. l'! • • v ., 
-- & "vie. , COf?.!. 
-10 and less 1 
- 9 0 1 8 
1 - 10 1 8 
11 - 20 2 19 
21 "'O ,;) 12 ·g 
31 40 16 3 
41 - 50 ,5 51 and over 5 l \ 42 42 
----------------
_____ ..__"'t" __ ... ____ ,,,_~~-------
· ff" ·a1- o~atistics (1907, 1909 and afteP) rrb Vic tor1an o ici.,. •;t '" ' " "· • 
·· e . 0 ·i Union· results relate('. to relatively 
and Comm,~rc1a 1 --- ana., 1,10 ,, r.oi'· b·P..··vr:>rir Pood -, ; vo tunes · ,(,,.,, · ! ,,,, \,,'/ ·~ ~maf-1 ~J: em:u~f' A~stralia-wide Sl.1I'J.Jlu.ses, ind1ca1.ors,, u"'." • · 
(1) 
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.As were the fi1.,e st t· .... 8 18 •,1cs discussed above 
' 
af'te11 1941 N.s.w. an" v· t . . a le o.riian marine surpluses are 
before f-111 tr-txation, includinr, l"ela t1'vA.ly , 
. .1e11 v:,r stamp 
~ .i. h auqr c nrges in N.S.Vl. In l'J13bJ.e II.:21, +11e suripluses 
. 
of four States hnve been crilculated afte11 tRking account 
of taxation: 
rrn bl~IJ_._?J~ 
1v1a£.1ne Unde1., wr i tinP. Suppl uses. on P.remi mns ERPned 
uer cent. U.K. Cos~nd Austr·ali~n sta=fes;l94;2=~o. 
Period 
( 1) 
1942-45 
1946-50 
1951-55 
1956-60 
u .1\. 
Cos. 
N.S.W. 
Befo1~e ~f_t_e_£ 
S ._D. -- S • D. 
res~.) 
( 2) (3) (4) 
29.6 58.8 
17. 9 44. L~ 
13.2 35. 7 
6.3k li0.8 
,...3 8 ::> • 
39.4 
28.7 
Vic. 
( 5) 
58 .. 0 
27.9 
S •. 4us t. 
(6) 
41.7 
26.6 
J~3. 0 
20.9 
Qld. 
(7) 
26.0 + 
30.3 
24.9 
17.7 
Sou1.1ces: CBC8 and U.K.Board of rrrade ret"urns, as 
for A-~1pendix A. 
k 1956-59 only. 
+ 1944-45 only. 
S.D. =Stamp Duty. 
rrhe N.S.W. Stamp Duty rate was 6d. per £100 
of cover 1939-05, 9d. per £100 1956 nnd aft.er. 
'Phis is o.ssurned eCJ.1.li valent. to 5 per <;mt of 
u1.,emi urns 1942-50, 7 per cent 1951-55 and 1o per cent 1956-60. For Victoria the 3 per 
cent licence fee has been deducted from 
surnluses before tax. ".:'he~South AustPalian and Queensland su1.,pluses 
nre after all t'.:!xes, ineluding allocf-l tions 
of income tai. The Australian State sru,pluses are exp1.,essed as 
percentages of written pperniums·_1ess commissions 
e.dj"•Jsten t.o. a 50 per cent. -premLum r•eserve. 
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The U.K. premiums ape net of commission 
and adjusted as described in Appendix A 
fop rnable A.2, Col. (5). 
I ' 
I ; 
r , 
It is evident that even on t~is basis Australian 
slu .. pluses were Vel"'Y much higher than those of British 
companies. 
The Australian marine statistics do not take account 
uf overseas reinsurance, but the Board of Trade re tuPns 
of tl1 e four Australian companies also reveal high 
surplus es, even thol1gh it is likely thn r dira er. t_ busirJess . I I 
l 
0utside AustJlalia - particularly in J .. ondon - was ( 2) 
imnoi-- tan t • .. 
'Table II.22 
y Au~tr~~ian Companies; __ ~ia_r:J:_~e UndePVlr~.t~i.UB. 
S'\IT__P.lus~ on p~ .. emium.s P,er cen t, 1 .1.948::.5-9· 
I 
I ! I 
p . d 
... er10 
( 1) 
19L~8-50 
1951-55 
1956-59 
Source: 
Notes: 
I ! I 
U.K. Cos. q~and Bankers Vic t. United '' j I }d A us tn. , ? • : 
l I ' Cos. r" '1 
-- ,,1,,r 
l I 'I 
! :i . 
{ • I \ 
'1 
Ins .Co. & 
Traders 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (?) (8) 
I 11 I 
• ' l ln. I ii . ,, 
' rn 
17.6 8.7 33 .l.i x 31.6 + 31.2 
13.2 Jl.2 36.2 16. 2 
6.3 8.6 30.7 8.7 
19 .• 4 
25.9 
25.9 
18.8 
28.9 
24.4 
' I I • 
, ( ~ I I 
' t 11, ; ) 
, 1ri i t 
! It 
:·,1L 1
1
1 
• io1r I 
, 1r. ! u. K. Boarcl of rrrade Re turns. .' ,g· 
1 
i 
x 19h9-50 only. ; ,1; ; i 
+ 1950 only. .p • 
0 
·1'1:; l Col. ( 2) is calculated a ... te1 .. ad JUS tm:--n t f ?r .. 1 ~ b. trary Dt'emium rese.,ves as expl9.1ned 1n 1 ·i l f. 
o.r 
1 d~ 'A ... ~ Ac tuo.1 transf'ers by British ; ;1• l f 
Appen ~xs .to Pr•ofi t. and L;:~s account from (Cont ) i ·f ( i 
compan1e · · J • I I; 1 ~ ------~==~----:-:-::-=:-:;::-;::-~-;;;;::;-:----...:...===-...:..... i '" ; ) (2) The four companies all had London offices. { ;, f '} 
t l i ~ 1 ' ~ l 
t ! t ~ 
£ I- i l 
1
1 ~ ~ I!.,\~ 
L; r !l:' j!j@ Ii 
~ari~~ accounts do not-. a'})peara to. bear much ~el~t~on to current profitability. NevFrtheless ~?· .. ~ansre:-is, exrn-i ~ssed as pei-icen ts.ges of x~~ ~ten. p.rero1u.n:s are shown in Col. (3). A 11 the 
to P~al7~n suriplus ra ti.os are based on transfers 
t e ~f1 \, and J.;oss. and written pPemiums, but 
bh --Y1 .. a_ffer very li tt.rr.e frvm survluaes cA lcula t.ed Y .ne method of Col.(2). 
In the detailed comparison of the u. K. And. 
Australian statistics a number of ot.licr fRctoPs need to 
.· 
be consiclered, but none alt.er the general impr>ession of 
quite extraordinaril~3~igh underwriting margins on 
Aust.ralian business. 
(3) One important. differ•ence is thai· the .Austi~alian 
CBCS stat.isf-ics include pr0visions for outstanding 
claims, but the U.K. f'ip.ures claims 9aid u1u-•ins 
the year only. ~his would tend to understate 
Australian relative to U.K. sur~luses. ~he U.K. 
figures include aviation hull business, separated 
from 1948 onwards~ but although on the wh0le this 
was less profitable t~an other marine business, 
the differ»ence vms not nearly sufficient to bring 
non-a via. ti on m'.:u1 ine su1•nluses to anyv1here nea1.., 
the Australian level. A mo •e significant difference 
is thn. t hull business v;-as impo1•tant fol" U.K. companies, 
but (p.robably) very li1:~:le was v1ri.tten in Australia" 
':!1his mn.y explain 9flrticulRr periods of relatively low 
suruluses for U. K. r.ompcmies. For example, 
Fairnl~ quoted the f?llowing fourth ye~r.l?ss ratioR 
in the hul;l unr~erlfrri ting accounts of a Br1 t1sh 
company: 
1923 - 107 
1924 - 104 
1Q25 - 103 
1926 - 134 
1927 - 122 
1928 - 109 
1929 - 100 
1930 - 81 
1931 - 81 
1932 - 63 
( T.\"" • ..... lau .-.1 Dec.1935· U'lme of Co. not civen. No ~alr1J .v' -' h 11 d . t1· 1" e··cept official stetistics of .u un erwr1, l~.- A 
aviation - shown seuarately). However, if U.K. 
(Cont.) 
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_lQ!Yorkers' Conmensa tion Workers' Compensation 
premiums in 1916 
accounted for about 10 per centJ of total 
p:,, emi urns in N, S. W. ::i. na." V1' c t·""'r"1· ,.., ' 
v c;.• and 13 pep cent 
non-lif'e 
in 1925. Afte11 the H.s.w. Workers' CompensRtion Act of 
1926 theri e was a big i nc.Y'eas e in N.s.w. premiums, and in 
1930 W. Comp. business was about 20 pe.r cent of tot.al 
N.S.W. and Victorian business ~h t 
... • - e pePcen age Pemained 
at about this level the,.earter, both Rs regards N.s.w. 
and Victoria, and Australia. Afte.r 1930 therefore, the 
pronounced flue tuation in t.he profitability of the 
business (Cha11 t. II.2) affected about one fifth of total 
non-life business. 
__________________ .. _______ . 
~gotnote (~) continued. 
non-hull surpluses ~·1e1.,e at about AustJ:>alian levels, 
this would imply heavy hull losses, o:r very low 
surpluses, for mosf~ of the period; in ot.her words 
that price discriminAtion WAS keeping world cargo 
ana. internal m'l1:ine rates at rela ti vr-ly high leves. 
In view of the st.ruct,ure and open natur>e of t.he London 
marine market this seems unlikely. Another 
:possibility is thRt. lO\'/ lT.K. underwrit.ing suI'pluses 
v1e!'e not passed on to insureds. as low rates, but to 
brokers as high commissions. If this were so the 
Australian figura es vmuld mer el;y reflect that very 
little Australian business v1ent,tnr0ugh brokeI•s over 
the period. To assess thi.s DOSsibility stati~tics of 
U.K. maririe com:nissLons would have to be s1·ud1ed, and 
these were not collected by the Board of Trade. Again 
on eenei"al g1"ounds it would ay,>pear unlikely t:ha t this 
was a significant factor. 
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In both Victoria (from 1914) And N.s.w. (from 
1926) Government Insuraance Offices were important 
c ompe ti toPs r'or this b11si nese, but as Chor t. II. 2 shovTS, 
in most years underwri t.ing surpluses of the Gov ernmen'-
. 
offices were higher than those of the rest of the (4) 
market. 
Althoueh profit margins were hich in some years, 
periods of losses ~nd low surpluses produced average 
margins very consideraably Jm•rer than those in fi1-ae and 
~arine innurance. ~n ~able II.23 these are sh0wn 
sena11 a tel v f 01-a th1-a ee States. In a 11 three stamp du ties 
. "' 
were negligible or non-existent (Victoria) and no 
special allowance need be made. 
Period N.S. W. Vic. S. Aust. 
-
( 1) ( 2) (3) (4) 
1942-45 12.2 16.1 1o.0 Ix 
1946-50 8.2 11.6 1. 7 
1951-55 11.4 8.7 16. 2 
1956-60 -1.9 4.0 0.5 
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I i ~ (4) 1 11 is surplus after• bonus paymen t.s. "Underwriting surp us 
Sources: 
Notes· 
• --!. 
r,Bcs statisttcs and a~ for ~ablo 
A pp end ix A. "' ·· '"" A • 3, 
~a Af t:-r ,s11 t.axa ti on, including income tax. 
: xat.1on not separ3ted from manarement. expenses 
:n publfshea sta tisrics. ;..; ' 
Wo!'kers. Comp. business in Queensland wns 
run entirely by the GIO from 1916 and has not been shown. 
wePe 
.l\fte,• 1947, when innusf·rial nccident.s in Brit.Bin 
covePed by the Hntional ITe:tlth Scheme, the business 
was no longeJ" shown separie t.ely in the U.K. Board of T.rade 
st.a tis tics. However befo11 e this surplus es of Br• i ti sh 
c0mpanies 'llere hightep tl-ian surpl11Ses in N.s.w. and 
Vict0ria in most years. 
d 1\1otori Vehicle and Com nlsoPv ~h.iPAl:~.r:_ty. Like 
Workers' Cornr,iens9.tL:m business, moto'..' vehl.cle und motor 
vehicle thiI'd party insuPance wePe less ~l"'ofitable in 
N.S.W. and Vict,l)ria than fot• U.K. Companies, over the 
years for which comparisons can be made (Chart II.2). 
Snppluses nlso fluct.uated v1idely. Before 1920 this was 
not; particular J y si2nifican t for over all i~esul +.s, as 
i.W premiums were only about 2-3 per cent of total premiums, 
but after 1920 HV becnme r:mch mo~,e impo1~f;ant, and with 
C'rP accounted for !:!bout 37 pel' cent of totttl premiums in 
1960. '11he percentages wePe: (5) 
(5) crrp b iness commenced in Victoria in 1939, j_n N.s.w. 
· - 194~. rrhese shares are for N.S.W. and Vic. only, but ~~vsely resemble ,Australia-v1ide shares: see Table IV.2 
p.103~. 
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MV CTP Total 
-
--1916 2.0 2.0 1920 3.4 3.4 1925 12. 6 12.6 1930 19.1 19 .1 1935 16.8 16.8 1940 21.6 21.6 1945 19.2 4.5 23. 7 1950 16.8 5.0 21.8 1955 25.9 10.1 36.0 1960 25.9 11. 2 37 .1 
In both N. S. i'J. and Victoria n htnh propo.Ption of ..,:, 
CTP businesR was \'H1 it t: en b~r the Gov er nm en t Of fie es, but 
' 
as Ghnrt II.2 shorrs surpJus pat.es with GIO business 
... emoved did not differ ..,reatJ'r from results on total 
~ .. •''-
business, although i,11ey were sli~htly more fav)urable 
t v the pp i va te com11anies. 
rr'he pattern of low SlJr})JUses Or1 losses after 1945 
was also evident in ~ueenslr-tnd P.nd Sou th Aus '-N1lia 
Table II. 24 
MV and cmp Under111~·i tinr._Suppl_~Q._on PremilJ:.111~ 
Earned uer cen_t;-u:-If. Cos. and Australian 
States,:~2u2-~Q!. 
Pe1"'iud U.K. Cos. U.S. 1tl. Vic. ('\ - d ...,1 • S.Aust. 
( 1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
18.0 15.6 35.9 + 7.8 .L 1942-45 11.7 I 
1946-50 -o.B -9.9 -13. 0 -6.7 -3.5 
1951-55 0.7 -5.6 -5.9 5.7 2.2 
1956-60 -3.1 x -2.0 -1. 2 2.3 1.8 
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gs ources: OBOS and TJ.K. Boa11d of 7.r.ade RetuJ•ns, as for Ap~endix A, l'J1able A.3. I : I 
I I Notes: x 1956-59. 
+ 19Li4-L~5. 
I After all taxes~ including inc0me tax. ! l I 
I 
A'.2a'in, stamp duties \'1ere not ~mpor-tant and the Cha1-.t II.20 I! ! 
surpluses ape bcfo·•e all 1·axes. 
1 
I 
! 
' 
I I 
It is unf ortuna 1·e f.ha t Hie CP,CS st.a tis tics do not 
:..11 loca. t.e comi.iission ~md expensen t.o !.'lV nnc1 crrp b11siness 
sepBr:J. tel~r, but it. is evident f11 0m the following loss 
p ::t ti os that C'TP vms the most impo::i t'3.n t f:::tc top in losses 
1)P low snr:f")luses nfte · 1945. 
(6) 
lt\T 0'11P 
19l-t2-45 51.0 46.6 
1946-50 67.5 108.7 
1951-55 65.4 116. 7 
1956-60 68.7 99.0 
'- • 41 Cl "" •Chert. II.2, sec1.1on -if:.) Miscel~ane0us asoeo._ 
· ...... lt1aes 0.1 all clnoses not so • .....}1 e und er·"~'r; tin n sur , · SDO\'!S 1.. ~· ... .,j ~ 
fa1, discussed. ' r•elat.1· vel.•1 hir..h mar2ins ~hcse again snuw ~ 
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( 6) Sourc.~ 1..,BC ' - :i "'a D;-e;~inrns. assuminr a Lio per cent . ''.. t ~ 
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191_ 
r~ncing between 10 and 20 per cent before 1930, and 
f'1:-0m 20-30 pr:-..r cent a1)PPoxirr.1·e1~, af'te.t• 1930. The 
coverag8 of 1:he U.K. statistics is nut. closely compnN1ble 
except d.uPing 1931-47, but" fut' what the comparison is 
r101• tb the Australian nn..r:iins appear 1~0 be Pa th er more thsn 
dot1ble U.K. ones in most ~rears. OVF:l"' t:--ie ent.i"e period 
"I"a sc ellaneous 11:1cc:oi.m ted for about 1 O :1er cent· of total 
-r- ..... 
1 ~ 1 a ,., . t . . , ' • t 1 ld b f ed ii.;:;.,,. an 1 ic.or10.n premiums, rru.; 1. s1on c n0.:. 
that from 19l!2 Ifrl, I.J?, E:rrin}::lc.~r L~ak'tge anrl !I<:iiJ were 
As before, Table II.25 ?ives avcra~o unde~w~itin~ 
snr>pJ.uses by the indivic11.1-:l 8t.~~tcs for• rrhtc'h nt.!lt.istics 
'lPe B.vailable. 
Period 
( 1 ) 
1943-45 
1946-50 
1951-55 
1956-60 
~able II. 2~ 
N.S.'T!. 
- (?) 
27.2 
22.2 
~1. 8 
15.6 
Vic. 
(3) 
40.1 
29.2 
26.3 
20.6 
Glc1!. s. Au.st. 
(4) ~5) 
13.5 37.2 
30.0 28.6 
16. 7 21. 2 
17.3 16.1 
Sources: and as for Appendix A, CPCS s ta tis t.ics, 
'Table A.4. '" h"'noe in definitiun·in 
.. 9' 2 n.,t r<l-1 ·•":n due lo c. ~ ~,), -
..t.. L' v " ..... .., " 1 ..:> ta but 
,_ ~ .r " _ suruluses a!~ e .Je.1. Ol' e · x' , 1hlS wear. . 'f' L 
st.amp. duties insigni ican'-'• 
Notes: 
. ' 
I , 
j ' ~ 
. ' 
It: t' I-' 
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In the CBCS statistics commi· . 
• • 
1 ss1on o.nd expenseB ope 
not allocated· to sub cla 
- sees, but loss ratios ape of 
i. n t er es t ( rr n b 1 o Ir • 26 ) • 
1£.ble II ~.26 
Australia: Loss Rattos fo" Lliscellaneous Classes. i942:b'6:---~ ·~--~~~~:;.:::.:;::;.;..:.;::~ 
_......_ --- 21 
Per c en ~a., e of 
-·-. . ) --..... 
'Tl o ta 1 Pr ems. · 
--~~o_ 
Pe~,sonal · 
A CC"i dent. 3.40 
rrelevisi on 1.4h 
Public ..., . 1 ~.1. s \'. 1 • L11 20.6 '"'!) 7 :>~ • 
3u'rl., lary 1. 27 20.5 29.8 
All ~isks 0.70 44.1 SJ+.6 
Fl'tte Glass 0.36 l+O. 1 Ji 7. 6 
Aviation 0.23 132. Li 33.4 
Live-Stock o. 22 Li6. 1 147. 6 
Gu.c.'1Pf:l n tee o. 21 5.3 7.8 
Boiler 0.19 16. 9 25.6 
Pluvius 0.07 57 .1 94.4 
All other 1 • 11 25.7 27.4 
rr0tal 10. 61 32-.5 40.7 
,, 
37.0 Li6.0 
37.8 
31.5 
54- 9 
59.1 
48.2 
49.Li 
11. 1 
36.4 
60.7 
27.2 
76.5 
L~9. 7 
24.5 
35.6 
56.3 
l' 
j I 
I' l 
'' 
: • ' l 
' 'I 1' l I 
I , · i 
I ',I'. I 1' ! '!'I 
I ~ I : ;· : Ii 
------·-!: 
34.5 48.3 l l ; ' : ill 
·---t'; I . I\ 
I ;·I; ! 
j •I ) i 
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Source: 
Note~: CBCS, ·E]..nance Bulletins. PePso~al Accident -is included with 11.All OthepH 19li2-,o~ but wal:i the most important line in 
all P~riods. ~elevision was sepa~ated for 
t.he fir-st time in 1959, but was unirnpor-tant before then.' 
(1) Total business. 
- -
Befo~e the 1920's overall results 
in Australian undeJ"'VlPiti11g m~inly depended on fire and 
marine business. ~efe~ence to TAbles A.5 and A.to 
shows ln11 ge fluctuf!tions in under\7PitinR sm1 pluses 
before 1900. This is nlso 1ll"'JXlPen t from Chr.111 t II. 7, 
drawn from statistica to be explained below. There was 
a very rapid decline from hir.h levels in the enrly 
1880's, recovery in 1886-1888, renewed decline 
1889-92, high Rurpluses 1893-95, decline nnd losses 
1896-1899. From 1900 until 1920 nlu.'"Jpluses of i'ive 
Australian companies were Pelatively stable, and fell 
(?) 
below 10 per• cent in onl~1 four yea1"'s. 
In the 1920's and aft.er\'/. Comp. and l1lotor Vehicle 
business becar.1e incrensinglt important, and CTP after 
1945 .. ,_, one of \~1ide 'T1he general pattei-in was 1,nen 
fluctuations in surpluses in these classes, and a 
.relatively low avepage level, against hi~h snrpluses 
d ,ated 1 1·nes marine, and miscellaneous. in fipe an ?'.le_ - ' 
This is v1ell illus t1 .. a ted in the ~esul ts of the fOUl"' 
----
-------------:-:--1--f-J.' t" - Chart II. 7 - was ( 7) Table A. lo. "Theoreti~::l. pro T • ... 
less than 1 O per cen ,, in onl; J of tr1e 21 yea1-is. 
I I 
l ( 
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\ 
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l I 
! 
I 1 • 
l 
' I I 
I 
Aus ti ... alian com · 
pan1e9 already discussed (Table II.2]). 
E.~iod 
. 
( 1 ) . 
191iB-50 
1951-55 
1956-59 
Source: 
(2) (3) 
10.3 14. 2 
9.0 14.9 
6.9 15.8 
( L1.) 
30.3 
28.9 
24.4 
(5) 
-4.4 
-7.9 
-4.4 
Mis cl • 
TIDCi. w. 
Coaj"E. )' 
(6) 
7.0 
6.3 
5.9 
Notes: 
~--
U .K. Board of.' rr 1,r1de RetuJ•ns. 
~r,r;r c;:i,r1 ted 1\ cc\nm ts of' lJ!~e=n1_sland ( 19lr8-59) t 
nan~ers r.nd 'Jlraad~iis ( 1949-59) Victoria (195?-59) m1rl Fni t~ (19.51-59). ·-co1:19anies' 
u\'m Ll'[Hlsf er c fr•om l1 evenue ~=iccoun tB to 
PPofi t: and I.,,y .. s. 
It. i:::: no-t2ble t.hq t the J_)rof'i t~ble classes are 
'the ones with \'lhich tay•iff O!'~anisntions have had r.1ost 
concern histo1"icall~r, and over r1!1ich their influenr:e 
remains strongest. (See Table II.8, p.121). On the 
other hand the J.esn pr•ofitsble lines have all been 
subject to Government control or supervision of rates, 
and t.0 Pela ti vely s trone OIO comre ti tion. 
Despite these differences, undel1\7ri t.inc surpluses 
On L ~O l 1-tl..,.; noss i• n .Aus !:ralia hnve been higher thsn l· 0 I.JU. iJ •J - l v 
3Ul"J?luses of U.K. and U.S. com"0anies (Ch~n·t II.2 o.nd 
I' 
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Table A.1, A;:nendix A). "'.)et 1916 :.·~, .o, ,Vfeen _ o. nd 1959 sux•plus es 
in N.s.w. anc1 Victot1 ia wet:ie g1•eate1, t.han U.K. company 
Stl!'Dluses in everv year except fou~, 1924-19~7. ~he 
S'llr}1lus 1.,0.te of U.S. stock fir•e and casualty cot1}?anics 
exceeded the n.s.w. and Vtctorian rate in onlv one 
" . 
yenr, 1927. A.f' teri 191+5 J\T. S. \'I. Hnd Victorian surplus es 
v1ere even hiGheri with ~-.he r•esult.s o:r the Government 
('f;"'• .. J .. ices 11emovea. 
ststistics 2re c0m:-~red v.rith 1·he .'!r·owth of G.N.P. or 
11riemiums (Ch'1.rt. II.3), it w:11 be se.en tly1t ~:11ere 
W[1 s some tend enc~· for- m'J. ri~ ins to .nnrPOJY d11r in.~ times 
of b•)om, nnd ID, den duri nr; recessions. 'i1hus, braoad 1:/ 
S!ieaking, m1rs·-iluses declined in the 1880's, 1920 1s 
and 1950's, and incpeased in the 1890's, durin13 
' 1900-04, 1914-20, and the 1930's. XX"~:<~~~., 
~¥~~'X!Xxlx0Ck~x. 
·rn Cha1 .. t II.2, after 1941 ~he N.S.W. nnd Vir,torian 
erur:rluses e.r e a2ai n before all taxes, inclndinn s tai:1p 
In 01 .. der to help assess t~e credibility of these duties. 
s ..:a tis tics, in r."able II.28 surpluses are shoV!n :ro~ 
J i· and b~y States both before and Af~er Aus i:ra 1 1a 
tax8 i:ion. 
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'.rtlble II.2C 
U. i::. Companies, Australia and Australian States1 Total Business 
Underwriting Surpluses on Preni1.1111s Earned per ~i· 
~· Australia ~· Victoria ~eensland S. Australia Cos. 
Before ~ After All fil.1..£9.!.. All filQ All Cos. Before 
tax tax .""Ta"X Cos. 
After Before After 
w filQ ~ 
Cos. ex GIO tax- tax ~ ~ 
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (a) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1904 - 07 18.S 
1909 - 10 14.6 
1911 - 15 ho.2 12.6 
1916 - 20 12.9 10.9 25.2 
l(21.9 
1921 - 25 s.o 2.4 13.7 a.a 
1926 - 30 5.9 3.4 7.6 
5.9 18.a 
' i 1931 - 35 6.3 13.l 15.9 
7.1 20.1 
I 
1936 - 41 9.7 10,5 17.8 
115,0 18,S 
1942 - ~5 13.6 26.l 16.9 23.7 6.1 24.6 21 .a 35.9 27.4 
... 23.7 ... 14.5 19.4 
1946 - 50 9.5 14.a 10.4 lo.a - 9.5 12.3 20.4 
24.1 20.2 13.a 9.0 12.8 8.2 
~ 1951 - 55 7.9 13.2 8.7 9.0 -10.6 11.6 11.4 - 4.9 12.5 17.9 13.8 6.4 2.0 
1956 - 60 2.8 9.1 s.2 4.1 - 4.7 5.& 
10.8 0.3 11.7 10.3 7,2 12;3 8.6 
Sources: Board of Trade and ca:s statistics, as for Appendix A. 
Qld. 1917 - 38, Annual Reports. Insurance Comnissioner, 
~: T 1913 - 15 ; 1935 - 3a ... 
xl917 - 20 
~1944 - 45 Taxation in the columns for Australia, Queenslend and South Australia refers to Al! taxes, includin;J income tax. 
The N.s.w. and Victorian fiqures are after ill taxes, until 1941, and then after estimated stamp duties and 
licence fees only. The U.J::. figures are before U.J::. Canpany Tax. 
Compa1'!ison or cols. (1) and (2) sugnests that 
Australian were al t d (8) 
mos· ouble U.I\. margins afi·er 1942. 
From 1948 it is also possible to compare 
( 9) U.l':. and Australian post tax result.1:1,· J.h 
u_ v.UEj: 
U.K. Gos. 
·--·------
.Aus tt'alia ..__ __ ..._ 
i948-50 5 ') 
• £;.. 10.8 
1951-55 3.7 8.7 
1956-59 0.9 5.2 
It is evident froor11 f'T'!nble II.28 that for t~e most 
ns.pt sui-•plm:;es in individual Stn.teD \7Bri:· nlso in most 
excen~ions r:el''C w.s.w. in the 1920'n .• ~ueenslnnd durine 
1926-30 ')l1d So111~h /nrntrinli.a duPin3 1951-55. Sur•pluses 
on non GIO business in both N.S.W. nnd Victoria, tnken 
business. 
(8) 
(9) 
Austi,alia-\•ride expenses, commission etc. not 
available befor·e 1942. 
Undei-iwri ting sur-rluses after all ex:rienses and taxation, 
uer cent on earned :•rerniums. o:i , -T r 
-s our c e o • A s for rr able I I • 2 a. .!.• o :i i· ·1 e u • 1:... C os • 
•
0
• r · 110.i.h Rece1·~'),,_'"'") in Proof1"t ( "Othe1" Exvenses 1 m1n~'lS \,er ... ' .., ~ ~...., -
c-tnd Loss .Accoun t.s has been a.educteu fr om 
co.lcula ted underwriting su11plus es. 
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Despite the higher level of' Aun t~,?.lio.n s11J'pluees, 
chan!2,es hn ve been 11 .Juc,hl~' in accordnnce ni th ch[.1nges in 
Brii tish coml)r11;1 .,.,,l"lnl1 ·1sec- (C'hQ t II 2) 
- r..;. .r 0 u..: .. ... •:I. ..J <<. .r ' • • 
pattern of both was hl2h S't.1Y'pluses dur1ing the J?i.rst 
World War, declinin~ in the 1920's, risine in the 
1930 1 n, hir11 in 1·11 e 1940' s, dee Ji ni ng af tE:r 1945. 
Flt;ctuations in British r-esults in hlr'n follo\'1 those 
of U.S8 companies, no doubt reflectinQ, the high 
:pronoPtion of B,..i ticl1 Corm!:tn~r 1-usiness written in the 
U.S.A. (In 1958 3bo1Jt hO ret1 0ent). 
(ill Defee ts of_1111d~J:17ri till~l._SnI·.:21us Rs a m~asure!.. 
The sur•plus pqfj_o ... discussed in the YJ·'levluus sect.ion have 
five ~rinci~Al wcuknc"scs. 
1. mhe;y de'~C'nc1 on .-tr>bi trio.1'1y unex')irec1 ~1rerutum 
i1rovini ons. 
2. • t ~.I. 1' y-r.> .I. eo of They depend on companies e.., i. .1-. t, o 
,.1 t 8 .r.....,nding cl•)irns \"hich 11ay be in3ccur::i.te. •) ~ '-'"~ - .. ;) " - ' . 
3. Comi)arisons rna~,: he influenced by differing 
tax rates on pr erni urns. 
,. n~ Qccount of invPstment income and They ta;:e v u. 
cs:pi tal gains. 
5. 
indicated. 
" 
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As regarcls the first two weaknesses,in the absence of 
d<~tailed .fnformation very little can be said. However it 
seems likely that in the long run they ma·y not be very 
imoortant.(l) 
• 
Conoerning._point (3), in Australi~ indirect 
taxes on premiums were most important for fire and marine 
insurance. For example, in N.S.W. ~fter 1955 stamp 
dutie~ and fire brigade charges took about 20 and 10 
per cent of ,premiums in these classes, respectively, 
but v1ere insignificant in other lines. To the 
extent that such taxes were oassed on the nremium base . . 
aoainst which s~rnluses are me~sured was rais~d. For 
~ . . 
t~is reason it is of interest to consider alternative 
measures such as surpluses expressed as percentages 
0f c.laims. and ex9enses. 
-·------
(l) See discussion, Appendix A. 
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However, if this is done fop the Australi~n statistics 
111) ch'1nges ar•e involve( i\n., the roneraal conclusionn (2) -
already reached. Indirect taxes Rre n0t 
senap3tel~1 shovm in thr; H.K. r-t~1tistics, but the 
~ifference betveen indi~ec~ t~xes to ~ot~l business 
in AuRt~alia 9nd for U.S. s~ock com~nnicc does not 
·---------·-... --____ ._ ____________ -
( 2) For ex3mole, the f0lJ0win0 were percentaq~$ of ) 
estimate~.under~riting surpluses (a~ter licence fees 
in V1cto.r1a )n J.960~ 1 . 'i"1o t.: 8 tim'.1ted 1'._Q._J2t e iu~lfl§ Ii' o e 21.@§ .:::.!._ -- -
earned Con Jiseion ;;axes \ 
--- ~11us ,E.B. c~ S.D. 1 
.,.__ 
exnenses. 
-· -
to 
P1 .. erni urns. 
--·-----.... 
17.3 62.0 50.0 12. 2 
24.3 58.3 106.2 3.0 
-1.9 -2.Li -7.6 
w.corrrp. 7.2 10.1 39.1 
8.9 16.5 30.5 
Sotu•ce: S f' - r· /1 .. )·- Pnd ix f\. CBC , n s - o ·, -- -
' f t 
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de above (Seen. 3(f)). In 195:1 ~'lrJ"'cent~nes to earned 
nPe1nillms 'itePe 2.8 (U.S.A.) .... nd :{.8 J 8 (~ ) ( 3 ) 
_, - j.. HUGi"Y'FtlL:t. 
(.Q) 
11 Theo~:_q_ti,~~..£.2f.ii'.\ In OPc1cr to :131" 'Ll;y 
.l..<tkc 8.CCOt1nt f .a.• ,,::> 
0 1 nr: .LJ1Jl.,th Wcnl:ne.os, SCl,ies Of 
"theoreti<"' ... l 
of Aus traJ.ian 
COr.'T!_ianics \'!ere C":lClll'..'l.tcd. nhCDC' ~f'C Shu\7D in 
Charts !I.7 and II.9 nn~ t~vendix A. M~hJes 
nnd A. 9 • 
. t\us tra lian or1ned c0m:...,anies, rnn 
e:xtr>o.c tea. from 
o.cr.ounts sum.mPiSC!o nnm1riJlv btr f-he AIBR. The second 
. ' 
~·r oup consists of f1. vc c :JHnr,nles, '1'l1e .t~neenslanq., 
_(:r~~.~?.l.t...G e_n_~:;:_~l.. PrE:·mi um income of thE; 21, ou:p 
accounted for the f;11J1tn~ ~e~ccnfa3es of DUbliohed 
_./ 
-~rer;iiums of Austr<!.ion cor.1"p11ntPs (includin~ 
subsidiaPies of U.K. coi~panies). 
~lf 
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2.02· 
Pr_~Q.:!-J!Tll:S_ as nep cent of Pu1 l' 1 _ _..______ . 
-.;...L J.S 1Cd . A 11 1We-mi'\.tms 
DP ems. of' ·· 'fr(A~w t..rali a Ai.iBtn.-cfo~. ------·---
-----·-.... ··--.. 
1890 177 31.1 n.a. 
1910 l~OO. · 53.9 n. a •. 
1930 1837 114. 8 15. 9 
1950 415.3 38.9 8.9 
;_960.· 15141 29.1 8.4 
It is felt of fn c: r::, oup ape a 2 oocl 
incl ica t.i on of' all puhlis11ed Pesu.Jts, but. it is evident 
t- rr::t t o.f t er 1930 C.t leRs~· t.l:C'.'·,; fi111'.r not') ,..,P,'clnl' .. r 
. ., v c 8 11-. _ ., 8.S 
f .r> .... • • • • e J.._ ec 1,1 v e a :.3lU de to to ta 1 Aus f".11.2 l i."' ... 11 1 "'· .. ____ )U.:.:ilness. 
"Theor•etj_cAl :i:i-iofit" is <3.efined as 1:0tal ::1rofit 
sr1aj~eholc1e.rs' funds mu.1tir)liec1 b~/ t:l1e yield.on 
Government bonds. Tl'' t11 ° "r r:1 '')h"' l' .z. .: "' e vi"r ,..., c- S e ~ -'- J .l.o- 'l~ w """"l ...;. 1. J.u ,.l•l! C:i.,J a as a 
profit m~1rein on premi urns on th':'. assumr:-,'d on that 
shareholdePs ,. funds (S.F.) were invcs ted entirely in 
,.., . . ' ....... b ., d'"" .. 
\,7 ov er•nmen !J _on .:i. rrhe conce!Jt ncco.rd ingry hJ.kes account of 
.. .. J...... · • ... •· ·.i.· n· of th·"' tr0de "•na-. rku.·i::-," t'11an extent is a be~~er inn1ca~o ~- 0 G ' - _ - • 
underwriting suriplus alone. The inr9ortance of mal<ing such 
-·-~----~ ·-----~---~----
- -- -gr):-
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an allowance is indicated b1, 
., per cen tnc en of 
investments and total 
earned premiums. 
assets in excess or" S.:51., to 
1890 
1910 
1930 
1950 
1960 
Source: 
ITO£esl 
102 77 
70 Li2 
101 71 
148 109 
117 7.., 
' I 
AIBR 
"Investi1Jents 11 ape de:f'ined as t0taJ. assets minus 
Debtorstbrnnch nnd Aconcy balances, and cosh. 
'rhese pe:·t~entaf!_es a.re subject to ~"fide 
fluctu2i;ions due t0 c'.1an'1CG in the timinr of 
vnri0us pe~n-:icnts. Fop example, the 
c0n'centr1n.t.i0n uf ~' •cuitun receipts in th.-
baluncin:J month ">l.,oduces n Pela ti vely hir,h 
:'igu,.,e for lJpanC'h and a13enc~r balances, debtof's 
and i1e11 ha:ps cash. 'The quar teply or annual 
po.~rment of reinsw1 anco acc.;1.mts rnay also have 
an im~orto.nt influence if ~he time of payment 
is alteJ..,cd rel::i~;1.ve to balancin!3 dates. 
Reference to Appendix A will shov1 that 
11 
... h eor eti cal 11 rir ofi t rms r re'.'.1 te1., ""han undel1\7ri t in° 
:1rofi t b~1 a marr!in i-anngtnc from nbout 7 pep cent to (Li) 
less t.ha n * per cent of enrn ed ~w emi m;is .. 
(4) Compare cols.(5) and (6),- mable A.5, Rnd col.(4) 
'rable A.9 v1ith col.(4) Table A. 10• 
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Impontant factoro in thic marrin ape: 
(1) '11he t:ize of ~he provicton for t.:mtstanding clR.ims. 
'rhis in tux•n ir: likely to he influenced by tho claos 
c,Jmnosltion of' f·he ~om:Danies' portfolio. Unfor tuna tel" 
" 
nei. th er ~he account i f-n eJ.f n,)fl cJ nss com~)osi t: ion n '10 1 '' 
11ublished by Aus t11 ~ Jinn <' )tlp"lnies. 
r•isks, de:penrling on the aver'l~e ~ci1 r1 of ;;olicies issued. 
( 3) rriho .r etw:1 n on the t nv cs t:men 1: of i-hesc n c counf· s. 
unefulness of the ~oncent. 
(4) If S.F. are in fnct invented at n rai-c hi 0 her 
OJ1 J.cruer t·,hen bond yield, the "theore1·ical" m:.H•2in v1ill 
ba over or undcrst:atcd. This cffe;ct (5) vili also vary with 
( 5) A f t er l 9Li 1 r e la ti v e ly com]_Jany tnxa ti on -
J"an;.;ing t1~ 0m :.:tbout 15 hJ 45 !JC'"' cent - means tho.t. the 
t: . f .... , full P.1.v•e-tf.!X b·)nd vield may unde:1 nta.te a~sump .ion o 1ne _ ~  
L' t. 1 
·neore 1cu me.Pe ins. 
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Despite these last qualifications, the· two series 
useful as indicators of Profit marcins if the reasons 
. ( 6) 
va1,iations a1,e borne in mind. In particular they 
seem to reflect impo1,tttnt: ev~nts in the histoPy of' the 
Australian tariffs, to be deacribed in Chapter IV, notably: 
~ariff collapse in 1882. 
Revived tariffs in the early 1890's. 
Com:r>1.,ehensive h:t1,iff o~rc·crnents. 1898. 
R3te WR1 .. in Westepn Aust.J,.$.lia, 1906, 
New entrants, especially non-tariff, in the 1920's. 
Ne\7 entpr·nts 8nd incr6asing coin~etitiveness in the 
1950's. 
A 1so, ~·heoretical prof'i t-.s epe n. measupe of notional "eturn 
on S.F., if n. fixed l,~t.io ·:Jf S.P. to pi-1 emiums is nssumed 
t 0 be apl1ropri ate. For exmnple, if the a ppr opPia te 
L • 
YIR 1 .. 10 r1ere 1 : 1 the theoretical ,1rui'i t: nremiums 
... .... se.Pics 3ive 
r>e tes of return on s --:i • J~ • above bond yield. 
1£~t,urn on nhnPeholders' f1mds. The most 
if.1nop tan t defect of the neasur es used so ftt.r.t is that they 
(6) 
not related to the funds i nve~-; ted · the same 
over 1~h e en tire period, for both p,x•oups of companies, 
external ""iorPoviing (c1ebeni;.~1'1eS~ .I.mortgages, bnnK 
overdraft etc.) ,.,as non-ex1s ten,, or nesligi ble. 
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n1.,oup of companies, Cho·'ts II l+ nnd II 8 h f' t 
· • .. • s ow :pro i ,s 
expressed as Percentages of· shareholde-•s' funds. '1.1he 
sctual statistics and details of sources etc. will be 
found in Appendix A, Tables A. r-;, A 8 A 9 A 
.,, • , • and • 1 O. 
'Phe measur•ement of prof'its in this \•ray Paises the 
nroblem of the "a,..1p.ropriatett i•atio of S.F. to ppemiums. 
As Charts II.4 and II.8 show, this r.ati.o in fact 
flue t.ua ted conside -.ably for th r-- f'-Pou11s c1::mside1,ed; 
discussion belovr wi11 also indicate th3t the.:..,e ig 
t·y;)ically consic1ernble VHPiation bet.ween comDanies. 
Since an inswance com::-:i.n~r :receives premi'l1ms 
before ~ayinn out claims, it has no need of initinl ca~ital 
:"ol: the reRsons thnt this is Pequired by most ne1i1 fi.rms. 
'"Phe function of' \~api !;al is to :1rovia.e some ass'IJJ'ance t{lo. t 
~r1e company wL1.1 be r-tble t~o p~y cl~~ims if it, runs into a 
1)eriod of losses, 01., is not ~nlly protected by reinsurance 
'10ainst cat8.str•oPheR. I•1 or this reason it has been })Ossible 
.J • 
for numbers of c..;mpanies t:.) commence 011era t.t •)ns on 
(7) 
"')ua.rantees, without actuall;v raisinc any cash at all. 
/1:::,ai n, Bspecially in the 19th c·en tury, it has been common 
tor companies to operate with Pela ti vely lar;_!.e sums or 
) 1 . J.l vapious Government Offices, and ( 7 ? . 2 • in A us t 1., a i a , ·-· 1 c 
lT. Il.M.A. InsuN1nce I1td. 
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cn;.Ji tr-.1 isouec1 but''tlnC[.llled. This contingent liahili ty 
on shareh0ldePs vms viewed as an impo1,,tant p~J:>t of the 
protection to the insured. In Tnble A.9, Appendix A, 
;:rofi ts of' the f'i Ve companies have been eX)!ressed as u 
riercentaee of· S .F. plus uncalled CR:?i tal, but this pPobably 
~1as little meanin3 unlecs the S.F. : p1,,emium r>atioi were ver~1 
much lov1er i.e. unless there v;ex1 e some l"'eal 11yiosnect of a 
~ -
l1i3h propo1"'tion o!' the uncalled liabtlit:r 3ctually being 
cnlled up. 
In principle, the "inv~::-tr.1ent 11 in insur>ance should be 
~ecided by considering the funds the investMent of which is 
ni2nificnntly in~luPnced by the fac~ ~hat ~hey are held to 
be "b::icking 11 for i.nrnwnnce ope1-.:::l tions. 'rhis inves trnent may 
be underf·.~ken b~r the r:uRiie.ntoP!:J of ~·he comprmy, b~1 ovmers 
o:L' shn1~es subject to an lll1C'!'1lled liabi li t-.y, or by ~he 
...,n i'"self In l)Pa~tice it. may be ver;;' difficult. to C0Y:JD..... ';! 1, • _ _ -
'1SBess, becnuse: 
( 1) The need of insurance buyero to be renssur ed about 
.i.t.' •• 1--: bi"· t " +· cu~nipany m::,y VRP,u, '1nd r:JGy be Pel:1ted to . r;; sta .Ll. ,y Ol .,ne _ ~ 
such factors as the re:putation of its manacement etc. 
be l·ni'lue11ced by views of the share market (2) It may 
~ t t t "adeauat.e 11 baclcing~ 
·1s to v1:'.1a t c0ns .i ·u es ... 
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( 3) The desired ra t1.o to · 
PPem1 ums ma~, vari~r according 
t.o the retur.n of the business \'rriitten. Business wlth·a 
stable loss ratio and a low catastrophe .t•.isk vrould 
~:resurnabl.y require a lower Investment/Premium riatio than 
business with an unstable Joa t· ~ h 
. ..., s i' 2 , 1 o a na a hi !J. 
catastrophe risk. 
(4) Related to (3), the desirable Patio woulc1 depend 
on reinsurance arx•angement.s .. 4. highl~' Peinsured company 
1·1·J11ld presumably requiroe a lower ratio than a company 
Vii th.Jut e.xt.ensi ve reinsurance. 
(5) ~xpect.ations of' t.he dlrect0rs (anrl outsiders) 
.~:.bout: the future state of c0mnetiti.on will influence the 
(6) Expectations of the _dtr1 ect0Ps (and outsiders) 
•1b.)nt. the p;_"ospects of existinr; investments. 
All these considepations mar:~) t.he concepts of "normal" 
o.1:1 "nveiiagr;- 11 S.F./ppemiti.m r?.ti.os or rates of return 
difficult to envisage. However it is possib.le to. distinguish 
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.• , numb er of fa c to!'S . Vlh i ch in the long run probably (mol' e or 1 es s yr I 
.~111t0m&.tically) limit extreme. cases. fl j( I 
-- ------------·---.---~-1-·-a r-1c-1 ---------------~!!': , . 
( 7) The "S • F •/premium" lictt-io in .. J is .. " ~rh1ee ~~!~~:n~oncept . {i_·; ii; I 
i. '" .: c i· ntended to also refer t.o i1 .. 
cun\.eXv J.o I I . II -:it'o· rt:: .. 
of' t.he "Investment Premium re .. 1 • .. :\) ·: i 
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It the S.F ./premium l'a tio is "too lm7"' broke1•s' 
agents and instwed ::.re likelv 1 
.... ~o bec0me increasinQly wary 
about doing business with the company. For this reason 
the comp" ny 's Pr emi urn vol umP 111 1.1 el t hP. r fa i 1 to expand or 
even fnll. An (~)olute lower limit may nlau be set 
by lenislation. T~ fh ,. ~ .... .!. • ,._ .r•a c1 o is low bece.usc of 
1 1i~1h reinswance, unde11 wr•1 ting 1wofi ts and so the r•eturn 
on .func1s will be .reduced to the exten~ of thP p1,of'i~s 
of the .Pei nsux• e11s. 
If the S.Ji1 ./r.remium p·:.t:io is "too hinh", the 
business of the com:rv·iny v.riJ.J. 1:f'nd 1:0 inc11 ease if i.nsu.red, 
brokers, anents etc. regard it 
ns an es-neci:tll~r "s:-ife" 
v 
C•Jl1J"'Jany. If p!.1 emium v0Imr1e in ~he,rnn.rket i.H incJ•easing, 
such a company 1·1ilJ. not find it ner.cssaJ>,'' to Pnise nevr 
c:-:i:•i tnl as soon as r.om::ri nies vti th lower P~- ti os. If i. to 
u , " ' ! n · t ex.i.ensi· ve i· ts unde_i1 t'1'r1· ti' n°_, supplus may be l'cla ti vely 
ni.;h as a result. Also Sllch a comnnny ma~/ be vrilline to 
;;u , sone. o ,. t f . i"ts J~.unds into riskier inv~stments with 
1 
.i.· 1 h" · ret.urns, since it may c0nside11 them to be t1 e_a :,1 ve y inn -
c;urnlus to its r equip emen t.f' fol"' i TISU1.'.'D.11Ce hacJ:ing • 
·-----------:--:----~~~=-·----·-----(8)"E. g. in the U.K., 10 pe..r cent 0f ~rerriiums~ See Chapter €5:,)ilt> 
S ecn. 1 .( c). 
I 
I I - -- --------
' I 
' I 
t 
I I 
I I 
L I 
I 
J l 
! ' 
/I I 
' I 
I I I 
I 
I I 
! I 
1i I 
.i I 
l' l 
'! 
r 
) l j 1 
I I ·I ' I 
! 
! 
l 
' ; 
I 
I \li• 
I I 
•' 
.. 
fl-
Por thr-!se l'easons, " 
aespite the ~ifficnl1ies in 
the c0ncepts involveu~ 
' in t~e 10110 t 
o run ,he ro. t:e 0f Pe turn 
0n shareholders' funds is Jirobably a not 'Lno.cc11ra te 
i.ndicntor> of· }.)Pofif·abilitv. rr 
" - o\vevep th er:- arc two 
f'u11 t!1eri conside:ra ti •)l18 ·a:11· nl_1 
.._ - TnQ~T lead to sho1"' t-Pun 
i nae c1.U"'acy. 
ljihe first of th ep, ~ i G the. r ~;~·-· e ' · 1 , PP-ni.rn \"Ill be 2reatly 
in:'luencocl. hy compo.nies' VFJ.lvs.ti.Jns of invesi;ments. 
It seems likely that Bri~ish and Austr·,Jian i.nsuraance 
8umpanies are conserv'1tivc 'lnd nndfJt'stat.e 2scet V:Jlues 
in most ye·-irs. 0Vf'r lon(' periorl.s in 1\11~'trHlia the 
~l)ni·inuous inc1•ease of p11 cmiur:i v,:>Jumr> '1.nd the neecl of 
c0mps.ni.es fv!:l P.de01.1s.te "covc_l"' 11 (1' e "'d ' 0 ..., / • 
-... • • • Cf_UR1;e w.~·. premium 
r 2 ti os) has ~1r obn b lJ' lna 1· o i)er i odi c'..1.l ~·1P i tin~ uri of 
nssets. Also the need f·o i~ivc shareholdePs Y'eturns 
C.JMpqro.ble riith those obh1i..nAble f'11 0l!l other COTDI(ll1~cs, 
3nd to keep share prices ht2h, mq~r be impol•tant fop some 
~ompanies in Auot"alia in vie~ of the large 
(9) ov e:•s ens 
(:roups on the lool..:out for t.a!(COV e.:.1 s. 
rrihe la. t ter nof n t has been 3nnli ea ble in mos i· 11 eo.r s to a 
relatively 'sr:1all number of cornpanies. Thus inv mid~l961 
, l I 
' 1 
I 
I 
. I 
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l 
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} I i I 
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r ~. I 
only 13 non-lii'e insur>ance cor.1r.ianies \Trere li.sted 0'n ~ !1 I 
Ai.istralian st0ck exchan~es. In 5 0f thes~ ove!'seas intePests ~ 1" J 
held rrojori ty holdinf's. In 4 of-heps non-insur•ance f)irrm ~ 1 1 
held majority or> la.:>3e intePests. Or1ly 4 - A!_R. •• 4.Holdin·~~, 
Jrercantilc r.rutual, VictuJ'ia, and Australian General -
may havebeen susceptible to the pr'essures c1esc1.,ibed. Of 
tll~se 4 tJ1e Aus tra~J..~enerR·l ~vas contr 0llen hy t~: 
mercantile ·1.'Iut~, and the business of ll..P.1\. Hola1 n~ 
wns mainly life. Howe¥.er lu t!1e 1880's e.ucl 1920's the 
listing of companieQ9 closel,y held was )"[l thep mo1,e 
impoP tan t. 
The second rossibili ty is that therE mny be n 
l~~ bet.ween PD.isini; new rsipi tal and ·rle·whing the 
appriopriate Premium level: in the meantime the insurance 
cor-1pa11y in er.feet act.r.; as an in1cotmcnt mana•,:!.er uf' the 
"excess 
11 
.funds, on be!m'lf of its sharepoldcPs. 'T'his 1:ind of 
ef'f'ect is most fl1f1r1~ed in a depression when PPemitim volume 
falls away ranidly. In Australia, between 1930 and 1933 
t11e nrcmil.un income of t,he flve sanrnle conronnies 
- - -
drop~ed by 35 ~er cent, S.F. increased by 12 prr rent, and 
11-ie rstio S.F./1werniums inc.!1eqsed from 1.43 to 2.46. 'Phe 
y 
i\.1 1~)32 ~nd 1933 wns not Pe.fleeted in the f'Ote of rebu-in 
on fundP. ( Compnr e Chn.r ts J:J. 8 n nd II. 9). Indeed 
11els ti vcly high underwri tin2 surpluses tbP0uehout the 
1930 's and 1940-• s a~)peared !:ls i .. e1R ti vely low ra te8 of 
return. on the other hand declinino uhderwriting surpluses 
and utheoretical" margins after 19'15 
by a rapid falJ in the S.F./Premiurn 
were more than offset 
Tdtio. In other 
· th~ rate of return on funds were periods, too, changes in 
movements in this ratio (Chart associJted with .1nve:rse' 
II. 8) . 
t . aqain tn mind, Charts IJ.4 With ~any r.~serva ions _ 
~holoss of intergst. Once ~ore they and II.8 are never\,i .... - . (l) 
. . . tabilitv in th'= 19th cen-cury, 
show cons1derable J ns _ _:__ ----,,..,--t~h;-e--------
~~~~~;--:-:::::-1;• h uld not be placea on . (
.[' Too are at r~J. i.ance s o 11· a 1.i..l")n1_1011 it wa~ i:hp thirrl 
r.; - .. ,, 1..:Jn.-.n resu .... ~s, _1.. _, •• h 
.. ~us i..L'cil.L~n .-i. L j • ...,..., omoany dLfrj ng the period s .own laroest Australian c · (Chart II.4). 
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rPlatively high.profitabilit'r uo t 
. ,o 
~he l920's. On this measure nrofit 
were also. relatively low. 
1920, and decline in 
rates after the 1920's 
_lct)_ _C_?.pi t~u.J:Q_f i t_s ._ Chart Tr 8 l · 
_ · · . .• a so snows "capital profit" F~r the five sample corn!)anie s, as revealed in published 
1ccounts • 
11
Co9i. tal profit" is defined as the difference i.n 
. . 1..J ' f d 
sn3reno .. ~1ers lln s at the beg.lnnin<J and end of a year 
n0t attributable to retained pr0fits 0r new caoital 
' 
a c tlla l 1 y sues cribed. As re cia rds timj no, these profits we re 
~r0bably more closely geared to changes in premium income 
t'· an to actual changes j n the market value of investments •. 
Nearly all were revealed to c0incide with transfers from 
reserve funds made to reduce uncalled li~bility on shares, 
bonus or orem.i.um issues of new shar.~s • . 
It is obvious that capital oains were an important 
of inc0me t0 the five componies, ~nd that this is 
likely to be especially true in times of inflation if the 
v:::- 1_ 11 c: 0 f inv0 stments moves with i:he C)eneral J.eve) of prices. 
·-)11ring the 10 years 1951-60 i~evealed capital gains v1ere 
~1'!'1St ,_ oer cen o · · . .L , • ~o t f total n~ofits In the U.S.A., under . 
~~~t~ insurance laws investments are valued each year at 
11rket prices, and the resu ~1n0 1 . · uinvestment gain" published. 
,. t· for IJ 5 stocY. fiTe and casualty "h0 Rest's star.is .1cs - · , • • 
-----------
C'Y1panies show that over --- ·· 195] 50 these qains accounted for 
- lmost half total profits eri:n-:e b r Federal income tax. By 
"'r1· nc1· ,..al co. m,rJ onents of profits were: , ~ ::i c ad e s the ,_, v 
. . 
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y.s. Stock Fjre and c -----.:.-~ ---€.~J~al_t_y__<~q_rnP...~te.§...z..l 911-59. 
Percnntaqes 0 f 0 J • ~------~--~ - ----...!l _ 1:. C.:t..b_ '?._J.:QP r S 1 S l 11' ()] US • 1011 '? ______ _._, __ ._ 
~~~,::2. ~::~-~~ 1931-~0 1 
.L._, O 1 ·-- .3 .. ·-· _G41-50 1951-59 • . . 4 -·3·;.-r -- -·r:-r -
l..~ .2_ _____ C?_!. 8_ 6 • 9 5 6 
i..,.9 10 5-·------- . 5.8 
Iriv.Income 
• 1 o . 3 9 :rs --------6:9 
C~oital Pr~fits A ? 
=---1· .7________ 0_~1 0.7 3.1) 4.9 
. io.9 - ---fr:-0---1-:::>- _n _____ --,-,--
... __ ·---....... - • - .... 8 
To7.al J\ssets/P.S. - - ·---· ·-- ·----- · --- - - -- -- -- - ·-· - ··· 
per cent 250 241 213 
Source: 
---
i\1ote s: 
-----
23'2 240 
Best's lire ~.lcl._<;a.?_l!?..!.tY.. !ig_oreg_ates and Averaoes 
- - -- - . - . . . - -- -. . - ··-'- ~-' l_o_~~?.· 
P.S. =Policyholders' SurpJuc;. 
:\1 ~ i:;ecqrj ties valu8d at narh:lt nTices, exceot ., 11
1.12.Qh grade bonds" f0r which a·nortised values 
usea after l93l. (Best's ... ,Preface o IV) 
"P ] . h J ----- ' • 
f') J.cy1 o.ders' c:1p·p1us" i..n U.S. terminnJony 
corre.sr..,rmds al)pr0xirn~telv to ushareholders' 
f d II ' • un s as used aoove. The averages a~e of 
total surpluses ~tc. in each of the years 
covered, ojvided by the total 0f 
policyholders' qurµlu~es in each of the years. 
After 1942 all ite~s ar~ heforP Fed8ral income tax. -·--~ · 
?r0bably due to a ~elatively high proportion of lon~er term 
0usiness, the U.3. ratios of assets to policyholders' 
~ 1 1rolus are hiah relative to Australian ratif')s, Nevertheless . , 
kxx~l)J){ixJdc:x~l0',,.<xklx.x~ if a si.fl1ilar procedure were adopted 
:-o.c .i:he val11ation of ,1-\ustral i.an company investments it is 
li~ely that considerable fluctuations would be revealed, 
•·1i. th the orobabili ty of more substantial 0a ins than are 
• 
s'10wn in Chart II.8 during 1908-14, and in the 1920's and 
1 9 50 t s . 
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Previous discussion has suggested that underwritin9 margins 
on ~remiums ha~e been considerably hi9her in Australia 
I I 
' ! 
I 
I 
i 1 ~ : ~ I 
than .far U. K. Companies. P.ow do orofits comoare when account 
. . 
! : : i 
' ' . i ' I 
' I l' 
is taken of investment earnings and shareholders' funds? 
The Board of Trade returns allow such a comparison from 
l . l 
I. 
I, : I ! I • I 
! 
! 
t ; 
1948. In Table II.29 9rofits after taxation 0£ U.K. 
c0-r1oanies are shown against the results of three grour>$ 
' 
' I I I 
' ' l' I 
! 
! ' l ' 
~f Australian companies. 
Year 
{ J_ ) 
1948 
9 
1950 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
~ 
7 
8 
9 
1960 
( '.?) 
5.36 
1.84 
5.87 
5.74 
5.31 
6~32 
7.52 
6.53 
4.65 
4.06 
4.40 ' 
6.30 
I 
(3) ( 4) 
7.15 -1.04 
6.81 3.23 
7.98 1.96 
6.19 ') 7? ..J. v 
6.38 1.14 
7.80 3.48 
7.87 4.88 
7 .34 3.08 
4.62 2.56 
4.21 5.25 
6.62 5.18 
6.84 4.84 
33 6.11 
33 10.04 
33 9.94 
36 9.92 
36 7.52 
38 11.?.8 
39 12.75 
41 10.42 
43 7.18 
45 9.46 
46 11.80 
49 11.68 
51 10.79 
8.37 
8.20 
9.78 
9.12 
8.19 
10.34 
11.04 
9.1~ 
8.99 
9.34 
9.62 
9.73 
9.34 
' I 
I 
' ' 
q • 40 9 , 06 i :· I 
· I I 9 • 44 9 • 23 ! I ' ! l ,· 9. 68 9. 27 : 
~ 10. 29 10. 72 I 
i'. 9.26 9.36 if 1: 
\I 
I' 
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S0urc0s: 
U.K.Cos: - ~pard of T.i:ade Sum'!larie!?..t_ op.cit. ~~stralian Cos. - published accounts, mainly from 
- - ._.. -~--
r-.rotes: 
---
. -._BR, Jobs911' s Investment Diaest and Insur,!Jn ce 
!e.§L Bo_ok....Qf_ ]\\1.0'.:i~ J.;-il._~~w z.; a 1 and,_ - --
The U.K. stati s ti.cs ::ire calculated as f·o.llows: In 
col:(2) underwriting surplus is assumed to be equ1~alent t0 actual transfers made bv c0m~~nies from 
revenue accounts to Profit and Loss a~coun~. In c0l. 
(3) underwrjtina surolus is as calculated on the 
basis Of COffi;Janies I CW:n premium rf:SEr'/eS, GXCept f·')T 
marine insurance. (This is the sam~ as underwriting 
surplus described in section 3(f) ~bnve). Interest 
and dj vidends v1ere obtained from revenue accounts 
and tbe nrofit a~d loss accnunt. To this was added 11
0the r Rece iots 11 (co] • ( 7) , ~ ummari sed P. & L. ac c0unts) 
• • and "Exor=n(;es not ch1r('ed tn Other Accounts and Otner 
Payments 0 was deducted· (col. (12)). 11 Shareholders 
i=unds 11 was t"\b ~ained f r1rn the s 11:-rrnarised ha.lance 
sheets of U.K. c~m~anies carrying on both life 2nd 
non-lj fe ins~rr--;c;ncP. It c0nsists of the surn ..,f the 
fol1owino items nivAn i~ the Board 0f Tra<le Summary: 
..; -
Carital P.oid Up 
Othe:r 'risu:rance 
General :ind 
Investment 
Raserve Funds 
Profit and Loss 
Rd. ~r TradQ C0lu~n 
2 
4 
5 
6 
minus the sum of all unexpir~d r5sk rAserves as 
- shovm in revenue ac~oun~s ~nd calc11lated 
arbitrarily for man.ne ousine ss • 
. f .:..h p and o Steam r!avination Co. The f1aures o 1..1 e -.!- _!__-;--- ~--·--·-;::;--··;:---
and the JiQY_~1 .. -.rsenal Coone:i;:_::f:J_ve .50£l!.. we_e 
removed in all cases. 
f Pustralian comoanje s covers 
Thel arg~l 'Jr~~~h o publish.ed accounts •. \rbi trary 
near Y a Wd . es~rve~ were assumed. The 
40 per c~nt premium r. t ~~~he fire comoany group aroup c0ns1s s ~L ~ • 11 c 0mpany ~ . . ~.[ British compa nie s: the 
pl us 6 ~uos~d~arfe~in~ C')l'Jnj al /v1utual Fire, 
.r'.ustral1an lvtll .ua,.. r~u~tralfan AlJiance, 
Derwent and l~ma_:-_, · , •6utu::-1 fi·re and General ~_;,:;--;-;-'-1 ~ • a f'Q "11 cl - ·- ~ City Mutua -~1re ! _ ~rbi trary-40 per cent ) 
of Tasman:i.2_. Again dn - · (Cont. 
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• I , I 21· G 1 1 ) ) j pr~mium reserve was acsumea' Th 5 
nroup · t . ":. - • e comp<Jny 
-· ~onsis 5 of t'1e J Australj an owned 
companies to which reference is .made above 
Col. ( 5 ~ s~ows o.rofits as calculated on · • 
compa.n:.es own !)remi.um reservP.s, col.(9) on 
an aro1trary '10 per CP.r.t reser· '• 
It can be se~n (cnl.(4)) that Australian profits were 
~?2in markedly hi9her than the profits of British comp~nies. 
This is so whether the c0~parisan 5s made on the basis of 
r J .K. com')nny transfers fr')m rAv0nue accounts or c; 1 cn latP.d 
un,:erv1ri ting profits. It also h:::>lds ior thrc:e orouos 0f 
_, . 
ne2rly ~11 published accoun~s. ~0 substantial difference 
is m2de w~ether c0mpanies' 0wn or Arbitrary premium reserve 
adjustments are used; t'·e tw'J Lc:si::s '){ culculoti0n are 
, iven for the 5 c0m;.>r1ny ciraup i.n cols. (8) and ('J). 
J\ possible explan2tion 0f the ~jfference is that the 
S .. ?./premium ratios ')f U.K. co;ipdnir.s ·v~re tem!)orarily 
~i~h over this oeri~d rel~tive t~ t~ose of hustralian 
.,,. . 
c~rnpanies. However Table II.30 indicat8s that in f~ct tte 
~everse was the case as ra9ards the ~1slralian 11 Jnd 5 
cl')rnpany gr0ups •. After 1952 the Aust=aljan lar0e ?roup 
Tatl~ was somewha ower, -t l :JLJt oy amn•m ts not nearly 
d]._fferPnce i.·n rates of ·· · t t~ ~cc~1_1n+ £Lor the - -s 11f-!.1c1en .' n 'J .. 
'':::turn. 
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Ye.ar 
---
( l) 
1948 
9 
1950 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1960 
Source: 
-~---
Tul?Je_rr .30 
-._ .. __ -
U.K. Cq_~. 
(2) 
109 
109 
102 
94 
90 
89 
94 
101 
95 
91 
78 
80 
(3) 
147 
120 
107 
99 
82 
77 
78 
76 
78 
75 
74 
73 
72 
As for Table II.29. 
(4) 
137 
154 
143 
128 
110 
108 
105 
103 
· 104 
104 
102 
97 
101 
5 Cos._ 
(5) 
139 
139 
131 
120 
107 
108 
108 
110 
113 
113 
112 
106 
114 
A sec0nd possible explanation for the relatively low 
re turns to British companies is that over this period 
capital profits on investment ?Ortfolios were more important 
for them than for Australian companies. Market values of 
investments are. not rBvealed in British compamy accounts, 
9 ·1~.7 Iv ., 
but the statistics oresented in Table II.31 suggest that this 
. 
, I 
! 
! ' ( 
d, 
1· 
•::as unlikely. Although total assets of U.K. companies were i: 
~i~her, relative to shareholders' funds, (compare cols. 
(0) and (5) ) a hioher proportion of Australian company 
I 
Year 
( l) 
I948 
9 
iqso 
J. 
?. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
1960 
• 
~9~_.]I.31 
----
U.K. Companies 
-~ssets Invests. Int 
--- -----· (2) (3) (4) 
222 
231 
234 
241 
240 
242 
243 
?.41 
248 
253 
262 
267 
138 
145 
147 
148 
146 
151 
155 
153 
154 
152 
156 
168 
~.84 
3.04 
3.03 
2.87 
2.77 
2.38 
3.51 
3.87 
4.22 
4.19 
4.60 
5.07 
5 Australian Comnanies 
-~~~-t.s. In._v~_s_t§._. Int. 
----(5) (6) (7) 
2Q7 
211 
213 
222 
?2~ 
- _:) 
215 
215 
<05 
199 
lgg 
201 
~10 
~03 
178 
177 
184 
181 
183 
180 
180 
169 
16.l 
163 
165 
170 
166 
4.69 
4.57 
4.64 
4.48 
4.24 
4.47 
5.09 
5.39 
5.08 
4.79 
5.06 
5.49 
5.44 
'> . 
, ... 1 s 
S">urces: 
1
'r0 te s: 
As for Table II.29. 
"Interest 11 refers to a.ll investment income. For 
U.K. comoanies it is after income tax, (Insurance Com_o_anie~ .. (Forms) _RAaUTaITons, 1958...!.. Stafutory 
Inst~ament ~o. 1765 1958, U.K.). From the 
Australian oublished accounts it is imooosible 
-------
I 
to teJl whe~her income ~ax is deducted: or if 
it were not, to allocate tax between interest 
and underwrit]ng surpluses. 
Assets and Investments of U.K. companies were 
estimated from the Board of Trade summarised 
balance sheets of b~th life and non-life 
anmoanies, by addin~ t~!.following items: 
Mo.rtgages, Govi:.S~cuI11..1es, Shares,~ lO to 20 
Debentures, Loans, eve. J 
· • r • ,. ~ 11 nnu1· +,, t::nnds minus .... ire anu h" . v; .I. u • 
Outstanding Cldims, life 
= Non-l j fe j_Q.Y.§..? t.J!i.en!_~ 
olu~ Aoents' balances etc. 
~-- .., ~"'fr--h. 
~;i~blishment Exps. etc. 
= Total non-lif..g_;}..§.§_et.s_ 
3 
7 
21 
?? 
23 
----
; I 
] t 
' ' , i 
1 I 
' I i 
! 
I ' j I 
I 
< 
' ' 
I 
i I 
; I 
' 
I ' 
assets appear to have b 
een represented by investments 
(cnls. (3) and (6) ). ro...,1·ng t th th 
v"' o e me· od of separating 
life and non-life assets it is likely that non-life 
ac;~ets of U.K. Companies are QYiU'st~~ and investments 
und_e_ts_tateq. Allowing for this there may in fact be 
very little difference between .• ustralian and U.K. companies 
on either of these counts. A further test is to compare 
inter0 st rettJrns on S.F. (cols. (4) and (7) ) • fJnf0rtunately 
it is not certain whether the Australian finures for 
investment i~1come are net of income tax (See Note to Table) 
hut even if thev are not it is n0t oossible to conclude 
' . 
+i-a+ tJ K 
.. ' ~ . . investment/nrem:i.urn ratioc; were si.-,nificantJv ~ J • 
1re~ter. On the other hand if Australi.an company interest 
is ~ost-tax, the presum,tion is that the col. (3) col. (6) 
c'lmoarison is substantjalJ.y correct, i.e. that capital . 
~r0~tts nn S.F. w9re li~ely to be morP important for 
1~ustralian than British companies, not vice versa. Against 
t~is there is the final posstbiJ5ty that a hi~her 
nroportion of U.K. company assets were in low-yield, high 
capital appreciation investments. Neither published 
( · to lack of detail in balance .-.11stralian accounts owing ·· 
~~~ets) nor total Board 6f Trade figures (owing to the 
of life and non-life a~sets) allow this lurw1in9 together 
+0 be tested for the com!Jan:ies so far discussed. However 
I 
1' I 
I 
I I 
l 
I 
I I 
I 
I 
I / 
• I 
I 
' ' I 
' i 
. 
the following f iaures of cornea . . ~ · nies incl11ded within the 
orioinal groups suggest that 'f . 
' 
1 anything, the AustraJian 
cnm~~nies were in a more favou abl . . 
· r e pos1t1on in this respect. 
Ord-inary 
shares 
Land, 
r3ldgs. 
etc. 
'otal 
Percentaaes of Total Investments 
1950 1957 
U. K. Cos. 1J.:..':1~-~. u. 1<. cos:-
--- --- -- .. 
11.3 
4.3 
15.6 ?J.9 3].0 13.5 33.0 
L_.~q_stn. Cos. 
17.2 
27.2 
45.0 
Sources: U.K. Board of Trade Returns. Notes: Th: 3 Alic; tr_a~ia n 1;ornpan i.e~ are thri Queens 1 and, 
United and V1ctor1a. Their invBstments accounted 
for 71 per cent of investments o{ the 5 company 
group in 1~57. The U.K. Cos. are all Cos. 
established within Great Britain not wr~ting 
life insurance. Their investments in 1957 
accounted for 35 per c~~t ap9rox. of estimated 
total non-life investments of all British 
companies. 
ff] I f 
.L- _ nsur.ance pr_q__:_t_t_s .... an.cL.R..~-oJ.~ ts of _Q_t_fieL_}\uc;i.ral ian comoanie s. 
It has been suooested that the orofits of Australian 
.,/ J • 
n~n-life insurance companies hav~ been high~r than those of 
3ritish c0mpanies. Since the latter write a hiah 
0roportion of their business in many parts of the world, 
10th direct and by reinsurance, the presumption from this is 
:~Dt the return from insurance operatjons in ~ustralia has 
~een hioher than the average wotld level. What about the 
.... 
ir 0 fitability of insurance com9anies in Australia, compared 
· d t · ? I+ i's o. ossible to obtain :o returns in other ln us ries ~ 
I 
! 
I I 
i I 
I 
' I 
I ! 
11 
1 
' I 
I 
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a rough indication of this from 1928 by comparing returns 
0n shareholders' funds of AustraJian public companies 
aggregated from published accounts by the RPserve Bank of 
Australia. This is shown in II.32. The Bank figures 
c~nsist of the published accounts of a chan9ing group of 
c~rnoanies in the following categories: . 
Mini.ng 
Manufacturing 
Wh0lesale and Retail Trade 
Transport, Pov1er and Other Ser vices Banks 
Other Finance 
Table II. 36 
Australian Public Comoanies and Insurance Companies, 
1928-1958. Profits afte~j._ax "on Shareholde_~2' Funds 
per c.ELJli. 
\ . Publtg_ Insurance Comnan1es y_ear Cos. Ch a n..Q.i.119. 5 Cos. - i;zw. ~ Caoital Incl. Gr0uo ...... 
Caoita1 Int. Pt• 
Protrfi 
- ·---1928-30 6.9 8.7 10.2 10.2 
]931-35 3.8 7.8 8.2 0.2 8.4 
1936-40 6.8 7.9 8.l 8.1 
1941-45 5.9 8.5 8.2 -0.l 8.1 
1946-50 7.9 8.1 8.7 0.4 9.1 
1951-55 9.7 10.5 11.2 1.5 12.7 
J.Q56-58 8.6 9.7 9.2 2.4 11.6 
1th (Reserve) Bank of Sources: Public ~os .~c: ~~mm~~~~aBull .. e_tiQ~ 1937-. · 
:-\ustral1a' 5t~.i1-:>-t~rsror'Tcaon t J.t ·29 ·rofi ts Insurance os~joures are tor o a~ P Notes: In both cases r ·~ 
-- divided by total S.F. 
I 
l 
'• 
' 
' l 
.J 
'1 
I I 
~ 
' l' 
I 
I I 
I 
Although the Bank warns.that the public company 
statistics must be interpreted with great caution, (2) 
in the ~eriods before 1946-50 the differences are such 
~s to warrant a cautious prima facie conclusion that 
insurance prof its were somewhat higher than the average 
of public companies. Between 1946 and 1958 the 
differences are pr0bably insufficient to warrant any 
conclusion other than that the levels were rou0hly the 
same. However if account is taken of the prevailing 
~nflation the capital profit capability 
------c~~~anies may have lifted thetr 
1verage level. (As sug9ested by revealed 
~f the 5 company group). 
The Reserve Bank statistics are subdivided to some 
8xtent by industry groups. Average profit rat~R for 
1·.hese 9roups are sh0wn below for two periods. 
_ _.__ ----~------------
(~) . •t comoanv Suoolement E.g. Statistical Bulleti~ op. ~~c~iar (o.5): nincome 
October 1957, eP· ~- 5 . a~iz~ri~ normally lower, and 
disclosed by liste com~ha~-th;·finure arrived at 
often very much lower, · · ~ 
for taxation purposes." 
I 
' I 
I I 
l I 
' I 
'1 I 
I 
I ' 
I I 
I I 
> I 
I 
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~; I 
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I 
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Profit·aft~r~ax on~~. 
·- • r • '- Pet · c e n t • 
i'Jon Life· Ins •. 
Cos., large orouo 
. - 4 
·• )_kserve BaQ_k Samoles 
Mining 
Hire Purchase 
Finance, e1:cl'. · ) 
Sanks; in_cl.Hire Pchs ) 
. . 
Wholesale and Retail) 
1· d 1TJ e ) 
:\1.Jnuf acturino 
_ _, 
Transport, Power ) 
and Other Services) 
Banks 
:\ll Grouos 
. . 
~..ources: As for Table II.32. 
1_952-5.Ci 
10.5 
n.s. 
10.9 
9.1 
9.0 
7.0 
5.8 
9.3 
1956'-58 
-----,---
9.3 
15.8 
14.3 
n.s. 
8.5 
8.4 
7.7 
5.5 
8.7 
The statistics again suggest that while insurance 
~rof its were probably higher on the average than in 
. !,, • f :Jan .. ing or. or the Transport, Power etc. group, they did 
not differ oteatll from the average level in other 
inJustries~; In particular they were not nearly as high 
'3s. the levels associated by some writers with high seller 
C'mcentration, monopolistic practices, or high ubarriers 
tJ cntry 11 •• ( 3 )_ ~---
------------------(3) E.g. Joe s. Bain : Barriers ~o 
Harvard University Press 1956, 
./~_ 
4 • t. Ne·w Cornpe ~3:_..2::.QD., 
OP. J.90-20lt 
. , 
i;', I 
;: 
l 
I 
.( 
.. 
~· • Aus trali§.!l_GQ.!!ll~~nie s -- Hates of Growth. 
·-
The evidence of previous section$ ~as pointed to 
association with surviving outside organisations, and size, 
as two (~o~ necessarily independent) factors tendin0 to 
improve th~ chances o{ survival of Australian i~surance 
c0mpanies. Before this it was suggested that the 
aq~1arent importance of these non-insurance l'i nks was 
likely to mean that the early qrowth of new companies 
\'/.'JUld be relativelv quick, bllt slo1;ver \•/1"1en the li.mits 
0f the 11 special marketstt provid~rl by bact: ing 
0rqanisations were reached.( 4 ) The premium statistics 
nf some 11.ustra.Uan c0mpanies are now examined vri.th this 
in v'iew. 
As Chart II.3 shows, Austr ,lian prem):urn nrowth after 
19,< was very rap1 • v nQ 'cl \'1i'thout OdJ'ustment to constant 
)~ices it was ~ven quicker, so that in 1960-61 combined 
oremium volume of N.S.~. and Victoria was 44.5 times as 
. . 
;reat as in ~- o. ,, 191 - l"" Ho·~ .t.·""a,oid was the \-:'rowth nf 
· 'oy cornD. arisen.with this? established insurance companies 
t i- relu tive pArformance of the frrnr Table II. 33 shows · .1e . 
t 1 . c0n10. anies in 1915-16. :)rincipal Auf.i ra ian 
·-------::---------· 
d Ch TI oo. 148 ff. , ?3 44 ff.~ an •l• i .•.• (4) See Ch. I. PP•- ' 
----·--
11 
f ~ 
11 
l 
' ~
' l 1 ! I 
?i 
' . 
. ~ \ 
.. , , 
I I 
~ r • 
; I 
>I 
11 
. , 
f j 
~ t 
? I 
'I t' 
r ~I 
'' 
; l 
, I 
\ l 
I I 
• 11 f I 
. f i 
"i l 
';I 
; I 
J.! I 
I I 
'I 
j, I 
1' ! 
"~t j 
~) \ 
:ff I 
•' I/ 
</ 
~~ ~ 
" ! I 
I 
Table II. ·33 
- -
B.?1§.s of Gr~Vf.ib.,_~[ld Profits-t._ FQllr 2stabl ish_g_g_ 
A1..1stralj an C0moanies ,. 1916-.1961. 
_...., _________ -----..-... ..... _ . .._ ... __ _ 
p . d 
. Prl0 
---
T . 
... ncrease 1n 
ore ms. wrfilg__11.~ t 
I}l. s. w. Q, Vi~.!) 
LJ1.Y.§..i._ralia, & 
Hatins of increase tn Ins.Co. PJern~~E-~0 .-ra=.~iffo-s;:_ ?_0£ 
(1) 
1916-~5 
1926-35 
1936-45 
1946-55 
. a..vo~.market 
orof i tr,rate s on-s _,.£.:.. ---
(2) 
2.so-* G. 
P.10.3 
l .l4x G. 
P 8.1 • 
G. 1. 66 
P. 8 .2 
G. 5;86 
p. q .6 
l 956-0 ~ -,. 'l .. 1_.o"'l 
P.10.4 
Ins. Co. orcfi.ts to marke_i 
orofit rates • 
(3) 
1.07 
1.53 
0.70 
1.28 
1.13 
J .• ?l 
0.65 
0.99 
0.93 
o. ~n 
( 4) 
0.60 
1 ")" 
_ • ._o 
0.93 
0.81 
0.74 
0. 76 
(5) 
0.61 
1. 52 
0.67 
1.26 
0.90 
0.74 
0.91 
O.Q? 
] . . 04 
0.86 
r .. 'iercantile 
i7iiJtual 
(es td·. 
WJi) 
( f)) 
1.16 
0.71 
0.58 
0.96 
0.90 
1.01 
1.10 
1.23 
1.33 
1.07 
' 
'' 
' i I' 
I 
I I' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
-
l ' 
- I 
' l 
~: 44. 46 x 0 • "1 ... -~ •·3·~- .... -~ ·-~~ .. -- -~~~ ------- i 
-----------..-------·--·- l 
J.Ql6-61 
( .f0r 1926-35) prems. in 1935 t Expressed as e.g •. - 1925. divided by prems. in 
' l 
l 
1 
i 
·fl 
• 1 
~ 1 
i 
t 
i ; 
Sources: Published accounts and GBCS statistics. G. = Growth 
P. ·= Profit 
+ 1956-60 only. 
nMarket !"rofit rates" are the annregate pro£±c ~f~er !ax divi~ed by aggrr~~~e S~F. ~f the · ~ cnan~in~~oup of comoanies referred to in Table II.25. . 
The ratios marked~ are based on prems. 
in· N.s.w. and Vic. only. 
In most periods, 211 these compan~~s failAd to 
"r0\'' JS rapidly as the market, and this of course meant a 
decline in their ·narket shares. 11 I-1ii;h" relative rates of 
growth, defined as coefficients oreater thiln 1.1. occurred 
in only 5 of the 20 company-periods. The Table also 
sb0ws relative profit rates on funds, and it is interesting 
~hat there was no statistically significant relation 
;1(::i tween orofits and growtli rates. The results are 
' 
· d b l '1'th relative. o ro{it Jnd 0,rowth rDtes su:-irnar1se e ow, ~v. #• _ 
d~flned as follows: 
Relative Growth _...2.!:: __ Prof Lt 
"Hioh 11 ..., 
111.\verage 11 
0 Low" 
Low 
~JZ§..9~-
Lov1 
1 
4 
Profit Rate _ ... ______ -·--
l-\vera_ge_ 
2 
3 
Coefficient 
-----·-·--
1.10 and over. 
0. ·JO to 1.09 
0.89 and less. 
Hinh Tot_aJ. 
~--
4 7 
1 8 
2 2 5 
Lri oh l --·---------~- --- -----_:_:_~~--·----------7-·- 7 ~o 
Total 6 
--...- ... 
--------
--------------
~--·-----------
I 
' 
I ~ 
r ! 
'. I' 
' 
'i 
' I 
' ' 
I j 
' 1 
. I 
' 
' ! 
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This performance is now compared with the growth 
rates of companies which commenced business during the 
oeri od. (table II.34). In each case the relative 
• r 
nrowth rate in the first five ye~~s has been measured 
by considering written !)remiums i_n the f i_rst ful!-_ year 
of operation. Unfortunately accounts for the early 
years of many cnmpanies were not published, but the 
information of the Table is still of some use. 
Relative Growth R~t~ __ 9_nd Prof i t~ .... oJ. ,Newly_ §.~-t:.?..~It!?.h. e d __ Au s tt..9_1_ i_a_n __ G ~f!!.J?_~_r}j._~~91.~:J 9<il. 
Y · F · t Second Follmvino 10 vear oeri.ogs ~ra~ ?~;_ti. s--vis; iI[ ____ r?r--m m 
Chamber of 1914 
•( ,. t 1;1-:::nur tic -
ures 
C::>-
')Oe ra ti ve 
':: a n J· 0 'i' s l1 .... _ - & 
·r raders 
. ~uto-
:;bile 
l: .. 
. ire e 
~11neral 
., ' ter i,i,1ncnes 
TJn i_ ty 
Southern 
Pacific 
J 
1919 
1921 
1922 
1926 
1935 
2.60 
1.13 
5.78 
1.27 
5.13 
0.90 
11:46 
2.30 
2.00 
1.83 
5.94 
0.93 
l.02 
1.75 
1.09 
1.48 
1.18 
1.31 
0.63 
2.47 
1.06 
1;52 
1.86 
1.10 
0.89 
1.22 
1.08 
1.40 
1.33 
0.89 
1.11 
1.71 
0.86 
1.17 
l ._31 
1.35 
2.07 
0.83 
0.86 
1.85 
1.10 
1.05 
0.65 
1.39 
0.47 
0.89 
0.95x 
1.29 
.J.. 0."81 0.91' 
0.72 0.19 
1.10 
2.26 
0.64-* 
0.85 
J..67 t 
1.76 
0.86x 
0.84 
(Cont..:_) 
' 
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Como~ Year First Second Fol 101,,1i.n~ 10 ~ar oer iods ·-- est£!. 5 5..;rs; rrr---r2 --- (3J--c41-Y'.£§. • _ __ 
i"Jtional 1947 1.11 1.20 1.63/ Co- n.a. 0.39 0.76 
operative 
~h:nauard 
.., 1951 5.16 •0.40 
-3.02 
-2.03 
.\ustral- 1952 4.52 2.16x 
ian 0.04 1.02 
'I 
i Ec:uitable 
! ,t 
' ...... ustral- 1953 2.90 1.63 
tr:n I) 0.53 0.89 -...'• 
Inter-
national 
:<ational 1954 6.86 ' I 
e. r3eneral 1.71 
Sources: 
------
Published accouhts and CBCS Stvtistics. 
:-rot~: + 6 years only 
.x 9 tf tt 
-t 8 n II 
x 4 It It 
I 3 tt It 
I 
. i 
I 
i 
! 
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It can be ~e~~-that the growth rate in the first 
five years for each f ti 
o 1ese· companies exceeded markPt 
~rowth and that'for each company except the Nati0nal 
---......... --- ... 
c~ooerative this rel~tive ~ f 
----·----- o . ra '-e o t_)!'')Wth was much r:_ireater 
t~an any achieved in later pe~iods.(5) If relative growth 
rJtes are defined as before, their d1strlbutl~n was: 
Fi.rst Sec0nd Other ------ -..._ 5 vears ;::- .. -- .. ~-- -----
.__._ _ _. ---
~ vears neriods 
-------
..__. __ .. _, ____ 
Low ? 8 
:'....verage 3 tl 
µ· h 
.. 19 10 5 7 
.. 'Jain, too, it .is interesting th0t there was P") apparent 
a~sociation of relativi profit rates with rates nf ~rowth. 
In ()nl y th rel? cases (V2n9_~§_rd_, ~~:_E_~JJ_a_n_ _~quJ.t.a_o)_e~, and 
:1y_stra l i.-:ln and Ifl.~§_rnatt.2.!~U \"'"Hlld there appear to ~;e a 
nrimA fac.i.£.. case f0r associati.nr; 1'2;1ld e2rl.y rxnan~i.()n 
·.··i.·~h rate cuttinri or hi.nh sel.lino expenses. In others 
~ - ~ 
( r.otabl y the Automobile Fi t'e ?Jlsi __ ~:?_D_i:iral and Nati12.l!.O..l_ -~nq 
'Jeneral) exceptionally rari.d ex9ansi0ns "1erG associ.::ted 
\'lith exceptionally high profits. The distrihut"io'n 0f 
qrowth and profit rates, defined as bef0re, was: 
I 
' l 
____ .. _ ..- .. ----------~--·-~---- _.__.,., ..... -~--...--.... 
In makinn ;h;;;;· comparisons it ~~?u~d be borne in mind 
that theJsame 5 and 10 ye3r coef~1cJents of course ( 5) 
· .,.~ t 1 ri:i1-,+1vi:i ra+es r'1f orowth. represent dirteren, annua._ ....... :---- - "' - - -
I 
Growth 
--
- Pr.of it Rate 
Rate 
,....__..._ _____ -
~ 6..'-:~r;-ge ·-~:--h··--·----
--~- :..d.'L 19taJ._ 
Low 
Average 
_Hj <l_h__ 3 2 
Total ---;----------- -----2. ___ ._._J:Q. __ 
----·----·-- ·- - 2 5 10 
Sec0nd 
----~-.. -- ... --.... -------... -----.... ·------
5 y_ea:r_§. 
Low l 1 ') 
Averaoe ,., 3 3 
_..H_.i o-.;h 2 · 
----- _____ --1._ 2 5 
Total 3 1 --·-·------6~ ···- -1-0----
.. _ ... ____ ... _.__ _____ ..._ --·---~-------- ---
')ther Periods 
-· .. ---
Averaoe ;;,; 
4 
l 3 
8 
4 
!-ri£.h ____ L _____ . ___ l ________ ___ J_ 1 
----·--Total R ] 
. '- - 10 19 
--~----·-------- ...... ---------·-·-- -·----~-_ ... _ -
.2i._ Con cl us ions. 
-........ -~ ·---
Much of the mRterial pres9nted in this section is 
'J - if1X 
intended principally as b:lckground t" Chaph~:;:-s IV and v. 
However a number of princi;Jal points related to prP.vi_ous 
~; i c;cussion can be made. 
1. Company numbers in Australi~ have fluctuated 
c1irly closely with National Income and premium income. 
2. The statistics do not sugsest any obvious 
0ss0ciation of orofit marains and changes in company 
• J 
numbers. Large numbers of new entrants have been 
associ~ted with both high (1870's) and low margins 
(1880'~, 1920's, 1950's). 
I 
.. 
3. Australian companies have b 
e8n extremely 
vulnerable to underwritinq losses, 
- takeovers by overseas 
.... , . 
1.1e1r companies, an~ investment and liquidity problems . 
liv~s have tended to be short, and in contra~t to overseas 
c~~0anies in Australia, they suffered very heavily in 
t:ie 1890's and .l.'.'lte 1920's and earlv. l930's. At l t · eas . in 
t~~ 20th Century, the ~hanceq of qurvival of an Australian 
c0r.1_1any were pr0bably improved if it ~)ossessed thR backi'.19 
nf a stronry non-ins1Jrance or')ani.sation or firm, ard was 
able to write a relatively lar0e volume of business. 
4. In the 19th Century there was considerable 
i~~tability in the resu1ts from the two principal ltn~s, 
fir~ and Marine. In t'1e 20th Century, underwriting 
surpluses in fire, marine ~nd miscellaneous lines were 
relatively stable and high. SurrJ11ses in the new classes -
"'"rkt?rs' com~ens~tion, motor vehicle and CTP -
fluctuated widely and their average leveJ was much lower. 
5. The level of surpluses in fire~ ~arine and 
~iscellaneous classes in Australia has been far higher 
t~an surpluses earned by British com9anies fr~m w0 rld-
De so].· te d1'fficulties in c0mparin~ U.S. \•1ide operations. . ( ) 
.
·Lr1surance statistics'6 the surpluses ~nd Australian fire . 
• ,.. J. l' of the order of l0-30 per cent on earned 
, n :i.us 1.ra. ia 
____ ...... -
---- - __ .... 4e<- ------ ------- ---... --:-- -- --- -
-------
nrohable larger average te~m of (6) Mainly due to the ~ 
U.S. oolicies • 
• 
----~--
I 
' ti 
0remiums contrast strikingly 
with American Insurance 
C • • I om~1ss1oners rules settina 5 (7) J per cent as a desir~ble 
return. . 
6 • Underwriting. margins on total b~~c;j ness in 
:\11stral i.a have been much hi 0 her th th 
- · an 1 ose of u K 
• '. or 
I• s • 
·-'· • companies. After World War II the average marrd.n 
_, 
,,n bus ines·s wri. tten by private companies has been even 
h~~her, mainly owing to the sisnificant proportion 0f 
less or un-profitable w. c omp. and CTP bus i.ne ss writ ten 
by Government Offices. 
7. ~J1_?nnes in Australian surpluses have nevertheless 
fnllo~·md those of U.K. companies in most periods. One 
)'ssible explanation of this is that c~anges in 
_____________ .. _____________ ..._._ ..  
( 7) ''The standard rule nf the f\'P.IC ffeat,i.')n.::il f\ssociati.on 
0f In~urance Comrniss:i.r:mery fr0m J.92J. t0 19'11 was to 
cut rates when orofits avera0ed mor~ than e rygr cent 
nf or~miurns. Th~s 8 oer cent-incl~ded a 3 oe~ cent 
con~lagration allowa~ce, which a 1950 resolution of 
r-Y·.IC re C0'11'l1e nded be cut to l per cent. Thi. s rnakes a 
6 per cent return, end th~ result is t0 requir~ 0 cut 
i.ri rater: ''Vh'?ri tre return -::vt?rDne~ r;.ver 8 per cent f'Jr 
five years and an increase when it falls belov; 4 ;JCr 
cent for five years. The 1950 chan~e 5s 9enqralJy 
acce,ted countrywide by both DatAmakers and 
rc:gul2tory bodies. Insofar. as the. c~tast.r09he 
allO'Nance is accurate, the ~nderv!rJ. t1n9 r:tu;--~ ha~ 
been and is 5.nte:nded t0 be ::> per cent of .'r.:;,n1ums • 
Sim'.'.>n N. Whitney, Antitru~t Pnlj_ci.es, ~!ew York 
1958, Vol. II pp; 351-2. 
I 
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f 
underlying economic conditions 1·n A 
- .ustra li.-3 and 
~lsewhere were similar. 
Another is that devel0pmen~s 
in competition in London and other· "'or1a· · 
•
1 
. ~ i.nsurance 
'll:irkets weri:; felt in Australia, but that tt-ie .,F1 "l'.'Y.~t was 
~()r,111=.:ted from their full effects. 
8. The conce9t of "theoretical profit" attempts 
t~ take account of the important 2lemen~ of investment 
i '"":c0:-ne from underwriting funds. Th~ rn::ir'_"lins 0f both 
1
t+1e0retical" profit and 11nderwriting surplus over premiums 
•
7
0r five Australian companies tended to nv1v~ ~_n_v_e_!.:§_gJ.Y. 
.. ,.; th economic activity i. n the ~0th C'.r ritury. 1 .. 10st ncd: :ihJ o 
"'~!.'~ the narrowin".] of mar<] ins i.n the 1920' s and aft.er 
l945, and widening in the 1930's. 
9. Profit measured aaainst sharehnl~ers' funds 
•J 
s 0r0bably the best long run indication of average 
~r0fit levels, but there are difficulties of 
~0terpretntion of short run chanryes. In the ?0th Century, 
?fter the decline in the 1920's returns on insirr2 nce 
~~unds aooear to have been about 5 per cP.nt above the 
.. 
"~;lrl on G0vernment on s. b d In tn. e 1930's and l940's 
• • · 5 vias n~t rP.flP.cted, -.:;~~ increase in under\Nr.1t1ng margin -· · 
the ratio of sha~eholders' funds iwing to a big rise in 
·'~ "J ;:>remiumr,. 
I 
.. 
10. P~ important com~onent of insurance ~·+ proA1.s 
a~e capital gains on the ]nvestment of both 
~h~reholders' and underwrltino .. funds. c~ 01·t~1 ,..t 
. "· ·" pror1~s 
revealed by the five Australian c0mpani.es su~y·est that 
0pp~rtunities in this directjon have some i · th par: in ~·e 
Axplanation of underwri tin<J marr;i.n!=i and new P.ntrants. 
11. Profits measured ec;ainst sharP.'.10lders' funds 
of Aus t:::-alian companies were greater between 1948 and 
1959 than the equivalent 9rofit rat~s 0f U.K. comr2nies • 
. ~.v2ilable evidence does not sugnest that thP. di ffer0nce 
could be explained by ~reater capital profit pntential 
'In the oart 0f U.K. comoanies. In c0rno:ris:m v·ith . . 
:nistralian public companies 1~\ustrali;in insurancP ~rnfi.ts 
m3v have been sliqhtly higher than t~P ~verage level 
- -
betwe~n 1928 an~ 1945, but therelfter ~erq nnt ?rPJtly 
cl'ifferent. 
l.'.". In a ~ se s sin'] the de sirabi l i. ty 'Jr nthe nvise of 
::n;r pr0fit l~vel, the relevant q11estion is: is the level 
:1bl")ve -Jr bt:?1".:I"! t~2+. at whicli ~ nsu1·aricP functicns can be 
efficiently perf0rmed? 1 ,. . .!. f The a•)narentl y . 'J"ve-r or011 "s o 
!T }( 
-. . ..... . : · a p_,..1'nia -1"'.::icie c:ise for suppo~inl] companies suggests 
that /.u5tra 1 j :in !Jrofj tc; are too '1i9h in this SP.rise· 
h . ti·o~tJ"nn of this n0ssihiltty :ro~vever a thoroug. i_nves ._, 0 --~ • 
11:ould need tn take account of many factors not deal+. ,.,;-:h 
'~ 
\ 
' ' I' 
' 
'0 
' 
'• ,. 
., 
I' 
'r 
in t~e present section, including the distribution of 
profits between companies in Australja and other 1. ~ . 
. marr.et:s. 
It wquJ.d als0 be greatly assisted if inf0rmat
1
· '"'. n 
·' we re 
3vailable concerning the re<;ul t.s in Aus trali3 of 
indivi.du.:;iJ overseas companies. The high rAlative sh'1res 
of overseas companies as a group in the m~st nr0fit:h]~ 
~in~~ (Table It.6, p.111) suggests tha~ their 
.2.ustra.li.:n res'J1.ts DJ..<lY. be better (and ;:)Qssioly very 
crm<;iderab1y better) t 11an tf-i')SP '1f Australian companies. 
13. There is D tendency for established companies 
t·J orow lesi; raoidly than m~r~et r)J'erni.11ms, -=rr>d f0r their ~ . 
~1T~et shares to fall. 
companies expanded rapidly in their e 3 rl y years, b11 t 
tl-~~r~::fter mor~ slowly. There was no ap9aTent 
a~~~ciation of rapid growth ~ith low profits, or vice 
vers~. 
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PART B . : . THE HISTORY OF' THE AUSTRALIAN TARIFF SYSTEM. 
·:CHAPTER;.v: .. · 
. ,···' 
, THE NINETEENTH. CENTURY - BACKGROUND: 
·. . ' 
1. Intr0ductiC>n 
• l • ·, 
I o 
The tariff system~ Which, in Austra,lia as . in. other, . 
countries has be.en ·a most important facto1' in ·.·the 
development and functioning.of the market,.was estab-
lished duririg the period 1896~1909. During 1897-1900· 
f'ire ·. tariffs drawn. up' on. uniform. principles were adopted 
in all States and adrilin.istered by .recol1stituted. Fire 
. Underwri tars.' ·Associations •. · In· 1900·· ·the ·Federal council 
.\ . . ; : .. .· ,· ,·· ' . ' ·.. '·'·. ··. . ·. 
of Marine Underwritel's was formed to administer tariff's 
.· . . 
agreed. on by the ·various st'ate Marine .As'sociations in 
1897 and 1898~ · In'1902 ~tate Accident.Asaoc:l.ations.~ere 
. . ' . ~ . 
formed and tar1rf6< 'for: i 10:~cidentw busih.e~s · (dei'inecl· to 
I ' , ' '1 : ~ . ' • ·.' 
include all «~1~ase_s other than f,ire .and· marine) were 
adopted. " Iri ·1909, · a:rt'ar a :s.er'ies';·of ~6rir~rences :.held ! 
. I 
over the preceding th~e '.:Y8~r.s·, 'the .pres:ent Council. ~tf· 
' . ,, 
. .· .. · ·; ·,\ ... .. . . Fir~· and Accident Under~iters/was 'established. - ' Under' -
·this sc0heme un1r6rm A~t1~ie~',·or. Asso~1~t16ri ···w~re· ·cira\Vn·. 
-up for State<Associations;· and t}?.e··final say ·on ·most. 
• ' J • ' • • 
important matters. wa~" given 'to the .. "d~unc11.". in'. ' 
.. · '.. · .. } " ·'.~:·.·-..... ::,, .'.··.··, .'' .-.· .. • <. .'~;_c·:.· .. :-·~, ··. ~· :'_:~ :_·.-·. , ''.>._. ,';.'.::_ . .. :· ....... :: ..... :~·~--i"-~~ ,'~·~--~"' "·' 
subsequent years•.:the previou_sly ·separate ·Acc~derit':.'arid::: ;;-
• ." • ' ' ' • ~ ' ' '· .' ' • ; ~ • ', ' •' '." 0 • ; ' • • ' •' ! • \ • • '·,~ ·, • • - • n' •~ • _' • _. ', • • '• \ • ; : • .:· '> : .. • : .: ', ' • • :' ,:-
F 1 re. Associations were. merge~:\ iii .each·· state•·: _;The':F8derai · 
\ Council of. Hariri~ --Underwrit~~--:-~·ma~~~Ci":·f~~alli'- -' -~-- · .. ·~-~- :· :-~- .. 
\ 
• ' /. ·'. f' ' ·: • '•. '· •••• _.''. 
' ~ ' . , ' ~ , ~ ' . ' ' -\ ' 
separate from the Fire and Accident Council; it·~lso had 
less power over State Associations. However in 1932 it 
was replaced by the Council of Marine Underwriters, which 
was given greatly increased powers. As in the Fire and 
Accident Council, its·members were managers who had been 
designated "Controlling Officers" for Australia by their 
Head Offices. 
Eefore the establishment of the tariff system 
described above there had been many earlier attempts to 
reach similar agreements. Prior to 1880, these were 
relatively successful, but about this time most broke 
down, and the ensuing period 1881-1896 was one of 
relatively unfettered competition in Australia. The 
causes of this breakdown and the conditions for the 
successful agreements of 1896 and after are now described. 
2. Background 
(a) General. The events ,that are about to be related 
took place against a background of-rapid economic growth 
in Australia.(~) Before 1861 this was interrupted by a 
serious recession:Jin the early 1840's, .but accelerated by 
> I 
-
(1) On the economic history of the period see: 
T.A. Coghlan • Labour and Industrl ·in Aus'tralia, Oxford • 
N.G. Butlin • Australian Domestic Product, 1918 • 
Investment and Overseas Borrowins, 
1861=1938/39~ .Cambrid~e 1962. 
N.G. Butlin Investment in Economic rowth 1861-
1900, CBmbridee 1962. W.A. Sinclair • Economic Recoverl in Victoria 189!;!-• 
1899, Canberra 1956. 
t/ 
the gold discoveries in the 1850's. The broad course of 
development after 1861 is well·summarised by·N.G., 
Butlin's estimates of deflated Gross Domestic Product 
shown in Chart II.3. The expansion between 1861 and 1891 
was dominated by public inyestment in railways, roads and 
other public works, and private·i11vestment in building 
(principally in the main cities) and the pastoral, 
indust.ry. A large inflow of both imports and migrants 
was sustained by ~xtensive overseas borrowing, eon both 
public and private account. Towards the end of the 
1880's there was a considerable increase in speculative 
activity, especially with respect to pastoral holdings 
and Melbourne urban properties. In 1892, signs of weak-
ness in.new capital formation, which were already 
apparent as early as 1888, made themselves felt in a very 
steep decline in QUP. In 1893 a serious, financial crisis 
was followed by widespread failures of banks, building 
societies, land and.pastoral firms,~and extensive capital 
reconstructions. Although GDP. picked,up after 1897, 
further recovery was hindere~ by disastrous droughts, and 
rapid growth was ~ot resumed until 1904. In terms ,of 
duration and severity the depression was more serious for• 
Australia than.the depression o~ the late 1920's and 
1 1.- I.. i-- " 
1930 's. 
I 
Over the period economic condi tions··.varied between 
States.<2) In,particular the 1880's in ,South Australia 
were overhung ,by, the contraction of· the wool·· and ·wheat 
areas. This' probably provides a•part of the explanation 
for the failure of the 1 previously prosperous Adelaide 
based insurance companies at this time. -Between-1881 and 
1883 there was a slackening in the tempo' of development 
in both Victoria and N.s.w., but this was particularly 
marked in the N.S.W. wool industry. The speculative 
urban boom was ,much more pronounced in Melbourne than 
in Sydney, and the subsequent depression was more severe 
there; the relative success of the Sydney based~"mutual" 
fire companies compared with their Melbourne counterparts 
is probably connected with this fact. In the 1890's 
and· the early 1900 1s there was rapid development in 
Western Australia following the discovery of gold, and 
again this must be related to the increase in the number 
of insurance companies operating there (in contrast to 
the Eastern States) and the tariff collapse of 1906. 
During-the 19th Century, as explained'in Chapter II, 
most oye~seas companies in Aust~alia, wrote only one class 
of business, either fire, marine or accident. Only two 
• l 
important overseas companies - the Commercial Union and 
(2) Strictly speaking, berore 1900, Colonies. 
J 
the ·Alliance;::;;.;.. .combined·"·f'ire ·and :~marineLinsuranc~ before 
the 1890 1 s'1 <·and:'.the-':;two>·,associated",Alliance· ·companies _ •. ., 
were separateiy .. :;represented in ·Australia,. By contrast, 
many Atis.tr~_l.1_~,·:·.Q,()IDP?.~~.~s from. the .beginning· had;·'written 
both fire··and··marine•·:1.ines,'·and.-.some.•.developed· accident·_: 
business ·as.·well:,.;in•the.:: 1880's.·: ·:In• 1888:, of' 25:iAtistralian 
companies.; whose 'balance .. sheets were .. summarised by: the 
AIBR - ~3 );:, · :< :•_: .. , · . . i .... .:.. :•;· · · 
13 did .,both 'fire· and· marine .business ... ,._. 
8:· did·:· fire•, business only.·., 
4 did 'marine.: business only 
about· 5 wrote some· form· of: accii.dent. business• 
The 4 ·companies":specialising, in. marine insurance had net 
premiums :equal to'';40• 4 per.cent of -total· marine premiums 
(£312,400) of .. the 17 co~panies writing:niarine business. 
The 8 fire· specialists did: 38'. 8· per.· cent of total fire 
bus ineso >(£3231200 )..·written by the:. 21 ···companies doing 
fire . business-~ · ·:. ·... · · . 
AlthoUgh·in .the··Australian···section. of/the1,market,. 
which· was::,imp'ortant·: before ··.1890, the· same.~ companies. were 
(3). A.I:S.R 1_889_,_pp~,y36.,,'lf37•. ;.,~.sti..i:nB:~,es".,m~.~~-f'.o~.? ............ __ .... . 
companies whose accounts did not separate fire and 
marine·1:premiums .. ;'.·; The:-. N .s-. W '".:-.Marine-• is: 1·excl.uded, as 
it; became'~a< subsidiary or· the. Commercial .. Union in 
1881. . 
. . 
-.. 
I 
·~· . . ~ . 
2~t 
concerned ·With both~ f'ire 1 ·and marine insurance, it is 
nevertheless more convenient to discuss fire, marine, and 
accident business separately. 
!Jo.) Fire Insurance. In terms of numbers of 
independent companies operating, it has been pointed out 
in Chapter II that Australian companies were decimated 
during the 1890's depression. No adequate history of 
fire (or marine) insurance in Australia in the 19th 
Century exists,(4) but with the aid of Tables IV.1 and 
IV.2, it seems reasonable to infer the following broad 
pattern of development. 
1831-1846. Establishment of local companies; 
failure of a number in the recession of 1843. 
1846-1860. Entry of overseas and new local 
companies, but local companies dominant. 
1860-1876. Entry of some Australianand a large 
number of overseas companies. Decline in Australian 
company market share. 
' 1877-1880. Acceleration of entries by both over-
seas and new local companies; further decline in 
Australian share. 
(L~) For some notes on early developments see 
Appendix B. 
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1880-1890. Number of·overseas companies approximately 
constant; further increase in number of Australian 
companies. Probable rise in,Australian share. 
1890-1898. Large scale failure of Australian 
companies - liquidation, or absorption by overseas 
companies; increase in overseas market share. 
Year 
1866 
1870 
1874 
1880 
1882 
1884 
1890 
1894 
1901 
1908 
TABLE IV.1 
Percentage Shares of Amounts at Risk, Sydney Fire 
Brigade Area, 1866-1908. 
Australian Cos. 
No. not 
contri-
buting 
2 
3 
5 
6 
No. 
-
5 
5 
5 
10 
8 
13 
14 
13 
9 
8 
Share 
--
51.a 
55.6 
47.8 
40.8 
31.7 
41.3 
48.0 
48.3 
40.6 
37.5 
Overseas Cos. 
No. not 
contri-
buting 
5 
8 
7 
No. 
-
8 
5 
9 
20 
19 
29 
31 
28 
32 
37 
Share 
48.2 
44.4 
52.2 
59.2 
68.3 
58.7 
52.0 
51.7 
59.4 
61.4 
Five 
l~rgest 
75.7 
75. 7 
67.3 
46.3 
51.2 
36.3 
47.8 
50.2 
47.7 
43.9 
Sources: 1866-1882. Annual Re~orts, Sydney Insurance Compani~s Fire Brigade. Since the 
brigade was voluntary and financed 
entirely by the companies it was 
possible for companies not to con-
tribute to it. 
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1884-1908. Fire Risks held in the Sydney 
Metropolitan Area, N.S.W. 
Statistical Registers, 1884-1909. 
Companies were required by law to 
make these returns. 
Table IV.1 gives some idea of the quantitative 
significance of changing market shares in Sydney. 
Unfortunately before 1894 the statistics are not complete. 
From 1866 to 18~4 the fire brigade was run by the com-
panies and membership was voluntary. In 1884 it was 
taken over by the State Government and contributions 
were compulsory, but towards the end of the 1880's a 
number of fraudulent or semi-fraudulent companies never-
theless escaped this obligation. Despite these draw-
backs, the figures probably give a roughly correct 
indication of the trend of market shares, since most 
companies seemed to have joined the voluntary association 
when they had significantly large amounts at risk, and the 
fraudulent companies probably did not.write very much 
business before they disappeared or were wound up. 
The only other statistics available in N.S.W. were 
'\ 
collected by Coghlan and relate to business "within 
N. s. W." by companies operating in N. S. W. in 1892. <5 ) 
(5) T.A. Coghlan: Census of Insurance Companies-in N.S.W., 1892. Published in AIBR 1893 p.969. It is not clear 
whether the returns were net of local or ~reaty re-
insurance or both. 
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The pl:'emiums,;.wi'itten by: the ·.various national groups. 
according\_ to· 1ocation of head office· were::. · . 
Head Office No• of··. Prems. . Percentage, 
Cos.:- · £ 1000 of Total 
-
Aust. 16 143.'2 43.3 
U.K. 18 135.2 42.2 
N. z. 4 41.2 12.7 
Other 4 5,.7 1.8 
'· ·,.' ,•~ .. 
·Total· 42 325 .. 3 100. 0 .·· 
Of the 16 Australian companies, 7 had failed and been . 
absorbed by< 1899·,· .9· by. 1908. The~ first seven; companies 
absorb.ed had' a mai:ket share. in 1892 of' 12.0 per cent·, the 
last two. 2.0· per· cent. · All. except one were· . .taken: ove.r by 
British companies; on the basis of the 1892··.figurea· this 
represented· an increase' in .. the British market share .. from 
42.2 per .. cent to 54.7per cent', and a. fall'·in.the,.· 
Australian ·share from 43.3 to 30.8 per cent• 
The share of Australian· companies on the bas is of· 
premiums in N.S.W. was less than.their share of amounts 
at risk in the- Sydney Metropolitan:i-<area; in 1892 the 
' . . ' ~ . , . 
. · ...... · 
latter was ·4a.9· per cent.' The probable.reason. for this 
is the incl~sion in'.the "at rfsk"figures of'twoof :the. 
. . . ' . '· . ,.. -: 
·.·, ·. . , /' 
most successful Australian· "mutual" companies, the. 
. . . . '. - . . '• . 
' ' ' ' . ,/ ' ';. ' '. '. '. ; l :·,'. .. I :',~ '~ ' '"• 
Australian Mutual •Fire .. (es tdi · ... "1872) .and ~~e ··· ~e.rc~ ti:le • -
Mutual'. (estd.·· 187B_). Both these Companies had head offices 
I 
.; t 
" 
'' 
•. 
.. 
in Sydney, and specialised in small dwelling and trade 
risks, mainly in Sydney. Their combined'share rof 
amounts at risk in Sydney.was: 
1884 
1890 
1894 
1901 
1908 
per cent 
19.1 
26.4 
27.7 
26.2 
23.4 
It seems unlikely that they were as strong as this in 
N.S.W. country districts (or in other States). Accord-
ingly the 37. 5 :per cent "at risk" share in 1908 probably 
represents a smaller share of total State premiums. 
Table D/.2 sets out the only statistics available to 
. 
the writer of Victorian fire business. Again, the figures 
are not complete since not all companies belonged to the 
Fire Brigade Association, but the trend they suggest - a 
declining Australian market share - is without doubt 
correct. Unfortunately no Victorian figures are~ 
obtainable after 1890, (6) but it seems certain that the 
(6) In 1890 the Victorian Government set up a 
Metropolitan and a Country Fire Brigade Board. 
These Boards both possess statistics of fire 
premiums.since 1890, but were unwilling to make them 
available to the writer. The same applies to the 
N.S.W. Fire Brigades· Board, which ceased to publish 
individual company retu~ns after 1909, and to 
statistics in the possession of the Victorian 
licensing authority, going back to 1882. The atti-
tude of these bodies seems, to say the least, 
excessively cautious. 
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drop in the Australian market share there was more severe 
there than in N.s.w. Of.the 11 companies listed in 
Table IV.2 operating in 1890, only four survived in 1898, 
~ and three in 1908. The companies remaining in 1898 and 
1908 had 1890 market shares of 20.7 and 15.3 per cent 
respectively. 
TABLE IV.2 
Percentage Shares of Fire Premiums in Melbourne, 
1861-1890. 
Year 
1861 
1871 
1874 
1878 
1885 
1890 
Australian Cos. 
No. 
-
8 
11 
7 
8 
11 
1 1 
Share 
68.2 
67.2 
51.7 
42. 7 
42.1 
33.8 
-
Overseas Cos. Five 
Large~ 
No. Share Cos. 
- -
7 21.1 71.7 
8 32.8 62. 6 
8 48.3 63.1 
16 57.3 48.2 
25 57.9 35.1 
2f 66.2 30. 9 
Sources: 1861. Macredie: Personal Reminiscences of 
Insurance Business. Paper read before 
the Insurance Institute of Victoria in 
1886. Reprinted AIBR 1886 pp.693 ff. 
Premiums not given for one of the 
overseas companies. 
I 
1871-1878. 
1885-1890. 
Minutes: United Insurance Companies' 
Fire Brigade Subcommittee. 
Statement of Fire Premiums in the 
Metropolitain Fire Brigade Area. 
Document made available to the writer 
privately from industry sources. 
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· During :the" 1880 's and· .. 1890,•a· :Australian ;companies 
(wi.th ·one ·exception) (7) based on .. the' smaller ·centres of 
Brisbane, ·Adelaide;· Perth, Hobart and .Launceston, ·were 
wipe'd -out -altogether. To the ·extent that .the remaining 
Melbourne and Sydney companies were not ·already-estab...; 
lished or.did· not.move.into ,these States, overseas. 
domination became even mot'e complete.· A-.good illustration 
of this is provided by the number· of fire companies 
operating in Perth.(8) 
1895 
1899 
1904 
1909' 
Australian 
3 
3 
5 
4 
16· 
'18 
25 
28 
.§2urces: 18 95. 
1899-1909. 
Company Letter Book • 
Western Australian Fire Brigades 
Board. Fire Insurers in Metropolitml; 
Fire·<'.District. ·· 
It ·will be noted that in both Sydney and Melbourne 
thare was a considerable decline.over.the"period in.the 
(7) 
(8) 
The Derwent and Tamar. H.O~ Hobart, established 
1838. Absorbed by the London and Lancashire in 1912. 
The discrepancy between these figures and the numbers 
of Tariff insurers given in Section 6 (b.) below is 
due to th~ practice of parent· companies seridit~g in 
·Fire. Brigade returns on behalf of subsidiariea. 
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market·share of the five companies with the largest 
individual shares. This was accounted; for mainly by 
failure to expand at the rate of the market, but the 
business of some companies which originally had dominant 
shares probably declined in absolute terms as well. Thus 
the Sydney Insurance Company's share of Sydney risks 
declined from 28.2 per cent to 12.6 per cent between 1866 
and 1880. The Victoria's share of Melbourne metropolitain 
premiums declined from 19.6 per cent in 1861 to 10.9 per 
cent in 1885, in absolute terms from £13,000 to £10,900. 
Comparing the 1860's with 1890 the leading companies were: 
1860 's H.O. Share H.O. Share 
Sydney ( 1866) 
Sydney Ins. Co. (Syd.) 
L.L. and G.* (U. K.) 
United (Syd.) 
Imperial (U .K.) 
Pacific (Syd.) 
Melbourne ( 1861 ~ 
Victoria (Melb.) 
Australasian (Melb.) 
I -- - - - - -
28.2 Mercantile lilutual (Syd.) 13 .3 
21.0 Aust'n. Mutual (Syd.) 13.1 
Fire 
10.5 Commercial Union (U.K.) 10.5 
8.9 United (Syd.) 5.6 
7.1 L.L. and G.* (U.K.) 5.3 
75.7 47.8 
19.6 Victoria • (Melb.) 7.7 
17.3 Commercial Union (U. K.) 6.6 
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Colonial of Vic. (Melb.) 16.0 f National of Aust. (Melb.) 5.6 
L.L. and G.* (U .K.) 10.5 Colonial Mutual (Me lb.) 5,5 
Fire 
Northern (U .K.) 8.3 Queen ( U. K. ) 5.5 
71.7 30.9 
*Liverpool, London and Globe. 
Some 9ompanies which were important in the 'sixties were 
a.bso~bed by others"' For example the Sydney was taken over 
by the Commercial Union in 1880, the Australasian by the 
Australian Alliance in 1872. Despite these absorptions 
and others in the 1890's (including the Pacific, National 
of Australasia and the Quee!l) no single company achieved 
a high market share comparable to those of the 1860's. 
The decline in the 1 Australian market share was mainly 
accounted for by competition from a larger number of over-
seas competitors. 
There is no clear evidence concerning the backgro~nd 
of general rate levels in the 19th Century. The tallowing 
are r.ates on stone or brick detached buildings in 
Melbourne and Sydney quoted in various advertisements 
and tari:ffs. 
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Year per £100 of cover Source* 
1836 5/6 A. Sydney 
1841 5/- A. - II 
1844 8/- to 10/- A.· II 
1847 7/6 A. - If 
1851 5/- T. - Sydney and Melbourne 
1857 7/- to 8/- T. - Sydney 
1868 4/- to 7/- T. " 
1873 2/- A. - Melbourne 
1874 2/6 Policy - Melbourne 
1875-18?0' 5/- T. - Melbourne 
1881 1/- Letter Book - Sydney 
1897 and 2/- to 7/6 T. - Melbourne and Sydney 
after 
*A. = Advertisement. 
T. = Tariff'. 
The relatively low rates quoted in some years e.g. 1873, 
1874 and 1881, coincide with recorded disruptions of 
tariffs. Disregarding these there does seem to be a 
broad downward trend over the period as a whole. This is 
supported to some extent by average rates calculated by 
. the writer f'rom information from the Victoria Insurance 
Company records. Average rates on all business written 
and renewed during the month of' April were, in the follow-
ing years : ( 9) 
(9) No information available after 1880. 
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1851 
1861 
1871 
1881 
19/4 
20/2 
13/6· 
11/7 
During the early 1880's the fall in rates probably 
accelerated following the disbanding of the tariffs. 
Some indirect evidence is provided by premiums received 
by companies subscribing to the Melbourne Fire Brigade, 
compared with various indicators of economic growth. 
Victoria: No. of 
P'ire :yrems. Residential Rooms Aust. - G.N.P. S~dnel -
in Me b.t. in Cities and £M at Risk 
£ 1000 To¥vns (1900prices) £1000 
., 000 
1861 66.4 270 52.8 95873€ 
1871 71.8 348 84.3 9005 
1874 I 78.9 388 112.5 10330 
1878 102. 7 '4-18 125.2 15P.79 
1885 110.0 558 157.1 .. 36700 
1890 176.1 732 201.6 ·57100 
*1866 
Sources: Melb. fire prems. - As for Table IV.2. The: area 
covered was "Melbourn.a and 
Victoria - Resi-
dential rooms ·. 
G.N. P. 
Sydney, at Risk 
Suburbs ". : , 
N.G. Butlin: Private Capital 
- Formation in Australia, · " 
Table K, (Ce~berra 1955) 
- N.G. Butlin: The Shape of the 
Australian Economy, 1861-1900. 
EC"Onomic Record April 1958. 
- as for Table IV.1. 
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Before the 1850's most buildings in the cities were 
stone or brick and the fire risk was probably small. On 
the other hand the first organised fire brigades were not 
established until 1851. During the gold rushes and the 
period of rapid economic expansion between 1860 and 1890 
the water supplies to the cities and the effectiveness 
of fire brigades were greatly improved, but at the same 
time timber became a common building material, and there 
was a considerable increase in the diversity of manufac-
turing and trade risks, in the size of individual risks 
(such as warehouses), and above all in the danger of large 
city conflagrations. Much of the concern for the forma-
tion of tariffs which would provide fairly wide margins 
of underwriting surplus must undoub·C;edly be attributed 
' \ to companies which were aware of the conflagration 
danger; this applied especially to the principal British 
companies which had been involved in some of the 
disastrous American fires, notably those at Chicago 
(1871) and Boston (1872). In fact, towards the end of 
the 'eighties and in the 'nineties a number of serious 
block fires occurred in Australia and were important 
factors influencing the general hardening of rates at this 
time, and the formation of the 1897 tariffs themselves. 
~1£) Marine InsRrance. The main outlines of the 
fr 
1' ~evelopment of marine 1 insurance in Australia can be 
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described in 1 terms 'of Charts II. 3 and II. 6 and the 
discussion of entries and exits in Chapter II. Again, 
no satisfactory history of the development of the market 
exist~~, but the broad outlines are now set out. ( 1) 
The first marine insurance companies in Australia 
were formed between 1831 and 1841 in Tasmania,(2) 
Melbourne and Sydney. All except one of the mainland 
companies were wound up during the 18L~O 's recession, but 
three of the four,Tasmanian companies survived. 
In the late 1840's·two new companies were formed in 
Melbourne and some private underwriting developed in 
Sydney. However, und~rwriting capacity was limited and 
the insurances of moat imports and exports must have been 
placed in London. 
Between 1851 and 1862 about 9 new companies writing 
marine insurance were establis~ed, nearly all with the 
purpose of making arrangements in London and competing 
for Australian import and export business. In 1862 the 
head offices of marine insurers in Australia were: 
Australia 14 
Hong Kong 1 
,Batavia 1 
London 1 
(1) For more detailed notes on '~arly history see 
Appendix B .• 
(2) Then Van Dieman's land. 
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This contrasted with the situation in fire insurance, 11 , 
~ i . 
where there were already about as many overseas as 1 !
1
' , f 
Australian companies represented. The lack of interest j: 11 
It ! 
of British marine companies is probably best explained !' · 
'
1 I, 
:~ 
in terms of the ability of importers and exporters to , ~, ;, 
\ $ ~ ' £ 
seek out insurers on the London market. However, after 1 '~ I! 
! r ~ 
( 
1860 this situation changed radically. As Table II. 18 1 
shows, during the 1860's the increase in the number of 
overseas was about the same as in Australian compruiies. 
In the 'seventies there was a net increase of only one 
Australian compared to 12 overseas companies. In the 
1880's the increase in local insurers again exceeded net 
entries of overseas companies. During the 1890's there 
was a very sharp fall in the number of Australian 
companies, so that in 1900 the position of 1860 was 
almost reversed; there were twice as many overseas as 
Australian companies writing marine insurance in 
Australia. 
i 
Again, there are no satisfactory statistics of 
market shares, but ~n the limited evidence available two 
generalisations seem warranted. The first of these is 
that during the 1870's and 1880's a quite vigorous and 
I I ~ 
extensive market developed in Australia, mainly con-
stituted of Australian owned companies and underwriting 
groups. The second is that after the failures of the 
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1890's Australian marine insurance came to be dominated 
(/ 
by overseas companies operating direct in Australia and 
by Lloyd's and the London market in.general. 
During the period when the local market was 
relatively strong;·an important influence were numbers of 
private underwriting groups, usually managed by an under-
writer acting ,for varlous merchants and businessmen 
undertaking unlimited personal liability for their 
engagements., .Most adopted the name "Lloyd 'a". G1"oups to 
which the writer has found reference were: 
Name 
Adelaide Lloyd's t 
Melbourne Lloyd's 
Melbourne Underwriters' 
Association 
Australian Lloyd's 
Southern Lloyd's 
Sydney Lloyd's 
Melbourne Lloyd's§ 
Hull and General Marine 
Association of Australia 
North Australian, Lloyd's 
Townsville Lloyd's 
Queensland Lloyd's 
Office 
Adelaide 
Melbourne 
Melbourne 
Melbourne 
Melbourne 
Sydney 
Melbourne 
Melbourne 
Sydney 
Towns ville 
Brisbane 
Approximate 
period or-
operation 
1856-1864 
1856-1860 
1857-1860 
1879-1897 
1881-1895 
1882-1896 
1883-1903 
1883-1887 
1885-1890(?) 
1886-1892(?) 
1890-18913 
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Union·Lloyd's 
Federal Lloyd's 
' Sydney 
Melbourne 
1890-1894 
1892-1894 
tBecame,the Adelaide Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company. -------·~-----------------..;;.;.;;-
*Became the Commonwealth Insurance Company. 
Both the L~oyd's groups and the Australian companies 
were represented in.London where, in 1875 1 they formed an 
association known as the Australian and New Zealand 
Underwriters' Aasociation~(3) In 1887 Australian 
companies were by far the most numerous single national 
group doing business in the London market. The Review 
listed 59 "American, Colonial and Foreign" offices 
writing non life business in Great Britain in 1887; of 
these 19 were Australian, 6 New Zealand, 2 Amer~can, 
19 Continental (including Germany, Russia, Switzerland, 
Austria and Scandinavia) and the remaining 13 had head 
offices in various British colonies - India, Hong Kong, 
South·Africa.(4) ·In 1884 there were in all a total of 22 
Australian marine insurance companies and underwriting 
groups in existence; representatives of 17 of these 
attended the annual meeting of the A. & N.Z. Underwriters' 
Association in London.(5) 
(3) Hereafter abbreviated as the!:.!. & N.Z • .....!:filderwriters' 
Association. 
(4) The Review, Insurance Di1"ectory 1887, pp.555-6. 
(5) AIBR 1884 p.178. 
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, , The market share of Australian marine insur·.;~ rs· in 
the 'seventies and 'eighties was probsbly r.elatively 
high. From :published accounts, Coghlan's "census" of 
N.S.W. business in 1892, and various rough. estimates 
(described in Appendix B) the position in 1888·was 
approxira11.;. te:t.y as fol~. ow~: Th.e total marine premiums of 
22 Australj,r,::~i ·:s~~~JJ:6~· ,h, ... 1 ( 0xcluding two fraudulent 
companies) .::d.ua sL-: Ui;.'~e.::·wri ting groups were at least 
£3~~ (~' ooo. O:; cer•7/:~dn ar3sumptions (Appendix B) this was 
approximately 76 per cent of total premiums received 
within AustraJ.~~. If the business potentially available 
to Australian insurers is defined to be 
(1) Imports 
(2) Exports 
(3) All internal trade, including inter and intra-
State 
(4) Australian owned hulls 
the Australian share may have been between 22 and 52 
per cent. 
On the same assumptions the situation had altered 
drastically by·1903., ,In this year the 6 remaining 
Australian companies wrote about 29-33 ~er cent of total 
premiums written within Australia, and 8-19 per cent of'· 
total "available" premiums. A similar change can be 
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inferred from the Coghlan statistics.(6) These related 
to returns of business "Within N.s.w." during 1892, as 
for fire business. 1892<was after the failure on 
absorption of some of the principal local marine 
companies. The premiums written by national groups of 
companies were: 
Head Off'ice No. of Cos. ~rems. £'000 Percentage 
- of Total 
Aust.* 19 69.3 l,L6 • 4 
U.K. 8 32.8 21.9 
N. Z. 4 22.0 14.7 
10ther 9 25.4 17.0 
Total 40 149.5 100.0 
*Including 4 private underwriting groups. 
By 1900 all except 6 of the 19 Australian cornpaniea 
had been absorbed or liquidated. Of the 13 thus 
disappearing, 6 having N.S.W. marine premiums in 1892 of 
£13,900 had been absorbed - 6 by British companies, and 
two by Hong Kong and New Zealand companies respectively. 
The four Lloyd 1 s groups and one other company were wound 
up during the 'nineties. By contrast all except ~ of 
the overseas companies were still operating ,in N.s.w. in 
1900; in .additiQn"there had be~n a considerable nu~ber of 
(6) T. Coghlan op.cit. 
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new entrants. There were.:.no n~w. entries by Australian 
companies during· the period.· .... on. the, .basis~ of. the: 1892 
., . . ~ . . 
figures the~Australian company market share fell from 46 
.. • ' •. _.... ' :-;.· •• , • •• • ' •• • ••• , ., ' ' •· f II> • •• • • 
to about 30 ·pe.r:•cent, but ·1f .t.he. new o~erseaa· entrants .· 
"-• ,, .• ,"•·I ~··-.. 
reduced ·the share of the surviving Australian as well as 
that of the original overseas companies the actual figure 
. 
was less than 30 per cent. 
Marine insurance in the second half of the 19th 
; -· ,. "' 
Century was carried on against a background of rapid 
improvements in means or communication, both at sea and 
on land. On the main sea routes the most important change 
. " 
was the increase in the proportion of Australian imports 
and exports carried in steamships. In N.S.W. in 1879 half 
the tonnage of shipping entered was sail, but by 1900 
this was less than 20 per cent. Sailing ships were then 
used principally to move the wheat harvest, but even 
this use had dwindled considerably by 1910.(7) In 1912, 
as Table IV.3 shows, sailing ships were no longer 
significant in Australian international trade. Dµ.ring 
. i ,, • • ', .·• • 
and after the 'seventies, too, there were considerable 
.• .. , 
improvements in sail:i~g v~ssels; hard· wood, iron, and 
• • j • ''. ' I ' ;· ' • > '·. ,1 ,·, ' ' ~ • ' 
later steel replaced the earlier soft wood clippers. 
(7) E. Du~;sdoris :- The Austr'aiian wheat Growing Industry, 
1788-1948,·p.172 f'n.12. 
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TABLE IV.) 
N.S.W. Trade and Shipping Statistics, 1857-1912. 
No. of ships Tonnage cleared - Value of 
Year cleared for Average percentage of im:eorts plus 
interstate and tonnage sail to total exports, £M 
overseas 
1857 1204 313 n.a. 10.7 
1862 1568 298 n.a. 16.4 
1867 2104 346 n.a. 13.5 
1872 2091 389 n.a. 19.7 
1877 2301 479 ~56.o 27.7 
1882 2340 688 39.9 38.0 
1887 2508 848 26.8 37.7 
1892 2544 1093 23.6 42.7 
1897 2652 1267 20.9 45.5 
1902 2835 1526 15.1 49.5 
1907 3205 1875 13.4 53.8 
1912 3346 2227 6.4 65.3 
*1a76 
Source: N.S.W. Statistical Registers. 
---
Added to this were the extensions and improvements to port 
and harbour facilities both in Australis and other 
countries. On land in Australia there was over the 
period a vast extension of the internal ·road and rail 
networks, and the risks associated with long hauls to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I, I I 
·I 
1 • 
' 
'I 
I 
. ' 
! 
I ~ 
i 
I 1 I 
' ' 
' ~~ t I I I 
! '" 
J 
•I • 
< 
rail heads by bullock teams, or with barge transport along 
the Darling-Murray river system, were largely eliminated. 
The above changes were reflected, especially after 
1880, in a very rapid fall in marine insurance rates. 
This is shown in Chart IY.1. The rates calculated from 
the Australian Agricultural Company records were on wool, 
sheep's back to London as paid in London. They probably 
reflect to some extent changing proportions of wool 
carried in vessels of varying conditions, and the 
prolonged fall after 1880 was probably largely due to the 
increased use of steamships. However, the minimum rates 
snggested at various tarif'f conferences for Peninsular 
and Orient Line steamers indicate that there were also 
considerable reductions in rates for a relatively 
homogeneous risk class. This is supported by the fact 
that percentage rate differentials proposed between 
different steamer lines, were approximately the same in 
the 1882, 1892 and 1898 tariffs. The wool series 
suggests that rates were fairly constant during the 
'seventies, and this accords with the apparent ability of 
the A. & N.Z. Underwriters' Association to work a 
"Homeward" (i.e. Australia to U.K.) tariff over this 
period. The apparent fluctuations at the end of the 
'sixties also fit descriptions of the London market at 
that time. In 1878 the tariff steamer rate was identical 
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with the sailer rate i.e. 25/- per £100, {F.P.A. 
Homewards) and it seems· that the failure to draw up 
satisfactory tariffs in subsequent years must be 
attributed to some extent to persistent underestimates of 
the downward trend of losses in the new steamships. By 
1900 tariff steamer rates were about one third of what 
they had been in 1878, but sailer rates, even for iron or 
steel ships, had barely changed. 
A further important change that came about during 
the fifty years between 1860 and 1910 was the steady 
increase in the average size of ships in use, particularly 
after the introduction of ·steamships. The average 
tonnage of ships cleared from N.S.W. ports in 1902 
(including interstate voyages) was five times as great as 
in 1862 (Table IV.3). This did not concern Australian 
insurers as regards the hulls themselves, as few if any 
hulls engaged in international trade were in Australian 
ownership, and most were from the beginning insured in 
the London market. However, to the extent that the 
increase occurred in Australian coastal shipping, higher 
retentions were necessary, and in the important business 
of the internationa~ insurance of cargoes larger values 
were at risk. During the 'seventies and 'eighties there 
appears to have been a considerable exchange of re-
insurance between Australian and New Zealand companies, 
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but already in the 'eighties the capacities of British 
companies were considerably greater due to larger 
premium inoomes and reserves, and treaty arrangements in 
London and with Continental reinsurera. The limits 
allowed local representatiYes were again increased when 
agencies came to be replaced by branches. These 
companies were acoo:rdingly able to take substantial lines 
on ships on which .there were increasing amounts at risk. 
Australian companies, on the other hand, especially in 
the 'nineties, at a time when increased limits were 
required, found local reinsurance facilities actually 
reduced, owing to the failure of other Australian 
insurers. It is accordingly not surprising that those 
which survived the depression turned to treaty arrange-
ments in London and elsewhere. 
_ (.d) Accident and Miscellaneous Insurance. Fire and 
marine insurance were by far the most important classes 
of business written during the 19th century, and accident 
business only began to become important after 1900, with 
the development of the motor car and the passing of the 
Workers' Compensation Acts by State Parliaments arter 
191 o. ( 8 ) In 1907, the earli.est year for which accident 
(8) Most of the business classes and the developments 
referred to· in this section were similar to those in 
England., For a.description of the la~ter see 
W.A. Dinsdale: History of Accident Insurance in 
Great Britain, and H.E. Raynes: A History of British 
Insurance, Ohs. XVI and XVII. 
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statis:tics ;are .available ~·tn Australia1> all =lines. other.· 
than fire and marine···:accounted for. about.'· 17 per· cent ;of 
total non-life premiums in Victoria. <.9) This included: 
personal· ace iden t :- and sickness 
fidelity guarantee · 
. plate glaas 
livestock 
employers'· liabllity ·•. 
horse (and motor vehicle) injury 
•. and liability .. 
burglary 
boiler . 
In the matter.of.. employers' liability Australian 
legislation followed the English with something ·or a 
time lag., . ·Acts based. on . the· English Employers' 'Liability 
Act of 1880 were passed by State parliaments in the 
following years:· · · 
N.s.w. -
:S.A. 
Qld •. ;;. 
Vic. 
W.A. 
Tas. 
1883. 
1884. 
·1886 
1887 
1894· 
1895 
The purpose of these. Acts was to limit the defence of 
.. 
"common employment" in actions by .workmen agai~st 
employers. In England Wilson and Levy commented that 
... ; ' , 
few actions were brought under the Act and that in a high 
proportion t,he workmen railed; C-1·) ~h~ s~e was probably 
.. ·· 
( 9) Vic tori a, stat is t:fcal Regis t'er. 
( 1) Wilson· and ·Levy: Workmen's Compensation• 
./ 
•\, \1 
i < J 
·' lt 
,: \ : 
,, ,, . 
{~ : 
- ~r:·1, 
265 .;; 1' 
true in.,Australia•:.\: In .any :event the ·:volume .. of .. ~ insurance 
business written 'appears :.~·to have been.·relatively .small• 
Thus .a company· promoted ',by ·the Victorian Employers' 
Union specifically to write this class of business 
following the :passing of' the Victorian .Act in 1886 never 
had an annual ·prem1um ·income of· more .than about £1500,. 
and had been·:wound up:«by.>1892.( 2 ,, ·Personal accident 
insurance was ·probably . more important; .it was ·Written 
by about 20:local and ·overseas companies·over the 1870's· 
and 1880 's ~· ._ : During-. the .:1.880 's, as· in other lines, 
competition·seems to:have :sharpened. Thus the AIBR 
commented. in :J 887: (3) 
As is well known, accident insurance ••• has 
not been .. very profitable in the colonies ·for 
some' tfme' past' mainly ''owing to excessive ' 
competition, ;:which has had the effect of 
distributing a.moderate volume ·of business 
too widely, thus making the necessary 
establishment expenses.· too. high ·:.propor-
tionately, while it has led to a reduction 
of.rates.·:··~: · 
Other classes which were of some importance were 
plate glass, livestock and fidelity guarantee. From 
'1: .. 
about 1870 8 small plate glass mutuals operate.d at 
' ... J ... 
various times. About 7 small Australian livestock 
··· .. · ' -, ,·. :" "1 . .-
(2) 
(3) 
.... - . . ' " . ... - .. f 
The Employers ul11on tria.emn.:t tY societ;y,· ·1ae1_:;,·1892~ · : 
: '' 
' )w • 
; ,. 
AIBR 188 7 '.~p-p: 496~ 7 • · · 
.. ·. . ' ... , . ' ' ' . . ~ . . '., ·. ' 
,· f -
, .. , ' ' ... 
',··,,:, 
.. , -.-L •. 
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companies were floated in the 'eighties •. During the 
'eighties in Victoria eight Australian and one overseas 
company were licensed to wri 1ie fidelity guarantee 
insurance. 
Before 1900 none of the overseas fire or marine 
companies in Australia wrote "accident" (i.e. non fire 
and marine) lines. Those which did were specialists. 
Of these, some of the early ones had only short lived 
arrangements in Australia(4) and at least one of the 
later arrivals was fraudulent,(5) but others remained and 
were an important influence on the development of 
accident insurance at the time. They were: 
Company: 
London Guarantee and 
Accident 
N.Z. Accident 
Employers' Liability 
Ocean Accident and 
Guarantee 
Palatine 
Year 
estd. 
1869 
1880 
1880 
H.O. 
-
London 
Auckland 
London 
1890 London 
1891 Manchester 
Period in Aust. 
1873-
1880-
1880-
1895-
1891-
As in fire and marine insurance quite a vigorous 
market for miscellaneous forms of cover developed among 
(4) 
(5) 
e.g. Trafalgar Life - P.A. in Aust. 1852-54 approx. 
Waterloo Life_ - P.A. in Aust. 1858-58 " 
Ocean RailV/aY - ·P.A. in Aust. 1873-74 " 
Metropolitan Accident and Guarantee - H.O. London~ 
in Australia 1884. 
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Australian-ownedjcompanies in the 1880 1.s. ··However :of : · 
about· 31 small'", specialist. companies· floated in the years 
after 1870 only two were in existence after the.depression, 
and these.:. were bought· out·: by an ·English company in 1910 
and 1915 respectively. The others were wound up.or 
absorbed, mostly·during the 'nineties; some,. including 
several outright· frauds, disappeared during the 'eighties. 
A number, relatively prosperous, .were taken over by · 
overseas companies when they moved into the Australian 
market. (G) ·· 
As with the :British, .the Australian fire :and marine 
companies for the mos_t part di.~ not .write other· lines. 
There were about five excep.tions •. Notable among these 
was the Colonial Mutual Fire (Melbourne) which did, 
employers' liabili.ty from 1882, accident from 1889, and 
plate glassfrom 1889. However 1 t was rather more·· 
common, at least inVic~oria, for fire and marine 
companies '.to ·issue f~de~i ty· gua.~a,ntee. bonds.·. 
After the.depress~on,~nd. by the time of·t~e formation 
of the Accident Associations in 1992, overseas insur~r_s.' · 
. . . . . . 
(6) e.g. The Australasian Accident Assurance Association 
(H.O. Sydney 1878-1880), described by the AI~R as 
the.first company.doing accident business·- f'or 
the lethargic English agencies could scarcely be 
digni.f.i~.d,, PY. ~tne Jiame. qt _c9mp~t1~2rs_lf '.".9 .. (A~BR __ 1_878 
:p.120) was absorbed by the New Zealand Accident in 
1880. '. . '•' ·, .' ' '.· :'' . · ... 
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were dominant. Thus in December 1905 a revised Victorian 
tariff was signed by 7 English, 3 New Zealand and 3 
Australian companies. The membership of the N.s.w. 
Accident Association in 1907 was: 5 British, 1 New 
Zealand, and 1 Australian company. 
The period of 20 or so years after 1900 was marked 
by a general diversification by British insurance 
companies into new fields, largely accomplished by take-
overs. (7) Moat of the principal absorptions were by fire 
companies of marine, accident and life companies, but 
some of the accident companies - notably the Employers' 
b~bility and the General Accident - remained independent 
and moved into fire, marine and life insurance. The 
effects of this process were felt in Australia and, among 
others, some of the overseas accident companies which had 
been most important before 1900 became parts of composite 
groups. Thus the P~latine was absorbed by the Comm~cial 
Union, (1900), the ~w Zealand Accid~ by the~ 
Zealand (1906), the Norwich and London Accident by the 
Norwich Union (1908), the Ocean Accident by the Commercial 
Union (1910), the London Guarantee by the Phoenix (1922). 
The surviving Australian fire and marine companies 
reacted similarly; among the principal companies the 
(7) Viz. H.E. Raynes: A History or British Insurance, 
Ch.XXI. (London .1953.) 
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gueensland commenced accident business in 1905,(8) the 
Victoria in 1906 ( 9) and the United in 1 908 •. ( 1) By 1909 
a high proportion of all companies, either directly or 
• through subsidiaries, were writing all the miscellaneous 
classes which have been under discussion in the present 
section. 
L~) The International Settins- fhe development of 
the Australian insurance market between 1860 and 1910 
coincided with a period of rapid expansion in the inter-
national business of British companies. Already by 1880 
many of the principal companies were writing most of their 
business in countries other than Great Britain, while the 
London marine market was increasingly assuming an inter-
national character. The bulk of British foreign business 
was in the United States, but companies operated in 
nearly all other parts of the world, including Europe, 
Scandinavia, Russia, the Middle East, India, Africa, 
South America, and Asia.( 2 ) 
(8) 
(9) 
( 1) 
(2) 
Through the North ~ueensland Accident, established 
1905, absorbed 190 • 
Held Covered, p.49. 
Company records. 
For an account of this expansion see Raynea·op.~it. 
Ch.XV, and the various company histories, ~specially 
P. Dickson: The Sun Fire Office. 
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The course' of .:events in Australia was influenced to 
a lat•ge ·extent ·.by , the .. state . of ·:c()IIl.peti ti on and results 
in the international market •. Thus the large number of· 
new entrants· in Au~tpali,~n f'ire insurance during 1878-
1880, and the subsequent tariff co.~lapse in 1881 .coincided 
with periods of high ·and then relatively low .. underwriting 
surpluses by_British·fire companies (see Chart II.5 ). 
Bad underwriting:.results of Australian companies and the 
failure or absorption of a number in 1892 and 1893 
occurred when the five British companies (Chart II. 5 ) 
made a loss ·on·· their overall business. Again in the 
three years 1899-1901 ··following. the formati·on .of the 
In tariffs,British fire surpluses were relatively low. 
marine insurance British underwriting results were 
particularly· good in the late 'seventies (Chart II. 6), 
during the ·time·when .an Australian.tariff was.being 
successfully ·operated.· over·the years 1895-1899 results 
were bad1 and .this again coincided with heavy losses by 
Australian companies and the introduction of tariffs. 
A good example .of .the natu~e. of the:routes by which 
the international scene could be reflected in conditions 
in Australia .is provided by the .operations of 'certain 
,•. .. ... -.- , .... 
British backed.marine:companies having:their·headquarters 
in Hong Kong and Sliangha1. one of the'se ,: c,the Can ton 
(H.O. Hong,Kong established 1836) had operated through 
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various agents 1'in Sydney and Melbourne since as early as 
1849, and another, the No~th China (H.O. Shanghai 
established 1863) was represented in Melbourne from 1866. 
Two others, the !l!l!on of Canton (H.O. Hong Kong 
established 1835) and the China Traders (H.O. Hong Kong 
established 1865) appointed agents in Australia in 1878 
and 1880 respectively. Their system was to divide 
profits, after making reserve transfers, between 
dividends to shareholders and a bonus payable without 
discrimination to all policy holders. The result was 
that a substantial bonus could be declared on Australian 
business, which, taken by itself, may have been written 
at a relatively small profit or even at a loss. During 
the 'eighties and early 'nineties bonuses so declared 
varied from 10 to 30 per cent of premiums, and in fact 
were paid at times when underwriting surpluses of 
Australian companies were certainly less than this. The 
nature of this competition proved extremely irritating, 
not only to underwriters in Australia attempting to draw 
up tariffs, but also to London underwriters. In 1886 
two of the principal London companies, the Marine and the 
Alliance Marine, issued a circular cutting rates from\ 
London to ~hi~~ and Japan qy_40.to 50 per cent, with, 
according to the AIBR, "••• the avowed intention of 
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1.iping out mutual marine underwriting". (3) In 1887 the 
underwriter of ,the British .and Foreie;n made a statement 
regarding the "impending conflict" with these companies, 
saying that they were "unduly aggressive ••• and unfair 
and ••• unless we attack them in their stronghold ••• 
sooner or later, they would seriously interfere with what 
we consider our legitimate business • • • If they will not 
adopt this principle of live and let live, we must 
consistently and persistently pursue the course we have 
adopted until we have brought them to a better frame of 
mind. 11 (4) To what extent this deliberately chosen policy 
L 
of British companies affected marine insurance in 
Australia (where all the companies involved were 
operating) it is not possible to say; certainly if such 
a policy had been pursued it would have made conditions 
difficult for the smaller Australian-based companies. 
In any event in the late 1890 1s the "bonus question" 
involving the so called "China companies" no longer 
proved the stumbling block it had bean before, to the 
conclusion of tari~f agreements. By 1897 the Canton had 
given up its bonus system altogether and the other three 
had adopted steady rates of bonus which thus became more 
(3) AIBR 1886 p.763. · 
(4) AIBR 1887 p.242. 
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in the nature of predictable discounts. In the case of 
the Union of Canton this involved altering its Articles 
of Association, which had previously made compulsory the 
distribution to policy holders of a fixed share of the 
profits, including interest on investments. As from 
1st January 1895 the distribution of profits between 
reserves, bonus and dividends was at.the discretion of 
the Directors. (5) Agreement appears to have been reached 
on these matters in London.(6) A probable change in the 
underlying situation was that good profits on the U.K. -
Far East trade route were no longer so significant as 
to finance smaller profits or losses in other areas; 
certainly this was the state of affairs the U.K. based 
companies intended to bring about. Another was that the 
bonus system had automatically produced falling net rates 
during the 15 years after 1880, when, for reasons des-
cribed above, the trend,of losses had been rapidly down-
ward. The ex-post bonus was no longer such an ideal 
instrument when, as after 1900, this trend was probably 
less strongly marked. As for Australia, after the 1897 
tariffs were adopted, except for a few years local profit 
rates were considerably higher than world profit rates 
(5) AIBR 1897 pp.489, 583. 
( 6) Ibid. 
J 
·is reflected in the accounts of British companies. 
Bonuses declared on the basis of world-wide profits 
.. :ould then be relatively low in comparison with 
~ustralian profits. 
Over the entire 19th Century, as far as the writer 
has been able to discover, there'waa at no time in 
Australia any agent advertising as placing insurances 
at Lloyd's. In non-m~rine insurance this was under-
standable, since it was only towards the end of the 
century that a non-marine market developed at Lloyd's, 
even for British risks.(7) It is more surprising that 
no connection developed in marine insurance. Certainly 
business was placed at Lloyd's, especially by trading 
firms with branches or agents in London, but it is 
significant that over the period 1869-1899 the Lloyd's 
agency in Melbourne (for surveys, information etc.) was 
held by the local compsnl marine Association. When this 
Association took over the administration of the 1898 
marine Tariff agreements the Lloyd's agency was given up. 
Before this time references to Lloyd's competition for 
Australian business, in the AIBR and letter books, hardly 
ever occurred, but after these and the fire and accident 
agreements were concluded, references were frequent.CB) 
(7) Xiz. D.E.W. Gibb: Llol<'!'s of London Ch.9. {London 1957) 
(8) And from pro-tariff correspondents or managers, 
seldom favourable! 
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~f) Summari. The background so far sketched must 
be borne in mind when considering the details of the 
~ariffs and negotiations set out below. In particular 
the expansion of British and British owned companies in 
Australia in the 1870's and 1880's, and the shrinking of 
the local market share in the 1890 1s and earlier, meant 
that the tariff agreements of 1897 and after were British 
dominated and followed British patterns. In fire 
insurance, and probably· in marine, in the 1890's the 
market shares of the leading companies were much lower 
than they had been 30 or 20 years before, while the 
number of companies had increased. Whereas informal 
agreements between relatively few companies controlling 
a large proportion of the business had previously been 
possible, now it was found that elaborate constitutional 
provisions, procedures and rules were necessary. The 
Australian market had also greatly increased the number 
and importance of its links with London and other 
countries. An important factor in this process, not so 
far mentioned, was ~he opening of the England-Australia 
cable service in 1872• .Another was the operation in the 
London market of Australian companies and underwriting 
groups, particularly in the 1880 1s. During the 1890's 
this second connection almost disappeared, and from one 
• 
point of view the tariff agreements of 1897 and after were 
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an attempt to isolate the Australian market still further 
from the effects of the many connections which remained. 
From another they represented a truce between some of the 
major English companies, which by then had established 
satisfactory footholds and which considered that more was 
to be gained by cooperation than further aggressive 
expansion. However, before turning to more detailed 
consideration of these developments and the events leading 
up to them; the early agreements and their breakdown must 
be described. 
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CHAPTEi; VI 
THE EARLY TARIFFS AND THEIR BREAKDOWN, 1850-1882 
') j": 7 
hJ { .. 
Information coneerning tariffs before the commence-
ment of the AIBR in 1877 is extremely limited. Most of 
the information available to the· writer concerns Victoria, 
and this is described below in connection with fire and 
marine insurance in turn. It seems probable that tariffs 
in Victoria were fai~ly representative of similar agree-
ments in N.s.w. and other States. A~ter 1877 events in 
all States are reasonably well documented ~nd in fact 
broadly follow the Victorian pattern. 
(a) Fire Tariffs. The first tariff to which the 
writer has found reference was agreed in London for 
insurance at Sydney.(9) This tariff was said to have been 
"recently agreed" in February 1851. ( 1 ) It laid down a 
scale of rates ranging from 5/- to 20/-, and provided for 
short period rates and the use of the average clause on 
(9) 
( 1) 
Royal Insurance Company - Forei~ Powers and 
Instructions. Seven books cove~ng 1848-1875, 
Royal records, Liverpool. Book 2.A. 
Ibid. , Book 3. 
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f]oating policies. In 1853 the same tariff was in 
operation in Melbourne.( 2 ) In December 1855 it was 
undercut by 25 per cent by the Liverpool and London, and 
the other offices followed.(3) 
From the early 1850's companies cooperated in the 
running and financing of fire brigades to attend fires at 
properties insured by them. In this connection they had 
occasion to meet at regular intervals, and the meetings 
became convenient places for the discussion of such 
matters as rates and policy conditions. In Victoria 
from 1856 the meetings of the Insurance Companies' 
Brigade Association (as it came to be called) were at 
least as concerned with the administration of tariffs as 
with the management of the fire brigade,(4) although the 
discussions were not envisaged by the Articles of 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Ibid. 
Ibid. and Northern records, Melbourne. Book of 
instructions to agents, 1854-66. 
United Insurance Companies' Fire Brigade Association: 
Minute Book 1870-1891. Made available to the writer 
by the Victorian FAUA. Hereafter referred to as 
Vic. F.B.A. Minute Book. 
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Association. One member later commented: 
Under cover of this brigade Association we have ••• 
been in the habit of dealing with many questions 
affecting our common interests, but I need 
scarcely say that the practice is altogether 
irregular. By appealing to the.Articles of 
Association ~f member might stop such 
discuss ions. ~5 J 
Although in the 1880's and 1890's managers tended to 
look back on the period be.fore 188·1 as one of unbroken 
harmony, disagreements resulting in the .abandoning of 
tariffs occurred in Victoria at le~st twice, .pnce in 
1863(6) and again in 1873· •. (7) The N.S.Wtl tariff was 
abandoned in August 1867 after rates had been increased 
by 50 per cent earlier in the year;(8) a similar break-
down appears to have occurred in Adelaide at about ·the 
same time.(g) Most of these disturbances were however. 
relatively brief; one .of the.conditions for this· was the 
apparent willingness of overseas companies to close down 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
C. Jarrett: Some Advantages of Combination on 
Matters other than Rates, AIBRJ887 pp.586 ff. 
early talk given to the Victorian Insurance 
Institute. 
An 
The Argus,. September ~30, 1863 :· Ch~irman 's Address, 
The Au.st_ralian Alliance. Assurance Company, First 
Annual Meeting. · - · 
Vic. F.B.A. Minute Book, 6.5.1873. 
United records. 
l 
Commercial Union records. 
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agencies at.short notice. Thus the Commercial Union, 
London, North British and ~·withdrew entirely from 
Australia in various-years after 1867. 
As in Melbourne and Sydney, tariffs in Adelaide, 
Brisbane, Hobart, Launceston, and later, Perth, were all 
administered by the local fire brigade Associations. 
These Associations, controlling the main central city 
fire brigades, were in a strong position, since they could 
refuse to attend fires at non-insured property or property 
insured by non-members. These powers were nevertheless 
limited, and this is well illustrated by information 
available in connection with the Victorian Association. 
Although most companies in Victoria were members of 
the Fire Brigade Association during the years for which 
Minutes and other records are available, in practically 
every year there was at least one company, and on 
occasions at least four, which either refused or delayed 
joining. The a'bili ty to do this was largely ·dependent 
on the existence ·of numerous "volunteer" fire brigades, 
with which ·companies' wishing to stay out of the Insurance 
company association would come to some form of subsidy 
arrangement. The outstanding example of this was the 
withdrawal by the Liverpool London and Globe from:the 
Brigade Associa~ion an~-t~e tariff in May 1873•, The 
Association published, a' notice in the newspapers that 
.,. :; 
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r 1 
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' ' 1 ' 
this company·, would, henceforth_, not have its insured . 
property protected ·.·by:'. the. Association Brigade. C1 )_.:The 
Globe: however: made.:~rrangements ~with local fire brigades 
and did not· re.join: the Association until July of the 
f'ollowing year,· . ·• 
The· presence of thevol1¥.l,teer·brigades considerably 
limited the effectiveness of the,, control of . the 
Association Brigade as a disciplinary weapon;· moreover· 
in the ·outer Melbourne suburbs .and in country·. towns · '· 
locally·organisedbrigades were the only ones, and the 
Association itself .used· to make regular payments to 
certain.of them. Another factor was that non-membership 
in the cases: of companies doing a, small•· business was. not 
always accompanied by. non~subscription to tariffs; thus 
.· 
in 1874 contributions were received from only 15 companies,· 
but there were:21 signatories to the metropolitan tariff. 
The Association made·special arrangements for.specific 
charges for• attending·:· fires on.; property: insured by the 
6 non-subscribers~· 
. The pre-1881 ~tariffs had. much in ·common with the· · 
. later. 1897 agreements, .but they· were ·far less·. complex; and 
far more must. have been·' informally :understood.' :.A con- .. · 
di tion for this ·was··:.the ·:relatively small·.numbers ·of':·· 
r 
• • .,_ . ~- >; '· ' " ~ ' '.. '. 
(1) Vic •. F.B.A. Minutes,_. ~·5}·:1.~73 .. -.~· ' " ' ..• ·~'I!'···~' 
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companies involved, as alrea~y suggested. Table rv.4 
sets out the numbers of signatories to Victorian f.ire 
tariffs, and .the implications of the large increase 
between 1876 and 1879 need not be elaborated. 
One obvious step taken by the Association in 1873, 
after the defection of the Globe, was to adopt the so 
called "Additional Insurances Agreement", an agreement 
which became an important part of later tariffs. Under 
it there was endorsed on each policy and expiry notice 
the following clause: 
All other Insurance upon this property must 
be declared and endo~s~d forthwith, or the 
policy will be void.\2J 
The purpose of the clause, apart from helping to 
avoid over-insurance and fraudulent claims, was to 
provide information about the insurances of non-mem?ers, 
with whom coinsurance would be refused. 
Another issue which arose in the early Melbourne 
Agreements was also important in the post 1897 
negotiations·. This was the question whether votes in 
the Association should be weighted accordi~g to business 
written and fire brigade contributions. The financial 
arrangement of the brigade was that companies contributed 
each year to its support in proportion to premium income 
received from property within a radius of 10 miles of the 
--------------------------------------------------------
(2) Vic. F.B.A. Minutes, 6.5.1873. 
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.... ,. ' TABLE IV.4 
Signatories,·to -Victorian Fire Tariffs, pre-1882. 
Metropolitan Country 
Date 
--
1866 
1867 
~874 
August 1875 
December 1875 
September 1876 
September 1879 
June 1881 
No. of 
Sig.p.atures 
17 
16 
21 
24 
24 
24 
40 
40 
Date No. of 
Signatures 
March 1877 n.a. 
February 1878 29 
' 
July 1878 37 
September 1879 40 
.. 
Sources:. 1866 - Vic. -.Ins., Co. records. . · , ~ 
All other - Copies of Tariffs, FAUA records, 
Melboume. (. .. ~ · 
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Melbourne Post Office.(3) Votes on a General Committee 
were graded according to premium income: (4) 
Con tr ibu tibns per annum Votes 
Under £25 nil 
£25-99 1 
£100-199 2 
£200 and over 3 
This principle continued until at least 1881, except that 
by then 5 companies were allowed 4 votes each, a number 
had 3, and so on.(5) By this means companies with a 
relatively· large market share had a proportionately large 
say in the management of the fire brigade, but this 
influence did not extend to the fixing of tariff rates. 
Here companies doing a relatively small volume of 
business were able to.use the threat of withdrawal from 
agreements to good effect. In this kind of bargaining a 
small market share in Victoria may indeed have been an 
advantage, especially if the companies concerned were 
relatively strong in other states or countries. 
The relative incompleteness of formal agreements is 
well illustrated by surviving Victorian tariffs. The 
(3) Victoria Insurance Company records - Agreement 
dated 2.4.1866. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. Miscellaneous paper: date probably 1881 or 
1882. 
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1874 Agreement dealt antirely.with trade risks, and even 
though the list of ratings was extended in each year 
until 1881, dwellings and hotels were never included (in 
contrast to the 1867 tariff).( 6) Moreover, until 1877 
no attempt was made to regulate rates outside Melbourne 
and Geelong. A meeting in July 1874 was content to say 
that such risks were "... properly charged at an advance 
of from 25 to 100 per cent upon Melbourne rates", and to 
agree to at least not charge less than for the equivalent 
mercantile risks in Melbourne. In 1877 a scale of rates 
was adopted for country areas, but the effectiveness of 
both this and the Metropolitan tariff was already some-
what dubious by 1879. 
The tariff position with regard to discounts 
commissions and brokerage is not clear. The 1867 tariff 
contained no reference to these matters at all. In May 
1874 it waa agreed to allow not more than 10 per cent off 
country business "done otherwise than through regularly 
appointed agents",(7) and in 1875 a maximum commission or 
discount of 15 per cent was fixed for the Melbourne 
(6) Copies of Tariff Agreements held at the,Victorian 
FAUA, Melbourne. 
(7) Vic •. F.B.A. Resolution dated 15.5.1874. Vic. Ins. 
Co. records. 
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metropolitan and Geelong areas. (8) A new Agreement made 
in 1879 explicitly recognised brokerage, as distinct from 
agency commission and discount, for the first time. 
Maximum rates of 10 per cent.were fixed for the business 
of principals in the metropolitan tariff district, 
with the important proviso that if mutual companies 
announced a bonus non-mutuals could make an equivalent 
rebate, provided notice was given to the Association.(9) 
Again, by this time agreements were under considerable 
pressure, mainly by way of higher discounts and 
commissions. 
Evidence of penalties for tariff breaches is lacking 
for the period preceding 1874, but from May of that year 
it was agreed that infringements were to be reported to 
Hoad, the Superintendent of the Fire Brigade, and if the 
charge were proved the company would be fined.~ 1 ) At a 
subsequent meeting the fine was fixed as the difference 
between the actual and tariff premium and was made 
payable to the funds of the Fire Brigade.<2 ) In 1876 
(8) 
(9) 
(1) 
Copy of Tariff, Vic. FAUA records. 
Vic. FAUA records: Tariff dated 29.9.1879. 
Vic. Ins. Co. Records. F.B.A. Resolution dated 
15.3.1874. 
(2) Ibid. Resolution dated 3.7.1874. 
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a provision was added which became usual in the post 
1897 tariffs: (3) 
Where 1an Office.by infringement.of this 
agreement deprives another office of the 
·Insurance, the.offending office shall give 
the injured office the option of reinsuring 
at Tariff rates, such portion of the risk 
affected as it may desire~ 
Apart from regulating rates and commissions the 
Association also attempted to increase the degree of 
uniformity of practice among its members. Attempts were 
made to introduce the use of the average clause, and in 
December 1875 it was in fact inserted in the tariff for 
use on policies covering timber or goods in open yards, 
goods in transit, and goods in two or more buildings.(4) 
At a meeting on 3rd July 1874 it was resolved that:(5) 
(3) 
(4) 
(1) The Committee would pay the necessary £5.5.0 
where a fire inquest was thought necessary. 
(2) A uniform clause for "Merchandise on trust 
and/or commission" should be used. 
(3) A "Form of Statement" should accompany all 
proposals for insurance of stocks out of 
Melbourne. The form required estimates of 
the value of the stocks both at current 
wholesale prices and at the last stocktaking. 
(4) A-uniform wording for endorsement of transfers 
of interest·in policies on building contents 
should be used. 
. 
Vic. FAUA records. 
' Vic. FAUA records. 
Tariff dated 1.9.1876. 
Tariff dated 3.12.1875. 
(5) Vic. ·Ins. Co·. Records: Resolution dated 3.7.1a74. 
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During the four or five years after 1874 the tariff, 
despite its obvious incompleteness, seems to have been 
kept fairly well. One manager remembered the period as 
a time when "all ••• pulled heartily together".(6) The 
AIBR wrote in 1879: "At no previous time was.any tariff 
so stringently enforced, or maintained with such 
remarkable unanimity.u(7) However, by this time the 
large number of new entrants - 14 companies started 
operations in Melbourne in 1877 and 1878 alone(8) - were 
putting considerable pressure on it. Th~ result had not 
been reduced rates - the AIBR thought that rates were 
much higher than they had been 6 or 7 years before - (in 
fact "soarcely a single class of risks can be named on 
which any redt1.Ction of premium has taken place") - but 
rather higher expense ratios.(g) "Paradoxical as it may 
seem ••• competition has in this instance not been 
attended with lower prices ••• For the minute sub-
division of the whole business and the consequently 
increased percentage borne by necessary expenses to the 
---------------------------~----~--~----~------------
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Macredie, op.cit. 
AIBR January 1879, pp.12, 13: ~he Prospects of'Fire 
and Marine Insurance Companies. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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total revenue of each company render a large· pr.ofi t on 
each individual risk a sine qua non of success and even 
of existence .• " ( 1) Surveying the market a few months 
later the AIBR predicted "a severe crisis". (2) In 1879 
a new Tariff was drawn up, but one which abandoned the 
fining and reinsurance penalties and simply pledged 
Offices "on their honour".(3) Under this tariff "the 
breaches reported were more frequent than those under 
the money penalty system 11 .(4} Moreover, like the others, 
it did not set rates for private dwellings - "reckless · 
competi tid'n 11 (5) prevailed in this field~ During 1879 and 
after the same difficul tie.s occurred in other parts of 
Australia. The AIBR reported in March 1879 that in the 
neighbouring Colonies, especially New ~ealand "··· one 
after another the tariffs have been abandoned, and rates 
. 
are being driven down, and down again, ~ith lower depths 
in prospect still".( 6) In 1881 the Annual Report i'or 1880 
( 1) Ibid. 
(2) Ibid., March 1879, p.101., 
(3) Ibid., 1879, ,p.248. Also Vic. FAUA Records: Tariff 
dated 29.9.1879. 
(4) Macredie, op.cit. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) AIBR 1879, p.101. 
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of the Adelaide Fire Insurance Association noted that 
rates were being reduced by "suicidal competition", and 
was urging its members to sign an agreement not to 
employ brokers.(?) But three companies of 37 operating 
in Adelaide were not members, and a month later the 
Association announced what must have been its demise by 
expelling four others.( 8) During 1882 in Melbourne 
efforts wer.e made to stave off collapse by an attempt to 
revert to the ·old system of fines,(9) but agreement 
could not be reached, and in September the end came. 
The result was later rather dramatically described as 
follows: "The collapse ••• burst on our little colonial 
community with all the annihilating effects of a 
revolution, and for several years order was replaced by 
chaos ••• The fabric of fire insurance government 
laboriously raised during some twenty yea-rs suddenly 
fell to pieces.u(1) 
Although conditions in the other Australian centres 
had been worsening already, the Victorian collapse was 
felt there and intensified competition still further.( 2 ) 
( 7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(1) 
(2) 
Ibid., 1881, p.176. 
Ibid., 1881, p.1, 93. 
Ibid., 1882, p.374. 
A.J. Wright:·Co-operation: Paper ~ead to the 
Insurance Institute of Victoria in October 1893. 
AIBR 1893 pp.1066-78• 
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Afte;r' '.,~he .. '!=>r~ak9-.oym. of 11882 ·there were no really 
effective tariff agreements in Australia ,again· until 
1897, when the Victorian tariff laid the foundation of 
the system which still exists. Immediately after the 
breakup the AIBR commented that "··· the distrust 
engendered .by past events is· too deep seated· to render 
re-establishment within the bounds of calculation, 
however remote ••• u(3) and in fact attempts made after 
this were· all circumscribed by an awareness of the 
delicacy of the· ground that,was.been trodden. Limited 
aims and ~low progr~as were the rule; setbacks were many 
and came to be ,expected •.. Some limited success was ·" 
achieved, notably in Queensland after ·1888 and in Sydney 
after a serious block fire in · 1890. · During 1894 howe,ver, 
there were increasing numbers of rep~rts of .the circum• 
vention o:f the limited local tariffs .. in existence, · 
particularly by way of high commissions. The Victorian 
Discount,. Brokerage, and Agency ·Agr,eement ·of 1896 marked 
a turning point in this .',respect; after this, the serious 
fire at Flinder's Lane in Melbourne.in 1897, and·a crisis 
in Queensland· in· 1898; 1 tarif:f'' agree men ts. were tight r and 
for the ·next twenty·, years. probably as effective as they 
ever have been, before or since. 
----------------------------------·---------,---------------
(J) AIBR, October 1882, pp.374 ff. TI!e Late Victorian 
Fire Tariff and the. Insurance OutlQ.2.!£. · " , , 
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(10.) ·Marine Tariffs. Reference has' already been 
made to the predominant ,place local companies held·:in 
marine insurance .before the depression. As in fire 
insurance, before 1880 tariffs were organised and worked 
with some success. The agreements were,principally 
concerned with the movement of goods along the main trade 
routes. The most important of these was the tariff on 
shipments between.the U.K. and Australia and New Zealand. 
Already in the 1860's the principal Australian companies 
in marine insurance - the N.s.w. Marine, the Pacific, 
the United, the Victoria and the Australasian - had 
London branches or agencies. In the late 'sixties at 
least two of these companies suffered heavily on London 
business, resulting in the withdrawal of one (the United) 
and the absorption of1 another. (the Australasian). 
However during the 'seventies the United re-entered the 
London market and nearly all the other Australian 
companies opened there. As mentioned above, in con-
junction with the New Zealand companies they formed the 
Australian and New Zealand Underwriters' Association in 
1875. This Association henceforth became the initiating 
and administrative body·for the U.K.-Australia-New 
Zealand tariffs. 
The tariffs were extremely comprehensive. In 1878 
. 
the tariff in force at Sydney laid down minimum F.P.A. 
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and W.A. rates, for ·both sailers and steamships, for 
voyages to and from practically all foreign·parts and 
Sydney. Included were the U.K., Europe, North America, 
South America, China, 1 Africa, S.E. Asia, India and the 
Pacific Islands. ,. Separate 1 schedules set out minimum 
rates for.voyages between Sydney and other Australian and 
New Zealand ports, with especially detailed lists for 
ports in Queensland and.the Australian north and north-
west coasts. Special minimum rates were laid down for 
wool, smelted tin and copper,.and gold. There was also 
a tariff for hull time risks, covering steamers and 
sailing vessels, with special provisions for ships in 
foreign trade,· intercolonial (i.e. Australia and New 
Zealand) trade, the N.S.W. coastal and colliery trades, 
and engaged in trade in the Pacific islands.(4) 
As in fire insurance, the marine tariffs came ·under 
increasing pressure with the large number of new entrants 
into Australian underwriting towards the end of the 
'seventies~ In one of its few references to Lloyd's, 
the AIBR·suggested that competition from the Lloyd's 
market was also an important faator.(5)- Towards the end 
(4) 
(5) 
Copy of Tariff: Minimum Rates of Premiums Charged by 
Marine Insurance Offices, Sydney. Made available by 
Edward Chapman & Co., Sydney. 
On Lloyd's the AIBR said: "They either recklessly 
disregard or are in total ignorance of the teachings 
of experience." AIBR 1877 p.149. 
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of 1879 the· tariff was abandoned ·in Melbourne and , ··· 
modified in Sydney. The :Sydney 'modification took the 
form of allowing alterations at short notice. In this 
way it remained in existence, but, as the Chairman of the 
Sydney Underwriters' Association· said in 1 1888 " ••• in_ 
name only, as it -is an understood rule that any office 
finding that a ·lower rate than that specified'in the 
tariff has been quoted to any of ·its customers, it has 
the liberty to accept the same. Notice, however, of 
such alteration, has to be given to the Association, 
when the rate is ·immediately reduced by the Committee".(6) 
After 1879 there were no comprehensive tariffs for 
the bulk of Australian marine business until 1898. A 
series of conferences.of underwriters failed to produce 
concrete results.· Over the period various pooling 
agreements were operated, but although little evidence 
is available it seems that they too ran into difficulties. 
The most impo;rtant was the so called "River Agreement", 
which set rates and laid down regulations for the 
insurance of barges using the Darling-Murray river'net-
work. The Melbourne"and Adelaide Associations agreed on 
I' • 
(6) Annual Report, 1887-88, Sydney Underwriters' 
Association. 
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certain aspects of these insurances in 1871(7) and from 
the early 'seventies most companies belonged to the 
11River Agreement" pool.(B) ·This agreement set rates and 
conditions and provided that all premiums on such risks 
should be paid into a central pool. Companies belonging 
to the pool wrote all risks passed into it in pre-
determined proportions. The agreement seems to have 
been maintained in the 1880's, but there were frequent 
complaints, suggesting outside competition, and in 1882 
underwriting results were referred to by the Melbourne 
Association as "disastrous". (9) A similar pooling 
arrangement was also reached in Sydney for voyages 
between Australia and New Zealand, and Australia and 
Japan, China, India and other Asian ports. This was 
still in existence in 1890, but during the 'eighties 
rates were varied to meet competition from non-members, 
especially the Hong Kong and Shanghai based companies.(1) 
(7) 
(8) 
( 9) 
( 1 ) 
' Annual Report 1871, Merchant Shipping and Under-
writers' Association, Melbourne. 
19 companies were members in about 1873 - United 
records. · 
Ibid. Annual Report, 1882. 
The pool was known as ~he Eastern Agreement. 
shares in it were as follows: 
Cos. Eightieths 
-10 Australian 43 
5 New Zealand 26 
· 2 Netherlands-India 9 
1 U.K. 2 
-80 
In 1882 
Source: Copy of Agreement supplied bY:-Edward Chapman & 
Co., Sydney. 
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A similar pooling'arrangement,operated during the years 
1888-1891 ,to cover wool in stores insured under marine 
policies.< 2 ) From August 1891 it was replaced by a more 
comprehensive pool agreement for all transit risks on 
wool from sheep's back until shipment or sale. In N.S.W. 
this remained in force until replaced by the new tariffs 
introduced in 1897· 
Reasons for Breakdovm. What were the reasons 
for the breakdown in the early tariffs described above? 
Some important factors have already been mentioned, 
including the background of a general downward trend of 
rates, especially in marine insurance, and the large 
number of new entrants into Australia in the few years 
following 1878. In the 1880's there was also the large 
"turnover" of companies in both the fire and marine 
markets, which accentuated the difficulties of re-
establishing tariffs. Another consideration, of special 
significance, is that the period saw the building and 
consolidation of the position of British companies as 
international insurers. With respect to Australia this 
is now considered in more detail. 
Although a number of English companies had agencies 
in Australia from quite early times these-appointments 
(2) The Fire in Stores Agreement. Mentioned in Annual 
Renorts, Sydney Underwriters' Association. 
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did not necessarily coincide with the pursuit of very 
active policies. Thus the Royal had agencies in1 
Australia from aa early as 1848, but was probably not a 
very significant competitor until a Melbourne branch was 
established under a full time manager, Charles Salter, 
in 1873. The Commercial Union had Australian agencies 
between 1864 and 1867, and from 1875, but again did not 
embark on its later policy of aggressive expansion until 
the appointment of W.H. Jarrett as controlling agent for 
all the Australian colonies in August 1877• The dates of 
"significant" entry into the Australian market by the 
principal overseas companies are given below. The 
principal criterion of what constitutes "significant" 
entry are market shares as revealed by the Melbourne and 
Sydney fire brigade returns and the Coghlan figures for 
N.s.w. for 1892. .An entry has also been counted as 
"significant" when a branch or local board of directors 
was established in any centre. Excluded are the many 
cases of agencies apparently writing only a small volume 
of business; many of these were held by firms which were 
I 
agents for a number of insurance companies at the same 
' 
time.(3) 
(3) The lists do not pretend to be precise; in:particular 
some marine agencies writing a significant volume 1of 
business may have been excluded. 
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Fire Insurance: Years of "Significant" Entry by 
Principal Overseas Companies before 1910. 
Company: 
Pre 1860 
Imperial 
Liverpool, London 
and Globe 
Northern 
1860-70 
Queen 
London and 
Lancashire 
New Zealand 
1870-80 
Royal 
Norwich Union 
National of New 
Zealand 
Standard 
Commercial Union 
South British 
Manchester 
North British 
Phoenix 
Sun 
Net world-
1 Year Year wide prems. 
Head Office . estd. of in 1892 
entry: £' 000 
London 
Liverpool 
Aberdeen 
Liverpool 
London· 
Fire Total 
--
1803 1845 774 774 
1836 1853 1585 1585 
1835 1854 711 711 
1~57 1861 
1861 1862 
6451 
882 
645 
882 
Auckland(N.Z.) 1859 1862 n.a. 285 
Liverpool 
Norwich 
1845 1873 2033 
1797 1874 858 
Dunedin(N.Z.) 1873 1874 
Dunedin(N.Z.) 1874 1874 
London 1861 
Auckland(N.Z.) 1872 
1877 
1877 
Manchester 
Edinburgh 
1824 1878 
1809 1878 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1011 
n.a. 
516 
1467 
2033 
858 
88 
54 
1257 
193 
516 
1467 
London 
London 
1782 1878 1110 1110 
1710 1878 1029 1029 
\ 
It 
' ' 
I··· 
ii I 
I I 
' 
' 
' 
i 
) I' 
I 
. ~ 
I' 
1 
Ham,~~~g-Magdeburg 
Lion 
Hamburg 
London 
' • f 'i,, 
1844 1878 7632 763 
I 
18 7 9 : ' 17 93 17 9 
I.· 
· ···1a79 
1880-90' 
Scottish Union Edinburgh .:1824 1883 372 372 
1890-1900 
Atlas 
Palatine 
Royal Exchang$. 
Guardian 
1900-1910 
Alliance 
London· 
Yorkshire 
Notes: 1.1890 
21895 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
York·· 
31a95 . 51a96 
41896 
1808 
,1886 
;1720 
:1821 
.1824 
! 
~1720 
;1861 
1891 301 301 
, 
1891 405 436 
1894 3084 433 
1895 602 602 
.. 
1902 532 532 
1902 3975 689 
1902 90 .90 
Marine Insurance: Years of 11Significant" Entry by 
Principal Overseas Companies before 1910. 
Company·.:, 
et world-· 
•Year Year ; ide pre ms. 
Head Office ;estd. of· in 1892 
en:E' ry .· £ '000 
, Fire Total 
Pre 186<:f 
---...;;...,_....-...;; __ ,
. : ' :· .' ~" 
Canton 
.· . 
'1836 1849 135 135 Hong Kong 
British and Foreign .. Liverpool· · 1863 1863 572 572 
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1860-70 
New Zealand Auckland(N.Z.) 1859 1862 n.a. 285 ~ . I 
' 
Swiss Lloyd Marine Winterthur 1869 
! 
l: (Switzerland) '' ' 
.. 
Universal Marine London 1860 1863 ; 'j 
1810-80 ) t 
1· I : l South British Auckland(N.Z.) 1872 1872 n.a. 193 ! ' l j 0 • I I ~ f l . : 
Merchants' Marine London 1871 1872 146 146 i 
'' 
t 
Dunedin{N.Z.) ! : ;~ I', r ' Standard 1874 1874 n.a. 53 f I ~ ' 
National of New Dunedin(N.Z.) 1873 1874 n.a. 131 ! I \' I Zealand 
' 
I 
North China Shanghai 1863 1877 110 110 . 
i I I 
Union of Canton Hong Kong 1835 1878 199 199 ' \ 'i I ii i i I~ Maritime Liverpool 1864 1878 258 258 . I I ., 
Marine Ins. Co. London 1836 1878 
ti if 
I ! 
l ' 
I t 
Commercial Union London 1861 1879 246 1257 I I , I lf:'; 1880-90 Tl China Traders Hong Kong 1865 1883 123 123 
Alliance Marine London 1825 1885 164 164 I ~ 
Ocean Marine London 1859 1889 178 178 i l 
1890-1:200 r I 
Royal Exchange London 1720 1890 125 308 
i 
! ft !•I 
I I 1 f 
Indemnity Mutual London 1824 1891 not I 
Marine published !"· t 
·' 
Union Marine Liverpool 1863 1892 198 198 1' . 
; : 
: 1 
Thames and Mersey·""· Liverpool ~ 1860 . 1892 .392 392 
301 
Reliance Marine· ... ·· .... London 
World Marine · ·· .. ,London 
. ,•" 
. ' 
·1881 ., 1893' 
-~894 1896 
" ~' . 
103' ·.~ :103 
179 179 
1900-1910' 
Maritime Liverpool·· 1864 ' 1902 258· 258 
..... ,• . '~ .. ~ 
- --~ 
In appraising these lists it must be borne in mind 
that total premiums received in N.s.w. in 1892 were: 
£'000 
Fire 325.3 
··· Marine . 147-.,4 
47?· 7 
Total premiums .. for Australia were· 11kely to: be about 2! 
to 3. times ·this ·.figure .. i • e •·: ·. 
£ 1.000 
. · Fire 820- :976. 
Marine 370- 442 
.1190-1·418 
The largest Australian company in 1892, the Victoria, had 
' ' 
• - ' .. ! ~ 1 
a net premium income of £78,000, and others less than 
: '.~ .~ .~~ .. ~ , , , , ' < • .• • ~ I :._, .'> !~ i' . :. ' .• I ! . ! , ·~ ' ,::, : I,':, -: : • : 
£10,000. In comparison with these figures the annual 
.. ·: 
'' 
. • ~I ' 
premiums of British companies were very large. Three 
companies - the Royal, the LiverP.ool London and Globe 
. ' ' ~. ~ . . 
1 .··:I"' 
'. ~. 
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, 
and the North British - each had a greater premium income 
than the maximum estimate above ·for Australia. 
' 
In both fire and marine insurance there was a 
bunching of "significant" en tries in the years 1877-1880 • 
A :further moat importan~ fact is that a relatively large 
number of companies,. especially in marine insurance, 
entered Australia during the depression of the 'nineties 
and at the time-of the large scale failure of Australian 
insurers. Three important companies commenced in 1902. 
In contrast, as pointed out elsewhere, between 1890 and 
1910 only one new Australian company commenced business, 
and this was small.and in fact merelt the reconstitution 
as a company of the one "Lloyd's" group which remained. 
·During the time of ~he expansion.of these large 
newcomers to Australia, there is no doubt that many 
looked on rate .. cu~tting as a legitimate method of obtaining 
a foothold in the market. For example, t'he coup de gzra£!! 
was administered to the Melbourne fire tariff by an 
English company, and it was influenced by the view of 
its agent and local Board that desirable expansion could 
be best achieved in this way. 
The policies pursued by newly arrived overseas 
companies depended to a-large extent on the nature of the 
agency rirms~ or·t~e abil~ty and temperament of the.men 
appointed as agents or managers. Many agency appoint-, . 
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men ts, es pee ially ·,of large' pastoral· or trading f'i rms, 
were of a routine 'nature and the agents did not·make 
special efforts to build·up a business beyond that which 
came to them in the course of their ovm trade. . Others, 
on the other hand, were·v1goroua in endeavouring to 
expand their companies• connections. An outstanding 
example was W.H~ Jarrett, .the Melbourne agent from 1877, 
and manager f'rom 1880, of the Commercial Union. Until 
1885 he was in charge of the Commercial Union's affairs 
for the whole of Austral!~, ~nd during this period 
. 
largely laid the foundation for the rapid expansion 
which brought the company to the leading position in 
Australia by 1897· In his early years he was allowed 
considerable leewayrby his Head Office, but he was 
continually pressing for mo~e, and on occasions presented 
London with "1f'aits accomplir{· involving actions which 
may have been rejected had prior authorisation been 
requested.(4)_ The Royal too, another company which 
emerged in 1897 in a strong position, undoubtedly owed 
much to its Melbourne manager, Charles Salter. 
Most agency appointments made by British companies 
before the late 'seventies provided for a simple 10 per 
(4) For example, he purchased·a small Australian company, 
and set up a branch office complete with·salaried 
staff and·agents, in bothicases informing Head 
Office after the .event. Commercial Union Letter 
Book, 'Head Office to Austr~lia, 28.7.1882 And 
25.8.1882. Hereafter abbreviated to Q.JI. Letter 
Book. 
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cent coJiUD.iss 16n on:~;premiuins. actual1y··craedi ted to.:Head 
Office _.i. e • net i·9,f. :i~~-al ~~i~~uranc~ .~(~) 'The. ~er.centage 
" ' . '. ' . ~ ' ' . ' . . : 
was· expected to ·<cover··normal expenses, but an allowance 
of a further 5 :,per cent was made ·when -brokerage or .. 
commission: to sub""."agents <.was -paid;·· There 'was no:·provision 
for .profit ·:commission, and the. arrangements··were .as a . 
. , 
result very·, tempting to ·an. agent ·wishing: .to increase his· 
commission· by cutting:, .. rates. This· was counteracted ·in 
. . . 
some ·instances by detailed controls, such as lists of 
minimum· rates,> fortnight·ly or monthly transfers· of. 
balances,· strict limits ,on 'loss settling powers, and 
instructj,ons: to send· copies of all policies to ··London. 
Agents were also often instructed 0to follow local tariff 
rates;· if·:these ·proved inadequate, letters from Head 
Offices .often suggested that the company would'.be -will·ing 
to.give up·the·agency• · ,. '-', '· ;' 
In the late.·187-0!s one,of the signs-of the:.increasing 
.pressure .'.On· tariffs were increases.·in 'Commissions ,granted 
to Australian ·agents ot B1"i tish companies. These ·in· : 
turn allowed·the agents:to make higher .. payments to-.sub~ 
agents, . brokers. anq- on. local· reinsurance ·lines. ,.,:_In 
July· 1880: one London·c.Head:Offic~ wrote to.Australia: 
(5) This and the following discussion is based on. 
records, of· fi ve·-English '·companies;--·- ·The·-records .. , .. 
include letter, ... books ·:·to 1ag~nts from Head Offices 
and' vice versa.·; and' copies of powers of attorney. 
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When brokerage was first allowed (at the end 
of 1878) the disbursement was only made in a 
few. cases; now it is 1 almost universal. It 
will therefore be necessary(tQ readjust the 
scale of agency allowances. 6) . 
.An important cause of the situation which thus 
developed/was the entry of companies dividing profits 
I 
between policy holders and shareholders. In marine 
I 
I 
insurance these were the Hong Kong and Shanghai companies 
alread/ mentioned. The fire insurance companies were 
they were: 
Met opolitain Mutual Fire 
Australian·Mutual Fire 
I 
Colonial Mutual Fire 
City Mutual Fire 
Marcantile Mutual 
Industrial1Mutual Fire 
United Australia Mutual Fire 
Mutual Fire of South Australia 
Sydney Mutual Fire 
Queensland Mutual 
Melbourne 1869-1894 
Sydney 1872-1920 
Melbourne 1873-1927 
Sydney 1877-1897 
Sydney 1878-
Sydney 1878-1889 
Melbourne 1880-1901 
Adelaide 1880-1884 
Sydney 1885-1891 
Brisbane 1888-1898 
1/Vhile these "companies were willing to subscribe to 
tariffs, .their effective rates were lower as a result of 
bonus payments. In most cases profits were shared 
equ~lly between shareholders and policy holders. The 
(6) c.u. Letter'Book 20.7.1880. 
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reaction of the agents o~ overseas companies was to 
press their principals for higher-commissions~ out of 
' which they could finance equivalent discounts, or 
"commissions" which were either passed on to the insured 
or paid direct to him. Thus in 1881 appointments were 
made for fire business' allowing 20 per cent en direct 
business, and 22~ per cent when 15 per cent was paid by 
the agent. In addition profit commissions ranging from 
7~ to 10 per cent were allowed.(7) 
While companies were committed to tariff rates this 
was the only avenue of competition open to them. 
However, there was an alternative tactic; this was with-
drawal from the tariff and the quoting of considerably 
lower net rates. For the Head Office of one company the 
competition from the mutuals was'in fact the decisive 
argument in favour of such a step: 
The caus~s ••• which seem to us to warrant the 
step, appear to us to be ••• those connected 
with the "Mutual" system of Fire Insurance, 
which seems to us to be gaining strength day 
by day in your Area. 
Before the London Board of this particular company 
came to its decision, it had been dubious about the 
wisdom of such a move. The overseas manager wrote to 
Victoria in July 1881: 
' (7) London and Lancashire records: various Powers of 
Attorney. 
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The Directors could not overlook the fact that 
the rupture by us of a Tariff Union in your 
part of the world might loosen such bonds 
elsewhere and might, especially, create serious 
unpleasantness in the home field, between this 
Company and those of its neighbours whose 
business would be injuriously affected by our 
action ••• 
However, in December he was able to report that the 
Company would~ be affected elsewhere; in the meantime 
all round increases in Australian fire limits were 
notified. Later in the following year he suggested that 
the Australian manager should make a "frank personal 
statement" to the Association, informing the members 
that he would withdraw unless amendments were made which 
would enable effective competition with the mutuals. 
Such a move, he was informedJ would probably have the 
support of the other English offices. Before this letter 
could reach Melbourne, however, the local manager had 
announced his intention of withdrawing, and three days 
later the tariff was disbanded. 
It has been mentioned above that appointments made 
in 1881 by an English company provided for profit 
commission. During the 1880's this in fact became a 
usual feature of agency arrangements, both in fire and 
marine insurance, commission being paid on the actual 
profits of each year or in some cases on the average 
results of a series of past years. Another developm~nt 
was that agencies.came increasingly to be replaced by 
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branches under managers paid by salary plus profit 
commission. Both these changes helped to·bring back the 
interest of Australian representatives from expansion to 
profits, and a number who had at some stages been noted 
for their aggressive behaviour, later became assiduous 
and persistent negotiators in the inte~ests of agreed 
rates of premium and commission. 
As pointed out in Chapter J'v, during the 1880's non-
life insurance companies earned relatively high rates of 
interest on .their :funds, and particularly in Melbourne, 
made considerable ,gains by participation in the land and 
property boom. Investments in fixed deposits at high 
interest rates with banks and other financial institu-
tions were common. In 1889 the investments of 32 
Australian and New Zealand non-life insurance companies 
were distributed as follows:< 8) 
Mortgages 
Debentures, Shares etc. 
Land and Property 
Fixed Deposits 
Loans on Lire Policies 
Other Investments ~ ( inc 1. Govt. -Bonds ) 
Total 
Percentages of Total 
25 Austi~alian and 
7 New Zealand Cos. 
40.2 
6.1 
17.0 
23. 9 
1.3 
28.4 
100.0' 
(8) Calculated :rrom AIBR 1890 p.l1Ji6. 
Investments of 
25 Australian 
Cos. 
45.2 
6.8 
9.3 
29;a,, 
2 •. 0 -. 
4.8 
100.0 
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As mentioned dn,·Chapter. 1Tr,-· ·one :of the: causes. of ·'.the · ~: 
failur~ .:of· many.~Au.s~J'.Eilian ·compal'l:ies: was :weakness'. on ;the 
assets s.ide .. Jr.r Jh,e. J e90~s. 1 · e~peci_allY:.JlS, ·peg~r,.4.~' ·.¢teposi ts, 
',• ·• . 
:property and mortgages: · · 
There is practically no evidence available concerning 
'.· 
'" . 
the investments of overseas non-life companies·in 
_.' 
Australia, but there is little doubt that it was extensive 
in comparison with the volume of non-life business written 
'' 
by them. The only official statistics relat~ to mortgages 
held by non-life companies in Victoria in 1894 and 1895. 
These· show that, the ~or~gages of two overseas· companies 
exceeded all tho·s~ held by Australian companies :·(9) 
. Mortgages· ·in Victoria·, £ 'OOO. 
Australian Northern '!lQYal · 
Companies 
1894 306 281 145 
1895 306 208 116 
' .,;:·; "' 
. ··,. 
The other source of information is the published accounts 
: ' i : 
and Chairman's speeches ~f overseas companies. Unfortu-
. ,', ',.·;.' 
nately in most balance .sheets Australian securi tie~ were 
- . ':.j . \ •... . . ' . 
lumped under such headings as "Colonial and other 
•· l,. < ' .. ,. 
securities", but in 1892 and 1893 Chairmen often mentioned 
their Australian assets specifically. An examination of 
,; ' 
. ' : .. , 
(9) 
~ . : ; r~,: . 
Victoria, Statistical Register, 1894 and 1895. 
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reports and addresses for 1892 and 1893, as published in 11 
I f 
I 
the AIBR and th~ . ReviID! revealed the following totals: 1: 
Overseas 
or 
.. 
8 Cos. - Government Bonds 
2 Cos. - Mortgages 
6 Cos. - Fixed Deposits 
11 Cos. - Freehold 
14 Cos. - Total 
Investments 
594.6 
378.2 
148.8 
8.1 
535.1 
1129.7 
It will be noticed that the bulk of the investments to 
which specific reference was made were Government Bonds. 
The majority of these were almost certainly bought and 
dealt with in London as part of the general investment 
activities of most companies, and if so had no necessary 
connection with Australian underwriting operations. 
However it seems likely that other assets were greater 
than £535 1 000; thus one company mentioned having funds 
"locked up in Australia" but did not specify what or how 
much. Advertisements of other companies in the late 
'seventies and during the 'eighties also mentioned 
investments in Victoria; thus( 1) 
( 1) AIBR, 1879. 
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Queen, 1879 - "nearly £100 1 000" in Victoria. 
Norwich Union, 1879 "Revenue of the Victorian 
Branch invested in the 
colony." 
More significant, one company which made ~o public 
reference to Australian investments had large funds there 
from at least 1881. At the end of ·1895 its Australian 
assets were: 
£'000 
Debentures 33.0 
Freehold 42.2 
Deposits 96.3 
171.5 
Government securities 63.5 
Municipal securities 21.6 
Total 256.6 
In 1881 its fixed deposits with Australian banks exceeded 
£100,000. The amounts involved far exceeded its total 
Australian premium income or liabilities in Australia. 
The investments of overseas non-life insurance 
companies in Australia were probably not of themselves a 
significant proportion of the total capital inflow of 
the 1880's, but they did have important implications for 
the non-life market. As mentioned above the early 
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arrange·ments·•.of: most' companies·· Wi·th Australian agents· 
was for ·.the· regular' transfer of balances to London,. after 
settlement -of losses up ,to specified ·amounts without . · · 
reference. The· decision to undertake longer term··. 
investment was usually ·accompanied --by. the appointment of 
an Australian Board:of Di'rectors to advise on and 
supervise the investments~ In appointing such q.1rec.tors 
a natural consideration<2 ). was ability to influence or 
direct business to ~·the underwriting agency of the cotipany. 
If the company's business were increased in this way, or 
at least if 'its prospects were' improved, it was also 
convenient to increase underwriting and· settlement 
powers on the spot in Australia. Thus the appointment.of 
an Australian Board of.ten coincided with·the formation of 
.... 
a branch with a rented· building and the appointment of a 
full time manager with'expanded authority and a. 
specialised staff. . Where arrangements such as these had 
been made, a much ·1onger term. view· of the .company's 
operations tn the area tended to·be taken; in particular 
there were now ov.erhead. costs to be covered,. and quick 
withdrawal from the market was less feasible than under 
short term agency arrangements. This applied especially 
... <I • 
to investments in the 1890's, when deposits were tied up· 
(2) 
' ' Especially if the local agent recommended the 
appointments. 
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in reconstructed ·.banks,.· mor.tgages. were I foreclosed, and 
real property values. low.(~) 
In this way,· the ·.investmentc1opportunities in Australia 
in the late 1870's and the· 1880~s had a considerable· 
influence on :non-lite· underwri.ting. This is not to deny 
that the process may, have worked to some.extent"i:n 
reverse; i.e. companies invested in Australia because they 
were already planning.to expand or commence direct 
Australian underwriting., One obvious consequence of this 
interaction was that· in the 1880's underwriting profits 
could to some extent be sacrificed in the search for 
funds, but in the 1890's underwriting results were 
required to more than break even in order to compensate 
capital losses accompanied by low interest rates. 
After the.1882 breakdown the following period of the 
"interregnum" before the new· agreements of 1897.J was 
characterised by many attempts to form new tariffs, 
nearly all completely abortive or of very limited 
success. The writer has had.access to a number of letter 
(3) It should be noted that not all initial branch 
arrangements gave control over all Australia to 
one branch; more usually managers in Sydney and 
Melbourne, and sometimes in Adelaide, Hobart, 
Brisbane and other centres reported direct to their 
overseas head offices with respect to designated 
areas. This is fUrther diacussed~belowj see 
Section 7. 
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books o:r the period, written by managers of both 
Australian and overseas companies, and these throw an 
illuminating light on the real attitudes of the men 
involved. The views expressed in these letters often 
contrast rather sharply with the somewhat pious public 
attitudes which tended to be displayed on occasions 
such as the meetings of the Insurance Institutes. 
One of the characteristics of the period, very 
evident from the letters, is that an attitude o:f.' "live 
and let live" sometimes attributed to businessmen, a 
willingness to take tbings easy and deliberately forego 
profitable opportunities, was not present in the insurance 
market. It fs difficult to resist the conclusion that 
\ 
r 
the company under the charge of a manager with such an 
easy-going outlook would have quickly succumbed to 
competition. From the six sets of letter books examined 
by the writer, it also seems probable that most managers 
closely identified their ovm interests with those of their 
firms, and to succeed in even maintaining existing market 
positions considerable energy, organising ability and 
judgment were required. There can be no doubt that 
whether branches or agencies survived or pros:pered 
M 
depended in considerable measure on whether managers or 
chief agents possessed .these qualities. 
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A difficulty constantly met in tariff negotiations 
was the practice, deplored by all but universally 
practised, of cutting rates, increasing commissions, and 
generally stepping up the tempo of new business acquisi-
tion, if necessary at a loss, if it was thought that 
agreement would be reached. Thus one manager 
complained: (4) 
••• The regular course of procedure appears to 
be, burst the Tariff, cut rates etc. and having 
got the business go in for a tariff again ••• 
Our Tariffs never stand for long ••• 
yet only months later he instructed a branch as follows: 
.•• The resolution of the Fire Offices' 
Committee in London undoubtedly paves the way 
for a tariff, and the British Offices will have 
a restraint upon them ••• If we are going to 
have reasonable rates you should get as much 
business on your books beforehand as you can ••• 
As to dwelling houses in particular ••• we 
should like to get a good share of them in the 
meantime, even if we have to take them at very 
low rates. 
Another manager wrote some years later to a branch in a 
very similar vein: 
(4) 
••• If you can secure the formation of a 
Tariff so much the better for ourselves in 
the future. Meanwhile I would not hesitate to 
cut rates to retain your own business·, and if 
a Tariff were likely to be brought about 
should cut for other business. 
This and other quotations below are from managers' 
letterbooks made available by companies which 
prefer to remain anonymous. 
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As this quotation indicates, companies were prepared 
to go to considerable lengths to defend themselves; the 
letter books contain many instructions similar to the 
. 
following: 
You have full permission to quote the lowest 
current rates given. 
I certainly do not think you should allow any 
Company outside the tariff to steal your 
business, we would not permit such a thing 
here ••• 
••• You must exercise your discretion in 
adapting our terms to those of our aompetitors 
and the necessities of the case to hold your 
ovm. 
Cut rates hard ••• Carry the war into the 
enemy's camp. 
With attitudes such as these it is not surprising 
that managers were suspicious of the good faith and 
motives of others in negotiations. Thus one manager 
wrote: 
There are those ~no doubt the ability of 
anyone to make some representatives act 
straightforwardly, 
but another, who was probably included in the comment, 
said of the original manager: 
••• Unless London definitely directs ••• to join tariffs be will not do so, as I know he 
is insincere in the whole matter. 
In one instance a manager was convinced that it was use-
less even approaching a certain company over their 
"greedy and unprincipled competition". The result would 
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merely be "smooth words and.b~d faith". The only hope 
was that losses would bring them into line, and already 
• • • "We are told they ar1e doing very badly, and uni vsrsal 
joy is felt at the fact." Again: 
It seems impossible to keep such schemers as 
- , - and se·1eral others even decently 
straight; they must spend half their time in 
working out schemes to get round or circumvent 
every clause or condition of our agreement ..• 
A Tariff or combination with such men as can be 
found in the insurance world is really an 
impossibility, unless the honest members are 
willing to allow themselves to be robbed. 
There is little doubt that during this interregnum 
period companies frequently joined tariffs merely as a 
matter of temporary convenience or short run advantage. 
Thus: 
When our Association pass obnoxious resolutions 
I simply ignore them, and s·o far as I can see 
there is no occasion for your being coerced iuto 
anything that does not suit you. 
••• He will make his representatives keep 
agreements if it suits his company and if it does 
not he would in effect encourage evasion. 
There was widespread suspicion on several occasions 
that companies precipitating tariff breaks were prepared 
in advance (with pamphlets, advertisements etc.) and that 
subscription to the tariff concerned had merely been a 
convenient method of getting a start in a price war. To 
attempt to forestall this possibility, a usual provision 
in moat agreements was that a month's notice in writing 
should be given of secession; in the post 1896 tariffs 
this became three months. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE 1897 SETTLEMENTS 
1. General Reasons for Cooperation 
The previous section has discussed the reasons for the 
breakdown of the tariffs in the early 1880's and the 
difficulty of re-establishing them. The desire for expansion 
by large overseas companies, the development of ttmutual" 
underwriting, the high rates of interest and capital gains 
on investments, the commission arrangements with chief agents, 
and the attitudes of the managers involved - aggressive and 
mutually suspicious - were all factors that worked in these 
directions. Before turn1.ng to the opposite question, the 
conditions for successful tariff agreements, some of the 
more general reasons for cooperation, especially as they 
applied to insurers in Australia in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, are described. 
(a) Risk Sharing. Insurance companies have always 
found it convenient and profitable to reinsure with one 
• 
another. In Australia this practice probably existed 
from the time of the early Tasmanian companies, and by 
the mid 1850's it was definitely well established in fire 
business as well.(5) Apart from reinsurance, companies 
-------------------------------------------------------------(5) Minute Book, 1850-79, Victoria Insurance co. In England 
marine reinsurance was made illegal under an Act pass~d 
in 1746, and the legislation was not repealed until 
1864. However Golding comments that "cases of marine 
reinsurance were recorded in this country Li.e. U.K,] 
during the intervening period while abroad the 
practice steadily developed". C. E. Golding r The Law 
and Practice of \Reinsurance, pp.2-3. 
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would often be interested· in the same risk· directly; 
ID 
this of course is the rule' rather than· the exception in 
marine insurance, and haa always been common with the 
larger mercantile and manufacturing fire risks, especially 
where the business is' handled and placed by a broker.: 
For both these ' __ reasons 1 t is clear that considerable 
consultation and discussion between underwriters is,.and 
always has been,~inevitable. 
{{b) Government Regulations. Insurance offices are 
often concerned with Government and semi-Government 
statutes and regulations. The third object of the Fire 
Offices Committee of Victoria (1891), as stated in the 
Articles of Association, was: 
To watch all projected legislation in any way 
bearing on the interests of Fire Insurance 
Companies, and to secure, as far as practicable, 
that the principles involved in such projected 
legislation shall be fair and equitable alike to 
the insured and the Companies. 
A similar object appeared in the Articles of all the 
later Associations - fire, accident and marine - and of 
' l 
the Commonwealth Council. 
Apart f~om general legislation on such matters as 
company law(6) and taxation there was a special interest 
(6) The early English ~surance companies were important 
in the development of English company law in the 
19th century. See B.C~ Hunt: The Development of the 
Business Corporation· in England 1800-1867, Harvard 
University Press, 1936. 
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in buildi!lg regulations,, water s,upply, harbour improve- i" 1 ., 
menta, lighthouses, and matters of, a,aim~lar kind. One 
of the e~rly ·examples was the Building.Act of 1837,(7) 
introduced in ~ydney during the year following ,the 
establishment of the first mainland insurance company, the 
Australasian Fire.and Life. From that time insurance 
companies show~d a constant interest· in this subject, 
e~pecially when they suffered heavily in large block . 
fires.( 8) Marine companies'had a similar interest in· 
shipping and port 'legislation. For example, one of the 
main objectives for many years of the Merchant Shipping 
and Underwriters' Association of Melbourne was to "obtain 
the enactment of an effective Marine Board Bill".(9) 
Representations were made to the Government each year 
until a Bill was passed .in 1887.( 1) 
Another field of interest, which became especially 
important in the 20th.century, was the development of 
legislation creating leg~l,liabilities. The insurance 
companies, were in fact (for obvious reasons), probably 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(1) 
8 WJJ1. r:v No• 6. 
I 
e.g. AIBR 1890, p.747 ff. Editorial: The Great Fire 
at Sydney.' AIBR 1898, p.305 ff. Editorial: !h! 
Great Melbourne Fire. i 
second Annual Report, 1871. 
The Marine Board Act, 1887. 
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the only'significant,business group which supported the 
extension of the scope of the early Employers''Liability 
and Workers' Compensation Acts.( 2 ) Moreover, as 
Governments were creating a new market for-insurance 
companies, in all States at some stage measures were 
taken which ensured _at least some Government'supervision 
and control. Except in Queensland, where the 1916 
Workers.' Compensation Act placed the business entirely 
in the hands of the State Office, this again created the 
need for constant discussion and negotiation with the 
State authorities. Much the same was later true of the 
Compulsory Third Party legislation of the 1930 1s and 
early 1940's; quite complex machinery _was established. in 
most States, and in it the insurance companies, the 
Government motor registry offices, the Government 
insurance offices (except in South Australia) and the 
Law Courts work closely together. 
~Xb) Risk Improvement. A third reason for coopera-
tion by insurance companies 1Was that in many directions 
they were able to alter the "environment" of the market 
in their favour by their own actions, and not only 
(2) 
, 
In particular the companies favoured the idea of 
compulsory insurance. See, for example, AIBR 1910, 
p.889; 1914, p.160; 1916, p.978. 
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indirectly by'influencing Governments.(3) The most 
obvious instance of this is ther early fire engines and 
brigades, at first run by individual companies and then 
by companies in association.(4) These fire brigades 
were clearly in,insurers' interests: apart from 
minimising loss from individual fires, they were 
essential in preventing the spread of fires to adjoining 
risks and perhaps to a whole city or town. It was clear 
that rates could not allow for a high probability of 
large conflagrations; long before they reached such levels 
the insured would prefer to maintain a fire brigade them-
selves. It was also clear that it would pay one insurance 
(3) On this and the whole question under discussion an 
early paper delivered to the Victorian Insurance 
Institute is most enlightening. It is: c. Jarrett: 
Some Advantages of Combination on matters other than 
Rates, AIBR 1887, pp.586 ff., with discussion. 
(4) On the early history of Australian fire brigades see: 
Held Covered 1849-1949, Centenary Booklet of the 
Victoria Insurance Co. . 
A Brief Summari of the Events in connection with the 
Sidney VoJunteer Brigades which led to the Establish-
ment of t!1e present Fire Bri~ade System in Sydney, by 
"A Sydney Resident", AIBR 18 9, PP• 433 ff. 
Personal Reminiscences of Insurance Business, by 
Macredie, AIBR 1886 pp.693 tr. 
The Australian Encyclopaedia 1958, article: Fire 
Brigades. 
Select Committee on the Fire Brigades Bill, 1854. 
N.s-.w. V.& P. 1854, Voi.9. ' . 
The writer has also had access to a Minute Book 
held by the, Victorian FAUA (Vic. F.B.A. Minute Book, 
op.cit.) and records in the possession of the 
Sydney Metropolitan Fire Brigades Boa1•d. 
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company to help support the ·fire engine of another; an 
obvious case was where an insured building adjoined 
another insured by,a second company possessing a fire 
engine. In ·the suburbs and.country towns, where the 
interests of companies were less concentrated than in the 
cities, it still paid them to help subsidise brigades 
organised by Municipal and Shire Councils.(5) They also 
helped support the numerous . "volunteer brigades" which 
appeared in the suburbs of Melbourne and Sydney in the 
late 1860's. ( 6) 
From the 1850's the companies were anxious that the 
responsibility (and financing) of fire brigades should be 
taken over by the Government,(?) and this feeling 
(5) 
(6) 
A Brief Summary ••• op.cit. During the greater 
part of the 1870 1s and 1880's and probably before, 
the Victorian Brigade Association subsidised on the 
average a bout eight suburban brigades by quarterly 
payments of £12.10.0 each. It was often requested 
to help with the purchase of equipment, especially 
hosing, and usually complied when the municipality 
paid half. Payments were also made for attendance 
at particular fires, both to municipal brigades and 
"volunteer brigades" not regularly subsidised. 
(Vic •. F.B.A •. Minute Book, op.cit.). In Victorian 
country areas such subsidies were left to the 
discretion of individual companies, but in the early 
1890's the FUA attempted to control them, as it was 
felt that ·in many cases they were assuming the 
character of commissions for holding or attracting 
business. (~ual Reports 1889-1895, Vic. FUA.) 
A Brief Summary ••• op.cit. 
(7) N.s.w. Select Committee 1854, op.cit. 
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strengthened as' the.cities grew and after the 
Metropolitan Board of Works became responsible for 
this function in London in 1865.(8) In Victoria the 
consistent failure of Governments to pass a suitable bill 
caused the Companies' Brigade Association to constantly 
threaten to disband its brigade, although it never did. 
In 1875 even the following desperate resolution was 
passed, though again never carried into effect:(9) 
That it be an instruction to Mr. Hoad(1) 
assisted by a Sub Committee ••• to take the 
first opportunity of allowing a Fire to take 
its course when there is a prospect of its 
extending to neighbouring buildings. That the 
loss ••• be rateably divided among the offices 
subscribing to the Fire Brigade. 
This, it was thought, would teach non-insured property 
owners and the Government a sharp lesson and might lead 
to action. In fa.ct legislation in Victoria did have to 
await serious city fires, and the Act setting up the 
Metropolitan and Country Fire Brigade Boards was not 
passed until 1890, although there was legislation in 
the other Colonies (except Western Australia) in the 
(8) H.E. Raynes: A History of British Insurance, p.347. 
(9) Minutes of meeting 8.1.1875, Vic. F.B.A. Minute 
Book. · 
y 
' (1) The Fire Brigade Superintendent. 
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early 1880 •a·~ (~) ... >'In ·a1r, cases the insurance companies 
were both repreaented'1 on the various· controll1ng ·bodies 
and contributed towards· running costs (usually one· .. 
third). • '' ~- t, 
In marine insurance as well, by· acting in concert 
the companies were 8:ble to bring. about important: 
"external econo.mles" which seemed to benef'i t them all. 
The activities of the Melbourne Merchant Shipping and 
Underwriters·' Association (established 1869) provi~e a 
good example. C3 ) .·• ·It was particularly· concerned with the 
settlement of· losses and appointed its own surveyors. from 
at least 1873·; ·strongly ·recommending .i ta members to 
insert·in policies a·c1ause that the·Association should 
arrange surveys of damaged hulls and goods. (4) It was; 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Fire 'Bri'gade· .Acts were passed as follows: 
Queensland 1881 
'S.'A. 1882 
Tasmania - 18 83 
N~s.w. 1884 '...,,.:.'-
Vic tor ia 18 90 
W.A. - 1898 
The .Association was formally .. esta'})lishesL .irl .. 186~, .... 
but an informal arrangement must have existed before, 
becaus·e the f'irs t ·Annual Report refers to the 
Association then as ''being established on its present 
enlarged, basis".~· ·The Sydn.ey ,.Under~riters '· Associa-
tion was established· in,1876, but.it too existed 
before: "in ·an indefirii te form~'• · · AIBR 1877; \.,p.350. 
Other ··State Associations wer.e established in 
18.69. (Ade~aide), 1876 (Brisbane), 1898 (Perth) and 
1900 .(Hobart). . ··· ··' 
Ailriual Report, 1873· 
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naturally concerned with.salvage operations, and cDn-
stantly sought ways of.avoiding situations of the kind 
described by a member as follows: 
By a long series of remarkable coincidences it 
has happened that when vessels ••• have gone 
ashore at the Heads or whenever a lighter has 
been required for salvage operations, all the 
lighters in the Port have been at that moment 
absolutely indispensabl~ for the owners' 
immediate requirements.\5) 
Eventually in 1888 a lighter and the required equipment 
was purchased and put under the controt of a separate 
Salvage Association. ( 6) In 1934 a special "Claims 
Recovery Department" was set up "in order to encourage 
members to take a firmer line with ship-owners"• (7) 
At first this Department only handled claims where more 
than one company was involved, but at present the policy 
is to deal with individual claims when it seems that any 
legal precedent set might be of general interest.CB) 
\·la) Information and Technical Knowledge. Another 
area in which cooperative action arose, as it were · 
spontaneously from the nature of the insurance market, 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(}j) 
c. Jarrett, op.cit. A~BR 1887. 
Annual Report 1888. In 1913 the two Associations 
were combined
1
and the present title, the Marine 
Underwriters' and Salvage Association of Victoria, 
adopted. 
' Annual Report, 1958. 
Ibid. 
I 
was that of1 the dissemination of.commercial.information 
and technical knowledge. Again, the-Melbourne Marine 
Underwriters' Association is a good.example. According 
to an early report:C9) 
The·primary objects for which the Association 
was established ••• were: the examination into 
the condition of vessels laid on the berth for 
the U.K., the distribution among members of 
the information so obtained, and the constant 
supervision of vessels while loading, in order 
to prevent the. improper stowage which was for 
so many years a fruitful cause of loss to 
underwriters. 
The Association soon entered into correspondence with 
Lloyd's and the Australian and New Zealand Underwriters.' 
Association concerning stowage practices at the U.K •. 
ena.( 1) In 1876 arrangements were made with the Sydney, 
Adelaide, Queensland and New Zealand Associations to 
share the cost of weekly advices from London of shipping 
arrivals and departures.(2 ) In 1877 the publication of 
a monthly journal, the.Australasian Shipping News, was 
commenced. (3) .One of the first tasks was the compilation 
of a register of Australian shipping. At the time of the 
formation of the Association in 1869 it was estimated that 
(9) Annual Report, 1873. 
( 1) Ibid., 1875. 
{2) Ibid., 1876. 
(3) Ibid., 1an. 
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there were nearly 2,000 vessels registered in Australia 
and New Zealand, and a large number.not registered · 
locally were engaged· in local trade.(4) The Association 
agreed ·on a method by which these ships could be given 
different classes-of certificates by its surveyors, and 
in 1874, using information collected by other Associations 
as well, it issued the first Register of Australian and 
New Zealand Shipping. (5) In the same year it started 
work on a ·"Black and White List" which would give 
particulars about masters,'mates and engineers of vessels 
registered in Australian ports; by 1876 this list was 
available for inspection at its Offices. {6 ) 
In fire insurance there was a similar need for 
information. The first issue of the AIBR in 1877, for 
example, included lists of fires which had occurred 
during the previous· month, balance sheets of companies 
operating in Australia, and reports of market conditions 
in other centres and countries. All these became regular 
features of ea9h i~sue. From 1883·published figures of 
Australian and New Zealand companies were aggregated to 
give some idea of overall results. Until as late·aa the 
(4) Ibid., 1869. 
(5) Ibid.' 1874· 
(6) Ibid., 1876. 
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1930's the AIBR in fact continued to be the one 
comprehensive source of ,information, both for outsiders 
and the industry itself. 
The "product" which insurance companies sell is from 
one viewpoint a contract, and as such is closely affected 
by legal decisions and statute,law. The AIBR therefore 
from the beginning published details of important cases 
and over the years expressed the insurance world's view-
point on most· legislation affecting.it. In 1884 an 
"Insurance Institute" was formed in Victoria, and a 
N.s.w. one later in the same year.(7) These Institutes 
were meant to serve as formal places of .discussion of the 
ever changing legal interpretation of insurance contracts, 
but broader questions of practice and policy arose as 
well. In 1919 the Incorporated Australian Insurance 
Institute was established and a system of lectures and 
examinations commenced which led to an "Associateship", 
or eventually, a "Fellowship" of the Institute. 
(·-e) Risk Classification. An important reason for 
cooperative action by underwriters was the apparent 
(7) The dates of the formation of the various State 
Insurance Institutes were: 
1884 .Victoria 
N.S.W. 1884 
Queensland 1903 
W.A. 1911 
S.A. 1913 
Northern Tasmania 1922 
Southern Tasmania 192.5 
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advantage!to all,of.t~em of some agreement on risk 
classifications. Of course the broad divisions between 
marine, fire and.accident risks, and within these 
categories between hulls and merchandise, domestic and 
trade risks, personal accident and employers' liability 
and so on, were obvious enough. But in even quite 
narrowly defined categories there were differences which 
agreement could eliminate. The result was that there 
were many attempts to define these differences;. for 
example the Marine Underwriters' system of certificates 
sought to improve the general standard of seaworthiness 
of locally registered ships. If, even under competition, 
the fact of a "B" or "C" certificate from the Association 
was enough to produce relatively high rates, there would 
be an incentive to try to bring the stdp into the "A" 
category. Similarly, if underwriters paid attention to 
the "Black and White .List" there would presumably be 
' l 
some tendency to employ masters, mates or engineers on 
the "Black List,"~ l~ss .frequently, or .on less difficult or 
dangerous voyages. -In fire insurance there was the same 
feeling that observe~ cl:ifferences in I'isks should be 
formalised and· disseminated as widely as possible.CB) 
I I : 
1 
( 8) See some of the early papers to the Insurance 
Institutes, especially: 
c.·Jarrett: Some advantages ••• op.cit. 
W.H. Rowsell: Some thoughts of greater uniformity 
of nractice amongst fire companies, AIBR 1887, p.ro. 
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If such things as contiguity to inferior risks, absence 
of fire doors and wired windows, careless installation 
of electrical appliances, unsatisfactory storage of 
inflammable liquids, and so on, could be penalised by 
higher rates or even refusal to insure; and sprinkler 
installations, fire resistant construction etc. rewarded 
by relatively low rates, there would be a tendency for 
the quality of risks to improve. Risk classification was 
also viewed as a necessary precondition for "rational" 
price setting in the absence of explicit agreements. It 
was claimed that unless there was some agreement on 
classifications there would be difficulties in obtaining 
a common view as to which risks were profitable and 
unprofitable. This argument was later used in support 
of classifications made under the 1897 tariffs; more 
explicitly it was suggested that the Assouiations would 
collect statistics by tariff classes and on the basis 
of these set "equitable" ratea.(9) 
r(tr) Conclusions. Many of the matters mentioned 
above, which originally seemed natural subjects for 
(9) In fact, as the 1908 Royal Commission evidence 
amply demonstrated, nothing of the sort was even 
attempted, and indeed for many years after this the 
class statistics kept by companies, and also by the 
Commonwealth Council, were of a most rudimentary 
kind. 
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common disc~13~~ot'l aJ:ld ;act.i,on.,· ·ev.~11tual.ly came to be 
dealt w.ith ;by institutions ·Which .. had a life and 
initiative of. their own.·· . This was true even· of '..re-
insurance, where the growth of .specialist ·reinsur·ers and 
the treaty: system .led 'Australian underwriters to ·look· 
overseas to a large impersonal market, rather than 
towards each other •.. It was especially obvious ·where . 
·Government legislation created the Marine 1 .Fire Brigade. 
and Workers' Compensation Boards; here bodies were set up 
with the ·specific function ·of reducing the risks . of:. loss 
and damage or the'incidence of accidents.> "Risk 
improvement" through.insurance penalties was in any case 
of only marginal effectiveness compared with.Government 
fiat; very often the really impor.tant improvements were 
and could only be brought.about by Governments.· Never-
·theless, it is important to.realise that there was an 
evolutioni and that the insurance companies themselves, 
at firs.t through informal discussion, later by· co-
operative·action, ·were:to a· large extent _responsible for 
the nature of· the framework of :legislation and·institu-
tions in which"they came to operate.; In the· course of 
this ·evolution, when> so ~uch· was under discussion,· it .·. : 
would have been .surprisin2; indeed if attempts.had not 
been made· to limit; competition in the stricter s'ense of 
fixing rates ·commissions and policy·conditions. , ' 
· ··~-~-~=- 'T' ±no g eswJei: 
.. 
.:z... Steps towards the 1~97 Settlements. 
I 
As mentioned above, after 1883 attempts were 
0 0ns tantly made to dJ:law up new tariffs for both fire and 
,,"1rine insurance. Some of" the main developments in the 
h.wement f'rom t.he conditions of 1883 to those of 1897 are 
nvw set out. 
(a) The Australasian Insurance ar.d ~anking Recor.g~ 
Jne of' the most important factors in the situation was the 
.;IBR itself'. In its third issue (March 1877) it ~ad a 
lone editorial on the subject of disruptive and dubious 
practices amongst insurance brokers, and suggested that 
f·he Victorian Brigade Committee should ado:pt a system of ( 1) 
l.icensing brvkers. From the beginning it published 
'ri'11'1nce .sheets, many of which it crit.5.cised very sharply . 
.. vhen in 1884 it began publishing its annual summary of 
... evenue accounts and bal..:mce sheets, it WFJ.S apt to 
emphasise bad results and the precariousness of good 
~ 
It was very critical of lax accounting procedures, 
I 
especially failure to make adequate provision for losses 
(2) 
on unexpired risks. Throughout the period it 
suppoPted movements for Tariffs, discussed difficulties 
which they :raced and ways in which they were circumvented. 
4 (1) AIBR 1877, p.111. 
(2) e.g. AIBR 1884, p.473; 1885, p.25 8 
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tt, gave wide c~rculation .to important papers delivered at 
~he Insurance Institutes, especially those stressing the 
need for cooperation and 11 sane competition". It 
nrovided information about the fortunes of tariffs in 
\Jther :parts of the world, especially in the U.S.A. It 
0evoted special attention to New Zealand tariffs, and 
from experience there drew the important moral, that when (3) 
~~tes were fixed, they should not be fixed too high. 
( b) The Ins•.irance Ins ti tu tes. A second significant 
Ptep towRrds the 1897 tariffs was taken with the formstion 
of ~he various colonial Insurance Institutes. At the 
inRugural meeting of the Victorian Institute in August 
1884 the Chairman stated its object.s, as described (4) 
in t-he rules, as folluws: "The promotio·n of good 
feeling and friendly intercourse amongst its members Gnd 
the dissemination of professional knowledge and incalce-
ti on of sound insurance practice, by the reading of 
papers and other means. 11 In the circumstances of the 
time it was inevitable that "sound insurance practice" 
should be of special concern, and in the coui,se of his 
sddress he said: "· •• Insurance is not greatly different 
(3) 
(4) 
AIBR 1893, p.889. 
re-nri n t.ed .AIBR E.S. Watson: Presidential .Ad~§!§_f?, .!:' 
1884~ pp.46~-3· 
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from any other commodity•·· it has just as· much a 
price as have· the merchants• wares ••• The method by 
which that cost price.is to be ascertained, and the 
consequences lj.kely. to flow from a disregard of it, will 
doubtless be · i.ndicated here in due time. 11 At the 
inaugural meeting of the N.s.w •. Institute in October the 
President similarly expressed the hope that the formation 
of the ins ti tu te would bring about "a· more sat is factory 
state of things" as regards rates.(5) In fact many of 
the papers on fire insurance subjects in these early 
years were directed specifically to this end.( 6) It is 
(5) 
(6) 
AIBR 188!~, pp.587-8. 
e.g. Victoria. c. Salter 
J. Sinclair 
"M.A. Ridge 
• I 
c. Salter 
c. Jarrett 
Chandler 
.A.J. Wright 
: Some Principles of Fire 
Insurance, Oct. 1884, 
p.585. 
: Classification of Fire 
Risks, June 1885, AIBR 
1885, p.407. 
Insu ranee Pros~cts in 
the Colonies, Aug. 1886, 
AIBR 1886, p.551. 
Presidential Address, 
May 1887, AIBR 1887, 
p.3p6. ' 
Some Advantages of 
Combination on Matters 
otfier than Rates, Aug. 
1887, AIBR 1887, p.586. 
Esprit de Corps among 
Offices and their 
Representatives;-sept. 
1888, AIBR 1888; p.791. 
: Co-oEeration, Oct. 1893, 
AIBR 1B93, p.1066. 
N. S. W. M.W.S. Clarke: Some Aspects of Fi~e Insurance, May 1885, 
AIBR 18S5, p.354. 
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interesting that in them •rthe public interest ,in reducing 
"fire waste" was identif'ied wi~h the interest of the 
companies in restraining competition. Lax methods, it 
was said, encouraged carelessness which would lead to 
fires, or even arson. Some examples given.were: 
(1) A tendency to settle losses without adequate 
investigation, in the interests of "goodwill". 
(2) A practice of giving "blanket" covers without 
requiring the specification of hazardous machinery etc. 
(3) Accepting country ~own risks without adequate 
survey reports. 
(4) General looseness in inspections and in reports 
on physical and "moral 11 hazards and loss settlements, in 
the interests of reduced running expenses. 
(5) Loose control over agents, and the employment of 
agents of dubious morality, owing to the competition for 
their services. 
(6) Excessive reliance on reinsurance. It was claimed 
that the acceptance of reinsurance at very low rates 
reacted on the search for direct business by agents, since 
I 
w. Goddard : Fire Insurance: 1 Brokers 
and BrokeragB, June 
1886, AIBR 1 86, p.350. 
W.H. Rowsell: Some though,'!!s of sreater 
uniformity of practice 
amongst fire Companies, 
1887, AIBR 1887, p.740. 
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by this means they were able to obtain commissions on 
larger risks which might otherwise be shared. This 
encouraged further competition among agents and, it was 
said, greater laxness again on their part. 
From the beginning the Insurance Institutes were 
associated in many minds with the "tariff movement". 1.l.1he 
AIBR even suggested that, if a tariff were agreed upon, 
expulsion from the Institute would be a suitable sanction 
for breaches. (7) Although the Institutes never became 
part of the Tariff machinery as suggested, they were 
nevertheless a preparation for it, and later a most 
important adjunct. Iudeed, according to the AIBR, the 
"final impetus" to the formation of the FUA of Victoria 
was the 1887 Institute paper on the advantages of co-
operation delivered by Clement Jarrett.( 8) 
~:(c) Fire Tariffs. Soon after the formation of the 
Sydney and Melbourne Institutes an "Intercolonial 
Conference" of underwriters was held in Melbourne. ( 9) 
However, only 25 of about 58 companies in Australia were 
represented, and rates had to be excluded in advance as a 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
The Insurance Institute as a Guarantee of Good Faith, 
AIBR November 1884, p.573-;--
AIBR 1887, p.637. 
In June 1 ·aa5. AIBR 1885, P• 407. 
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subject for discussion. All· the Conference was able to 
do was to pronounce ·on the "desirability" of, many 
reforms and recommend that Local Associations (where they 
still existed) should "consider" them. The recomrnenda-
t ions are nevertheless of interest because they indicate 
the direction.which later effor,ts were to take. Some 
were: ( 1) 
( 1) The. formation of,·a Fire Insurance Association 
of Victoria. , : . 
(2) The establishment of a Fire Underwriters' 
Association for the Australian colonies; headquarters to 
be in Melbourne. 
(3) The fixing of agents' commissions. 
(4) The adoption of uniform fire policies and 
proposal forms in·Australia~and New Zealand. 
(5) The discontinuance of the practice of allowing 
additional insurances without.notification. 
(6) Greater care in loss settlement •. Where.more 
than one company was; 1nteres.ted in a risk, directly or 
by way of reinsurance, it should be obligatory.to refer 
to recognieed,loss adjusters. 
( 7) .T~e )~mpl_e_m_en,.~~~ti~n. of the 11spiri t" of t?e ~·ay.e,:r,a~e 
clause. 
----------------------------------------------------------(1) Ibid., and Vic. F.B.A. Minute Book: Text of Agreement. 
J =w 
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( 8) '.The fixing· of.; reinsurance. exchange commissioner 
so that "no'.profi.t. be ~~.e./~y.:a..nY.'..<>.ffice .. from reinsuring 
its surplus risks:!'. : · : . :. .~ ' i 
The difficulties that were likely to ar;tse if " 
attempts: were. made. to··fix rates at this .stage were· well 
illustrated by.an·abortive resolution passed in' Melbourne 
after the.,Conference. ·A<group·of.fire.companies agreed 
to fix·minimum·rates ·on soft.goods· warehouses at 5/• 
buildings and 7 /6 contents, the agreement to become · · · 
effective ·as soon as "3Q of the. 34.Melbourne .offices had 
·signed.(~) , Only. 24· signed, nor could the required number 
be obtained fora revised>proposal of 5/- buildings .and 
6/- contenta.(3): Apart :from such dissension within·their 
own ranks; the companies had to face the possibility,of 
new entries· in some cases directly occasioned by attempted 
tariff action. ·Thus .in October 1885 all Sydney fire 
companies except four signed:a·Borid tariff, and in 
November a ·list of rates for warehouses and·,meroantile 
risks was "agreed to ·by all. except the same. four. (4) 
However.the·companies .standing.out had all said' they 
would. conform,- ·.though not signing. ' The two ·11sts; 
(2) AI~R 1885, p.4~~. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) AIBR November 1885, p.656. 
/. ' -··-' 
' ' 
supposedly confidential, then "leaked" and were published 
in fUll in the-Sydney,Daily Telegraph. The agreements, 
among other things, abolished brokerage on the specified 
risks, and one immediate result was a meeting.of brokers 
to form an association "for the conservation of mutual 
interests". Their opposition alone might have been 
sufficient to destroy the agreement, but in addition a 
meeting of "about 500" Sydney merchants decided to form 
their own insurance company.(5) This commenced operations 
in 1886 as the N.s.w. Assurance Corporation, and under-
took marine and general insurance as well as fire. , 
Although it temporarily defeated the aims of the other 
companies, as the AIBR predicted it made heavy losses 
during all except one year of its years of operation, 
and was wound up in 1893. 
After these failures no fUrther attempt was made to· 
obtain agreement until September 1887, when the Fire 
Underwriters' Association of Victoria was formed. The 
memorandum and articles were signed by 32 out of 36 
companies in Melbourne, and the objects were limited to:C6) 
' 
The promotion of cooperation in all matters of 
interest to fire underwriters, but without 
power to deal with tariffs or rates. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) AIBR 1887, p.637. 
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The· Association forthwith 1 proceeded to deal with some of 
the more obvious reforms urged by Clement Jarrett, Salter 
and many others at•the'meetings of the Institute. In 
1888, despite complaints from the merchants and threats 
of starting a new. company, the average clause was 
introdu~ed in policies covering mercantile stocks.(7) 
In the same year the,N.s.w. Fire Underwriters' Association 
was established, and one of its first acts, apparently 
despite the existence of the N4s.w. Assurance Corporation, 
was to introduce the use of this condition in N.s.w.(8) 
By 1889 the clause had also come into use in Adelaide.(9) 
When the average clause was introduced in Victoria 
one of the managers wrote that it was intended to be 
"the thin end of the wedge 11 and in 1889, despite the 
original objects of the Association, tariffs were agreed 
for a number of risks. (JI) There were also agreements on 
(7) 
( 8) 
(9) 
(1) 
AIBR 1888, p.325. Jarrett had complained: "Nowadays 
it seems only necessary that a doorway should be 
opened in each party wall between two or three 
buildings in order to have the stock all covered in 
one sum, though the insurance may not amount to half 
the total value." c. Jarrett: Some advantages ••• 
Op.cit. 
First Annual Report, to 31.3.1889. AIBR 1889 p.357. 
AIBR"1889, p.348. 
Flour mills, Melbourne warehouses, wholesale grocers, 
bond and free stores, and theatres. FUA or Victoria, 
Second Annual Report 1888-89, AIBR 1889, p.861. 
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short period rates, discount to the insured, a uniform 
0 Goods on Trust .and/or Commission" clause, and a 
Woolbrokers' policy wording.(2) Again, an immediate 
reaction from the merchants resulted: the Melbourne 
Chamber of Commerce called.for controlling legislation, 
and representations were made to the FUA by the grocery, 
ironmongery and softgoods trades.(3) But the CQmpanies 
this time held firm. 
In 1891 all rating agreements in Victoria were put 
in the hands of a special committee called the Fire 
Offices Committee,(4) and it seems that this body was 
able to maintain them with some success for the following 
three or so years, until the extent of the leakage by 
.. 
way of discounts and commissions became clearer. During 
this time there was little, if any, extension of the 
areas subject to tariff rates; an agreement concerning 
agents soon turned out to be ineffective. In the FUA 
the moat important measure was an attempt to limit one 
of the forms competition was taking in the country, by 
requiring that requests for contributions from insurance 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Ibid. 
AIBR 1890, p.357. 
Vic. FAUA recorda, Memorandum and Articles-of 
Association, Fire Offices Committee of Victoria. 
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companies to local· fire:brigades should be referred to 
the Association.(5) Another agreement limited policy 
condition concessions which could be granted,to lending 
institutions~ (6) 
One of the factors which led to the strengthening 
of the companies' attitude towards merchandise and retail 
risks was a series of extensive fires in the main cities 
in the late 1880 1s and in 1890 and 1891. In Melbourne 
there were large losses on bond stores, and losses on 
retail stores of £71,000 in 1889 (George & George) and 
£86,ooo in 1891 (Mutual Store). In Brisbane a fire in 
1888 cost the companies approximately £135 1 000 (D.L. 
Brown & Co.) and another in 1890 £54,000 (Benjamin Bros.). 
The 1888 Brisbane loss was the largest in Australia up to 
that time, but in October 1890 a block fire in Sydney 
'caused an estimated (ins~rance) loss of £425,00o.{7) 
The magnitude of these losses is apparent when· compared 
with total fire premiums of the period; for N.s.w. in 
1892 this was £325 1300, and as suggested above (Section 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Vic. FUA Annual Report, AIBR 1893, p.1065. This 
was also done ~~ N.s.w. N.s.w. FUA Annual Report~· 
AIBR 1893, p.648. 
Ibid., Vic. FUA. 
The.fire destroyed a large area between Pitt; 
Castlereagh and Moore Streets. See AIBR 1890 p.754. 
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3(iii) above) total Australian premiums were probably 
not more than 2t to 3 times this amount. 
The reaction in Sydney was to set up a tariff which 
covered a wide variety of risks throughout the city area, 
with special provision for block ratings; in addition the 
average clause was extended to nearly all the principal 
risks.( 8) In 1892 a tariff for the whole of N.s.w. was 
launched, but was abandoned "af·ter a chequered and short 
career".(9) By 1893 there was also limited agreement on 
special classes of risk in Adelaide,·and a "fairly 
comprehensive" tariff operated in Queensland from 1888.( 1) 
Attempts were made to arrive at agreements on classes 
of country risk - for example woolsheda and flour mills -
and for country towns, but the AIBR was referring 
especially to these when it wrote: <2 ) "In some cases 
agreements have come into force only to be immediately 
broken; in other cases they have lasted probably a few 
months, and it is, unfortunately, the exception rather 
than the rule for the duration of their existence to run 
into years." 
(8) AIBR 1893, p.892. 
(9) AIBR 1893, p.185. 
( 1) Ibid. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Despite the incompleteness of these tariffs companies 
appear to have been fairly satisfied with them until 
1893-94. About this time it became especially apparent 
that control over commissions would have to be exercised 
as a pre-condition of the eff~ctive fixing of rates. 
One manager wrote in March 1894 that "brokerage", which 
before had been around 10 per cent, was.then well over 
15 per cent and increasing.(3 ) From this month a 
proposed Discount, Brokerage and Agency Agreement 
( "D. B. & A. Agreement") was discussed by managers in 
Melbourne, but the negotiations dragged on for almost two 
years, While this happened the situation worsened as 
companies competed in securing good agents before the 
Agreement came into force. 
In 1895, however, a decisive step was taken. Largely 
on the initiative of the London Fire Offices' Committee a 
conference of controlling officers of companies doing 
business in New Zealand met in Melbourne during July and 
August.(4) The result was a new and complete set of 
tariffs for New Ze~land (where conditions resembled those 
in Australia). From 1st October 1895 the old and 
(3) 
(4) 
Ro1a1 Letter Book 30,4.189!~. Also AIBR 1895, p.825. 
The business in New Zealand of most overseas h 
companies was at this time controlled from Sydney 
or Melbourne. 
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ineffective Central:New Zealand Fire Underwriters' 
Association was,abolished, a Central Council put in its 
place and the country divided into six areas, each with 
a local Underwriters' Association.(5) Soon after, the 
New Zealand Company signed the Victorian D. B. & A. 
Agreement~(G) and it came into operation on 1st March 
1896. The Agreement limited brokerage to 10 per cent, 
agency commission to 15 per cent (except for Chief 
Agents) and fixed a maximum discount to the insured of 
10 per cent (only allowable for risks in the Melbourne 
Metropolitain area). It also provided for the registering 
of brokers, limited.the number of agents each company 
might have in various districts, and attempted to deal 
with the numerous methods.used to evade the previous 
tariff, by laying down rules regarding "Local Directors", 
11Advisers 11 , "Referees", Canvassers 11 etc. ( ?) 
This agreement now became the foundation of a wide-
Bpread tariff movement. \During 1896 a committee of the 
Victorian Association drew up a comprehensive Tariff which 
one of j, ts members described as "crude • • .. but a great 
improvement both in form and substance on our New Zealand 
' ------~------·-------------·----------------------
(5) AIBR 1895, p.621. 
(6) Royal Letter Book 19.1~.1895· 
(7) Copy of Agreement, Vic •. FAUA records. ' j, 
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experiments", adding significantly"··· All our Melbourne 
work is designed for service elsewhere". (B~ This , , 
commenced on 1st March 1897., Unde~ it the State was 
divided into five main classes of area on the.basis of 
availability of fire 'brigades and water supply,: A, the 
Metropolitan Fire Brigade District; toMis classified as 
B, C or• D, and "all other", E. For each of these 
areas there were Brick and•Wood "General Rating Scales" 
showing basis ,~ates, additions for contiguity and mixed 
'construction etc. A long,list of risks - the 
"Classification ·of Risks Table" classed all occupancies 
under four.headings, W, X, Y or Z; the appropriate class 
would be looked up in the appropriate one of the 10 
General Rating Scales •. The classification in·many oases 
also laid down minimum rates: where a basis rate plus any 
general loading exceeded this it was to"be charged. In, 
addition there were spec~al tar~ffs for the following:( 9 ) 
Agricultural.risks in.specified areas. 
Flour Mills. · 
Public Bonded and Free Stores. 
Saw Mills, Joineries and Timberyards. 
. ~ 
Tanneries, Leatherworka and Woolscourers. " 
Woollen mills. 
(8) Royal Letter Book, 22.1.1897. 
(9) Soon greatly extended. 
:zs••=m 
. / 
Eight months.'.after the Victortan .tariff. i;he'-:"Flinders 
Lane fire" iny9~y~~'::,,insurers in a;:loss, of approximately 
£650;000;( 1.)· in·addition·1897.·and.1898 were bad years for 
losses,. from, bushfires and, in>marine insurance. <2) For 
these reasons>companies in other:States were not· in a . 
strong position to resist the1.agreements- that were: now 
being pressed-on ·them :from. Melbourne •. ,,By March 1898 · · 
similar tariffs ·Working ·,under· reconstituted Associations 
were established ·:in ,iN•S·. w. and South Australia. (3) · In · 
Queensland· there·, was· resistance, but. it was overcome by. 
drastic measures •. :. ;Qne manager) who ,had· a large .say.dn,_ · · 
these. events_, wrote: to :his .Brisbane manager in ·June. 1898 :· 
as follows •. · ·He had given him '.'certain instructions .which 
I had con.ceived • • .. fo.~ the purpose of .b:ringing. about a 
sharp .crisis which should shorten the time of ti:-ouble 
• • • 
.my anticipation.~··· in. this ·respect· were completely realised 
so that· an agreement dr~~n UE by myself was promptLy 
come to by .all .. Offices, and at my own · sugges tioti e~ecy 
Office controlling Br~~bane·from here.sent.its own 
representative:a ~telegram instructing him to sign".:. _His 
l ·' ,, ' . . 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The fire burnt out most of an important block in .the 
heart ot'.Melbou1-ne 's softgoods. and warehouse are::\• . 
AIBR December: ·1 a97, p. s29. 
' ·~. . ' 
AIBR: 1898, ·p. 849~ Also Ch. II. ·. 
< 
AIBR 1900, p·. 639 • 
,; 
! 
I 
plan had in,fact not worked quite so smoothly, for he 
continued: "You .alone of all Offices so instructed .did 
not carry out the instructions ••• and my previously 
successful attempt ••• was converted into an extension of 
the time of.trouble and an accentuation of competition 
most disastrous to all". Despite the recalcitrance of 
this local manager, agreement was reached by the end of 
the year, but by the~ large blocks of business had been 
tied up with long term and forward contracts at very low 
rates. (4) However, the original purpose was attained in 
a way more thoroughly, for this outbr~ak and the collapse 
in Western,AustDalia ::in 1906'became part of the tariff 
insurer's lore, as lessons of what would certainly happen 
if both tariffs and competitive conventions were both 
disregarded. (5) 
(4) 
(5) 
AIBR 1900, p.377. 
The Queensland crisis was described by a contemporary 
observer as follows: "For the last week there has 
been an Insurance Delerium here, nearly as exciting 
as a run on a bank ••• Nothing like it has happened 
in Australia before ••• The Insurance Companies 
literally lost their heads 'and the merchants and 
Banks and business people did what they liked.with 
them and made them take insurances at ridiculuous rate~,, in fact next door to nothing." (Letter 
dated 3. 6.1898 from an insurance broker in Brisbane). 
The outbr~k lasted about a month, but in its severe 
form leae"' than a .week. It extended to Queensland · 
country areas, and it was necessary to agree on a 
uniform telegram, which was sent to all country 
agents at a specified time. 
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Finally,_ ~~ri~f~ were.adopted i~ Western,Aus~ralia 
f 
in 1899 and Tasmania in 1900, in the latter case again 
following fierce competition.(6) All closely followed 
the Victorian model. The period following was largely 
one of elaboration, consolidation and compromise; no 
really important action involving basic principles was 
taken until the formation of the Council in 1909. 
, 
{, .(d) Marine Tariffs. As in fire insurance, attempts 
were made at various times during the 'eighties to agree 
on new marine tariffs. After the abandonment of the 
A & N.Z. Underwriters' tariff in 1879 by the Melbourne 
offices, the Sydney Association attempted to maintain~it 
"by judicious revisions from time to time".(7) However 
competition from London and Melbourne led t~ frequent 
alterations and from 1880 the Sydney Association wae 
pressing for a new agreement. In 1883 a Conference o~ 
the marine underwriters of Australian and New Zealand 
companies was held in Melbourne and considered a new 
schedule of rates' suggested by the A. & N.Z. Underwriters' 
Association. These rates were considergbly less than the 
old 1878: tariff rates, as can be seen from the following 
examples: 
(6) 
. ( 7) 
AIBR 1900 p.126. 
Annual Report 1878-79, Sydney Underwriters' 
XSsociation. 
l I I , 
! ,, 
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.. 
From Australia to U.K. 
(Se a Risk only:) 
i 
General Cargoes, F.P.A. steamers 
" " " 
Saile rs 
Wool W.A. Steamers 
II " Saile rs 
From U.K. to Australia 
General Cargoes, F.P.A. Steamers 
ti 
" 
11 Sailers 
Sldne~ ProEoaed·Tariff 
1883 Tariff 
1878 
25/-
25/-
35/-
35/-' 
22/6 
22/6 
15/- to 20/-
22/6 
25/- to 30/-
30/-
12/6 to 20/-
22/6 
Note: All rates per £100 of cover. 
The new tariff was eventually signed by all head offices 
in Australia and New Zealand, but when this had been done 
agreement oould no longer be reached among the English 
head offices in ·London.(8) 
In 1885 a uHomewardu(9) tariff only was sent from 
London and considered at a Conference in Sydney. In 
contrast to 1882 this conference was attended by the 
representatives of English, Continental and other over-
seas companies, but agreement broke down on the question 
of bonuses. The conference passed the following 
resolution: ( 1 ) 
(8) .Annual Report 1884, ~elbourne Mercha11t Shipping and Underwriters'· .Associati~n. 
(9) ioe~ Australia to U.K. 
(1) AIBR 1885, p.346. 
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That this ·1 conference. is willing to adopt the 
Revised Tariff of Rates proposed by the 
London Underwriters,· 31st October 1884, as. 
so~n as satisfactory understanding can be 
arrived at by,wpich the.bonuses offered by the 
Chinese and other companies can either be 
withdrawn, or the companies who do·not at 
present allow bonuses have the privilege of 
granting the same. , , 
In 1890 representatives from the Melbourne, Sydney 
and Adelaide.Associations met in Adelaide, but no attempt 
was made to consider rates. In 1892 a full scale 
conference was held in Melbourne, and attended by 
representatives of over two-thirds of all marine com-
panies in Australia.( 2) Opening the conference, the 
Chairman saiC.: 
Marine business has arrived in such a state 
that combination and uniformity of action 
alone can ·restore it to a ·paying condition. 
If some practical outcome results from the 
meeting now commencing the support of 
London companies and Unde~w~iters might 
reasonably be. looked for.~3J 
A tariff for "Homeward" voyages was in.fact agreed, 
and a Committee appointed.to collect signatures, but 
before the conference dispersed cabled advice was · 
received of the-refusal of three ·London head offices to 
sign. 
(2) 
(3) 
This meant the end of .the agreement, as the head 
37 plus 5 apologies, of approximately 52 in 
Australia. 
Report,of·Conference, March 21-23 1892, Melbourne. 
Vic. Marine Assoc. records. 
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office decisions were·binding on their local represen-
tatives. In Sydney, nevertheless, the tariff ,appears to 
have been maintained, probably in the flexible form of 
Sydney tariffs during the 1880'a. New lists of rates 
for Sydney were published in 1892, 1895 and 1897. 
Although the conferences described above were 
principally;concerned with the discussion of tariffs, 
they also dealt with meny other matters. Among these 
were the administration of the River Agreement pools,(4) 
and the drawing up of uniform clauses and procedures to 
be used in the various centres. The latter included 
proposals for uniform stowage and dunnage rules, clauses 
for timber cargoes, electrical installations on ships, 
general average bonds, hull survey reports, and so on. 
The 1883 conference also adopted a uniform Hull policy. 
In 1885 it was agreed that the A. & N.Z. Underwriters' 
Association should cable war rates from London, and that 
these would be declared in force by the various local 
Associations. Although most of these proposals were 
agreed to in principle, it is uncertain whether they were 
particularly effective in practice. Certain of them 
contlnued to be stated as desirable reforms at each of 
the conferences. 
(4) See section 3(ii) above. 
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During the· 1890·'e ·the~'situation in Aust..:T->alia was 
transformed, as already described, by the f'n.tlt\;• 03 or 
absorption of many Australian companies and the 
modification' of their bonus policies by the China based 
companies. The change was well exemplified by the 
decline in the influence of the A. & N.Z. Underwriters' 
Association. I'n··th.o ~-~~te. ~880's and early 1890's there 
were freql:t\~nt compt.(Jt5,!.~ 1~t .. · t.fJ.at it was "moribund", and in 
1892 it cea's,.ed to be a :pu.rely Australian and New Zealand 
institution by 1:,.1:.m:i.ttin!!: as members companies writing 
Australian and 1'-H~W Zealand ·business, but with overseas 
head officen .. These by the late 1890's greatly out-
numbered Australian and New Zealand owned companies. 
The eventual guccessf'ul·agreement on an Australian 
tariff was come to initially in London. In July 1897 
there was discussion and agreement there on an Australian 
"Homeward 11 Tari ff. ( 5) The signing was reported ·to ·be · · 
if anybody has not signed or·agreed 
fairly general: It • • • 
to do so, ·it is only because the non-signatory pre:rera:to 
give his word instead.·';(G): rn· the latter part of 1897 a 
delegate was Sent.from the Institute of London Under-
wri tere to be present: at Australian discu·s sions on the: · ' 
(5) AIBR 1897 pp~5721 649· 
(6) Ibid. p.649· 
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new tariff. These took place at a conference held in 
Melbourne from 17th - 27th January 1898. Sixty-three 
delegates attended the conference, representing 45 
companies; it was significant that only 11 of the 
companies were Australian. 
The conference agreed on the London tariff of 
minimum "homeward" rates; i.e. for all voyages from 
Australia and New Zealand to the U.K. and Continent not 
north of Hamburg (hereafter referred to as the "General 
Homeward" Tariff). The tariff applied to all cargo 
except specie, smelted metals, frozen meat, full cargoes 
of ore, grain, peas and flour.(7) Both minimum F.P.A. 
and W.A. rates were set. Rates for aailera were higher 
than for steamers. The steamer classification was 
according to 6 steamship company classes with rates 
ranging from 7/6 to 13/9 F.P.A., and 9/6 to 16/3 W.A. 
Special interests e.g. bark, leather and sheepskin, were 
charged extra •. Sailing ship rates ranged from 20/- to 
25/- F.P.A. to 30/- W.A. There was a list of surcharges 
for calls at ports en route e.g. New Zealand and South 
America, and for transhipments at u.K. or Continental 
ports. Separate tariffs were drawn up for shipments from 
Queensland and Western Australia. For each State there 
(7) This and information below is obtained from reports 
of the proceedings and agreements in the AIBR 1898, 
pp.105-6 and 249-50. 
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were special rates for "Sea and Coastal Risks", the rates 
given above being for sea risk only. Separate tariffs 
were then agreed for iron ore cargoes from South 
Australia and for frozen meat. Maximum discounts and 
commissions were set and special provisions made 
regarding bonus companies. Against the wishes of the 
I.L.U. representative, who wanted all reinsurance 
commission ~orbidden, a maximum reinsurance commission of 
5 per cent was fixed. All companies agreed to abide by 
tariffs of other State Associations and New Zealand 
tariffs. Standard clauses and riinimum rates were then 
agreed for inland 11fire and flood risk" on w9ol, and the 
long standing 0 River Agreement" was confirmed. A proposal 
was made that a Federal Council of Marine Underwriters 
should be formed, with two nominees from each co~ony, 
plus two nominated by the I.L.U. 
Following this.conference, similar meetings were , ' 
held in Melbourne in December 1898 and September 1900.<8) 
At the.1900 conference a Constitution was agreed for a 
Federal Council; this held its first meetings in 1901.<9) 
At these meetings further agreements were arrived at 
concerning the following: 
( 8) 
(9) 
Re~orted by the AIBR 1898 pp.849-50; 1900 pp.809-10. 
The proceedings of the first two meetings were 
reported by the AIBR. See AIBR 1901 pp.568 and 
870-72. 
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Frozen meat. 
War Risk rates. 
Inter State tariffs. 
Wheat 
Outward Sailers. 
357 
Tariffs to South Africa, India and North America. 
Hulls. 
Agency rules. 
Brokerage. 
Local Boards. 
Over the period the State Associations also drew up 
agreements on intra-state matters, especially rates for 
coastal voyages, locally registered hulls, and various 
inland covers to the principal seaports. 
A most.significant change was made in 1901. This 
was the replacement of the A. & N.Z. Underwriters' 
Association by a special HColonial Section" of the I. L. U. 
Before this it had been practically defunct; but it was 
signi:N.cant that members of the new "Colon:tal Section" 
were hot admitted as members of the I.L.U., where most 
important decisions were taken. Some years later _ 
re:ferences to the "Colonial Section" disappear, and there-
after Australian companies did not take any effective 
part in consultations in London. 
I 
i ' ! 
f ' ~ 
I \ 
l 
I , r ' ' I 
, I 
r. i 
. I f l , 
l 
I 
:·11 :·1;1 
lj I J L I 
: ! I 
' ' 
I J 
: ( 
' j 
j 
' 
•1, 
i ( 
I 
• 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONSOLIDATION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS, 1900-1909 
1. Consolidation 
The formation of the marine and fire tariffs were 
important achievements for the tariff builders; but much 
remained to be done if a stable tariff structure were to be 
created in Australia. One step in this direction was taken 
with the founding of Accident Underwriters' Associations in 
each State in 1902. These administered tariffs agreed by 
accident companies f'o·r Employers' Liability, Personal 
Accident, Fidelity Guarantee and other miscellaneous 
insurances. Again the agreements were dominated by English 
companies and followed English precedents. 
After 1902, there were three separate forms of 
organisation responsible f~r ·tariffs in the three 
.. ,, ... 
principal·- fields. Only in marine insurance was there an 
Australia-wide co-ordinating body - the Federal Council -
and its powers were not extensive. As increasing numbers 
of fire companies moved into accident and marine insurance, 
support grew t•or the view that all Australian insurance 
affairs should be placed under the control of some central 
organisation. In particular, in the rapidly growing 
accident field, it was thought that agreements were not 
well kept, and that there was a danger that dissension 
might spread to the fire tariffs, now that nn increasing 
number of msnagers were becoming responsible for both. 
-
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Thes~ views were eventually crystallised in the formation 
of the Commonwealth·Council in 1909, but- before this 
came about there were a number of important developments 
which explain to a considerable extent the form which the 
1909 agreements took. 
(a) The Proposed Council, 1899. References to the 
desirability of some form of central Australian organisa-
tion for fire insurance were made in England in the early 
1880's, and at the time of the formation of the State 
F.U.A. 's in 1897 and after there was a strong body of 
opinion in favour of the idea in Australia. In 1899, 
with this purpose in view, an "Intercolonial Conference" 
of fire managers met in Sydney~ It passed recommendations 
to the various Associations and adopted a Constitution and 
Rules for a proposed "Council o:f Fire Underwriters' 
Associations of Australia and Tasmania 11 .< 1 ) The reasons 
for the move were explained in a contemporary letter 
which is worth quoting at some length. 
(1) 
The necessity of curtailing the powers of some 
of the Associations such as those of Queensland 
in particular and Western Australia and South 
Australia, so as to prevent them from altering 
not only the details but also the fundamental 
principles of the various agreements, had become 
apparent, for there was not only a disposition 
to alter them in directions which had already 
A copy of the proposed Constitution and Rules is 
held by the 7ic.· FAUA. • 
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proved to be ~mpracticable and.impolitic in 
the earlier discussions, and which were 
abandoned as unworkable after adoption but 
the alterations were also being used by 
cliques to favour the connections of 
individual offices. In one notorious case 
in South Australia the letter of the 
classification list was altered to suit one 
particular large connection of a New Zealand 
Company: a regular canvass was made for the 
purpose, and votes were influenced by 
reinsurances. (1.a) 
In some Associations preferences were giYen to companies 
which did business in a particular way e.g. mainly by 
canvassers, and there were other "gross irregularities". 
These were expected "in such an entirely new scheme, but 
it has been felt that unless there be uniformity of 
action in all the Colonies (which practically means the 
taking away of legislative furictions from the com-
paratively irresponsible local associations in the 
smaller places where they are administered by inexperienced 
and untrained people) the system must necessarily break 
down." 
On the 6th June 1899 it was reported that the 
proposal had been carried in Sydney and Adelaide, but 
defeated 17 : 10 in Melbourne. The scheme had proposed 
that each company should have a "Chief Repree.entati ve" 
1 
for Australia, who would represent the company on the 
Council. At the time there ~vere s till a number of cases 
where the State representatives of overseas companies 
' 
were responsible di~ect to their Head Offices, and in the 
(1.a) Royal Letter Book~ 2.5.1899· 
' 
,I 
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absence of. a definite Head Office decision, ~en obvious . 
conflict of· interest·.a rose. In at 'least three instances,· 
in fact, re pres en tat i ves of : the same company · voted 
differently on ,the.:question in different ·States. · One 
manager of a: British company was convinced that this 
factor - what he called· 0 the .jealous· :rear-a· of· rival 
colonial rep res en ta ti ves" - ·was the main . reason for the , 
failure. · . However it appears that there waA considerable. 
qpposition from Australian and New Zealand eompanies·aa 
well; they· considered that they would.· lose even more 
influence than they. had already,.· if they wer~ to. join. a . 
'.. ' ~ 
central Council· with ,:J~xtensi ve powe1"s, which v1as certain 
to be dominate~by overseas companies: 
· ·:: :(b) Collapse in Wes tern Australia, 1906. After the 
failure of the ·1599 Council Scheme no more was heard of 
the subject for some years, but quite soon difficulties 
began to occur· of the kind predicted by its proponents, .· 
and these brought the question to a head in 1906. These 
difficulties were most acute in Western Australia. 
The Western Australian Fire Underwriters' Association 
,'I· 
' -
was formed in Perth after a visit of a delegation of 
. •'' 
. .. . - . 
contro11in~ officer~. in. October and November 1898. 
Tariffs al~ng the lines of those ad~pt.ed ·in the Eastern 
) :· .'. I.•';· .. '; ~ : 
States were.dr-awn up; as elsewhere an Accident Association 
was established in 1902. From the begiruiing there was · 
serious1 discord am:>ng the members of the FUA. Some idea 
of its extent is provided by the number of breaches of 
tariff rules recorded. To deal with these matters, the 
Association had adopted the Victorian tariff procedure. 
Upon an allegation·of a breach an "Enquiry Sheet" would 
be sent to all companies; if a company admitted to the 
breach or if it were otherwise proved, where possible the 
tariff 1•ate or condition had to be restored. If this was 
not feasible the risk had to be reinsured at tariff rates 
with the injured company or companies. 
Year 
1899-1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906* 
No. of No. of Cos. 
Tariff ~valved 
Cos. in in breaches 
W.A. -
-
29 
36 
36 
36 
37 
37 
23 
26 
24 
25 
31 
25 
Source: FAUA records,. Perth. 
-- *Part of year only. 
Results of alleged Breaches, 
NuT!lber 
Proved or Denied by Not 
admitted all Cos. proved 
166 
96 
57 
70 
121 
57 
46 
71 
60 
103 
119 
63 
38 
12 
14 
15 
20 
14 
A probable reason for the frequency of these breaches 
was that many tariffs appeared to be unreasonably high. 
To take a typical example, a breach report in 1905 round 
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that the correct tariff rates for a particular risk were: 
Buildings 34/9 
Contents 35/9 
It emerged that quotations had been made by 6 different 
companies as follows: 
Buildings 
19/-
Contents 
23/-
30/-
4/6 and 12/-
19/6 (accepted) 
20/-
35/-
5/- and 12/-
Matters were not helped when breaches at first denied were 
subsequently found to be true. Since the members of the 
Committee administering the agreements were often them-
selves involved, relations were not harmonious and 
resignations were frequent. .Another standing ii'l.'i tant 
was that a group of four companies had a contract for 
certain Western Australian Government insurances at 
rates below tariff. In 1903 22 companies signed a letter 
stating that they would cut rates for this busines;. unlesti 
tariff rates were charged. As a result a compromise· 
preferential tariff was agreed to, but the subject con-
tinued to cause concern. 
By 1905 friction within the Association was such as 
to render its continued tunctioning little short of 
I i I 
! I 
I 
I 
! 
farcical. In order to avoid the collapse that seemed 
imminent, an Extraordinary General Meeting handed over 
many of the powers of the Association to a "Committee of 
Refer~ncen dominated by controlling officers in the 
Eastern States. This Committee consisted of three 
managers from Sydney, three from Melbourne, and three 
from Perth and Fremantle. All Association matters could 
be referred to it, and no agreements could be altered 
without its consent. The quorum was six, and votes could 
be by post. 
The new Committee at once attempted to remove some 
of the causes of the trouble. In March 1906 a pooling 
agreement was reached for Government insurances. 
Provision was made for the appointment of a special 
"investigator of breaches", who was to have power to 
inspect all books and documents of any member. All 
breaches were henceforth to be reported to controlling 
or Head Offices for explanations, and these were to be 
recorded in the Association minutes. 
The creation of the Committee of Reference removed 
the responsibility for the control of West .P,uetralian 
fire tariff affairs from Perth to Melbourne, Sydney and 
London. As .events proved, howeve~, this did not 
stabilise the situation in Perth, even though there was 
the danger that local disagreements might now be reflected 
more directly on a far larger scale. The Committee of 
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Reference its elf was paralysed by disagreement, Thus in 
October 1905 a motion for a reduction in base rates of 
10-15 per cent was defeated in the West Australian FUA, 
but the Committee did not intervene. The proposal for 
the 11 investigator of breaches" was nev:er implemented, and 
no decisive steps were taken in other directions. In these 
circumstances the t.ariff could not possibly be maintained. 
In August 1906 a company refused outright to reply to 
enquiry sheets on five separate charges of breaches. A 
letter was receiV'ed by the W.A. FUA from the Australian 
controlling officer of the company, flatly disagreeing 
with the Committee's "alleged Tariff rate". The matter 
was deferred for consideration by the Committee of 
Reference, but on the continued refusal of this company, 
now joined by another, to complete enquiry sheets, the 
tariff was suspended. This was on Tuesday the 27th of 
November 1906. 
The fierce rate war which ensued was by far the most 
serious that ever occurred in Australia, It lasted about 
a week, but was most severe in the first four days. 
Large advertisements appeared in all Perth newspap~rs; 
temporary staff was engaged and offices stayed open for 
The course of events was 
business long into the night. ' < • • 
closely repor1;e<i ·' 1:11 the newspapers , including the rat es 
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and terms at which business was done. Some contracts 
reported were:(2 ) 
Sum 
Risk InSilred 
W .A. Government -
works and 
buildings £1,500,000 
Bean Bros. -
retail 
softgoods £75,000 
W.A. Turf Club n.s. 
Subiaco Municipal 
insurances n.s. 
Fremantle Trades 
Hall £2,000 
Anglican Church £125,000 
Old Rate 
11up to 15/- 11 
22/-
15/-
n.s. 
42/-
n.s. 
Fremantle Harbour Trust £45,050 9/- to 15/-
Her Majesty's Theatre £40,000 100/-
Perth City Council £20,000 £120(prem.) 
Brick Houses -
rurni ture and 
effects 4/-
New 
-Rate Term 
1/- 3 years 
8/- n.s. 
1/- n.s. 
6d 1st year 
3d Next 2 years 
1/- n.s. 
8d 5 years 
1/- 3 years 
25/- n.s. 
£5.12.0 3 years 
6d 1 year 
Note: n.s. means ''not stated". 
A feature of the outbreak was the use of long term 
and forward contracts, both expressly forbidden by 
--------------------------------------------------------
(2) Perth Morning Heralq, 28 November to 4 December 1906. 
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Auatralian·tariffs. ':By means of the latter, policies 
which did not fall ·'due for renewal at the time were 
brought into the conflict.: Most long term contracts 
were made for 3 or 5 years, but a number were as long as 
10 or even 20 years. At first companies thought that 
they would be able to take advantage of a clause which 
enabled them to cancel policies at will, but this was 
quickly pointed out by the newspapers and contracts were 
made with the "Cancellation Clause" itself cancelled. 
No statistics of fire premiums were collected at 
this time in-Western Australia, and so it is not possible 
to accurately assess t·he effects of the outbreak on 
premium volume. However it was known from FUA returns 
that total State _premiu~ income in 19.05 was £145,000 
approximately. At rates ruling on the first day of the 
outbreak the Morning Herald estimated that this would be 
reduced to about £20,000.(3) It estimated that of about 
. , 
250 employees in 35 Perth branches, 150 would lose their 
jobs.<4> Evidence obtained by the writer suggests that 
these estimates were probably substantially accurate. 
The Western Australian fire·results of two companies 
showed: (a) Substantial underwriting surpluses (after 
(3) Ibid. 29th-November 1906. 
(4) Ibid. 30th November. · 
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local expenaes)-o:f'·from .20 to 70 per cent of net 
premiums, .between ,1899 and 1905. (b) Significant 
losses for a number of years after 1906. The business 
of one ·company did not become profitable again until 
1913, seven years ·later. (c) A drop of 50 per cent in 
the premium· income of a company which did not greatly 
reduce its management expenses. The other company 
unfortunately did not show premium income after 1906, but 
a third which did, and which, like most others, 
drastically reduced its expenses, had the following 
premium incomes in Western Australia: (£'000) 
1901 : 12 .5 
1909 : 1.6 
•; · .. (C) Acquired ComJ:!anies. The last entry made in 
the Minute Book of the West Australian FUA reads: 
Should our experience be profitable to anyone 
and lead to a better understanding amongst 
underwri tars .. at other centres, we ·are surely 
repaid to' a very great extent for the trials 
we have undergone. 
The words were.prophetic, for the collapse did have a 
very important influence in other States, end in particu-
lar helped to avoid a new crisis which before 1906 had 
been threatening in Melbourne and Sydney. 
One of the important provisions of the Victorian 
' ·. ~ \ .... ' ' . ' 
< ""' '~ ... •• ' > ~ ' 
D.B. &: A. Agl'Element of 1896, also adopted in other state 
fire and accidE!nt tariffs, limited the number as well as 
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the remuneration of agents. For example, in.Victoria no 
company was allowed (under the fire tariff) more than 20 
agents in the city of Melbourne, 120 in the suburbs 
(maximum 6 per suburb), and one in each country town. (5) 
The original agreements made no special provision for the 
application of the rules to newly acquired and existing 
subsidiary companies. Before 1897 the many companies 
absorbed had been merged into parent company organisations 
and roost had lost their identities. After 1897, largely 
due to the new rules and the application of similar rules 
by the F.o.c.,<6) the separate identities of acquired 
companies were maintained in order to preserve and perhaps 
develop their agencies. Over the period 1897-1910 non-
marine companies absorbed to which this applied in 
Australia were: 
Acquired Co. 
Year Absorbing Co. Name 
Head Office Business 
= 
-
in Aust. 
1897 London and City Mutual 
Sydney F, Acc. 
Lancashire Fire 
1901 Commercial Palatine 
London F, Acc. 
Union 
1901 Royal Lancashire 
Liverpool F 
-
(5) These agreements are described in more detail in Section 8 below. 
(6) Fire Offices' Coinmittee, London. 
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Year Absorbing Co. 
-
1902 Alliance 
' 
1904 General 
Accident 
1905 New Zealand 
1905 Sun 
1907 Phoenix 
1907 Queensland 
1907 Commercial 
Union 
1 908 L<.'ndon and 
Lancashire 
1908 Liv.erpool, 
London and 
Globe 
1908 Norwich Union 
1910 Commercial 
Union 
Acquired Co. 
Name Head Office 
Imperial London 
Bombay Fire Bombay 
and Marine 
New Zealand Auckland 
Accident 
Patriotic Dublin 
, 
National Union Bedford(U .K.) 
Queensland 
Accident 
Union 
Australian 
Alliance 
Central 
Sydney 
London 
Melbourne 
London 
Business 
in Aust. 
F 
F, M 
Acc. 
F 
F 
Acc. 
F, Acc. 
F, M, Acc. 
F 
Norwich and 
London 
Accident 
Norwich(U.K.) Acc. 
Ocean Accident London Acc. 
Notes: F means "Fire", M "Marine", Acc. "Accident". 
As the number of absorbed companies grew in Australia 
there were complaints from "single" companies that the 
application o~ the D.B. & A. Rules discriminated against 
them unfairly. Threats were made of floating new 
subsidiaries, ·reviving'defUnct companies, 'and introducing 
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subsidiaries from other parts of the world into the 
Australian market. In February 1906 the problem was 
referred by the Victorian Association to the F.o.c. in 
London • 
At first it seemed that an amicable solution would 
be easily found. Meetings in London seemed to indicate 
that agreement would be reached along the lines of 
previous F.o.c. decisions. These were that absorbed 
companies could continue only those agencies existing at 
the time of absorption, with the proviso that agencies 
subsequently lapsing could be replaced by new ones. These 
rulings were conveyed to Australia, but were unacceptable 
to certain companies which had made appointments on a 
large scale after the dates of absorption. The question 
was now again considered in Melbourne, this time at a 
special meeting of controlling officers. Here it was 
agreed that in principle an acquiring and subsidiary 
company together could not have more representatives than 
allowed for a single company, but that exceptions would 
be made for all appointments made before 1st November 1906 
by seven specified acquired companies, and any others 
subsequently absorbed. (7) This was on 1st Oct,ober; · 
approximately two months later news reached Melbourne· or 
(7) Minutes of Meeting, Council Records, Melbourne. 
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the disaster in Western Australia. A series of meetings '.j 1..1' 
of controlling officers were held to endeavour to control j f 
the situation, and above all to prevent the spread of' ri { 
., i 
the rate war to other States. Nothing could be done ;l '! 
Ji 
i1 
about Western Australia, but it was agreed that it was ~! ~ 
~ ~J ~ \i 
l' t desirable to form, along the lines of the existing ;i ! 
1 
Vies tern Australian Committee of Reference, a "Council of 
Control and Reference ••• with a view to ensuring the 
maintenance of' Tariffs throughout Australia". (B) A sub-
committee drew up a set of proposed rules and objects. 
These were much the same as had been suggested in 1899, 
except that the Council was to be specifically given 
power as follows: 
If any Local Association should refuse or 
neglect to fix adequate special rates at the 
request of the Council, then the Council shall 
have the power to pass such legisl~tion without 
reference to the said Association.\9) 
Soon after the apparent settlement reached at the 
October-November conferences, the local representative of' 
a London company received news from his head office that 
a takeover had been arranged of a British company operating 
in Australia. Under the October agreement all agency 
appointments mad-e by the acquired company after the 1st 
I 
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LJ 
(8) Minutes of Proceedings, Council records, Melbourne. l ; . . j.' • . , 
' 
-(9) Ibid. 
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November 1906 were re·quired to be cancelled. Rather than 
comply the parent company notified that it would.not be 
bound; in re~aliation a "single" company gave notice of 
withdrawal from the Victorian tariff, to become effective 
three months later, on the 14th April 1907. Again 
conferences of chief representatives were called; when 
a deadlock ensued the matter was passed on to London. 
Here a meeting of F.o.c. members represented in Australia 
now decided that the only feasible so~ution was to allow 
all companies as many agents in each place as was 
possessed by any company: plus its subsidiaries. This 
decision was in turn unacceptable to the "dual" companies; 
one announced that it would withdraw from Australian 
tariffs on the 30th April. Another threatened to pay 
overriding commission to agents if the resolution were 
put into effect. 
At this stage it was obvious that there would be an 
Australia-wide collapse unless concessions w_ere made. 
The probability of such concessions was however greatly 
increased by the realisation by most managers of what an 
outright rate war might mean, and in this respect the 
recent events in Western Australia were much in their 
. 
minds and possibly of decisive significance. Thus the 
minutes of the January conference report~d that the 
companies concerned must be persuaded to withdraw their 
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notices of resignation II ••• and so prevent a disruption 
which 'NOUld inevitably extend throughout the Commonwealth, 
and not only place Fire Insurance Business in a more 
helpless and unrespected position than it has ever 
occupied, but would also involve the Companies in an 
appalling loss of revenue 11 • A related fear expressed by 
a London manager was that because of "··· strong 
socialistic tendencies ••• once rates were to go and an 
endeavour made to re-establish them, we should have to 
fear State legislation which might ruin Insurance business 
in Australia, not for a year or two, but :practically for 
all time". Nevertheless preparations were made; one 
London head office, for example, sent instructions to 
its Australian representatives that if a rate war were 
to break out: (1) If possible long term contracts were to 
be avoided, or if not, confined to 2 years at most. 
(2) Reductions in ,rates were·1not to exceed 50 per cent 
for one year and 30 per cent for two years, without 
cabling head· office. (3) Endeavours should be made to 
. 
bind the insured for 36 months after the contracts 
expired. , 
Under .the pressures described, new attempts were 
made to find compromises in London. Eventually, on the 
15th !larch 1907, u·was ·"unanimously and finally agreed" 
in London that: '' 
( 1) Dual :~_companies. ce>uld '.continue .. all appoin~ments 
made up to the 28th·May,1906 only; exceptions granted 
covering :.the :peI'iod. 28 .. 5.,1906 to 1.1.1.1.906 would have to 
be given up. 
(2) ·Two spe.cified .dual companies could continue . to 
make new appointments until 1st November 1908. 
(3 ) .. Henceforth the.· general principle was to be 
enforced, that only .those-.agencies .in existence at .the 
' ,. ' .. · . ... ' ,. . 
time of takeover could be continued. By implication, 
companies not represented in Australia at the time of 
absorption would not be.· allowed to open agencies . there 
after.absor:Ption. 
These decisions were at once cabled t.o the . 
controlling officer 9s. Conference in Melbourne, with .. 
instructions ..• that they should be followed by. all state 
Associations. On th~ir receipt in M~~lbourne the two 
notices of resignation were withdrawn by the companies 
concerned
1 
and the crisis had passed. 
The significance of the acquired companies ep~sode, 
now substantially but not completely over, .was t.hat it 
showed. very clearl.Y the need for .. some central body where 
effective decisions could be .taken,for the whole of .. 
Australia •. Since no such body existed, crucial matti:ir~ 
had been passed· on. to London .for. decision.·:. To th~ < 
Australian companies whi.cb had originally opposed the 
\ 
l 
Council scheme in,1899, even an overseas dominated 
~'-._ 
Australian body seemed preferable to this. The idea 
accordingly found new supporters. In addition, controlling 
officers from Sydney and Melbourne had, in their numerous 
and lengthy meetings, constituted a "de facto" Council; 
it was only a short step to formalise what to some extent 
had already been happening. 
iJn) The.Formation of the Council, 1909. With this 
purpose in view, confere~ces were held in October and 
November 1907. The proposed Constitution and certain 
basic rules were adopted. Further progress was however 
held up over the question of the voting rights of dual 
companies. One of these companies objected to the 
majority view that the absorbed and absorbing company 
would together have only one vote on the Council. 
In the meantime, as pointed out above, accident 
insurance had commenced to grow rapidly and many fire 
companies had or were contemplating entering this field. 
Accident tariffs varied between States, not all companies 
had joined them, and it was said that they were not well 
observed by their members. It was now felt that the 
problems involved were best dealt With at the Federal 
level; the November conference (held in Sydney) in fact 
satisfactorily di~pQ!=J~d of most of them. The following 
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broad decisions were arrived at:(1) 
(1) All insurance not life, fire or marine was to 
be classed as 111Accident ". 
(2) All classes of "Accident" business were to be 
tariffed and uniform policies and rating schedules drafted. 
(3) Separate agents could be appointed in a single 
place for fire, accident and livestock insurance if 
desired, but each of these agencies was to transact only 
the specified class of buoiness. 
At the conference the absorbed company question 
again proved a stumbling block. On one side it was 
argued that independent companies writing both fire and. 
accident business wet•e in a position to strongly attack 
the connection of an acquired company if the latter were 
prevented from developing accident business. Against 
this it was claimed that to allow non-accident subsidiaries 
to appoint accident agents would be an infringement of the 
previous London agreements. Since there was as yet·no 
agreed machinery for arriving at decisions in Australia, 
this problem·too~was sent to London for arbitration. Here 
a special joint.subcommittee of the F.O.C. and the A:o.A.(2) 
eventually came to a .compromise solution. Thia was that, 
(1) Minutes of Proceedings, Council Records, Melbourne. 
(2) Accident Offices' '.Association. .. 
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as regards acquired companies only, agencies previously 
authorised to transact fire insurance could write 
accident business. No further agencies for accident or 
fire business could be created. The subcommittee also 
stated explicitly what had been previously implied, 
namely that: 
(1) Acquired companies not transacting business in 
Australia before absorption could not open at all in 
Australia. 
(2) Agency appointments could not be made for 
\ 
subsidiaries newly floated in Australia. 
\ 
\ 
These rulings were cabled to Australia in November 1908, 
where ,they allowed further progress on the accident 
' 
' 
tariffs. At a meeting in Melbourne in June of the 
\ 
followirl~ year(3) draft uniform accident agreements were 
considers~ ~nd tariff subcommittees appointed uo draw up 
. 
rating scales for approval at a later meeting. Finally, 
after two long conferences in Melbourne and Sydney in 
August and St,ptember 1909, (4) the Council of Fire and· 
Accident Unde1~wr:i. ters was constituted. 
The Council became the supreme Australian tariff 
body for fire and accident business. All constitutional 
(3) 
' (4) 
• v 
25-30th June 1909. 
Sydney.conference, 3rd ~ugust - 1st September. 
Melbourne, 20-29th September. 
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matters affecting local Associations were under its 
control, plus the administration of a list of specified 
tariffs and agreements. Its members were the controlling 
officers of non-marine tariff companies in Australia. An 
elected executive Committee of seven was responsible for 
its administration between General Meetings; a full time 
secretary and surveying and clerical staff were employed. 
It served as a court of appeal from decisions by State 
Associations, and was henceforth the principal negotiating 
body with Governments and with the various tariff 
organisations in London. Before its formation, under the 
direction of the Western Australian Committee of Reference 
a·new Western Australian Fire Underwriters' Association 
had been formed, and a tariff agreed, in May 1909. In 
1910 the Articles of Association of all other State 
Associations (both fire and accident) were altered so as 
to oring them under.the direction of the Council; in 1912 
the Committee of Reference was disbanded and similar 
changes made in the Ar.ticles of the Western Australian 
Association. 
1 · Background Further Developments 
The background to the negotiations of 1896-1909 
'' differed in important ways. from that of the previous 
' 
-
"interregnum" •. ·yany,-of these differences have already 
been described'at some length and need not be elaborated, 
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except to emphasise again the overriding importance of 
the absence .of new entrants. Whereas in the 1870's and 
1880's enterprising firms had little difficulty in 
obtaining agencies for both local and overaeas insurance 
companies, during the 1890's and .after-1900 such agencies 
were relatively scarce.(5) Thus the manager of the 
Victoria, who had much to offer any company for which he 
might act as agent, wrote in 1903:(6) 
I would like to get a good English Fire and 
Marine Company for both South Australia and 
Sydney but ••• all, the good companies appear, 
to be represented. 
As pointed out above (Section 2(v)) conditions in 
overseas insurance markets probably influenced develop-
ments in Australia. The collapse of the tariffs in 1880-
1882, in so far as it was caused by overseas entrants, 
was traced by the AIBR to the "severe contraction" of 
business in Europe and America in the years proceeding 
(5) Before 1890, firms such as importers, commission 
agents, woolbrokers etc. often acted as agents,for. 
many insurance companies; when an agency for one 
company ceased, there was little difficulty in 
obtaining others. Of many that· could be named, a 
few were: T. Jacques Martin and Co., J.B. Were. and 
Co., Bright Bx•os. and Co. , James Hardy and Co., 
W.H. Mackenzie.and Co., Dalgety and Co. Typically, .. 
agencies were held for two companies, o~e fire.and 
one marine. Sometimes, however, the same firm wo~ld 
hold three, four or even more agencies; for exa~~ie, 
in 1870 W.H. Mackenzie and Co. were Sydney ~.A~····(," · 
agents for seven companies. 
(6) Victoria Ins. Co. record.a. Letter Book~ 26.8.1903 • 
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1879 and the desire or companies affected to keep 
premiums increasing.(7) On the other hand it was commonly 
said or implied that only good profits elsewhere enabled 
the English and other overseas companies to stay in 
Australia in the 1880's. In the 1890's the point was 
considered proved by the apparent ease with which local 
companies were bought out by large English ones. Later 
it seems probable that the San Francisco fire was 
important to the pre-Council negotiations.(8) 
(a) The New Zealand Companies. One of the closest 
and most important connections of the Australian market 
was with New Zealand; indeed from London Australia and 
New Zealand were typically regarded as a single market. 
From the beginning too, the AIBR covered both and usually 
dealt with New Zealand affairs in greater detail than those 
(7) 
(8) 
AIBR 1879, pp.12, 13. 
All British companies involved in San Francisco were 
operating in Australia. They were: (San Francisco 
Loss, £ 1000 Source: AIBR 1907 p.611) 
Royal 1251 Royal Exchange 619 Law Union 
London 967 Union 560 and Crown 342 
London and Caledonian 499 State 223 
Lancashire 925 Northern 483 Scottish 
Liverpool, London Alliance 466 Union - 207 
and Globe 816 Atlas 410 ------
Commercial Union 795 Norwich Union 358 
North British 666 SWl 350 Total 10,562 
Phoerix 624 
The.New Zealand paid £286,000. In addition a number 
of Continental companies in Australia suffered heavily. 
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of some Australian·states (e.g. W.A., ,s.A. and Queensland). 
The fortun~s·of :Australian and New Zealand tariffs ,were 
closely linked, with events in New'Zealand often taking 
the lead. 
One reason for the interdependence of the two markets 
was that Australian companies operated in New Zealand, 
but more important was the stake of the New Zealand 
~ompanies in Australia. These companies, of which the 
most important were the New Zealand, National of New 
---------
~aland, South British and §tandard, had built up fairly 
extensive international organisations at an early stage 
and their interests in Australia were quite large.< 9) 
Taking fire risks in the Sydney metropolitan area New 
Zealand·company shares were:( 1 ) 
No. of Cos. Share per cent. 
1884 6 8.7 
1890 4 7.7 
1894 4 9.4 
1901 4 9.2 
1908 \ 4 8.5 
In 1892 their share of total N.s.w •. premium income was:<2> 
( 9) 
(1) 
(2) 
Fire 12. 7 per cent. 
Marine 12.9 per cent. 
... I 
Sometimes in most.unexpected areas, such as the 
Queensland North CQast. No statistics available -
suggested in Royal Letter Book, 4.10.1898. 
Source: as for Table IV~1. 
" ~ .. ... - ...... __ .. ........ ...,..:/ 
T.A. Coghlan: Census ••• op.cit. 
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In 1890 6 New Zealand ;·companies had Melbourne fire 
premiums equivalent'to 14.7.per cent of the metropolitan 
premiums ·of all· companies contributing to· the Fire 
Brigacie Association. (3) · Their ranking was: 
Company · 
New Zealand 
National of 
New Zealand 
Standard 
South British 
Colonial of 
New Zealand 
Union of' New 
Zealand 
:Marine - N.S~W. 
1892 ~40 Cos.) 
13 
16 
.18 
5 
Sources: T .A;· Coghlan op.cit. 
Fire - N .s. w. Fire - Melb. 
189[J!ig Cos.l 1890 ($8 Cos.) 
6 6 
8 
15 
18 
17 
24 
11 
28 
27 
As for Tables IV.1 and IV.2. 
Note: The Colonial and the Union were absorbed by 
British companies in 189"1: 
The British ma~agers in Australia tended to blam~· the 
. ;., 
New Zealand compan.ies when tariff negotiations met 
difficulties, and there is little doubt that they proved 
stronger and tougher bargainers than Australian companies. 
. ! . ~· ' 
The latter they were able to influence with rein~urance, 
especially when these had branches in New Zealand. One 
........ _ 
explanation of their influence was simply that they were 
' . . .. : ,; 
'.• . 
. . . ·. 
. ;-;- - .··-- ,-- ... 
'···~ ··~~~-~~ 
(3) Source: as for Table IV.2 • 
. I 
.•. 
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bigger .than mos.t Aust~alian\ companies and by·:gomparison 
their Bri·tish" competitors:-were .. not quite~ so ··overwhelmingly 
large.. (Compare,_· section 3(iii) above.) Another. waso that 
they mal have been relatively· "efficient u.; in the serise of 
'l 
having low: expense''_ratios·-in .Australia. ;·Ratios for-~ 
business in N.s.w. in. 1892· calculated:"from, the· Coghlan . 
.figures were: 
: .· ~. . . , 
_!!ead Office 
British and·Foreign 
New Zealand. 
., ~ . ·' 
Australian· 
•· .· ·Expense .Ratios· per·:cent. 
· Fire .. 
·31.0 
2a.4 
39.6 
Marine··.· 
... ·26.6 . ' 
' '" . . ..... ~ .. ' 
. '. :1 17.·a 
24. 7•: ..• 
Source: T.A. Coghlan op.cit. Percentages of. expenses· . 
(including commission) to premiums. The marine 
figures: should. be." viewed with special ·scepticism 
as much would depend on procedures for alloc'ation 
of expenses between '.branches, especially: .claims 
expenses. 
The New Zealand companies themselves tended to be 
·,...;I :.', 
, . ... ...,.., 
: . ; 
- .. ·' 
suspicious of the motives of the British and blamed certain 
' ' r. • ' I .~ : ' ' ~ 
of them in particular for the disorganisation in New 
!-' ' ·;·,,·,.:· ~-· 1 -·tl··~~-~~ 
·" ': '~ ~ : ···" :~ t :. .. " {..' - . 
Zealand in the 1880's and early 1890's. They looked on 
-· •. £ .. ·..... ~ ' ' 
'·. ' l .· ,. . ' , ,.·.' .. •,, ,; . ,;, " ..... ~· .. ~ . . . . · · ·: ~, t r.-
the constant refusal of some c~mpanies to join New Zealand 
.. ) ' .. · .. "" ~- . ·: .. , ,· t " ; .. '. .. .... ' \ ' 
• ,, .... ~ ~.~ • ~ '" ,• t •• : v . :.... . ,. . - .... / .,.J. i,- ~... ,.:~.,," . 
Tariffs as part of a deliberate policy of expansion by 
other parts of the world. On the other hand the British 
! ; .' · .. ~ 
.. '· .. : _.. .· ·~ , ' -. -
managers argued that it would be futile to join tariffs 
. • ~ . • '· t ••••• •• ' '.. \. . . -' •·. ~ ~·\ , .. 
- ~ ";. : .• . .i 
• 
•I 
which were, they thought, not comprehensive and badly 
kept. One manager wrote of his policy :In New Zealand in 
the early nineties, that it would cause the New Zealand 
companies "to take a different view of the power and 
weight of the British companies"(4) and in this way, in 
the long run, make for better kept tariffs. In any case, 
he thought: "... 1 t was in fact unreasonable to expect 
British companies to make such great concessions to the 
local offices when the latter'persisted in hostile action 
in other quarters." This reference was to the National 
2f New Zealand "undercutting badly" in Southern India. (5) 
In fact, before the Australian agreements came to be 
signed, there was a good deal of bargaining between New 
Zealand and British company representatives. The New 
-
Zealand itself was for some time the only significant· 
company standing out of the Victorian D.B. and A. 
Agreement. It signed after agreement was reached on the 
New Zealand tariff; only then was it possible to go ahead·~ 
with Australian tariffs.( 6) On their side the British 
required the New Zealand companies to conform in other 
parts of the world, in particular in Bombay, Calcutta and 
(4) Royal Letter Book, 22.4.1895· 
(5) Ibid.18.5.1895. 
(6) Ibid.19.2.1895, 9.10.1895. 
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Peru and on the,main marine trade routes.(7) Later when 
the New Zealand agreements were functioning, the threat 
of breaking them up was often used. 
.... .. .. ~ -
II 
••• It is a 
monstrous thing that the New Zealand Company should even 
expect that they can maintain their position here, and 
that we should allow ourselves to be bound in their 
I 
stronghold", one manager wrote (before the New Zeal~ 
had signed the Victorian D.B. and A. Agreement).(8) A 
few years later the South British was easily pursuaded to 
withdraw its·notice of secession from Queensland agreements 
when the North Queen~!!!!2. threatened to withdraw in New 
Zealand. II There was never the slightest probability • •• 
of the South British adhering to its position ••• at such 
a cost."(9) 
,.(b) The Fire Offices Committee (Foreign). It is 
evident that much depended in Australia on the unanimity 
of policy.of British companies there. The history of 
British tariff organisation in the second half of the 19th 
century has not'been adequately told. However from at 
least 1868, and,probably before, overseas fire tariffs 
w~re drawn up and agreed to in England. The Constitution 
--
(7) See text of F.O.C. circular, published in AIBR 1894, 
P• 724. 
(8) Royal Letter Book, 5.9.1895. 
(9) Ibid. 3.5.1897· 
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of the Fire Offices.· .. Oommittee in 1868 includ.ed an 
obligation to .ad~e~e to ·r 29 listed foreign tariffs. f 1 ) 
In 1869 the !!£e Offices Committee (For~ign.)(2 ). was 
formed with the specific function pf dealing ~ith foreign 
• ..... 
tariff matters. The influence that this committee was 
.. 
able to exercise in different parts of the _worl~ depended' 
very largely on the strength of local and non-British 
companies in the area concerned. Thus its dealings with 
the U.S.A.,. Canada,· Australia and New Zealand and '.the· 1 .. • 
Continental countries were rather of an "ad hoc" nature 
and i ta power was .often severely reE?tricted. In· other · 
areas Local .Associations were given· only limited· powers; 
certain important·matters were ·specified for decision~in' " 
London. The countries to which this applied yaried; in 
1903, at· the time when the F.o.c. was perhaps at the 
peak of its influence; fire tariffs in the following 
places came:under-this ruling: 
North America . {Newfoundland·· . 
S~ •. Pierre, Miquelon Burma 
.. 
British Honduras Ceylon 
Central America 
Panama 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
Republic of 
China 
(1) 
( ')' \'-I 
Salvador Japan 
Levant {Constantinople 
Egypt· . " '· 
. Smyrna · 
. . : ' 
H.E. Rayne~,, .. op. cit., p.349. · 
d t the F O C It should be clear Also referre o as • • • 
from the con text whether the "Home" or "Foreign" 
Committee is intended. 
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South America 
. 
Argentina 
Brazil 
British Guiana 
Chile 
Guayaquil -
Surinam 
I I' 
Philippines 
f Siam,' Cochin Indo China 
Sou th Africa 
China, 
Straits Settlements 
West Indies , 
------
In -these places the decisions of all local associa-
tions were binding.but.any matter could be recommended by 
the F• a.a. to 'be :..passed locally, and local representatiYes 
were required- to follow their head office instructions •. 
How~ver lQcal associations could ~ make rules concerning: 
Limits· or acceptances of companies 
Policy conditions 
~Loos se ctlements 
Reinsurance . ·' 
·Brokerage and agency 
Suspension or reduction of tariffs 
Granting·· of pensions. I 
( 
In these areas directly, and in others as far.as 
possible, the'F;o.c; endeavoured.to enforce.certain 
principles~ and .rul,es ~whic~ ~ad. an impor,tant ~fl~~~c~ ~~­
the development of fire insurance p~actices. These ·f~ 
I .... ,_ • ,,. ' ".t j • t ~ .... ( -._ 0 .. includ~d:~ ~!.a:t;, ~~~~i~qg~,.: times., protlibi tion.S · on f'o~ward con-
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tracts, 3.ong term contracts, open policies, war, riot and , ~/ · 
earthquake risk covers, valued policies, loss of profit 
policies, reinsurance with non-tariff companies, and 
"rebating 11 by agents. A general principle was that all 
-
insurances on property contained in more than one risk 
should be subject to average. In addition, in areas such 
as those listed above, where F.o.c. influence was greatest, 
all specific insurances were.required to be subject to 
average. In administering agreements, in many places it 
was necessary to come to terms with continental insurers; 
this applied especially to Dutch, German and French 
companies. Many of these in fact joined the F.O.C. when 
they opened offices in London, or arranged at least to be 
represented at its meetings.<3) 
During the 1880's many F.o.c. administered tariffs 
were partially or wholly abandoned, and in many places 
where it was influential outbreaks of rate cutting occurred. 
Tariffs were suspended in Singapore, Cape Town and Simon's 
Town, Bombay, China, Japan, Natal, Buenos Aires, the East 
Indies, Siam, Surinam and Cairo; special discounts of up 
.. 
to 30 per cent were allowed in 16 other places to meet 
non-tariff competition; many rules - against the appoint-
__________________________ , ________________________________ _ 
(3) Thus in 1904 two of the three german fire companies in Australia, the Aachen und Munchen and the 
Hamburg-Magdburg, were members of the F.O.C. 
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ment of agent~s alreae;f acting for non,..tariff companies, r ,1. I.: i ~ 1lf I 
for example--'..;., wel'e widely ·evaded. From late 1892 a l~ iii '! 
process of rebuilding commenced and continued during the 
l i 1890's.• By.,the turn· of the century tariffs were again 
organised on a:comprehensive scale. 
The breakdown and reorganisation in Australia must be 
considered in the light of this.world wide·movement, and 
especially in relaticn to the changing influence of the 
F'.O.C. In the seventies and eighties.Australian affairs 
were p'robably very. little affected by it, but in the early 
nineties it assumed an important place in all Australian 
tariff matters. Thus ·_,in 1894 the AIBR reported that the 
F.O.c. had "stepped in·decisivelyu in Calcutta and 
Adelaide, and commented that .there was ttstrength and a 
commanding voice in the direction of affairs"•(~) ·In 
1895 it waa·largely responsible for the conference on 
New Zealand and the efforts mentioned above to get the 
, -
; . -
New Zeal~d companies to join tariffs in Cal~utta, 
Bombay, ··Peru ~d .'elsewhere. (5) . This influence continued 
after the, formation of the State Associations; as 
described aboy~, of 'particular significance were the 
. 
AIBR 1894, P!.716 •. 
" l - - ~- ..... 
' . 
" 
(4) 
(5) AIBR 1894; PP• 715~16; 189,5, .p.621; Rozal Letter Book -l~ti~rs dated 1.11.1894, 25.3.1895. 
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rulings concerning acquired companies, which resolved 
disputes which seemed c'a:pable of. leading. to the collapse 
of all the Australian tariffs. 
The importance ·,of ·the F.O.C. lay in the fact that it , 
was a meeting, place ,where differences could be negotiated 
on an international scale. As one manager wrote, it ,was 
a medium for.pressing on local·representatives via their 
head offices "the fact that they are a portion of a world-
wide organisation and must have due.regard to Imperial 
views and exigencies". (G) However, in places such as 
Australia the Committee probably preferred not· to· 
interfere in matters of detail; too frequent an obvious 
interventiai was likely to be resented. When a suggestion 
that it should send uniform instructions to British 
representatives was made in 1899, one manager commented 
to his British head office:(?) 
Such a course would be highly undesirable as 
tending to create a strong feeling amongst the 
local.companies here,· who would be likely to ' 
resent an attempt of an outside authority to 
·impose its will upon them. 
The effectiveness of the F.o.c. depended ultimately 
on the· existence or· .. otherwise of a strong non-tariff ' 
market. At.\the time of the Australian agreements 
(6) 
(7) 
Roya_l'Letter Book, 5.9.1899· 
Royal'Letter.Book, 13.6.1899· 
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companies. had or were becoming committed to tariffs in 
most parts of -the world, and the threat of disruption in 
home markets could be used to persuade them to join in 
other areas. This occurred in the bargaining with the New 
Zealand companies already mentioned. The importance of 
tariff commitment in England and Europe was also well 
illustrated in 1899, when rates were :increased con-
siderably over the whole of the Melbourne Flinders Lane 
area. Merchants enquired in London, but according to the 
AIBR were not able to find an English non-tariff office 
worth appealing to for large risks; nor did they meet 
with success on the Oontinent.( 8) In the following year 
a drapery tariff was agreed for all the Australian states; 
again Melbourne firms enquired in London, but were blocked 
by an F.O.C. circular to London brokers requiring them not 
to place the insurances at less than (Australian) tariff 
rates. (9) 
The immediate influence of the F.O.C. was over fire 
insurance only, and neither the I.L.U. nor the A.O.A~ were 
ever as important in overseas tariff affairs. In marine 
insurance especially, but also to some extent in accident, 
the principal reason for this relative impotence was the 
------------------------------·------·----- ------------
(8) AmR 1899 
(9) AIBR 1900, p.39. 
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importance of Lloyd's as a world market. The· tradition 
of independence and informality in Lloyd's underwriting 
made it very difficult to reach·rate agreements, let alone 
maintain~them.'. Accordingly, rates on the business of 
firms which had access to Lloyd's could not depart very· 
far from-rates obtainable there. Many Australian trading 
firms with branches or agents in London were in·this 
category, as of course were the English firms sending 
exports to Australia. The 1898 conference in fact did 
not adopt an "Outward" tariff for this reason, and .the 
influence on other tariffs was also significant. Thus one 
Australian manager wrote in 1905:( 1) 
The effect of the Tariff has been to drive 
nearly all the business from these colonies to 
London •. _ . · 
A month later:(2) 
_We can aiway·s command a 11 t tle better - and 
with ~some clients a good deal better - r_ates 
than Lloyd's; but the present discrepancy is 
almost toq much. to as~ 1 our best fr~ends yo pay. 
I hope London offices will give the matter 
further consideration, otherwise colonial 
offices will feel very dissatisfied. We do.not 
like having our hands tied while others are free 
to use their fists. 
•' I 
A few months afterwards the Federal Council of Marine 
Unde,rwri ters in fact :passed a resolution reducing 
(1) V.ictoriauLetter.Book, 29.a.1905 ........ _ 
(2) Ibid; 6.9.1905• 
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"Homeward" tariff rates:(3) "By a· reduction of 15 per 
cent Lloyd's will be brought down· to about bedrock, for 
anything lower means that the business will not pay." 
; .. ~(c) Internal Ooh!sion. The significance of the 
change from1agency to branch representation in Australia 
3 (_t..) 
has been mentioned above (Section ·3=£111d). This applied 
not only to overseas companies but also to the arrange-
ments made by Australian companies in other Australian 
centres. Some idea of its extent can be obtained by 
comparing lists of licensed insurers in Victoria in 1881 
and 1896 with details given in "Sands" business. 
directories. 
TABLE 1¥ .. 5. 
Numbers of Companies with Agencies or Branches in 
Victoria, 1881 and 1896. 
Australian Cos.with Overseas Cos. with 
Licensed - Not 
for Agencies Branches Agencies Branches siiO"wn 
--
1881 1896 1881 1896 1881 1896 .1§.§.1 1896 1881 1896 
Fire 3 3 8 7 19 8 13 18 2 2 
Marine 9 3 8 11 20 11 5 12 2 4 
All Cos. 9 3 13 12 31 17 14 26 4 5 
' 
Sources: Insurance licenses, Victorian-Govt. Gazette. 
Sands Melbourne Directory. 
Notes: "All Cos. 11 includes a few compa.nies licensed for . 
accident business' only. ' 
(3) Ibid.' 9.1.1906. 
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·Between ··1aa1· ·and .1896 the percentage .of companies.,. 
represented ··1n Victoria· by chief agencies only fell from 
approximately 64 to 34 per.cent; after 1.896 this .process 
continued until by .1909; especially -in fire ·insurance, 
there were .very few companies without a branch organisation. 
There were similar changes in Sydney and to a lesser 
extent -1n .·other states. 
One of ;the obvious reasons for replacing· agencies by 
branches was· that salaried managers came· under direct 
head office control· and it was possible to delegate much 
wider· responsibilities including, in many cases, the 
responsibility for the supervision of all Australian 
affairs ··Within fairly, wide broad limits. (Usually to-a 
branch in· Sydney· or Melbourne.) - Previously, a difficulty 
for the tariff builders had been lack of uniformity of 
policy and;liaison within individual compa.nies, so that 
the signature of--an area manager or chief'· agent was not· "· 
always : sufficient to guarantee the compliance of other ·' 
branches ·or·agents·, or:even1· in the case of\ov·.erseas -, .. 
compan'ies, of '-'·head offices• •:._A: formal· "penalty" fo1" -·. .-. 
branches. in_ t:t:ie 1.875 . .Yictorian_fire .t.arif~ .was that the 
head office 'of the .offending company should be informed, 
and iri fact throughout the 1880's and~1890's it.:was:common 
•. ,<' ·.·, 
• • w.• >'• '. 
• l "' ..... ,,. r• 
practice to write to English.he~d offices in the hope 
-· .. ~:~·~:;·,·;:.;'I.·, :"'' ' ' '· , . ., .. '·._.' I,:·"'-,·.· 
that pressure would :be .brought ,to bear -on local represen-
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tatives." .However, this presupposed unanimity in England 
and both the desire and the power to control Australian 
representatives. Where the latter were influential 
agents such as large pastoral or trading firms these 
last conditions were often absent. Moreover, in many 
cases head offices were unable to agree even when their 
branches or agents were. Thus the AIBR mentioned 
instances of head offices undercutting tariff rates 
agreed to by their own branches.(4) Another difficulty 
was that when state branches or representatives of over-
seas companies were responsible direct to their head 
of'fices, competition could exist between branches of the 
same company. (5) There was also a good deal of rivalry 
between Sydney and Melbourne branch managers in a number 
of instances. (6 ) 
Much of the difficulty that many companies had in 
achieving integrated and consistent policies can be traced 
to their weakness in the face of large individual buyers 
such as pastoral and trading firms. The manager of one 
. 
Australian company even thought that if he lost a certain 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
e.g. AIBR 1893, p.185. 
Ibid. This was evidently most noticeable in the 
Riverina area of N.S.W. 
~ became clear in the failure of the 1899 Fire 
Council~scheme; see above. P· 509 • 
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account he·might as well give up mar:fne,business 
altogether. Concessions were demanded, and he said with 
resignation: ( 7) "Of course we must grant all or be 
prepared to lose the business." In order to ,obtain the 
business controlled by such firms it was usually necessary 
to make them "Chief Agents u, or appoint their directors 
or executives as "Local Directors" of the insurance 
company. This was the obvious reason for the 1897 tariff 
limitations on the numbers of "Chief Representati v~s" and 
"Local Di.recto.rs" allowed each company. However, even 
after the agreements these firms could wield great 
influence, especially in smaller centres: 
There are two firms in Adelaide who appear(tQ 
rule all the insurance companies there ••• BJ 
In Townsville • • • three leading firms - Burns 
Philp and Co., Aplin Brovn and Co., and 
3amuel(~llen and Sons Ltd •••• almost run the 
place. J , 
Again, in Adelaide, having considered the possible 'v • ' 
appointment of a local director, a manager decided against 
it, writing: 
••• He requires the very lowest rates ·and every 
lalown and unknown concession, a business I very 
much doubt that has paid any company••• That 
' . 
(7) Victoria .Letter Book, 29.8.1894. 
( 8) IbiC!-.• 11. 6. ~ 900._ 
(9) RoY!l-Letter Book, 5.7.1898. 
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accoilnt h~s ·caused ·more worry and inconvenience 
to the Association that). ~ll the other· marine 
accounts "in Australia.~1J 
~ 
398~ 
Although they continued to.be influential, trading 
firms found their bargaining power reduced with the 
pronounced fall of new entrants to the insurance market 
in the 1890's and after. This and the extension of the 
branch system led to an increasing number of managers in 
Australia who could speak authoritatively and effectively 
bind their companies in tariff negotiations. 
3 
·:e. ~he tariff position in 190?• 
With the formation of the Council 
tariff affairs in Australia came under effective central 
control. The nature of these arrangements has already 
been outlined briefly in Chapter II; they are now described 
in greater detail. 
(a) constitutional. In fire and accident insurance 
the Council had power over the Articles of Association 
of all State Underwriters' Associations, plus certain 
specified agreements. These included: 
Regulations for the Conduct of Business 
Discount Brokerage and Agency 
Acquired Companies 
Classification of Risks 
(1) Victoria Letter Book, 14.2.1900. 
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Agreement~ concernin9 fire appliances, fire resisting 
construct10~, electrical installation etc. 
Loss of Profits Tariff 
Motor Vehicle Tariff 
Motor Cycle Tariff 
Personal Accident and Sickness Tariffs 
Hail Tariff 
Sprinkler Leakage Tariff 
Live Stock Tariff 
Com~onwealth Wo~kers' Compensation Tariff 
The Council W~$ also responsible for dealing with breaches 
and Government legislation, and had the power to fix 
special rates if State associations refused to do so. 
In each state there was both a Fire and an Accident 
Association. These were responsible for tariffs not 
specified among the powers of the Council, and for the 
detailed administration of Council tariffs. The principal 
State tariffs were fire and State Workers' Compensation. 
State tariffs had to be drawn up in accordance with the 
fundamental ••Rules for the Conduct of Business", and all 
resolutions and decisions of local associations were 
subject to appeal to the Councml. Although at this stage 
the Accident and Fire Associations were nominally separate, 
they were for the most part controlled by the same state 
managers and came under the control of a single Council. 
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In recognition of· this, in subsequent years administrative 
staffs were·merged and formally recognised by the creation 
of the present qFire and Accident Underwriters' 
Association§. (2) 
; In contrast to the Fire and Accident Council, 
the powers·~ of the Federal Council of Marine Underwriters 
were very limited. 'Thus it had no power of initiating 
tariffs.· On tariff matters it could only deal with appeals 
from local association decisions by individual companies 
supported by five other companies. Its specific powers 
related to matters of interpretation in the interests of 
uniformity. ·."They included: 
(1) ' Doubt as to the meaning of tariffs. 
(2) Anomalies and omissions. 
(3) Classification of vessels. 
(4) Alteration, cancellation and framing of clauses 
and warranties. 
(5) Matters referred by the I.L.U. Y.!! State 
· · Associations. , 
The member~·6f tne Federal Council were 10 delegates 
(2) The'se mergers. occurred in the following years: 
.:Queensland 
W.A. 
Tasmania 
South Australia 
N.S.W. 
Victoria 
Formal Merger, 
1918 
1921 
1922 
1927 
1928 
1937 
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elected by State Associations. In 1932 it was replaced 
by the present Council. The main purpose of this change 
was to bring.its organisation into line with the fire and 
accident C0uncil, and in the process to strengthen its 
powers with respect to local associations. Thereafter 
it consisted of all Controlling Officers, and was to hold 
annual meetings to synchronise with the FALL'\ Council 
meetings. Except for matters affecting one State only, 
it was given more extensive powers, in particular over the 
Articles of Association of local Associations, and breaches. 
Henceforth it could also initiate new tariffs. 
(b) Control. The FAU\ Council consisted of the 
controlling officers of companies in Australia. There was 
one vote per member, but companies and their subsidiary 
companies together had only a single vote. A two-thirds 
majority was required for the election of new members. 
The full Council met once a year, alternately in Sydney and 
Melbourne. Majority resolutions were binding unless 
objections were lodged by 6 members within 10 days, in which 
case a two-thirds majority at an extraordinary general 
meeting was necessary to confirm the original resolution. 
However there was no appeal from decisions regarding the 
rating of individual risks. 
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A President' and Vice-P'resident, who were both to be 
resid~nt in the same city, were elected annually from 
Sydney and Melbourne alternately. The President and Vice-
President, plus five other elected members, constituted an 
executive committee. The powers of the Committee were 
synonymous with those of the Council, and decisions were 
by majority vote. The membership was later increased to 9 
and is at present 12 (including the President and Vice-
" d t)(3) Presi en • 5 members must be from the State of the 
President and Vice-President for the ye~r, and 5 from the 
other State. The Sydney and Melbourne sections constitute 
«sectional committees" which meet independently, but 
provision is made for postal votes when voting is necessary. 
Four committee members retire annually, and are not eligible 
for re-election except as President or Vice-President. 
No member may serve on the Committee for more than four 
consecutive years. Decisions of the Committee are 
copveyed £Y""~eekly circulars to State Associations which 
,.,·-
a re obliged to carry them out. The Committee has a 
particularly important flln~t--ion as a kind of Appeals Court 
on matters ~oncerning the interpretation of tariff 
agreements. Interpretations decided by it became the 
(3) The President has a casting vote. 
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common rule throughoutjAustralia, and are recorded 
1 
alongside the tariffs concerned as a· 11 case::>iaw" · 
for the guidance of members. 
The members of the State FAUA Associations are the 
State managers of tariff companies. Day to day matters 
are controlled by Committees of nine. (4 ) At the State 
level acquired companies have a separate vote, provided 
the Association is satisfied that there is '°separate 
and independent representation" in the state. The extra 
voting power that this gives companies with numbers of 
subsidiaries must be viewed~ however, in the light of the 
overriding powers of the Council. 
As pointed out above, the Federal Marine Council 
did not possess nearly such extensive constitutional 
powers. However the setting up of the Marine Council in 
1932 was in large measure the recognition of a de facto 
situation, for by then there were very few companies writing 
marine insurance in Australia which did not come under 
the direction of one of the Australian managers who con- · 
stituted the FAUA Council. For this reason it was 
arranged that the meetirgs of the two Councils should· 
coincide. The Committee also followed the fire and 
accident pattern, witn the 4 N.S.W. and 4 Victorian 
(4) Before the amalgamations of the various Accide~t 
and Fire Associations, Ft.Jl.\ committee membership 
was 7. The present Tasmanian FAUA also has a 
committee of 7 only. 
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members {in '1952 in~r:eased to 5· N .s. w. and 5 Victorian). 
> ,' 
Previous'! y there had been no commi tt.ee separate from ·the 
Council, itself~ th~··bouncil had consisted of 10 members, 
of whom 6 were Controlling Officers from Sydney and 
Melbourne and the remaining four were. "delegates", (not 
necessarily controlling officers) from the Queensland, 
South Australian, West Australian and Tasmanian 
Associations. Meetings were to be held at least once 
every six months at places decided by the Council. As 
a quorum was four, and it was provided that Associations 
could appoint substitutes if their representatives 'were 
unable to attend. the practice was to meet in Sydney and 
Melbourne. (5) The Marine Council {as did the previo\.S 
"Federal Council") differs in one most important respect 
from the FAUA Council; this is that the criterion for 
voting i~ "separate and independent representation" in 
Australia. This of 'course has given the 0 group" companies 
" . (mostly British) far greater voting·strength than they· 
I ' 
possess in the FAUA Council. 
The arrangements outlined so far put the control of 
Australian insurance affairs very. firmly in the hands of 
5 
The original 19 O scheme had p~ovided for.meetings at 
least once every three months in Sydney, Melbourne, 
Adelaide and Brisbane alternately. -This was altered 
in ·(1902. 
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head offices in Sydney and Melbourne. In fire and 
insurance in particular, the Council Committee became a most 
powerful decision making body. 
The most active workers for the establishment of the 
tariff were the managers of British compan:ie s, and at 
the time of the formation of the State Associations and the 
FAUA Council they were undoubtedly dominant. In 1909 there 
were only 12 independent Australian insurance companies, , 
of which 6 were specialised and of little significance. 
Only three of the 12 - the Victoria, Mercantile MutuaLand 
Q_ueens'land - were surviving in 1962. 5 of the smaller 
companies were in a weak position and had sold out by 1915. 
Of approximately 43 independent companies entitled to vote 
on the FAUA Council, 10 were Australian, 24 British, 5 New 
Zealand, and 4 from other countries.(6) A similar 
situation existed at the State 1level. Thus only 8 of the 
38 companies represented at the 1897 Sydney conferences 
preceding the founding of the N.s.w. FUA were Australian. 
The first Committee of the N.S.W. FUA consisted of 
managers of 6 British companies and one Australian company. 
In Victoria in 1909 there were only 6 Australian companies 
voting members of ·the Marine Underwriters Association, 
(6) Estimated from-writer's card index and membership of 
Vic. and N.S.W. FAUA's. Two small Australian plate 
glass mutuals did not belong to the Council in 1909. 
' 
': 
! it 
l' 
' l 
l 
I 
t ' 
1 
' 
I 
I 
. I 
' I 
' ! 
1' 
< I ' 
. t 
! 
! ' 
{ l t 
I l I 
' 1 I t 1 I 11 
l 
l ~ 
,, 
~, I 
~ ' I I I I I • j I 
I 11• '. 
I 
I, I , 
1' I ! ' I 
I 'I j >!.: 
' ' I 
I I· : I 
' I ~ I 
I '• 
Ii : .. , t j j I 
I It ~ I 
I 
__ U~,I 
I 
__ ---- -r 'T'~~....-..-- .. eew • q;~; ti. 
1' 
compared with a-total voting membership of 36. 
The controlling officers of British and other 
overseas companies have varying degrees of authority in 
Australia, but they were of course responsible ultimately 
to their head offices. With few exceptions, British 
tariff companies in Australia belonged to co~responding 
tariff bodies in London i.e. to the F.o.c., the A.O.A. 
and the I.L.U. This was also true of companies with head 
, 
offices outside Britain but backed by British capital. 
(e.g. the Union of Canton, head office in Hong Kong). 
If these companies were to act together in London, given 
their majority on tariff organisations they were in a 
position to exercise effective control over the 
Australian tariff system. 
Australian companies were well aware of their 
relatively powerless situation, and as the British 
managers were careful to warn their head offices, apt 
to be sensitive about it. After the disasters of the 
1890's there was however very little they could do about 
it. Thus the general manager of the Victoria wrote in 
1907:(?) 
uThe bursting of the tariff would not affect the 
large foreign companies but to us it means ruin. 
Consequently tact and diplomacy are our weapons; we 
(7) Victoria letter book, 3.7.1907. Letter to manager 
for New Zealand. 
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cannot.always in~~st on ouri~ights ••• " 
{c) Limits on Competition. The purpose 1 of the 
elaborate arrangements so far described was to control 
1
, 
competition in the Australian insurance market. In 1909 
this objective.seemed to have been successfully achieved. 
The agreements concerned four main areas of restriction -
entry, rates, "product" and selling expenses •. 
_(,i) Entry. ·Following an F .o.c. precedent all the 
Australian ~ariffs incorporated strict ~non-intercourse" 
rules with regard to non-tariff insurers. The,most important 
of th~se was the prohibition of both reinsurance and 
coinsurance relations with companies, operating in Australia 
but not members of the Associations. This was a 
fundamental clause in the.so called "Regulations for the 
Conduct of Business", which appeared in substantially 
the same form in the fire, accident and marine tariffs, 
As mentioned above, membership could be debarred by a 
one third negative vote. (S). In 1909 all companies of 
1, any significance belonged to the tariffs; hence any 
newcomer.had to look outside Austral~a for reinsurance. 
backing if 1he wished or was forced to operate outside 
the tariffs. The agreements concerning brokers were 
also important in~these respects. As described in 
(8) nane bla~kball in three to exclude" 
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Chapter II a registered broker could deal only with 
tariff companies and tariff companies only with tariff 
brokers. A new non-tariff entrant accordingly would not 
expect a flow of new business from established brokers. 
The rules prohibiting the principals or employees of 
broking firms from holding directorates or agencies in 
insurance companies, or being employed by them, also 
ruled out a process by which many new companies had been 
promoted in England and other countries. "Non-intercourse" 
was also strengthened by the rule that agents could not 
simultaneously act for both tariff and non-tariff companies. 
(ii) Rates~. The fire tariffs were all copies of the 
1897 Victorian tariff, with modifications for local 
conditions (See seen. 5 (a.)) above). The Victorian tariff 
in turn was based on F.O.C. English tariffs revived during 
'the 1890's, but was considerably more comprehensive. 
All classes of risk were covered, whereas, according to the 
~_Q_,n_d<?.n Iimes, under the F .o. c. tariff in 1902 " ••• private 
houses, most public buildings, and a large number of 
businesses are free entirely from any special insurance 
rates". (9) With th~' formation of the Council all State 
fire tariffs incluclied uniform provisions regarding short 
period rates and sbrinkler and other fire appliance discounts. 
--~~------------------~--·----~----------------------~-----( 9) The Times,29,,8.1902, quoted by the AIBR 1902 p.880. 
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As .. r,~gards ~he, i 9~t:le~~l .le_y~l, of ·;ra~~s some comments 
by par~iciP,~n~s .in'.· t~e .Vi~~qrian. negotiations are .· 
illuminating~ .. qne :ma11ager wrote ;that he was .. bearing in 
mind 11 ••• th_e. seric;>us. storm rais.ed).in New ·Zealand by too 
trenchant acti9n 11, . ( 1 ) , and expl_ained his pol icy. as .. follows: 
" ••• The object ,to be -g~ine~ at present.is to stop 
further demoralisation and> get. ._a firm .foothold and . 
organisation so as to enable us to act further in the early 
future if found necessary and by dagrees so as not to set 
all the people up in ar~~ at once."(2) When the 
agreements were actually in force another manager wrote: 
"Many rates are raised too high and many others are 
far below what _we are at present receiving." .( 3) 
Although most.managers felt that the new rates, in· 
Victoria and N .s. w. were 0 rea*',onable", many were 
outspoken in their view {at least in their branch and head 
office correspondence!) that in cei:-tain areas .- notably 
Western Australia before 1906 - the~ level had been fixed 
too high. 
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.l!nder t,he . R?~nc.i_l ~ a.gre.emen~, as . explained a~ready, 
i· ' • . ·' ! ' 
special t~ri.(fs we.re. adopted for "accident" cover 
. ' ... " '' ·. ; " . ; : ' . . ' . ' . t 
incl~cJ.ing. ~e~s~.nal Ac~iden.1:, Motor Car. and L.iyestock, 
. . .. ' . " . --· .. 
By this ~i~~, local .A~sociations had also set rates for·~ 
Workers' qo~p,ensation, Plate. Glass, Burgl.ary, Fidelity 
Guarantee, and Pµ~lic Risk. It w~s decided that in 
principle ill forms of business should be tariffed; 
thus special tariffs were .adopted for. Loss. of :Profit~,,. 
I (,',A , 
Hailstorm and Sprinkler Leakage .. when they were, 
introducE~d in. Austr.alia •. 
Marine insurance. was the one field where all 
possibilities were not covered by agreed rates. Bere 
until 1917 there was !lQ. tariff for "outward'• voyages. 
i.e. from overseas ports to.Australia. However, with.,, 
' this important .. exception, marin~, ur;i~erwri tersi also had 
a most restricted choiee with respect to rates • 
. (iii) "Product.''. The tariffs specified the policy 
• ' ., • J 
covers, conditions, ?nd proposal forms.which~could·~~ 
used for all classes of. b\.Jsiness .•. _}n th~ .. ?:E;ginal fire 
tariff this r~g\Jlatio~ .was .ryot. ~t ~1,1.'.'.~~~ail~d;. .. (it: merely 
prohibited or s~t_ minimum e~tr~: ~harges . .,for. certai~_ classes 
of additional cover), but in.July 1906. tp~ .. Victorian":FUA 
~ • ' ~.. •••• • • • "'"""" y ,, •• ' • ' ., .. : 
adoptt=?d a urd form '."fire~. P<?l'~qy~)f ~I"m .. for.:,l1s·e ·b'( 1 ts iriembe·rs ~ · 
' ·' '; ... 
regards new policies only - for Australia. 
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In all other fields, as 'tariffs were drawn up 
standard·policy and proposal forms wer~ set out. 
Uniform wordings for endorsements a~d warranties were 
also adopted . . It was compulsory for a11 ·tariff companies 
to use them, and the granting of ccver beyond that 
officially provided for was prohibited. Of particular ~ 
importance in this respect were the prohibitions on 
forward and long term contractS.(4) Here the Australian 
tariffs went beyond the F.o.c. and A.a.A. rules, which d l ?f • 
had pro-: ided that: ( 1) Long tE!rm policies cou'ld be 
issued,but at the full multiple of the annual rate 
(2) Forward contracts could be made but only at the 
tariff rate at the time of making the contract. 
However F.o.c. ·rules were followed in forbidding·the issue 
of valued policies and open policies subject to 
periodical declarations.(5) 
!iv) "Selling Costs". The rules controlling 
competition in the area of selling costs were fdr the 
I' 
most part contained in the Discount, Brokerage and 
Agency and the ACquiied· Companies A9reements, to both ·of · 
which frequent reference has already be9n made: T~e 
main purpose of these agree.ments wa:s 'to prevent hidde'n 
4 i.e. contracts longer than 12 months. 
(5) i.e. in fire insurance of stocks etc. 
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price cutting-via discounts, or the passing on of 
commission or1'brokerage. , To achieve this effectively 
it was considered·necessary,to limit the number of 
agency' appointments each company could make, the number 
of registered brokers, and to prohibit the appointment 
as agents 1 or brokers· of certain,occupational groups and 
firms. It·was felt-that withput such, a limitation·it 
would becpme practically ~~possible to prevent 
appointments for "own" business. As far as concerned 
established companies this resembled a market sharing 
agreement, as the only way· to expand an existing 
maximum agency organisation was to take over other 
companies· already in Australia. 
The main principles. of the D.B. and A. Agreements 
were those adopted in Victoria in 1896. These in turn 
were iOfluenced by English tariffs revived in 1893 and 
F.o.c. (Foreign) rules. D.B. and A. Agreements· for 
fire and accident insurance in other states closely 
followed this model and .in 1909 they were made uniform 
and brought··under the direct control of the FAUA Council. 
The marine agreements were similar in principle but not 
centrally:administered ·until· the formation of the .new 
Marine.Council ~n 1932. 
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'! Some idea of the nature of the o.B. and A. 
Agreements can be obtained from the following 
description of the Victorian fire Agreement as it stood 
in 1909. {6 ) 
The agreement first disallowed all "discount~ 
commission, brokerage or other allowaince 0 !!_xceet as 
specifically provided. The specific provisions were for: 
l. Discount to the insured: none to be allowed except 
up to 10 per cent to compete with bonus companies, or 
higher if approved by the Association. 
2. Brokers,. Maximum b;I'okerage 10 per cent. Brokers -to 
be registered with FUA and sign agreement not to settle 
claims, arrange reinsurance, or accept commission from 
non-tariff insurers. (For further details see Ch.II. 
Seen. A.4). 
3. Chi~{_AgeQts.. No limitation on commission but only 
seven chief agents per company allowed in Victoria: one 
at Melbourne and two at each of Geelong, Ballarat and 
Bendigo, The term "Chief Agent" was defined to include 
the local manager, secretary, resident inspector, or 
any other principal representative at these places. A 
list of prohibited appoint~nts as chief agents included: 
{6) FAUA records, Melbourne. 
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Insurance brokers 
Collective bodies 
Cooperative Societies and Trade Associations 
Solicitors 
Pastoralists 
Farmers 
Financial Institutions (including banks; building 
societies, friendly societies, trustee 
companies.) 
4. Agen.ts.!.. Maximum commi!;sioni 15 per cent, except 
on growing crops and, stacks, 20 per cent. 
Maximum number allowed -
City of Melbourne:-
Suburbs of Melbourne:-
Ballarat 
Bendigo 
Gee long 
Elsewhere 
~ 
l ·-. 
·-• 
20 
120, max. 6 per suburb, 
No more than 4 sub :a agents in 
each place in addition to the 
two allowed chief agents. 
not more than one agent per 
country town, defined as each 
place with a post office. 
No agent was to act simultaneously for more than three 
An agent already acting for one company 
companies. 
wishing to do business with a second was required to 
obtain the written consent of the original company. 
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Prohibited appointments - as for chief agents. 
5. Directot's. THe ~term was ·defined to include 
"Directors, Local Directors, Members of Local Committees, 
Advisers. and Refe:t7ees. 11 
Except where the company's head office was in 
Melbourne, no more than six such appointments ,were to . ' 
he made for the Metropolitan area. A maximum'of·3 
' 
"local directors" could be appointed in each of Ballarat, 
Bendigo and Geelong, but at no other place in the.S~ate. 
No directors to be remunerated by commission. 
No director to accept risks or give cover for his 
company. 
No person to act as director for more than one 
company. 
No person al~ady an agent, or any e~loyee of 
a firm acting as an agent, to be appointed. 
Prohibited appointments 
Insurance broker· 
Estate agent 
Solicitor 
Minister of religion 
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1 !Bank _ .: 
'• ~ - Trustee Co. 
• • i 1 ( Building Society 
Friendly Society 
Employee of Life Assurance Society 
Pastoral Co. )l 
I fl Finance Co.l u Agency Co. l f wool Broking Co. 
Except 
Managing 
Director or 
Chief Executive 
Officer. 
6. Ot~er app~lntments. Appointments could be made of 
persons and firms in the following categories and listed 
by the Association: 
House, land and estate agents - Max. c'ssion 10 per cent 
Banks, building societies,l 
Life Assurance Societies 
... 
Trustee Companies 
Solicitors with offices 
in Metropolitan ar~a 
~ ' Pastoral companies -Metrop. 
area 
-Else-
where 
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All the above appointments were required to be.in 
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accordance with certain fundamental principles. These were: 
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1. ·:-Beyond the ·stated ';Cammi ssion ,}•~· •• ·no' further '· r<·; : ·, .. 
remuneration~or consideration whatever shall be granted, 
directly· or .. indirectly, -whether in the form of· a bonus, 
rent or ·any ··composition. of a lump sum in respect of ··' 
postage, :or·1likewise. 11 ( ?) . 
. ' ~ ) 
2~ "No person ·or combination of persons; whether~Company •.. 
Corpor.ation; Trust or otherwise. shall be ·appointed or 
continued as agent or sub-agent· merely· for ... the purpose ·· 
of obtaining .or~etaining his or their own business."(B) 
3. No chi~f agent, agent or broker was to divide 
commission with the insured •.. 
The equivalent fire agreements for the other States 
... 
differed from the Victorian only in detail: for example 
the maximum number of agents allowed in Sydney was 123, 
.. 
23 for the inner city area and 100 for the suburbs, with 
~ ~ 
,·, 
"Local Directors" were not more than 3 per suburb. 
allowed only in Sydney and ~ chief agent only in each 
·Maximum commission rates were 
of Sydney and Newcastle. 
....:- .. ,: ,' 
th:! same throu9hout Australia. 
. . . 
The accident tariff contained exactly similar 
provisions. They.laid down maximum commission rates, 
•''·!. ,, •. : 
maxim~m. n.umb~rs of agents, chief agen~s and local directors, 
,• ; .. ··. , :-··' ' ' i • • . :' 
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' 
prohibited r appointme·nts; provided for' th'e registration 
. 
of brokers, 'and so on. 1 ' t 1 ., .. 
t Under the marine tariffs, the maximum ageri'c'y 
commission was~l0 1 per cent. As mentioned above, brokerage 
was absolutely prohibited. A discount not exceeding 15 
per ·cent· could· be allowed to compete with bonus compariie s. 
only .Q!lE! marine agent or representative was allowed in 
each town or city; no further agents or subagents could 
be appointed. Prohibited appointments included: 
'' 
(Station owners 
!Banks Butter Factories Creameries 
or their m.anagers or employees. 
The fire, accident and marine D.B. and A. Agreements 
were coordinated in 1909. The agreements for fire and 
accident business were merged, so that they agreed 
concerning maximum number of appointments etc. It was 
provided that in each place a single agent could b~J 
appointed for fire, livestock, accident and marine 
business, or alternatively, ~eparate agents for each of 
, '' 
these. If separate agents were appointed they could 
accept business only in the lines for which they we~e fl, -t" .. 
appointed. As already explained the "Acquire.? C'.~mpa~ies 
Agreement", arrived at between 1906 ,and 19P~- wit,h, _tpe " 
help of London arbitration, in essence prevented the 
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expansion of: the·: agencies of an, acquired company: beyond 
the number in existence, ~t the time of acquisition. 
Agencies of acquiredaccident.companies,could:write fire 
business, and vice versa. 
{d) Summary~ In 1909 the tariff position in 
Australia seemed to be tight and well controlled. The 
structure wa·s dominated from the centre by Controlling 
Officers, and in fire and accident insurance by an 
Executive Committee with considerable powers. Ultimate 
control rested with British companies and potentially, 
if not in practice, lay in London, not Australia. Any 
person or firm buying practically any kind of insurance 
except a few marine classes had to accept conditions 
and a price set by the Tariff. Agents' commission 
was limited and could not be passed on; brokers were not 
free to deal at a~y except tariff terms. Due to the 
tariff rules regarding reinsurance, coinsurance and 
brokers, there were serious difficulties in the way of 
starting new companies unless they were willing to join 
the tariffs and tariff companies were willing to accept 
them as members. 
How effectively did this system achieve its purposes? 
To what extent was competition limited and the market· 
·-·~ t b· 1 ·· d"? In what ways were the original agreements 
.. s a i i.se . 
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modified as circumstances changed? Was competition 
seriously inhibited or was it after all "workable"? 
An attempt is now made to answer these and related 
questions. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY - NEW ENTRANTS 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the 1909 Agreements a 
strong non-tariff market had emerged in Australia by the 
1950's. As pointed out in Chapter II, the tariff market 
share in 1960 was about 60 per cent, whereas in 1909 it was 
virtually complete. The emergence of this outside 
competition, the entry of new tariff companies, and a shift 
in the balance of power within the tariff, are discussed in 
this Chapter; Chapters X and XI then deal with the nature 
and effectiveness of the tariff rules regarding rates, 
":product" and agencies. 
1. Information II During the 19th century tariff negotiations were on the 
I, whole conducted in the open and the proceedings were fairly 
f, f' fully reported, not only in the AIBR but in the daily press. 
11 This continued to be the case, to a less extent, in the late 
I 
·: 1890's and until about 1902. From this time however it 
became the policy of the industry to reveal as little as 
possible concerning tariff matters, and to avoid the publica-
tion of statistics. until the collection of statistics was 
begun by the State Bureaus this meant that there was no 
information available on class results, and very little on 
overall results. 
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r ir; ' I less informat~ve than they had been in the 19th century, 
As painted o~t in Chapter II, the overseas branches which 
r f " ~ • .- \. ~ ~ f t "I . 
dominated the Aust~alian market published nothing, and 
. ' 
the balance sheets of Australian companies were markedly 
( 
' ~ t . 
d I l 
\ 
! • and indeed became less and less useful to an outside 
~ I 
observer as the century progressed. The reasons for 
this change of attitude are not hard to see. They were, 
first, that insurance, especially fire insurance, had 
become extremely profitable; second, the fear of new 
competitors; and third, above all, the fear of 
Government intervention or competition. Both fears were 
well justified, especially in view of the growing power 
of the Labour Party in the Federal sphere. For these 
reasons the long series of conferences leading to the 
formation of the Council were scarcely referred to in the 
press; one manager wrote regarding the "great conference'' 
held in November 1906, that "not a single pe~son knew 
anything about it."(9) 
Despite this new policy (maintained to the present) 
lack of information was not in the long run an important 
deterrent to new entrants. First came the collection of 
statistics by the state Governments, in Victoria as early 
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as. 19Q7~ and in,N~~.w. in 1914. Secondly, information-
reached the.Lorydon market via the reinsurance treaties 
of companies ope.rating in Australia. (1) Thirdly, 
Australian published accounts, though uninformative -
(the lump.ing of ·all lines into a single revenue account 
was especj.all y; unhelpful) :-- still showed sufficient 
information to allow the drawing of reasonable inferences. 
~inally, employees of companies in Australia, such as 
local managers, sub-managers, and accountants, were of 
course aware of -the position and no doubt provided 
information, as they did their services, to interests 
contemplating the establishment of new companies or to 
prospective entrants from overseas. 
(=:2-~ e Boycotts. The rules against co- and reinsurance 
were considered to be formidable deterrents to new entrants. 
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---------------i,, ::J/1 (1) Before 1914 this probably applied mainly to Australian ii ;·:f I 
companies, because British companies probably did /( if!!· 11 
most of their Australian reinsurance with professional j' i .:1 q 
re insurers in Germany and Russia; at least this is true · i '' : j i ;f" 
of 3 major British companies to whose records the writer : 1 : , : ! ;,· 
has had ·acce·ss. ' Soon after the commencement of the War . 
these connections were severed and British "foreign'.' ) i'f 
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treaty fire business flowed to a much greater extent/ 'to I ~; l{' 
British reinsurers. See W.F.Gephart: Effects of the War i; V lf 
llQon Insurance,. Oxford U~iversity Press, 11991287, and c. E. i11.'11·: I· 
Golding: A History of Re1nsura~, London • ,. l~lj ' i1tl. f. ·: l 
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However, it soon ·became clear that to be effective they 
would require enforcement not only in J.\ustralia but . l.n 
London and other parts of the world. The test case • this in 
respect came in 1904, when the Seddon Government in New 
Zealand set up the Government Insurance Office to compete 
for fire business at reduced rates. J.W~ Brindley, a 
former New Zealand manager of the Victoria, was appointed 
General Manager. In accordance with their agreements, the 
companies operating in New Zealand refused both co- and 
reinsurance. Efforts were also made to block reinsurance 
in London and Europe. At the request of th~ F.o.c. U.K. 
companies with New Zealand business sent letters to their 
reinsurers and brokers asking them to join the boycott. At 
the same time severe rate reductions were made in New 
Zealand; in Auckland, for example, dwelling rates were 
reduced by one third in 1905. The purpose of these moves, 
as openly expressed in many letters, was to "put the State 
Off ice out of business 11 and to discourage similar experiments 
in Australia. As the Victoria general manager wrote:{2) 
"We are watching the New Zealand State Insurance Co,~ 
When that gets sick it will be time to start getting better 
rates again." 
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The response-'fr
1
orh reinsurers and brokers seems to 
have been favourable, (3) but Brindley obtained the 
reinsurance protection he required from the famoug Heath 
Syndicate· at Lloyd's.(4) F b or a out a year it was noped 
that Lloyd's would find the business unprofitable and 
withdraw, but when this did not happen the morale of the 
boycotting companies began to fail. Brindley came to 
Londonjn September 1905 and obtained renewal of the Lloyd's 
cover. Doubts now began to appear in the letters of the 
managers; one wrote:( 5 ) 
" ••• we must ••• look at the question dispassionately 
and from the most severe business standpoint." 
Another was somewhat cynical:(6) 
"We must run semi-friendly with him lSeddo!).7 .. Possibly 
and even very likely semi-friendship would soon develop into 
strong love with some companies, and there would be a race 
to see who would get the closest hug! Even this might be 
better than fighting. Higher rating under present 
circumstances would be madness~" 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
One London company had favourable letters from 12 
Continental reinsurers and promises from brokers that 
the Russian companies would follow. London and 
Lancashire records, London. 
See R.M.Burdon, King Dick,Whi tcombe & Tombs~·l955,!).301. 
London and Lancashire letter book, Head Office to 
Melbourne, 14.12.1905. 
Victoria letter book, 14.2.1906. 
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~n May 1906 Seddot:l,,_
1
who had been the pow~rful 
: , political force_in,New Zealand b~hind the state Office, 
died, and the way opened for a compromise. His successor 
as Prime Minister,was Sir Joseph Ward, the chief.New 
) 
>I 
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.. Zealand agent for the Manchester. The boycott officially 
continued for three years, but with mucfi reduced 
enthusiasm,(!) and in. 1909 the Government Office agreed 
to follow a new scale of tariff rates set somewhat higher 
than the prevailing level. In return the Council lifted 
the boycott, on the1understandin9 that the Government 
Office would reinsure only with tariff companies in 
New Zealand. 
The granting of cover to the New Zealand Government 
Office by Lloyd!S did not augur well for any future attempts 
which might be m~de to block new competition in Australia, 
In fact on a number of occasions.pressure was applied 
to companies, put it is doubtful whether anything beyond 
relatively minor inconvenience was caused. The first 
occasion of which there is record was the disciplining 
of the Insurance Office of Australi!!,. a company floated. 
in Sydney in 1910. It had joined the tariff, but was 
1 • 
suspected of .~iS~ehaving itself •. The Australian ,_ ' --
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"••• it is now only a question of the r.o.A. 
conforming to the rules of the Association or going out 
on their own, which they would find very embarrassing, 
seeing they would be unable to place their reinsurances. 
The effect on the market for the stock has been to knock 
it down to its par value, namely 5/-. 11 (S) The I.O.A. 
remained within the tariff and presumably thereafter 
' followed the rules more carefully, but soon after this 
similar dealings with newly floated companies showed 
that the threat had perhaps after all not been such a serious 
' 
one. In 1914 a company known as Amalqamated Insurance 
(Australia) Ltd., was floated with the purpose of making 
special arrangements regarding the insurance of the 
properties of retail chemists. {9) Because of these 
arrangements (in Victoria with an organisation called 
Pharmaceutical Defence Ltd.,) membership in the 
Underwriters' Associations was refused. However, 
according to the first Annual Report, reinsurance 
arrangements made 11el:;ewhere:! were •tvery satisfactory.,. (1) 
(8) 
(9) 
(1) 
P:-ustralian Financial Gazette and Insurance Chr~~nicle, 
Feb. 28, 1913, p.24. 
It had subsidiaries known as the Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane and Adelaide Fire Offices. In 1916 
Amalgamated Insurance and its subsid~aries were 
taken over by the London and Lancashire. 
AIBR 1915, p.792. 
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In the sa~e ·year the Manufacturers' Mutual and the 
Chamber of Manufactures were es,tabl,ished in Sydney and 
Melbourne respectively to write Workers' Compensation 
business on a mutual ~asis. Neither at first joined 
. (2) 
the tariffs . but the Manufacturers' Mutual 
arranged a stop-loss treaty with ~ British company, and 
the Chamber was able to operate without difficulty until 
it came to an accommodation with the Associations in 
1916. (3) 
Immediately after the War, a similar situation 
arose in connection with yet another new company, 
the CooRerative. This was e$tablished in Victoria with 
the backing of Victorian rural Copperatives. In their 
First Annual Report, the Directors wrote as follows:( 4) 
"On commencing operations towards the end of 1918, 
the company found it impossible to secure reinsurance 
facilities in Australia, owing to the action of the Fire 
Underwriters' Association of Victoria in refusing it 
membership. We were therefore forced into negotiations 
with London treaty companies, and after considerable 
delay and expense were successful in making adequate 
arrangements for the underwriting of our risks on a 
sound basis. In October last, however, the opposition ••• 
was withdrawn, and consequently local reinsurance facilities 
were made available to us ••• The Directors intend to ••• 
place our business with local companies, from whom we 
shall be able to· secure reciprocal business." 
T2Tthe ch"ainber o"f" Manuf"actures joined in 1916.the 
Manufacturers' Mutual not until 1927. (3) The Manufacturers' Mutual treaty was to pay all claims 
in excess of a year's premium income, up to £50,000. 
Annual Report for year ending 30.4.1917. 
(4) AIBR 1920 p. 443. 
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At the time of the attempted boycott of the 
Cooperative one -London-manager wrote to his Australian 
representative that the Coo~~~ative would certainly 
obtain reinsurance in London owing to the increasing size 
of the market and the develQpment of reinsurance as a 
I 
1 
cf specialised branch of it. This development was not confined 
,d to London. Golding listed 156 profec;sional reinsurance 
, 
'. 
' 
~u ;~ companies in existence in 12 countries in 19~. and only 
1~ 20 of these were British. Some indication of the extent 
I, 
I 
i 
= 
of this activity is given by his list of the formation 
dates of the 156. (5} 
Founded No. 
·-
-
1850-1899 37 
1900-1909 15 
1910-1919 72 
1920-1925 32 
the 1920 1 s ·(and afte~)many non-tariff 
companies 
In 
were in fact floated in Australia, and reinsurance backing 
was easily obtained. Among the more important companies 
to which this applied was the Aut~mobile Fire ani General 
(estd. 1922), which had a two-thirds quota share treaty with 
(6} 
the Excess Reinsurance Cq., London. 
. . 
(:>} C,' E. Goldfilg: A History of Reinstiranci~ P• 9L 
(6) AIBR 1937 P• 951. 
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Other non-tariff ~ompanies which received overseas 
backing includeq N.R.M.A. Insurance, (estd. 1925),the 
Federatio~, (e~~d. 1927), and the Southern Pacific (estd. 
1935). 
Most n~w non-tariff companies were floated locally, 
and as Table IV. 6 suggests, a great many were ephemeral. 
Table IV. 6 • 
.....,.._.........._ ........... ...,...____._.... 
Fi~e .. and )\cciden:t Insurance : Entries and 
Exits of non-tariff In_s~u~r~e~r~-s~'"--=1~9~0~0~~~1~9~6~0· 
Austn.Cos. U.K. Co~. 
Ent. Ex. Ent. Ex. 
Other Cos. Brokers 
and Aqents 
Ex. Ent. Ex:-Ent. 
-- __..... --
-
1900-10 
1911-20 13 
1921-30 40 
1931-40 10 
1941-50 4 
28 
1 
3 
17 
15 
3 
7 
1 
2 
3 
-- -· 
1 
2 
l 
2 
3 
l 
11 2 
I j 
1 
I 
I 
1951-60 
Notes: 
......... .....-
Source: writer's 1 card index. Organisations which f, 
appear to be merely self-insurance funds and 
insurers writing marine business only are excluded., · 
State Govt. Offices are included. ~ , 
I.hey made the greatest impression in motor and workers' 
compensation insurance. In both these lines it was possible 
t 
. . t . l ( 7 ) th ~ .. 
o operate without re1nsur1ng ex ensive y; e main 
. 
I , 
r ~ 
f i 1 ' I 
T?Jin.-d...,.e_e_a_> -·t .... h_e_w_r_i:--t~e-r_w_a_s---ii~n"'?f.-o'"'.".r_.m-.-e-:'ld--L"b~y-:t"t h!:"'e~S-;::e:--c:"'.r~e~tL":a::-::r'.:":'y~o:-;:f~o-:n-:e---·--; t ; 1 
small 9ompanv. that th:y o~erated for.over.20 years l i· 
in Workers' Compensation insurance withou~ ,any fo~m of ; 
reinsurance whatever, on the grounds that the Act 1 ,1 ! 
placed definite l imi'ts on the amount that could be " , ·. 
awarded to individual workers! f: I 
I• ,, 
l 
I f 
I 
protection needed was some form of excess of loss or 
catastrophe cover, both of which the Lloyd's market and 
the professional reinsurers were particularly suited and 
willing to provide. In fact, tariff companies in 
Australia would not have been willing to write this 
kind of reinsurance even if the non-intercourse rules 
had not prevented them, and there is little doubt that 
the majority arranged their own excess of loss and 
catastrophe treaties with Lloyd's. 
Most of the new non-tariff companies never made 
applications to join the Underwrite~s' Association; 
relatively few applied and were not elected.(B) Only 
a few companies, once having joined the Associations, 
decided to leave; these however included the influential 
' 
General Accident (Head Office London-left fire and 
accident tariffs 1930), and the Insurance Co. of North 
America (Head Office Philadelphia, U.S.A. - left all 
Australian tariffs 1961),. 
It has been mentioned.already that in the 19th century 
there-is no record of permanent underwriting agents 
in Australia .for Lloyd's. After the 1898 tariffs certain 
1 
J ''I ~ J 
1 I ': /!'I 
, ~ I l , 
I I If 
~ j 1 , 
' ' ! ,, 
f •,I 
~. I t )I! I 
15 ~ " '. ! 
____ _:.:----------------------------,A 1' ·i1 1 .J ' i I,' 
(8) The Australasian Catholic (estd. 1921) and the Southan Pacific (estd. 1935). The first application of the 
Manufacturers' Mutu~ was also defeated. 
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firms did place Australian marine business with Lloyd's, 
and as the Lloyd's non-marine .market developed a small 
amount of Australian fire and accident business also 
reached Lloyd's by, the same channels. (e.g. Dalgety 
and Co. acted for Lloyd's in MV and livestock insurance 
from about 1908). The main impact of Lloyd's non-marine 
activities was however not felt in Australia until after 
1917, when the firm of Bennie S. Cohen was formed. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, other agents for Lloyd's brokers 
followed, and the consequences for the tariffs were 
far reaching. The strength of these brokers was that their 
parent or associated London broking firms has the extensive 
facilities of the London market to hand, and for routine 
business annual ttbrokert covers" could be negotiated with 
underwriters up.to quite high limits. Only above these 
limits or outside delegated underwriting powers was it . 
necessary to cable London. As to rates, Australian agents 
typically operateO under standing instructions to quote 
up to 15 per cent less than the net tariff rate. This 
of course depended on finding out what the tariff rate 
~· Despite repeated exhortations of tariff bodies to 
their members regarding the confidential nature of 
tariff books,. the Lloyd 1 s agents .(and other non-tariff 
companies) hadrlittle difficulty in obtaining them, and 
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the tariff ratings for·most classes of risk became 
common knowlege· in the -insurance market. This is not 
surprising when it is considered that many thousands 
of tariff company employees and agents all needed to·possess 
at least the basic tariff information and rules if they 
were to apply them correctly. 
Still another form of outside competition which 
tariff companies were powerless to prevent came from the 
insurance offices set up by the State Governments. 
Apart from endeavouring to prevent their formation, 
the principal objective in these cases was to achieve 
as harmonious a working relationship as possible. The 
experience in New Zealand had shown the danger of ant-
agonising Governments, and this consideration was re-
inforced in Australia by the fact that the founding of 
most of the Government·Offices was associated with 
politically popular legislation introducing or 
extending Workers' Compensation or Compulsory Third 
Party insurance. This subject is further discussed 
in Chapter V; here it suffices to point out that the 
aims of the tariff companies often coincided ~ith 
the desires of sta~e Gove~nments' for funds, and that 
as a rule Government Insurance Offices agreed to ~, \ . "'
follow tarif{ rates and"procedures subject to bonus 
payments based on un·derwriting results• 
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To defend themselves against non-tariff competition, 
tariff companies made important changes in their 
agreements in the mid-1920's, and many other 
adjustments and changes can be traced to non-tariff 
pressures. These are described below. Another reaction 
was to attempt to create a favourable public image 
of tariff insurance. Officially this was confined 
to emphasising "security" and "service», leaving it 
to others to imply that these were perhaps not~attributes 
of non-tariff insurers. Unofficially, propaganda 
was far more direct; it was suggested that non-tariff 
insurers were less than generous in meeting claims, 
, 
tended to look for legal loopholes, were financially 
unsound, and so on. (9 ) Much of this propaganda 
was directed specifically at Lloyd's. In 1940 it 
a~tracted such attention in London that the L.A.I.C. 
cabled to the-FAUC\ Council __ ~ompJaining that it was 
harmful to British interests as a whole, and might even 
be harmful to British companies.(l) 
ft3 ft 
------------~~--~~---~~~----~-----------------(9) K.g. A· typical pamphlet circulated in Australi~: 
Insurance Securit and a uarter Centur of Failures, 
by Geo.,R. Raggett 1927. Its t~eme was (p.5.J."When 
people offer terms which others in the same business 
cannot afford, the prudent man will not entrust them 
with his money unless he is satisfied th?t the 
possibil-ity· of fraud or gross .:exaggeration has been 
elimi'nated." . (1) FAUA Council Circular, 12.7.1940. 
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Despite this it probably continued, and to the present 
there remains .a feeling-that non-tariff insurers, 
especially Lloyd's agents, are not quite ••respectable,.. 
The discussion so far has mainly concerned the 
tariff rule against reinsurance, but the prohibition 
of coinsurance with non-tariff insurers was also 
... important. Here however the tariff at no stage forbade 
coinsurance as between the principal business classes 
e.g. tariff companies could write the fire business 
of a firm even if its worker's compensation, MV, 
public risk etc. insurances went to a non-tariff 
insurer. The rule against coinsurance within classes 
was strictly kept, and undoubtedly added to the 
difficulties, and their reliance on reinsurance, of 
non-tariff companies especially in fire insurance. One 
side effect of the rule was the oicasional issue by· 
British tariff companies of so called "home-foreigntt 
fire policies on Australian risks in order to introduce 
non-tariff coinsurers, but this practice, while it 
undoubtedly occurred, was strictly speaking a breach 
of Australian agreements and it is not possible to 
estimate its extent. (2) The whole subject was indeed 
(2) A "home-f oreignu policy is a policy issued in London on foreign risks. 
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the cause of_ cQn,siderable controversy, and some managers 
argued that instead of destroying outside coinsurance, 
the effect was to drive the business 'in toto' to 
non-tariff markets. However, as mentioned elsewhere, no 
adjustment was ever made in Australia similar to the London 
65/~5 rule. (3) 
To sum up, the aim of theiariff agreements, of 
preventing the growth of a non-tariff market in Australia, 
was manifestly not achieved in the long run. New 
companies were able to oparate quite successfully outside 
the tariff - es~ecially in accident lines - without 
tariff co- or reinsurance support. Serious competition also 
developed, principally from Lloyd's, for the most profitable 
fire and marine lines; in every State except South 
Australia it was necessary to come to rather uneasy and 
precarious understandings with Government Offices. As shown 
in Chapter II (seen. 3(e)) by 1958/59 Government Offices 
and schemes were writing about 14.4 per cent of Australian 
business, other non-tariff insurers 25.2 per cent. Moreover, 
membership of the tariffs had been reluctantly 
It is notable that small local tariff companies were. 
probably affected more than others, as they were less 
likely to have London branches which could issue 
3 
0 home-foreign" policies. 
" 
I J 
I 
' . 
I 'I 
I I, 
J 
' l 
! ' 
' I 
j 
·l 
' 
' .. 
I I 
I 
$ 
' 
" ' 
') 
~ J ." i '1 I p: 
• I 
! 'J : • 
' 
! . 
: 
l I 
, l 
i 
I j 
l 
Ii 
d' 
i 
ii 
" it 
.\ 
ii 
·· l\ i1 
l : t 
· 11 
l 
l 
I 3 
. ,
t 
'It: granted to mutual companies - notably the Cooperative, 
II -
Manufacturers' Mutual and the Chamber of Manufactures -
whose bonus systems were far from being viewed with 
enthusiasm by tariff managers. 
(2') -~ontrol of the Tariff Associations. Although 
most ·.new Australian companies opercited ·.outside th~ tariffs, 
a number joined and the result was to somewhat alter 
the balance of voting power in the Councils, which in 
1909 had been overwhelmingly in favour of overseas, 
especially U.K., companies. An estimate of voting 
strengths by national groups on the FAUA Council is 
presented in Table IV.7. 
Table IV. 7. 
FAVA Council : Estimated votin 
y national groues. 
-
Head Office 1909 1924 
U.K. 24 24 
N.Z. 5 4 
Aust. 10 16 
Other 4 8 
Total 43 52 
1958 
38 
5 
25 
11 
79 
ths 
1961 
25 
8 
24 
11 
68 
Notes: Estimated from writer's card i~dex of . insurance companies in Australia and certain 
limited information provided by th: FAUA 
council, Melbourne. The actua~ lists of 
voting mambers was not made available to the 
writer. 
., 
I 
' 
' 
' '• ' 
' ' 
, I I 
i 
. 
I 
ti ~ I 
Ii r l ! ' 
A > 
' ' I ' 
' 1 I 
,i 
l, 
·' 
., 
I , I . ,, 
I I,! 
'l 
I /qi 
.) 
I j 
! I 
It will be recalled that the original agreements 
provided that absorbed companies were not to have 
voting rights on the Council in addition to those of 
their parent companies. This is of course a 
potentially serious disability for the large "group" 
companies, and at various times, pressure has been 
exerted to have the rule modified. These moves have 
never succeeded, mainly because of failure to agree 
on an alternative criterion which would not give the 
group companies overwhelming voting strength and 
perhaps encourage the revival of defunct companies. 
To a small extent the balance could be redressed by 
introducing new companies to Australia and acting as 
their chief agents, but this is a course also open to 
"single" compamies. In 1961 14 of the 68 Council 
votes were in fact held by companies in their capacity 
as ~chief agents". Voting strengths by national 
groups was augmented as follows: 
Head Independent Cos. 
Chief 
in Aqencies orrice Established held Aust. 
U.K. 20 
5 
N.Z. 3 
5 
Aust. 22 
2 
Other 9 
2 
54 14 
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By this means certain companies had considerably 
strengthened their voting power; thus the South 
British (N.z.) representative had five votes by 
virtue o'f holding chief agencies for the Eastern 
!:l!lited, Helvetia Swiss, Skandia and A.M.P. Fire and 
General. (4) The Eag~~ Star (U.K.) also had three 
votes (representing the African Guarantee and the 
South African Fire and Accident) and the Royal Exchange -
Atlas (U.K.). three (representing the Triton and the 
ifi.orld Auxiliary).( 5) 
Despite the fact that not many ~ustralian companies 
acted as chief agents, their voting strength as a group, 
relative to the strength of U.K. companies, increased 
spectacularly over the years 1956-1961. This came 
about almost entirely as a result of the series of 
mergers between British companies, to which reference 
has been made elsewhere. In 1961, for the first time, 
( 4) The last three ~ the South Bri tis.h subsidiary, the 
United. 
( 5) There is little doubt that the voting motive was 
one of the principal reasons for the original 
entry of numbers of companies into Australia. 
However some of these companies eventually 
established their own Australian organisations, 
e.g. the Cornhill (introduced by the §J:!!l in 1930), 
the Provincial (introduced by the Atlas, 1933), 
the Scottish [introduced by the Royal, 1936). 
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the combined vote of Australia and New Zealand 
exceeded the U.K. vote, with other companies -
I ,, ! companies ; l 
most 
from the United States and Continental countries -
holding the balance of power. In view of the striking 
nature of this change it is likely that there will be 
renewed pressure for alteration of the voting rules. 
In marine insurance the rule depriving acquired 
comparaies of a separate vote was never adopted, and as 
a result the voting predominance of British companies 
has never been challenged. This can be seen by reference 
to Table !V. 8. 
Table IV. 8. 
Marine Council : Estimated voting 
strengths by national groups4 
Head Off ice 1909 1924 1958 1961 
U.K. 
N .. Z. 
Aust. 
Other 
Total 
Notes: 
J 
31 51 59 66 
4 4 4 8 
8 17 13 24 
7 10 11 11 
50 82 87 109 
Actual lists of voting members n~t a~ailable. 
These are estimates only from writer ~ card 
·ndex and lists of members of the M~rine 
tnderwriters' Association ?f ~ictor1a and the 
Sydney Underwriters' Association. 
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In 1961 the voting strengths of the national 
groups were made up as follows: 
Head Indeeendent Acguired Chief 
of'f ice Cos. estd. Cos. 
in Aust. 
.._ Agencies 
held • 
U.K. 20 37 9 
N.Z. 3 1 5 
Aust. 18 2 1 
Other 9 2 
Total 50 40 17 
Some of the British groups, through subsidiaries and 
other companies represented, were especially strong. 
The leading examples were: 
Votes 
Royal - Globe - 15 
Royal Exchange - Atlas - 9 
Commercial Union' -
North British - 8 
Northern - Employers 5 
It has been pointed out that British companies 
were responsible to their head offices, which in 
turn belonged to tariff bodies in London. This does 
not mean that all policy decisions concerning 
Australian tariffs have been formally taken, or even 
initiated in London. Probably the most important 
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influence hl'.\s been inf'opmal by \Vay of the raegulai" 
~Jnsult~tion of Australian m~nagers with their ~ead 
J:'·"'if'!eS. !IO\VeVer, J,onrlon discussions have unuoubtedly 
been of some significance, nnd in 1925 this was 
rcc0~nised by the creation of the London -
---
AustrAlasian Insur.ance Committee (L.A.I.C.). The 
I,./1.I.C. consisted of all comrianies represented in 
~0ndon doing business in Auatrnlia and New Zealand, 
·-·n1 ·aa.s established in orut:r1 to for•nY~lise 1o some 
~o~ree discussions of tariff affairs in the two 
c(11..m'·rics. Aus+.ralian and New Zealand tariff coITT!1anies -
~ n P1r- 1920' s acain opening London branches and agencies -
·::el"7e included in it.s membership. 
Des:!,)i t e the er ea ti on of t.h e L.A. I. C. , af t.eI' 1909 
t ~centre of gravity for tAriff decisions wrs moving 
~ncressingly towards AustrRlia. ~he L.A.I.C. itself 
-::~,ne::irs t-o have been uf some impoptance in the l'"tt.e 1920's, 
'"~·in the 1930's its meetin"s were sporandic, and qftel" 
+'1e Second Viar its influence waned considerably. One reason 
-0~ +his w~s the increasing autonomy of the local 
,,c,,r.=sentatives of the principal British companies. Another 
:LJs t~e continued and growing contrast betwee~ London as an 
inLepnational free marl<et, and Australia as a tightly 
Acc ount alno had to be taken or~~nised tariff market. -
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comp an ie s, ~ l' of the increasing numbers and strength of local 
trends strongly marked in the 1920's and in post World War 
II years, especially after 1951. 
The voting strength of the U.K. group of companies 
on the FAUA and Marine Councils has been reflected,as 
would be expected, in the membership of the all important 
FAU\ Council Executive Committee, the Marine Council 
Com:ilittee, and the various controlling Committees of the 
State Associations. Committee membership in 1961/62 
may be taken as an example: 
FAUA Committees, 1961-62 
Head Office Council State Committees 
-C'tee of Co. NSW Vic. S .A. Tas. Qld. W.A. 1Total 
reeresented 
6 6 5 5 6 6 
I 34 
U.1C. 8 
N.Z. 1 l 1 - - l 
3 
Aust. 3 l 2 4 3 3 
2 15 
Other l -
l 
Total 12 9 9 9 8 
9 9 53 
.: 
I I 
,.j 
i ~lt11J 
Marine Committees,1961-62 
Head Office Council State Committees 
~:p;~;ented C'tee NSW Vic. S,A, Tas. Qld. W.A. Total 
U.K. 
N.Z. 
Aust. 
Other 
Total 
8 
1 
1 
10 
6 
1 
1 
-
8 
7 
1 
8 
4 
5 
4 
1 
2 
7 
3 
1 
1 
5 
5 
l 
l 
7 
Sources: State Committee Membership - Insurance 
News and Views, 1961. 
Council Committee Membership - provided 
by FAUA Council, Melbourne. 
As can be seen, U.K. companies had an absolute 
majority on every local committee, and most important, 
on the two Council Committees. This was also the case 
29 
4 
5 
2 
40 
in all previous years back to 1956-57. It was not 
possible to check earlier committees, but the writer is 
informed·that in most the U.K. company preponderance 
was, if anything, even greater. A notable feature of 
the membership of the Committees examined was the 
constancy with which certain companies were represented. 
Thus the B.Qlal-Globe and 9ommercial Uniou groups had a 
repre?entation on a high proportion of all committees 
in each of the 6 years. Por example, in 1961-62 there 
were 53 state FAUA and 40 State Marine Committee places. 
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Representatives of these two groups filled 6 and 7 
PAUA places; and 7 and 6 Marine places respectively. 
Each was also represented on both the FAUA and Marine 
Councils. Among the Australian companies, older 
established companies such as the Queensland and 
Victoria were the most frequently represented. 
Probably the principal reason for this is that such 
companies, with relatively large market shares, and 
organisations long developed in accordance with tariff 
principles, have the greatest interest in ensuring that 
the tariff machinery functions effectively. Another is 
that they are more likely to be able to afford giving up 
the time of expert officials; it is also not possible to 
ignore the tradition of service in tariff organisations 
that has been developed in many of them. 
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THE TVVENTIETH CENTURY - RATES 
(a) Basis Rates. The basis rates set in the fire 
tariffs of 1897-1899 remained for the most part unchanged 
in Australia in 1962. Only in Western Australia and 
Queensland were alterations made. In W.A. the restored 
tariff of 1910 was somewhat lower (10 to 20 per cent) than 
the 1898-1906 tariff. In Queensland in 1912, in order to 
cancel out the effects of allowing an (optional) discount 
of 10 per cent, basis rates were raised by one-ninth. In 
1918, following Government intervention there was ~ all 
round reduction o~ 28 per cent (Trade risks) ar.d 40 per 
cent (dwellings). 
The basis rates were the starting points for all 
rating of fire risks, and depended on construction 
(brick etc., wood or mixed), risk classification (four 
classes) and area classification (six classes). Although 
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for over 60 years1they were unchanged, this did not of 
course preclude,a changing general level of rates as the 
! 
proportions of risks in the various classes changed. 
For this reason, since water supplies, fire brigade 
services, construction etc. on the whole improved 
(from the fire risk point of view) over the period, 
automatic application of the tariff classification rules 
would have tended to produce a downward trend of rates. 
This applied especially to the classification of towns 
and districts, and to the "Classification of Risks" table. 
Under the latter all risks were classed according to 
occupancy, e.g. churches, dwellings, warehouses, retail 
shops and factories of many kinds, and so on. As well as 
stating the risk class (W, X, Y or Z) of the base rating 
scale under which these risks were to be rated, the table 
laid down compulsory additions to the basic rate and 
minimum rates, and decisions concerning both of these 
undoubtedly took account of what seemed equitable in 
relation to risks already classified.(G) As regards 
(6) The power of risk classification was clearly of great importance, and in recognition of this in 
1909 it was specifically mentioned as one of the 
overriding powers of the FAUA Council. 
4 
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area classifications, there were objective criteria which 
had to be satisfied. 'For example, in N.S.W. class '~B" 
towns were required to have a water supply system 
meeting certain specifications regarding pressure, 
diameter of mains etc.; over 90 per cent of the buildings 
in the business portion of the town were to be constructed 
of brick, concrete or stone; there was to be a fire 
engine and at least one permanent fireman plus 9 
volunteer firemen. However, applications to the N.S.W. 
FAUA regarding town classifications were to be made by 
the local Governing body concerned, !lQ.i by insurance 
companies or brokers • 
. &, 
.LJ21) Standard Deductions and Additions. In arriving 
at a tariff rate, after working out the basic rate, it 
was necessary to apply certain standard additions and 
deductions. Additions were to be made for such factors 
as contiguity to other risks, numbers of floors, 
multiple occupancy, doors and windows, electric and gas 
motors, electrical installations, liftwells, roof 
material, and so on. There were deductions for various 
kinds of fire resisting construction and for the 
installation of fire alarms _and appliances and sprir1kler 
systems. 
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Again, over the period, very few changes were made 
int1hese respects. ,There were increases in discounts 
for sprinkler and fire alarm systems, but even here 
the maximum discount obtainable was not altered after 
1921. Maximum tariff discounts since the inception 
of the fire tariffs have been as follows:(?) 
2er cent 
1897-1908 nil 
1908-1909 25 
1909-1910 35 
1910-1921 40 
1921 to present 50 
(C...~ 
(~) Special discounts and ratings. The 
regulations and classifications described so far were 
complex and there was undoubtedly scope for agents 
or brokers who knew their business to advise clients 
to arrange their affairs in ways which would result 
in lowered tariff rati~gs. However there was strong 
resistance against actual changes in tariff ratings, 
especially to suit particular companies when intra-
(7) These are maximum discounts for sprinklered risks 
with two water supplies, hand chemiGal extinguisher~, 
fire hydrants, and direct alarm comne~tion to a . 
fire brigade station. See G.Gordon Russell: 
The Automatic Sprinkier:Development in Australia, 
AIBR, 1934, P• 259. 
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as~ociation rivalry was involved; indeed, as has 
been po~nted out, a strong Council was created very 
largely to avoid this kind of situation. When 
competition came from outside the tariff, however, 
the Council took a very different view. This became 
clear with the development of non-tariff .competition, 
especially from Lloyd's, in the early 1920's. In 
order to find ways of meeting this competition a 
special Council Committee was set up. \ 
Following the suggestion of this Committee, in 
1926 a new sub-clause (2) was added to clause 3(a) of 
the fundamental "Regulations for the Conduct of 
Business". This was to the effect that the Council 
Committee could allow discounts off the net tariff 
rate for fire risks, of up to 25 per cent, provided: 
(1) th~re was evidence of "tariff hardship" (2) approved 
sprinklers were installed (3) the sum insured exceeded 
£25,000. Although the original wording referred to 
"tariff hardship" only, non-tariff quotations b~low 
tariff levels were considered to be evidence of this, 
and the clause was later amended to take account of 
them specifically. Later amendments also removed the 
conditions regarding sprinklers,minimum sum insured, 
and the limit of 25 per cent on the discounts it w~s 
possible to grant. 
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Another important change was made in 1928. 
Prior to then, when rating the premises of large 
firms with numbers of buildings, it had been re ce s sary 
to apply the tariff rules separately to each building, 
and to machinery and stock in each building. Non-
tariff competitors in these cases had simply been 
quoting a single rate on the total value at risk, in-
cluding stock, machinery and buildings under a single 
0 blanketu cover. Apart from considerations such as 
simplicity of premium calculation, this broug~t 
considerable savings in the surveying expenses 
attached to the careful inspection of individual 
risks. The 1928 amendment (S) enabled Council Committee 
to declare a similar average rate when the amount 
at risk at a single location exceeded £5CO,OCYJ. 
The average rate was to be calculated on the basis 
of the net tariff premium against the total sum insured, 
and was to be revised every three years. 
The application of clauses 3 (a) 2 and 3 (a) 4 
henceforth became of great importance to the 
functioning of the fire tariffs, and since their 
aciministration was in the hands of the ~ 'Comm3.tte:'1::., 
(8) It became clause 3 (a) 4 of the Regulations for the Conduct_g_f Business • 
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its powerwas'stilt'furiiher enhanced. Unfort·unately 
details of numbers of applications and discounts 
granted are treated by the Council as highly 
confidential, and even the existence of this possibility 
is for obvious reasons not publicised. However it 
seems very probable that by 1962 a high proportion 
of th0 larger Austr6~i~~ Eire accounts were written 
tariff rates. The writer 
.; =i info.l''".led that in one year alone (1957-1958) about 
200 new applJ1~~ion~ were forwarded from Local 
Associations for consideration by the FAUA council 
"Referenr~ Committee", (9)nearly all on the grounds of 
non-tariff competition. It is almost certainly the 
case, too, that the majority of large fire risks are at 
present ratQd under the provision for "blanket" ratings. 
The effect of these procedures, as intended, is that 
non-tariff insurers have found themselves inc ompetition 
tariff market as a whole, as well as with 
with the 
each other. In the late 1950's there were some signs 
of weakening of tariff solidarity in this respect, due 
(9) In its capacity of considering aeplicat~ons 
for special discounts, the Council Co~mitt~e 
is referred to as the "Ref ere nee Committee • 
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to alleged cooperation of tariff companies with 
outside companies or brokers.(!) A sign of this 
was a more specific enunciation in 1962 of an earlier 
rule. Under the old rule, the Reference Committee, 
when granting discounts to meet non-tariff competition, 
had the power to "approve of 11 the proportion of the 
risk to be reinsured locally. In 1962 applicants 
under 3(a)2 were required to undertake t? reinsure 
proportions of the risk with non-related member 
companies ttas directed by the Committee". (2 ) 
(1) A tariff company would arrange the transfer of 
the business of a client of another ~ariff 
company by promising a discount. ,It would then 
ask a friendly non-tariff broker to quote for 
the business, at, say, 20 or 30 per cent below 
tariff, and on this ground apply to the 
Reference Committee via the State Association, 
for a 3(a)2 discount. Su:h a procedure might 
put considerable pressure on the Reference 
Committee, even if its members were aware of 
what had happened, because once the non-tariff 
quotation had been made the business would 
probably be lost unless the discount were granted. 
(2) Current Fire Tariff, Vic. FAVA, Melbourne. 
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"" ('!9) Breaches. The effectiveness of tariff rating, 
(and other tariff rules) of course depended on how 
well the rules were observed in practice. This again 
is a matter which is extremely difficult to ·assess. 
As mentioned in the discussion of Western Australian 
affairs, there was a standard procedure in cases of 
suspected breaches. An "enquiry sheet" would be 
circulated among all companies, asking each manager 
whether or not his company was concerned with the 
matter in question. If the Association committee 
found that a rating breach hQd in fact been committed, 
the offending company was required to reinsure the 
risk in full at tariff rates with the aggrieved 
company or companies. When theFAUA Council became 
responsible for breaches, these procedures were 
largely followed, but reinsurance was to be at the rate 
actually accepted. 
This of course did away with the Rfining0 aspect 
of the old provision, but against this the powers of 
tfe--Q.;artil Committee were greater. Thus it could 
initiate breaches procedures, require that all enquiry 
sheets should be signed by controlling officers, and 
had power to interview an~ question any member and 
"to require sworn declarations". {3) The details of 
(3) current Vic. Fire Tariff, FAUA Melbourne. 
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proven breaches were to be printed and circularised 
among member companies. 
The breaches procedure combined moral pressure 
(few managers would be willing to be caught out in an 
outright lie !), some financial loss (the reinsurance 
provision) and publicity. The latter was most important, 
as it made it more difficult for managers to turn 
blind eyes to the acti\ities of perhaps vigorous 
but tariff-breaching subordinates or agents, 
especially if they wished to negotiate from a 
position of tariff virtue. In early years the 
breaches machinery was frequently used and many 
breaches were recorded. In Victoria, for example, 
over 1000 fire breaches had been proven in the 15 
years to 1912. However many of these were mainly 
"technical" i.e. genuine misunderstandings of the 
correct procedures to be followed in applying the 
rating rules. Even without allowing for this the 
proportion was (approximately) only l per company 
per year, a small number when account is taken of the 
numbers of employees and agents working for a typical 
company. Af1er 1912 the writer has not had access 
to records which would give any clear guide to the 
actual situation. All that can be P.Ofnted1 to:fanEh(the 
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obvious general considerations that: (1) "technical" 
breaches are likely to be more frequent in times of 
exRansion, and the entry of .new, less experienced, 
tariff companies,(2) the more flexible the tariff 
machinery for meeting non-tariff competition, the less 
likely are "defensive" breaches 1 (3) deliberate 
breaches are probably more likely to be associated with 
companies depending relatively heavily for expansion 
on purely insurance activities, rather than the support 
of some non insurance organisations. On the other 
hand, by the~same .~easoning, such companies are also 
less likay to join tariffs. The balance of these 
arguments would suggest that the 1920's and 1950 1s 
may have been periods·of relatively poor tariff 
discipline, but there is no empirical support for this 
view beyong the fact that rumours and complaints, 
seemed to be more frequent in these years.( 4) 
(4) In the late l950's some managers seemed to think 
that ·tariff observance had all but collapsed. 
Thus it was cldimed that some branch managers had 
aiven ~p reporting breaches to the.Association, 
and instead were keeping informal records of 
breaches against them by individual companies, with 
the purpose of ensuring that the number of breaches 
given off approximately balanced those incurred! 
Against this, there were managers who considered 
that tariff observance was quite good. Some also 
vividly recalled the chavoc" caused in an office 
in the 1920's and before by the receipt of a breach 
notice from the Local Asso?iation. On the other hand 
again "enquiry sheets" said to be comJton before the S---n~ m~r were seldom circulated in the 1950's. ~\.,.V U ,,_ t 
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Th~ operation of the "Pegging Agreement 0 does however 
strongly suggest that discipline was probably good 
over 1941-1945. Under this agreement, in order to 
conserve manpower, the companies (including non- · 
tariff and Government Offices) agreed to avoid 
competitive transfers of existing business. (5) 
tel Loss of Profits and Householders Comprepensive 
Rates 
Most of the remarks made so far in connection with 
fire insurance are equally applicable to these two 
related lines. The first comprehensive Loss of 
Profits tariff was laid down in 1910, with a rating 
system based on the average fire rate on the contents 
of the premises insured. This rate was adjusted 
according to the "indemnity period" of the policy, 
and the adjustment factors set out in the 1910 
tariff were still in force in 1962. Of course, the 
effective rate for loss of profits insurance 
automatically followed the underlying fire rate, 
but as in.fire insurance provisipn was made (in 
1935) for special discounts;in cases of "tariff 
hardship" or to meet non-tariff competition. 
(5) See Ch. v. 
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Householders' Comprehensive policies were 
introduced on the recommendation of the special 
1925 Council Committee, as a counter to non-tariff 
competition. The basic rates for ttAu and ngu districts 
decided in 1927 were again unchanged in 1962. In 
1935 the elaboration of rates for country towns and 
districts produced an effective overall fall for these 
areas, but no further change has been made. The 
original extra rate for Storm and Tempest cover was also 
reduced in 1940.(6) However there is .D.Q. provision in 
the tariffs for special rating or discounts for these 
policies. 
(~) Conclusions. In assessing the effects of 
tariff regulation of fire rates, it is necessary to 
separate three groups of factors. First, rates may 
change due to alterations in the basic tariff 
structure. Secondly, the average level of rates may 
change due to a certain amount of built in flexibility. 
Third, tariffs may be evaded. It has been shown that 
there has been little or no voluntary alteration in 
the first direction in Australia; changes such as the 
introduction of 3(a)2 discoun~s and blanket ratings, 
have been forced on the Association by the pressure of 
(6) From 2/6 to 1/- per £100. 
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outside competition. Tariff evasion is impossible to 
estimate, but built-in rewards for improved risks, 
and vice versa (themselves indications of a certain 
degree of suscepti~ility to competitive pressures) 
have without doubt been important. The total result 
. 
has almost certainly produced a downward trend in rates 
during most of the 20th century. Unfortunately few 
satisfactory statistics are available in Australia, 
but those which are confirm this impression. 
1922 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
Ave~ge fire rates on Amounts 
at Risk, £ per £100. 
N.S .W. 
.42062 
.41224 
.37552 
.33901 
.32757 
S.A. 
n.a. 
.35677 
.31262 
.27984 
n.a. 
Sources: N.S.W. and South Australian Statistical 
Registers. 
Despite this apparent downward trend, fire insurance has 
remained extremely profitable, as have Loss of Profits 
and Householders' Comprehensive insurance. This suggests 
that non-tariff penetration was still in 1962 far from 
widespread, or possibly that successive rate reductions 
brought about by non-tariff competition were just about 
offsetting underlying trends which would otherwise have 
produced rising underwriting surpluses. 
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.ll?..L.M.arine. 
It will be recalled that in the 1898-1900 
arJreements minimum rates were fixed for most of the 
orincipal trade routes, with the important exception 
U.K. and overseas countries to Australia. 
the subsequent history of these tariffs, one 
~~portant fact stands out; this is the great 
;jgnificance of the Lloyd'd market for what could be 
3nd was done in Australia. As regards international 
trade, few decisions were taken on Australian tariffs 
which were not made at the suggestion of the I.L.U., 
or at least after consultation with it. As regards 
·nternal tariffs - mainly coastal trade - there was 
1reater room for manoeuvre, but this too was 
diminished with the opening of the Lloyd's brokers in 
.ustralia. 
(di) International Trade. The most important 
+ariff agreed in 1898 was the so called "General 
·~ameward Tariff". After 1898, as can be seen from 
:hart IV.!, changes were made in it on a number 
~f occasions. The tariff applied to all shipments 
~rom Australia to U.K. and Continental ports. Until 
1936 it included (but made special provision for) 
:''101; it also covered grain except when special rates 
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were declared. Until the First World War it thus 
accounted for the. great bulk of Australian exports. 
During and after the War many of the principal export 
commodities were handled by Government sponsored pools, 
and the Federal Council quo~ed for these insurances 
and handled them when it succeeded on a pool basis. 
Leaving aside this consideration for the moment, it is 
interesting to examine changes made in the ta~iff and 
reasons given for them, as revealed by Association and 
Council records. (7) 
(7) 
(8) 
1902 : 20 per cent reduction (due to Lloyd's and 
Continental company competition). 
1903 : 15 per cent increase (as desired by London). 
1909 : Reduction of 25 per cent on~ suggestion of 
I.L.U. 
1913 : I.L.U. propose 2/6 surcharge on all rates 
not agreed to. 
1914 : I.L.U. point out that sutcharge is justified: 
" ••• lights are extinguished, buoys removed, 
v~ssels are missing through mines." 25 per 
ceot increase adopted from September 1914. (8) 
1924 : Following I.L.U.>reclassification of steamer 
lines - many moved into lower rate categories. 
1925 : Rate reduction due to overseas competition. 
1937 : Rate reduction due to overseas competition. 
1940 : "Combined marine surcharge" adopted on 
suggestion of I.L.U. 
The following information is obtained from Marine 
Council records, Melbourne, and Annual Reports of 
the Sydney and Melbourne Marine Underwriters' 
Association. This increase was on rates for normal F.P.A. and 
w.A. covers, from which w~r risk was excluded. 1 T~e 
same was true of the "Combined Marine Surcharge, i11 
force 1940-1950. 
qlf2 
1950 : Combined marine surcharge to be "recommended", 
not mandatory. 
1950 : Complete :rev·im·on- and simplification of 
tariff. Rates reduced by 25 per cent due to 
London s_~q .loc~}! competition. 
1953 : Further reduction of 25 per cent. Minimum 
W.P.A. rate abandoned. 
The influence of overseas competition was even more 
important for "outward tariffs~ i~e. rates on imports 
into Australia. In the 1898-1900 negotiations the 
"homeward" tariffs had been signed without the 
agreement of Lloyd's, but London companies were 
unwilling to adopt scales of outward rates unless a 
substantial body of Lloyd's underwriters were to 
sign. 
As regards steamers, outward rates were set for 
only one line,( 9) and at the suggestion of the I.L.U., 
these were dropped in 1902. Over the next fifteen 
years renewed efforts were made, but on every occasion 
when agreement seemed close (notably in 1909 and 
1914) London companies withdrew on the argument that 
Lloyd's were not participating. Eventually, in 1917, 
the I.L.U. had "considerable success" in obtaining 
signatures in London. 
(1) Thia tariff covered all 
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(9) "Holt's Ocean Steamship Co., Clyde to Australia: Single screws F.P.A. 10/-, twin screws F.P.A. 
8/9 ... Ann~al Report 1917, Vic. Marine Association. (1) 
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merchRndise from U.K. and Continental ports to 
Australia, and cRme in to force in Aus ta.,q lia in A}1ril 
1918. Subsequent changes we~e made in a manner 
~nd at times very much as described nbove with 
reg·u•d to the "homeward 11 tnriiff; but in Addition 
the scope nnd significance of the trriff were 
considerably reduced in the early 'twenties by the 
( 2) 
exclusion of Continental ports. Countries 
other than the U.K. and Continental Eurupean countries 
were also never included; for example efforts made 
by the I.L.U. to include the Eastern Coast of the 
United States were unsuccessful (e.g. in 1898, 1915. 
(3) 
qnd 1920). 
As can be seen from Chart i Jil .1 there was no 
qp~arent downward trend between 1900 And 1950 in 
"G enePn 1 Homeward" .rates. However this must be 
viewed in t.he light of special arl"'1ngements made 
for some of the principal e~ort commodities. 
Wool. From 1898 to 1935 the W .A. sea risk 
on wool was rnted under the Gener~l Homeward tBriff. 
However, during the first Wr-tr wool WP..S bought and r>aid 
(2) November 1922. 
(3) Marine Council records, Melbourne. '' 
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for in advance by the U.K. Government, which placed 
the bulk of the insurance in the U.K., and only a 
small proportion in Australia.( 4) Later, after the 
War, B.A.W.R.A., the joint British-Australian surplus 
stock disposal organisation)again placed most of its 
insurances in London. 
During the 1930's, the wool tariff was separated 
from the general tariff, and rates under it were 
somewhat lower. Thus: 
General Homewards Wool Tariff, 
Tariff, W.A. - Sea W.A. - Sea 
Risk only. Risk only. 
1936-37 8/9 6/3 
1937-40 7/6 6/3 
1940-46 9/- not applicable 
1946-50 9/- 5/-
1950-53 5/- 5/-
1953 to date 4/- 4/-
Over the period 1940-1946 wool came under the control 
of the Commonwealth Government and was not insured. 
After the war the Australian Wool Realisation Council 
(4) Annual Report 1917, Vic. Marine Association. 
had an open policy with tariff companies acting 
through the Marine Council, but this was at a 
specially arranged rate. 
Wheat. Wheat owned by the Australian Wheat 
Board was insured on special conditions with tariff 
companies from 1916-1922. After the war similar 
special arrangements were made rli~h "voluntary" 
State wheat pools; e.g. the Victorian Association 
wrote the insurance of the Victorian Wheatgrowers' 
Cooperative between 1921 and 1936. On each renewal 
of these contracts quotations had to be competitive 
with quotations from Lloyds and other overseas 
sources. During the Second War the Commonwealth 
Goverment was its own insurer for wheat as for all 
pooled commodities. From 1948 to 1956 the Australian 
Wheat Board arranged its insurances through brokers 
in Australia with Lloyd's and from 1956 to 1961 
with a group of Australian owned companies. The 
writer is informed by the Board that the business 
is done at 0 substantial discounts" against marine 
market (and tariff) rates. 
Butter and Cheese. Between 1925 and 1935-1936 
butter and cheese exports were insured under a 
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Marine Council pool. In 1936 the Council commented: (5) 
"The Loss of the Butter and Cheese Insurances 
to the London market at very cut rates is to be 
greatly deplored.•• 
The writer is informef that the cover has been 
with Lloyd's ever since. The cover is renewable 
every three years and "on most renewal occasions 
since 1945 some concession in rates has been 
obtai:ned," (6) 
Other Commoditi~~· Where marketing has been 
organised by Government Boards, insurances have 
again in almost every instance been arranged on 
special terms after calling for tenders. Thus 
the insurances of the Australian Barley Board have 
been with a Marine Council Pool (1939-1943 and 
1946-1949) and with Lloyd's (1949 to date).(?) 
The insurance of the Commonwealth Apple and Pear 
d . . ·1 (8) Board have been arrange in a s1m1 ar manner. 
5 
6 
Marine Council Circulars 1 1936. . Letter to the writer from the Secretary, Australian 
Dairy Produce Board, Melbourne. Dated 25.10.1961. 
(7) Information from Australian Barley Board. 
(8) In 1949 the Marine Council lost the business to 
Lloyd's, whose quotatio~ was 50.per cent.less 
than the Council quotation. Marine Council Records, 
Melbourne. 
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It is evident that a high proportion of 
Australian exports were not insured on the terms 
prescribed by the tariff; either the business was 
not written in Australia at all, or, if it were, 
the rate was substantially below the tariff rate, 
usually under a tariff company pool administered by 
the Marine Council. For these reasons the far 
reaching revisions of both the "Homeward" and 
11 0utward11 tariffs in 1950 probably did not affect a 
very high proportion of Australia's international 
trade. Previously both tariffs had been complex, 
with lists of additional rates for calls at ·specified 
ports, transhipments, specified shipowning companies, 
additional risks etc., and both minimum F.P.A. and 
W.A. rates had been set in all cases. The new 
tariffs abolished the minimum W.A.schedule altogether, 
and simply laid down a single minimum F.P.A. rate of 
5/- for Al vessels, 7/6 other classes. Beyond this 
there were only a list of additions for age, and a 
flat minimum (1/3) for transhipments. (9) By the 
1950's a high proportion of all marine business was 
said to be written on W.A. or ~All Risks" terms, but 
(9) Iri 1953 the F.P.A. rates were reduced to 4/- and 
6/6. 
~ 
~67 
the new tariff placed no restriction on quotations 
for such covers, provided only (as mentioned above) 
that the total rate exceeded the minimum F~P.A. rate. 
The "Outward" and "General Homeward" tariffs were 
concerned principally with voyages between Australia 
and England and European ports, but as well as these 
there were tariffs covering voyages to and from other 
countries or areas e.g. South Africa, India, South 
East Asia and China. These tariffs remained largely 
~ r 
'l°{'() i 
.t Oo l 
unchanged until the 1920's, but there were substantial 
reductions made in some in the 1920's,and a number were 
completely abandoned soon after the end of the Second 
War. The India to Australia tariff may be taken as an 
example. The agreement was signed in London in December 
1908, and subscribed to by the Australian Associations. (l) 
For P. and o. A.l steamers some minimum rates were: 
1908-1923 Tea W.A. Rubber, Indigo, Silk W.A. 
Merchandise F.P.A. 
1923-1924 Tea W.A. Rubber, Indigo, Silk W.A. 
Merchandise F.P.A. 
1924-1951 Merchandise (incl. Tea, ) Rubber, Silk etc.) W.P.A.) 
All other F.P.A. 
15/6 
16/-
15/-
12/6 
13/9 
12/6 
7/6 
10/-
(1) · th1·s route were in existence Agree~ents covering 
before this, however~ 
. i: 
1951-53 
1953 to 
date 
Merchandise F.P.A. 
All other F.P.A. 
Merchandise F.P.A. 
All other F.P.A. 
Tariffs abandoned included: 
5/-
7/6 
4/-
6/6 
Austral~a to South Afric~ - abandoned 1949. 
Australia to 19The East" (Batavia, Manila, 
Hong Kong, China, Vladivostok) - abandoned 1949. 
Frozen Meat to overseas ports - abandoned 1946. 
In November 1946, large reductions were made in other 
special tariffs, e.g. 
Ore from South Australia to U.K. and Europe. 
Copra from Island Ports to U.K. and Europe. 
Timber from Southern Tasmania to Europe, South 
Africa, Mauritius, Colombo and 
South America. 
~ Local Trade. The tariffs so far discussed 
cover business where one of the parties - either the 
importer or exporter is likely to have fairly direct 
access to an insurance market outside Australia. 
The same is not true for voyages around the Australian 
coastline, overland in Australia, or, to a lesser 
extent, between Australia, New Zealand and neighbouring 
Pacific Islands. These tariffs were probably the most 
elaborate of all, and it appears that there were very 
few changes in them until the 1920's and 1930's, when 
non-tariff, and especially Lloyd's, competition made 
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itself felt within Australia. 
As originally set out these tariffs gave 
specific minimum rates for practically all possible 
voyages and combinations of voyages between Australian 
coastal ports. The changes made in the 1920'a and after 
may be illustrated by a few examples: 
Minimum F.P.A. rates 
Auckland Derby~ 
to to 
Sydney · Sydney 
Before 
1924 7/6 27/-
1926-29 6/- 27/-
1929-38 6/- 22/-
1938-46 4/9 17/6 
1946-50 4/9 10/3 
1950-53 5/3 2/6 to 4/6 
1953 to 
date 4/- 2/6 to 4/6 
Townsville 
to 
Sydney 
9/-
9/-
8/-
6/6 
5/6 
2/6 to 4/6 
2/6 to 4/6 
Rockhampton 
to Sydney 
(Frozen Meat) 
32/6 
29/3 
23/6 
18/9 
No 
special 
tariff 
.t.nothe·r example is the so called "inland fire and 
flood risk" cover on wool, from after shearing until the 
wool reached auctioneers 1 .stores. If the cover was an 
extension of a sea risk insurance to the U.K., the 
extra rate agreed in 1900 was (in N.S.W.) 1/- only. For 
a separate policy covering the ninland" risk only, 
however, the following minimum rates were set: 
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From within 50 
miles of Rail 
Station or Port 
Sydney from 
NeS.W. 
Brisbane from 
Qld. ' Mdelaide from 
S.A. 
:\1elbourne from 
Vic. 
Geelong from 
Vic. 
Perth from West. 
Aust. 
~obart from Tas. 
Launceston from 
Tas. 
3/-
6/6 
2/6 
2/6 
2/6 
4/6 
3/-
3/-
From over 50 
miles of Rail 
Station or Port 
4/-
6/6 
3/-
3/-
3/-
4/6 
3/-
0 
3/-
Cover: Inland fire and flood risk only; from 
after shearing until auctioneers' store. 
Period: 3 months; for each additional month !/-
extra (N.S~W., S.A., Tas., Vic.); 1/6 
( Qld.) • 
If the wool was sent to the selling centre by coastal 
ship, a special tariff for "fire, flood and coastal 
risks" applied. The rates in this tariff were close! y 
related to the various intra and interstate coastal rates. (
2
) 
The relevant "River Agreement" rates applied to wool 
shipped by the Darling-Murray river system. 
For almost 30 years these rates remained unchanged, 
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(2) e.g. Gippsland to Melbourne 11/6; Rockhampto1n to ;, , Sydney 12/6,· Gulf Ports (Qld.) to Sydney, 20 -. l • • i . . l 
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with a few mindr exceptions.(3) After 1928 ·the· 
foll.owing alterations and extensions were made:· 
1928 -. red.ucti'ons in West Australian and 
1929 
1931 
Queensland.fire and flood rates. 
further reduction in Western Australia 
N. S. W .• fire and flood' rates reduced to· 
2/- and 2/6. . . · 
1931 - P:ovision f?r "within° and "beyond" 50 
m~les of railway station deleted in N.S.W. 
Vic·. and S.A.; the "within'~ rate to apply 
everywhere in these States. . 
1931 - Rainwater damage and hook, oil, grease, 
mud and damage from other cargo could be 
covered without extra premium. (Previously 
1/- extra). 
Damage by sweat and,moisture could be 1932 
covered at 1/- extra. . . 
1934 _Wool on sheepsback while in shed for 
shearing could be covered - no extra 
1936 
': l .. . 
, .. . 
premium. " 
Consolidated and revised tariff. No 
extra premi~m for sweat and moisture~ Rates 
for comprehensive inlund cover (3 months)l940 
to date: 
· N.s.w. Vic. 
Qld., W./.:... 
S. A. Tas. 1/6 
1/9 
Other tariffs of some significance which felt the 
0 
coming of the Lloyd's agents were tariffs on local hulls. 
Thus the N.s.w.· hull tariff agreed in 189.8 was abandoned 
in. 1936 " ••• owing to the recurring.necessity of making 
t . t . II ( 
4 ) • Th . t' 
amendments ••. to counter compe l ion. e in er-
state ~old tariff was also abandoned in 1930. 
. • I . ·' .l ~'i~:' 
' · I , I · i ~:i 
t r:, i ! ! H ' i'I 
; : l': ' I J i ' JI 1: I ~· ': ... f. 
· ., I ii: · 1" ;'! : .. : ii.: I' i 
' I : ; ,. . 1 ·.·· I .. ·• i. i 1 ; i (. p ; ! ·. ' i { . .t ': d 
: l ( i , J : i' q 
•.: I . f ; : I I' ( ~ i I ' I : • 1 ·' .... ~I . ! ; . f ; U 
, I : : ' t; a ~· . f • f I ·· 1 
.i\ : 11 : .1 i; ' .·• 11 
1;1· ! . F :j 
{ Ii l .· ~. i 1. f. ~ I . 1 l ~ : I i I )\· [f.M?i ;\ 
[. j , '. f i I q·: 
i I : ~ .( t j: !l . : ; •! 
.. i ,! : : §... ~ !.. . , 
: .! ! ; t : f ( ' 1 
t: I J i 1 i; :· ! . ' , 
: , t , I : I: : !. ' i 
I i l f:l: ~· I i 
,! , : :: 11:··.n · · 
l '· f . ; ! ':.\' 
, \ •· 1 ·ti H · l : j 
' !. · •. ) : ;!, ii: } '. '1 
•. ,. . . i~ · I :j ., . , \ 
;; ~ .I !;~ , f / ~; 
. I .. ·1 ' ! ( ii/ 
.I;, r.l·t JI l !1j. i: 1'1\ 
. . I ' •.: 'f 
' I ·1 . H I ; ; I l , . ; . r 
h . ·,1 !I 
;I !'HJ 
, i1 •. .\ · 1 r :1 ri. : 11 'li 1 '. t 1 ·r ~ · ~ J 
¥ I : 1 1 ' ~ 
l'i i l! ii '. 
11l' ... ,J 'r 
I ,.1 ) ,' ) \ 
* j 
1
l' 1 : I 1 
( i i ' :1 ; : I ·!•:I ,· ': j\ 
-
--------------------------- ----- ")I ' ,· il I ii,,· __._ !; i' jl . 1,, 
(3) In 1909 the Queensland fire and flood rate was reduced i -!J! , . ·· ! · j: 
to 5;_, but in 1911 the com.bined fire, flood and H .! · •· ! 1) .. 11
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coastal rate was increased. In 1917 a rate was set I, !l ; , 11 .• 
for rainwater damage, (1/-) • . j, !t[ • !I I· ·· 
Annual Report, 1937 ,Sydney Marine Underwriters' I q · i · J j. 
Association. I\~ l \ \. ;: · ·.· 1 Ii! : l ·~ .-
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(4) 
The coastal, interstate and other·local tariffs 
were sweepingly revised and simplified in 1950, as 
were the international tariffs. Subject to certain 
special provisions, interstate and coastal voyages 
in ships of over 300 tons became subject to minimum 
F.P.A. rntes only. The single rule regarding W.A. 
covers was that they should be charged at not less 
than 3d. above the :B1.P.A. rate. In view of the 
predominance of "All Risk" Rnd W.A. terms. after 
1950 the tariffs allowed underwriters a wide degree 
of discretion in quoting rates, as compared with the 
complicated system that had existed before. 
(~) Conclusions. It has been shown that marine 
tariff rates responded in the long run to non-tariff 
pressures. This was most obvious in the cases of 
"international" tariffs, which were adjusted from time 
to time after consultation with the I.L.U. The fact 
that one important tariff - the "General Homewards" 
was not reduced in the 1920's and 1930's probably 
explains the drift of a good deal of eX1~ort business 
, ~ to L_ondon, when it was not underva1 i tten at special 
rates by Council pools. Local tariffs were probably 
relatively rigid in their first. 20 or 30 years, but 
changes were made vdth the coming of direct non-tariff 
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competition tof-\ustralia. Despite this competition, 
as shown in Chapter II.c, Australian marine insurance 
appears, to h~ve been exceptionally profitable. This 
is the more remarkable when it is considered that 
~ 
'1 j' ~{ 
Federal Marine Coundil powers were far less comprehensive, 
than those of the FAUA Council, notably with respect to 
breaches. Also, compa~ies had greater discretion 
regarding discounts: they could allow up to 15 per cent 
to compete with bonus companies, or for cash, without 
notify~ng their Association. On the other hand there 
were the very drastic provisions that !1Q. brokerage 
· should be paid, tha~ maximum agen~y commission was 10 
per cent, and that each company could have only a single 
agent in each main city. These restrictions probably 
considerably inhibited the development of informed and 
expert insurance buying within Australia, and firms 
and org~nisations which were alive to the possibiliti~s 
in these respects may have been in a position to use 
more highly_developed marine markets outside Australia. 
This subject is discussed further below. 
{.6) Workers' Compensation. The control of Workers' 
compensation business was not given specifically to 
the couricil, because l~gislation vari~d between States. 
Nevertheless, by virtue of its overall powers the 
council could and di~ intervene on occasions. 
th. e wi' dening of the scope ·of the 1910, ·after 
Thus in 
!1·{ 5 
Queensland Workers' Compensation Act, the Council 
instructed the Queensland Association to increase all 
Workers' Compensation rates by 15 per cent. The 
Queensland Association, fearing Government intervention, 
passed a resolution a few months later which would have 
reduced the new rates by 25 per cent; the Council 
considered this resolution and ordered that it should 
be !'escinded. 
The effective power over the fixing of rates 
soon passed, however, from Local Associations and the 
Council to State Governments. The first modification 
\ 
in this direction came with the setting up of the 
State Insurance Offices, the second with the 
promulgation of maximum rates by Government 
organisations set up under the various Acts. Both these 
tended to occur simultaneously with the amendments 
making insurance compulsory. 
Year of Original 
Workers' 
Compensation Act 
N.S.W. 1910 
Vic. 1914 
Qld. 1905 
W .A. 1902 
S. A. 1900 
Tas. 1910 
.K2 1911) Cwlth. 
1912) 
Year of 
Act or 
Amendment 
making Ins. 
compulsory 
1926 
1914 
1916 
1924 
1924 
1933 
1911 
The dates were as follows: 
Year of 
Commence-
ment of 
G.I.O. 
Compe ti tim 
1926 
1914 
1916b(1 
1926 
1919 
Year of 
Commencement 
of Gazetting 
of Max.Rates 
1945 
1916 
1948 
1947 
t-~otes: ~l 
b(2 
Monopuly(lo9fll~· ~n.od. r •. 11 th.Govt.employees (1912) • 
Seamen J a ~·-
' ' I 
i • 
~ 
I t > 
• 1, 
~ • I I I\ Tri""!llm-
l .. ) 6 I I 1 I 1f f' 
Year Independent 
Insurers 
Principally 
Self-Ins. 
Cos. 
Self-
Insurers 
1 '1 } I I I I~ ! ,~! 
i I 1:' Percentage 1 
1
1 
1 
, 
1
' 
of Wages \ ; ; I 1 
covered by ; 1 l ! 
Self- , 1 1 ~ ~ 1 
Insurers'* 1 I I :1 j : 
1926 29 7 64 ! : ; '~ i I ; n.a. 11 lf !1 
n.a. ii :1 }i 1930 35 7 70 
1940 42 7 66 
j t 1l i j : 
n. a. ; I ·, l 
t I I ~ ~ ~ 
1950 50 8 59 
1960 77 8 50 ~::~ : : :r I i ~ 
l l ' 
Source: Annual Re2orts, N.s.w. Workers' Compensation 
Commission. 
~Not including princi~ally self-ins. cos. 
a number of small co~p~nies were in effect self-
insurance sch~mes for particular firms or trade 
associations. These are shown separately. Both types 
of scheme are able to reinsure catastrophe risks and 
high value common law liabilities with Lloyd's or 
professional reinsurance companies. 
Where maximum rates are set by the Government, 
these become minimum rates for tariff companies. However 
they are subject to certain discounts and rebates 
provided for by the tariffs. Two of these are largely 
within the discretion of companies; they are: 
(1) "Wage roll" discounts i.e. discounts specified 
in the tariffs for annual wage rolls beyond certain sizes. 
{2) Rebates on renewal equivalent to bonuses 
declared by the Chamber of Manufacturers, Manufacturers' 
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jv1utual, and the Gcw ernment Insurance Off ices. All 
• l l') 7 
.f I ., 
the latter agree to inform the appropriate Association 
in advance of bonuses proposed to be announced. 
Two further forms of discount must be considered 
by the Association and Council Committees respectively. 
They are: 
(3) "Claims experience'' discounts. These were 
introduced in 1940 by Council decision as a counter to 
Government competition (particularly from the 
Victorian State Accident Office) and the development 
of self insurance. The original discounts were 
ap~licable to annual payrolls over £12,000 and gross 
premiums in excess of £100. Dis.counts could be 
ailowed on the basis of average loss ratios over three 
years as follows: 
Loss ratio (per cent) Discount (per cent) 
Under 20 25 
n 30 15 
It 40 5 
The maximum discounts were later increased, but 
each application for su~h a discount must be considered 
by State FAVA Committees. 
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(4) Finally, the Council Reference Committee 
has power to declare special rates in particular cases 
on the grounds of "tariff hardshipu and non-tariff 
competition. This comes under Regulation 4 of the 
"Rules for the Conduct of Business" and is the 
equivalent (for all accident business) of the fire 
discounts under Regulation 3(a)2, referred to above. (5) 
In addition to these discounts, in N.S.W. since 
1945 there has been a system of profit control, called 
the 0 fixed loss ratio scheme 11 • This is further 
described in Chapter V; here it may be noted that 
compulsory rebates on gublished tariff rates (i.e. before 
the application of any of the discounts listed above) 
may be declared by the Premiums Committee of the Workers' 
Compensation Commission. The Committee may also require 
certain percentages of premiums to be transferred to or 
from special 1•equalisation reserves 11 • Under the scheme 
statistics are collected both on the basis of actual and 
tariff rates, and loss ratios calculated according to 
these two methods are of some interest. 
(51 The clause differs in one interesting respect from the fife clause. Whereas 3(a)2 discounts are 
(officially) purely defensive, special acci~ent 
ratings may be granted nt? preserve.or acgu.ir: a , 
connection from u non-tariff competitors. (Writer s 
emphasis). 
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It is obvious from the above 'list that tariff 
companies did not long have a decisive say in the 
fixing of Workers' Compensation rates, and in fact by 
191='.0 · 11 c .. t t and Tasmania · ~ in a v a es except Victoria/maximum rates were 
. . and Tasmania 
set by regulation under the Acts. In Victoria/the 
FAVA consults with the Insurance Commissioner before 
announcing changes. Equally as important is the 
presence of Government Office competition. In the early 
stages in both Victoria and N.s.w. G.I.O. participation 
brought big reductions in rates which were followed by 
the Associations. The severity of the competition has 
however varied between States, and within States 
according to political developments. There is also no 
Government competition in South Australia. 
As well as from Government Offices, competition has 
come from mutual companies, non-tariff insurers and self-
insurers. Of the first the most important are the 
Chamber of Manufactures and the Manufacturers' Mutual, 
already mentioned above. Lloyd's brokers and non-tariff 
companies quote below tariff and are countered by the 
FAVA Council by the application of special discounts. 
Under the various Acts self-insurance is allowed, and a 
number of large firms and organisations run their own 
schemes. some statistics concerning these are available 
· In addition to self-insurers listed as such, in N.s.w. 
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Workers' CompensationL N.S.W.1~51-52 to 1959-60. 
Loss Ratios on Basis of 
1951-52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
1959-60 
Tariff Rates 
-
39.3 
38.4 
49.8 
62.9 
66.2 
74.2 
64.4 
72.8 
68.8 
Actual Rat.es 
47.9 
46.3 
62.2 
69.0 
75.4 
81.3 
72.5 
78.8 
71.8 
• 
Averaoe 
Discount 
off Tariff 
Rates 
18.0 
17.1 
19.9 
8.8 
12.2 
8.7 
11.2 
7.6 
4.2 
Source: Annual Reoorts, N.S.W. Workers' Compensation 
Commission. This information is not available 
before 1951-52. 
As can be seen, the average discount level implied by 
these loss ratios have tended to be high when tariff 
rate loss ratios were low, and vice versa. This of 
course would follow automatically from renewal bonuses 
paid in accordance with past underwriting profit by the 
Manufacturers' Mutual and the G.I.O. of N.s.w. 
~ Motor Vehicle Insurance. Power over motor 
vehicle insurance was given to the Council, which, as 
soon as it was formed, spent much time devising a 
uniform policy for the Commonwealth, and setting rates 
for each of the States. Even at this early stage there 
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was some difficulty as the wool-finance firm of 
Dulgety and Co. had made contact with the early Lloyd's 
motor underwriters and were issuing motor policies 
embodying somewhat wider conditions than tariff, at 
considerably lower rates. Eventually Dcilgety and Co. 
agreed to follow tariff rates (in September 1910) and 
in November 1911 they subscribed to a new Australia-
wide tariff. However it seems probably that the form 
tris tariff took and the rates charaeJ under it were J 
influenced by their original stanp~ 6) 
As did other forms of business, in the 'twenties 
and after motor vehicle tariffs came under attack from 
Lloyd's ?gents, the mutuals, and other non-tariff 
companies. However direct Lloyd's competition was 
probably less important in this field than others, as 
the business required a rather extensive field organ-
isation, 'especially for claims assessment and settlement. 
As mentioned already, the Lloyd's market was probably 
more important in providing reinsurance backing for new 
Australian companies. More significant was the pressure 
from private motoring organisations. In Victoria the 
Royal Automobile Club of Victoria arranged its members' 
Information from Council Records, MelbouDne. No_ 
details of negotiations with Dalgety and Co.available. 
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motor vehicle insurances with a non-ta1lff company, 
the Automobile Insurance Company of Australi~, from 
about 1922. In 1928 the business went to Lloyd's 
at a still lower discount, 7 but was captured by the 
tariff market under a special arrangement 
administered by the Victorian FAUA in 1934. In N .s. w. 
in 1925 the National Roads and Motorists' Association 
started N.R.M.A. Insurance Ltd., again to underwrite 
members' motor insurances at below tariff rates. 
Later, in all other States except South Australia, 
similar a~rangements were made. The present position 
is as follows: 
( 7) 
N.S.W. 
Vic. 
Qld. 
Tas. 
W.A. 
S.A. 
N.R.M.A. members' insuranceshandled 
by N.R.M.A. Ins. Ltd., since 1925. 
R.A.C.V. members' insurances handled 
by FAVA companies through agency 
known as Club Motors Pty. Ltd. 
Since 1934. 
R.A.C. members' insurances handled by 
F~UA pool since 1941. 
R.A.C. members' insurances handled by 
FAUA pool since 1946. 
R.A.C. Insurance Pty. Ltd., es~d.1947, 
underwrites members' insurances. 
Previously F.A.U.A. pool. 
No special arrangement. 
AIBR 1928 po. 240,730. The Auto~obile Ins. Co. 
became the present Automobile Fire and General. 
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It is unfortunate that in none of these cases 
are useful statistics published, and the organisations 
concerned were unwilling to supply them to the writer. (S) 
However it is known that under these schemes a high 
proportion of Australian motor vehicle business is 
written at substantial discounts from tariff r~tes. (9) 
For example, the effective rate to the Victorian 
Club Motor pool companies is about 25 to 30 per cent 
below tariff rates when account is taken of: 
(1) 15 per cent discount to R.A.C.V. members. 
(2) No claims bonus 33i per cent after first 
claim free year, compared with tariff 
bonuses of 20 per cent in first, 25 per cent 
second, 33~ per cent third year. 
(3) High commission paid to R.A.C.V. At present 
said to be 20-30 per cent, compared with 
maximum tariff agency commission of 10 per 
cent. 
Moreover N.R.M.A. Insurance has been willing to quote 
its normal rates for vehicles under hire purchase 
agreements. 
(8) E t N RM A Ins Ltd , on a confidential basis. xcep • • • .• • • 
In 1958-59 N.R.M.A. Insurance Ltd.motor vehicle premiums~were about 40 per cent of total N.S.W. (9) 
motor vehicle premiums. 
. 
' 
I 
' 
" 
I 
I I I 
I I 
I i ' . : ; •, 
• 
l. l ; I
1 d' 
I J i , ;; ; .Ii" 
I I l l 
I l i. 
I f I i 
I 1 l l: '{ 
" •' 
J 
I 
I~ I J 
ll 
" •' I ( 
I 
1, ,, 
' 11 
I' 
··h 
I 
I 
t 
' I I' 
,. ' 
1 ,1 
I 
' 
l Ii 
ii 
I I 
,, 
• l l ? • l ~ 
, 
• 
; . 
' 
' . ' I 
! ~ 
I 
' 
< 
I ~ 
As in Workers' Compensation insurance, 
competition by Government Offices for motor vehicle 
business developed in all States except South 
Australia. The dates of commencement were:(l) 
Queensland 
Tas. 
W.A. 
Vic. 
N.S.W. 
1916 
·1919 
1926 
1941 
1942 
Rates to the general public, except for hire purchase 
vehicles, are again below tariff (e.g. in N.S.W. 
about 10 per cent, Victoria 15 per cent) and are subject 
• 
to profit bonuses on renewal. Special low rates are 
also quoted to public servants in most States. 
As in other tariffs, adjustments were made to the 
agreements, to enable FAVA companies to meet outside 
competition, in the late 1920's and early 1930•s. One 
of the more important measures was the adoption of 
regulations for special Ufleet ratings" in 1928. Under 
these owners of more than 10 vehicles in one State 
could be allowed a discount of up to 25 per cent. In 
1939 this was increas~d to 35 per cent. All applications 
(1) In N.S.W. and Victoria the commencement of Motor 
Comprehensive business was largely a by product of 
the introduction of compulsory third party insurance. 
-------------------------·--------·--~-----
l i r 
, 
" ( '.'. 
i 1 
' ' . 
for discounts were to be considered by state FAUA. 
Committees acting on returns showing premiums and 
previous claims experience. The reguJ!cttion applied 
to vehicles not under hire purchase only, and 
applications could.not be submitted if the business 
a:;. 
were already Qn the books of other FAUA members •. Lists 
of fleets specially rated were circularised amoh~ 
members. In 1961 the 35 per cent limit was abolished 
but the power of fixing an appropriate discount was 
' 
\ 
taken from State Associations and given to the Council 
Committee. Both new applications and annual renewals 
were henceforth to be considered,, It is ..-;lso 
signif i~ant that it was felt necessary to specify that 
claims ratios should be calculated on premiums ~ of 
all discount, agency com~ission to the ins~, und 
" 
directorial allowances. 
- . 
Another important measure was the introduction 
of the "no-claim bonus 0 from 1933. Between 1933 and 
1951 a discount of 20 per cent was allowed for no claims 
in the preceding year. In 1951 the bonus for no claims 
in two consecutive years was increased to 25 per cent, 
1 
and for three years 333 per cent. 
All the factors mentioned so far have weakened 
the control of the FAVA over motor vehicle rates. 
u th development of hire purchase financing of 
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~otor vehicl~s, important in the 1920's and 1930 1s, 
but especially significant _in the 1950's, worked in 
the opposite direction. The reason for this was that 
finance companies Were able to lay down the terms of 
.insurance . in hiring contracts. As already pointed out, 
numbers of .new Australian insurance comoanies were 
. I 
.formed by or with the backing of hire purchase companies. 
Not all of these joined the tariffs, but this did not 
in any way threaten tariff ratings of hire purchase 
. . 
motor vehicles, and there was little opposition to 
successive increases in rates made by the FAUA Council. 
·v~hicles under hire.purchase were first separately 
. . 
rated in 1933. Taking the Victorian tariff as an. 
example, percentage margins above normal rates have been 
as follows:( 2) 
192 ~-1937 10.8 
1937-1951 23.5 
1951-1953 28.7 
1953-1955 25.7 56.7 ) 
1955-1956 58.5 78.5 
) After 20 per cent 
) 
1956-1961 44.4 80.5 )· no claim bonus .. 
1961- 67.3 i0.9.3 
) 
) 
Under the tariffs the »no claim" discoun~ has never been 
allo~ed for hire purchase vehicles; the resulting 
~~~---~---------------------
· t tor cars (2) £1000·comprehensive cover on priv~ e mo. . 
. , d . th. Melbourne Metropolitan ·district. garage in · e ·1 · I '! ; .. . 
' 
, .. . 
~ ~· : ' 
r ~· 
_lL 
'· 
increased differ~rtial over the normal premium is 
shown in the second column on the assumption of a 
20 per cent no claim bonus in the second year. A factor 
not taken into account above is that the tariffs require 
that if premiums are paid in advance, the full premium 
must be paid without account being taken of interest 
earnings. In the mid 1950's, on the argument that some 
allowance should be made for inflation, the tariff 
provided for loadings on contracts of longer than one 
7' year; for example, under a three year contract paid in 
I\\ 
advance 15 and 25 per cent were added to the hire 
purchase premiums of the second and third years 
respectively. 
The situation in hire purchase insurance has had 
some recognition by State Governments. In 1957 the N.s.w. 
e Government amended the Hire Purchase Act to allow the 
Governmen~ to fix maximum premiums for vehicles under 
hire purchase contracts. In 1959 a conference of 
Com1onwealth and State ministers agreed on uniform State 
legislation for hire purchase. Under provisions passed in 
all States in 1959 and 1960 hirers were given the 
statutory right of nominating an insurance company of 
their own choice. Although this right is of dubious value 
in practice, no other States followed the N.S.W. practice 
(3) 
0£ gazetting maximum rates. ----------~----:-~--=---------~~~~--
( 3) For further discuSSion of this legislation see 
Chapter V. 
I 
i ' 
, 
~ Other Classes t. The most important of the classes 
of insurance not so far mentioned is motor vehicle third 
party liability. Originally this cover had been given 
as an extension of the motor vehicle policy with rates 
set by the Council. In the late 1930 1s and early 
1940's, following the examples of New Zealand and Britain, 
all the Australian states introduced legislation making 
this insurance a prerequisite for the registration of 
motor vehicles. 811. the Acts provided for Government 
approval of insurers and for Government setting of 
maximum rates, usually after the recommendation of 
committees upon which tariff companies were only one of 
the interests represented. (4) After the War, long delays 
in adjusting rates to rapidly increasing claims caused 
many companies to withdraw from the field altogether, 
especially in N.s.w. and Victoria. The result was that 
most of the business came to be written (at a 
substantial loss) by Government offices, and so the 
influence of the Council over rates was even further 
diminished. 
In the many other miscellaneous forms of cover 
tariffed by the council, broadly the same pattern was 
(4) For further discussion, see Chapter'V. 
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followed ~s in fire insurance. However in a few cases 
there were early difficulties. Thus in livestock 
insurance Dalgety and Co. in 1909 had a special 
arrangement with Lloyd's and it was agreed that no 
alteration would be made to this-'tariff without 
consulting them. In plate glass insurance there were 
originally two small mutuals outside the agreement, 
but this problem was solved when both were absorbed 
by the London and Lancashire (in 1912 and 1915). A 
similar difficulty existed in personal accident; over 
1909-10 the Council negotiated successfuly with the 
kolonial Mutual Life. In later years all the major 
life companies commenced personal accident business, 
but they agreed to follow the Council tariff, which was 
profitable and still very little changed in 1962. In 
these and all other lines - sprinkler leakage, hail, 
public risk, boiler, burglar~, fidelity guarantee, 
pluvius, aviation, all risks etc. - Lloyd's, Government 
and other non-tariff competition developed in the 1920's, 
and all became subject to the provisions then introduced 
fb r special ,ratings and discounts. For some classes -
e.g. hail and aviation - FAUA administered pools were 
the most eff1·ci·ent means of meeting this established as 
competition. 
over the period,as intended in the 
agreements, minimum rates were set for all new permiss~ble 
forms of cover.(o) Hoe lt w ver a erations to existing 
tariffs involving reductio.ns in rates, were few; the 
principal changes were: 
1950 Public Risk 
1959 Burglary 
1959 Fidelity Guarantee 
It has been shown that tariff companies 
were in the long run unable to prevent the operation of 
new competitors outside their agreements, Also, in two 
important areas - workers' compensation and compulsory 
third party - rate fixing was eventually taken over 
directly by State Governments. Moreover in Queensland, 
after 1916 all rates were subject to the Insurance 
Commissioners' Approval. 
Excluding Queensland, in 1957-58, the volume of 
Australian non·life premiums for which tariff companies 
( 5) e.g. Television.tariff, a~opted 1?56. 0 The only exception was •contractor s All Risks , for w~ich 
the agreement specifically states that comp~nies 
are free to quote any terms or rates they wish. 
The cover, as the n?me indic?tes ! is' a "pack~ge" 
usually including fire, public risk, wor~ers 
compensation, contr~ct guarantee bond, windstorm 
etc. in the one policy. 
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decided the basic rating framework was 
or 39.5 per cent of a total of £147 m. 
This was made up as follows:' 
Prerns. £m. 
Fire etc. 28.3 
Marine 4.5 
MV 18.7 
CTP -
w. Comp. -
Other 6.7 
All Classes 58.2 
only £58.2 m., 
approximately. 
Per cent of 
class prems • 
.. 
72,0 
63.3 
46.4 
-
48.9 
39.5 
Source: Statistics of tariff and non-tariff 
market shares made available by the 
Industry. 
if' 
Within the "controlled" sectors a probably high 
proportion of the business was subject to spe~ial 
discounts, or to bonuses from the principal mutual 
companies. In marine insurance in the 1950's the 
tariff was so simplified as to leave considerable 
. 
scope for the competitive quoting of rates. 
During the 50 years underconsideration, downward 
changes in tariff rates were nearly all in response to 
outside pressures, and were seldom initiated by tariff 
bodies. 
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Although the tariffs were sponsored by London 
companies and dominated by them i n later years, 
important and effective competition in Australia 
also came from the London market, especially from 
Lloyd's. 
In the long run rates responded to competi tiN":e 
forces, but it seems probable that the response was 
slowed down by tariff rules. In contrast to a market 
such as London, where rates may fluctuate from month 
to month, or even daily, Australian tariff rates 
have remained unchanged for periods of years, even 
in the most Rflexible" case, marine. 
Effective rates have, differed from tariff rates, 
but the requirement of Committee approval of discounts 
r:J 
and sp~cial ratings has slowed the process down 
and has probably led to marked discrimination between 
risks subject to non-tariff attack, and so specially 
rated, and others written at tariff rates. This is 
probably especially true for classes where the 
uincomew aspect of premiums are relatively 
insignificant. Here it is to be expected that the 
other dimensions of competition, "product• or "policy
0 
variation, and "selling costs•, would be more important. 
These are now discussed in turn. 
-· 
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CHAPTER XI 
!f!E TWENTIETH CENTURY PRODUCT VARIATION AND SELLING COSTS 
1. Product Variation 
As already explained, the aim of the tariffs was that 
all forms of cover issued should be uniform, and that 
extensions should not be.granted if not allowed for in the 
agreements. To achieve these aims standard forms of cover 
notes, proposals, policies and endorsements were laid 
down. 
For two important new classes of business - Workers• 
Compensation and Compulsory Third Party - the scope of the 
cover and conditions were set out in the various Acta~ and 
the Council had no say beyond regulating what could be done 
by way of extensions to these policies e.g. common law 
cover to workers' compensation policies. Accordingly the 
following discussion is confined to developments in fields 
where the Council did have greater influence. In view of 
the complexity and variety of insurance contracts no attempt 
is made to undertake a comprehensive survey of !1! changes 
in every tariff. Instead attention is concentrated on a 
number of the more important contracts, and these are treated 
as case studies to illustrate more general points. 
Uniform fire policY conditions. The policy adopted 
by the council in 1910 reDlained substantially unaltered 
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until 1946. It embodied 20 "small print" conditions, 
and its relative complexity contrasted with more 
straightforward policy forms introduced by some 
non-tariff insure~s in the 1920~s • The only 
significant amendment was made in 1934, - but this 
added a further condition to an already formidable 
list. The revision made in 1946 was occasioned to 
some extent by non-tariff competition, but mainly 
by pressure from the Queensland Government Office. 
The latter claim that 10 of the 21 conditions were not 
essential and from 1941 'i-s,sued1 policies on this basis. 
From this time the desirability of a simplified policy 
was discussed by the Council and the LAIC, and although 
it was thought at first that only 5 conditions could be 
safely eliminated the insistence of the Queensland 
Office made this impossible, and the policy eventually 
adopted (and agreed to by the Queensland Office) 
contained 12 conditions.(6) The new policy closely 
followed the U.K. F.O.C. standard policy, already in 
effect in England for many years. Tariff companies 
(6) The posi~ion of the QSGI9 in this matter was ~reatly 
strengthened by its rumning an extremely profitable 
fire reinsurance pool in which tariff compa~ie? shared. 
The Commissioner was able to say: you are willing to 
reinsure on these terms, so why not write such 
policie? direct? 
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were to use it in future for all new fire insurances 
in Australia, but there was no obligation to replace 
existing policies on renewal. 
Addi tiona.l Qei:,i,ls.. The uniform fire policy covered 
damage to property by fire, lightning, or explosion of gas 
used for lighting or heating, or of domestic boilers. 
Among the more important exclusions were fires 1 caused by 
earthquake, riots and strikes, war, and explosion. However 
standard clauses and extra premiums for these covers were 
included in the 1910 agreement. In 1937 tariff companies 
agreed not to cover war risk, but with this exception 
the position was unchanged in 1962. It was not possible 
to cover explosion damage as such until 1918. The 
Council then decided that the cover could be granted 
without reference for "W" and other non-hazardous risks, 
but for all other risks only on application to the 
Council, and at rates and on terms decided by it. This 
rule was in force until 1953, from when Council approval 
of each case was no longer required. 
Average clause~. One of the important tariff rules 
was that certain classes of fire risk were to be subject 
to a standard "pro rata" average clause printed on the 
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back of the policy. These included single policies 
covering two ·or ·more separated risks, goods., in the open 
air, and stock ·or merchandise in single risks axceeding 
£10,000 in value. St'ate FAUA Committees could also 
declare average conditions to apply to any other risk, 
(including accident risks) and in fact the "Classification 
of Risks" tables in all States contained many such cases. 
Between 1910 and 1962 little alteration was made to these 
requirements: the only change of any significance was the 
raising of the required stock value to £50,000 in the 
1950's. ThereW3s also no attempt to encourage variants 
of the average clause in use in the U.K. arad other 
countries. The two most usual cla1Jses in the U.K. state 
that average does not apply unless the sum insured is 
less than 75 or 80 per cent respectively of the value cf 
the property. Probably the most common use is in 
with 
connection/agricultural insurances, but in Australia tariff 
insurance of crops, grass, livestock, stacks etc., the 
full "pro rata" average clause must be used. Such clauses 
may be used in two cases only: 
(1) Machinery .·90 per cent average clause. 
(2) Buildings - 80 per cent average 
allowed by FAUA Committee, and 
increased by 10 eer cent~ 
clause: if 
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Short period ~ates. The 1910 tariff, for both 
fire and accident business, took over a scale of 
short period rates direct from the F.o.c. (Foreign) 
rules. These provided that the premium on short 
period policies was n~ro ratau plus 5 per cent of the 
difference between the short period and the annual 
premium, except when the policy was cancelled by the 
insured for transfer to another insurer. A special 
penal scale then applied. This again was unaltered 
in 1962 except in Queensland, again because of pressure 
from the Government Office.( 7) 
(7) The Queensland scale makes concessions for 
cancellation after the sixth month. 
Period Proportion of Annual Rate • 
(month) Queensland All other States 
1 ~ ~ 
3 ~ ~ 
6 ~ ~ 
7 4/5 l 
8 17/20 1 
9 9/10 1 
10-12 1 1 
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Master Policies. On many large risks tariff 
companies in Australia were coinsurersrbut until 1942 
the tariffs made no provision for collective or "master" 
policies. Until then it was necessary for each company 
to issue a separate policy for its share of any risk, so 
that it was common for 30, 40 or even more policies to be 
current for individual risks. Large insurers or their 
brokers would, as a result, hold perhaps 100 or 200 
insurance policies. For each policy there was a separate 
cover mote and proposal, and each time an amendment was 
made requiring endorsement of the policy, every office 
issued a slip for attachment to its policy. For this 
purpose the policy had to be returned from the client or 
his broker. If a fire occurred, it was necessary to 
fill in a claim form for every company involved, In 1942 
this procedure was admitted by all to have been grossly 
inefficLent but until then no effective moves to alter it 
had been made in the tariff market, either by compalilies or 
registered brokers. Change had to await wartime staff 
shortages and pressure from the manpower authorities. 
The method adopted was to allow the issue of a single 
"master policy" where more than 5 companies were involved 
~ direct on· the same risk. The company with th~ largest 
share issued the policy and it was merely signed by the 
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others, which agreed to follow the leading company in 
claim settlements. The procedure had such obvious 
advantages of convenience to the client, and in expenses 
to brokers and companies, that it was incorporated and 
to the present remains in the tariffs. 
Blanket Covers. The original fire tariff provided 
that separate risks were to be separately rated even if 
' 
' 
" ~ 
} 
I t I> 
t 
' 
under the same ownership and part of the same establishment. ·~ 
For large factories this involved careful surveying, 
detailed maps, and extensive calculation both in the 
assessment of the premium and for each alteration. In 
the early 1920's.non-tariff insurers, especially the 
Lloyd's brokers, by-passed these procedures by issuing 
policies fo~ a single sum insured and at a simple flat 
rate. As mentioned above (p. 598) in 1928 the Council 
responded by empowering the Council Committee to declare 
an average rate when the value of the buildings and 
contents<i a single establishment exceeded £500,000. 
Since then many such "blanket" covers have been issued 
by tariff companie s, but to ~he present special. 
application to the Council Committee.is necessary. 
Replacement-value fire policies~ This was another 
innovation introduced following non-tariff pressure. 
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A replacement-value fire policy would pay the actual cost 
, 
of 'r~placing property destroyed, rather than the "value" 
of the property at the time of the fire.( 8) The Council 
first provided for these policies in 1925, but its 
approval of each case was required until 1951. After 
1951 issue was open to tariff companies without reference, 
but only in the various forms laid down and in accordance 
with tariff rules. Moreover the regulations state: 
"Issue of Policies under this regulation is not 
to be advertised, ·nor used as a means of competition 
between members of the Association." (9) 
Q._eclaration pol icie.~. Following the F.o.c. (Foreign) 
rules the issue of open fire policies with periodical 
declarations of amounts at risk, was not allowed under the 
1910 and earlier tariffs. Such policies were considered 
to be inconsistent with the schedule of short-period rates. 
However they were freely used in marine insurance, and were 
. 
an obvious convenience where fire policies covered goods 
in warehouses, stocks of raw materials at factories etc. 
In the absence of a declaratiom·policy it was necessary 
( 8) 
(9) 
The latter is usually taken to mean. Pmarket value" 
less depreciation. 
Regulations for the Conduct of Fire and Accident 
Business, Reguln. 14'.(b}. FAUA Records, Sydney. 
, l 
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to endorse the policy frequently, or to insure for 
a sum well in excess of the average values at risk in 
order to cover peak requirements. The first procedure 
could be cumbersome and inconvenient and the second was 
expensive. Accordingly non-tariff introduction of 
declaration policies in the early 1920's - found a ready 
response, and the FAUA Council was forced to change its 
rules. In 1924 it drew up a special "Adjustable·; Policies 
Tariff", and in 1928 replaced it by the present 
"Declaration Policy Agreementtt .. 
The scope for issuing these covers was at first 
relatively circumscribed, and it is of interest to 
trace the steps by which some of the rules were 
liberalised. 
(1) 1924 - policies to be issued only to insureds 
approved by Council Committee. 
1948 - requirement deleted. 
(2) 1924 - business to be "mainly manufacturing". 
1928 requirement deleted. 
(3) 1924 - minimum amount at risk "on main premises" 
~' £1 m. 
1928 - minimum "im the Commonwealth" - £1 m. 
1928 _ minimum fire insurance in "any one State" -
£100,009. 
1929 - minimum any one state £50,000. except N.s.w. and Victoria - £100,000. 
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1930 - Govarnment controlled boards - minimum 
£25,000. 
1942 - minimum "any one location" £20,000. 
(4)1924 -
1928 --
Full annual premium to be paid in advance. 
75 per cen~ annual premium payable in 
advance; minimum premium 50 per cent of 
full annual premium. 
1943 - special provision for wool brokers· minimum 
:; ··,_, premium 1/3 annual premium.' 
Householper's Comprehensive. Asmentioned already, 
Householder's Comprehensive policies were adopted by the 
Council in 1927, the recommendation of the special 
comm~~tee on non-tariff competition set up in 1925. 
Before this, it had been necessary to issue separate 
By contrast, in 
requiring comprehensive protection. 
non-tariff insurers had offered combined 
"burglar~ 
England, 
fire and damage" policies as early as 
1893, in 1906 
extended to include domestic 
workers' compensation(l). In 
British Dominions introduced the modern form of 1915 the 
comprehensive policy to England, and F.o.c. tariffs was 
adopted in 1920 (for contents) and 1922 (for buildings)(
2
). 
(1) W.A.Dinsdale: History of Accident Insurance in Great 
Bri ta~D_, p. 267. 
(2) Ibid,. p.197 fn. 29. 
I 
It is notable that the .§.ritish Dominions(3) operated 
outside the tariff in the U.K. but as a tariff company 
in Australia, and ln Australia made no attempt to 
introduce its new policy until tariff rules allowed it 
to, together with all other companies, 12 years later. 
The Australian policy was based on the F.O.C. 
tariff, and from the beginning gave a wide range of cover. 
Thus it included loss or damage to buildings and contents 
caused by fire, explosion, burglary, larceny, theft, 
riots and strikes, overflowing or bursting of water tanks 
or pipes, storm and tempest damage to contents, domestic 
workers' compensation, and other miscellaneous contingenci~~~ 
It came into operation in May 1927 for "AP districts only, 
but was extended to B, c.,D, and E districts in 1928~ 
As concerned buildings, it originally applied to private 
dwellings only, but in 1930 private boarding houses and 
residential flats classed "W" were included. It was subject 
to "pro rata" average for both buildings and contents, 
but this clause was no longer required for buildings after 
1939. After 1939 ~o further changes of significance were 
(3) Name changed to Eaale Star in 1917. 
(4) e.g. contents temporarily removed, damage to mirrors, 
loss of rent, hotel expenses, public liability, death 
of insured. 
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made, and by 1962 it was less liberal than the U.K. 
policy in at least two respects.(5) 
Loss of Profits. Loss of profits insurance was 
forbidden by the 1897 Australian tariffs, and was also 
not written by tariff companies in England. One of the 
grounds for this was that profit policies then issued 
paid a fixed percentage of fire losses, regardless of 
actual loss of profits, and this was considered to be 
a dangerous infringement of the principle of indemnity. 
However, in 1901 a company called the Profits and Income 
was formed lo London to write the business along the 
lines of modern practice, i.e. with detajled rulesfor 
the estimation of profits lost. In 1907, the u.K. F.o.c. 
( 5) The 1920 F.o.c. policy burglary section had contaired 
a 90 days "unoccupancy clause" i.e. if the 
dwelling were left unoccupied for more than 90 days 
the burglary cover would cease. This clause was 
deleted in 1948 (Dinsdale op. cit. P• 268) but in 
Australia a 30 day unoccupancy clause was inserted 
in the beginning and still remains~ .In ~he U.K •. 
the maximum liability under the public risk section 
was increased to £25,000 in 1948 (Ibid. p.187) but 
the Australian limit remains at £!,000. 
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rule was :re s.cinded and the business commenced by tariff 
companies in England. The reasons · given for its 
adoption. by the· General Manager of a London company are 
of interest. (6 ) 
" ••• At last we have started this Comsequential Loss 
Insurance. · 
. I' have for years had it in prospect.knowing that 
it wo~ld. have to come. but no big fire Co.l had the 
teme~1~y to make a st~rt, fearing that it might 
precipitate the matter, as all the other Companies 
wo~ld rapidly follow ~uit, and that oonsequently, 
while there might not be much business obtainable, 
the normal hazard of the fire insurance which is a 
much more important thing for us all, would be 
deteriorated. 
These objections still apply, but the departure 
has come .about: firstly, by the Profits and Income 
having sold their business to the new Legai, which 
Lega! is impinging upon the fire business of some 
important Companies, secondly by a Canadian company 
having commenced the business in this country, and 
thirdly by two or three of the bigger Offices having 
decided that they must include this kind of business 
in ~heir programme,out of self protection." 
About the time that the business was "legalised" 
in Britain, there was discussion between Australian and 
London head offices, and the general view was that it 
should be: introduced in Australia, especially after the 
Profits and Income approached the N.S.W. F.U.A. in 1906 
(6) London and Lancashire Letter Book, London to 
M~lbour~~' 4~12.1908. 
) > 
I 
with an enqui~y about the possibility of its operating 
on a tariff basis in Australia. Ref erring to this 
move, another London head office wrote to its Sydney 
manager: ( 7) 
tt··=We think it useless any longer to object 
to 7t so long as it is carried on on a proper 
basis, or the result may be that the desirable 
fire insurance business may drift into other 
channels." 
Despite these views, the prohibition remained in 
force until the ~egal actually opened in Australia· in 
1909. When this happened a tariff based on the F.O.C. 
tariff was adopted forthwith and operated from January 
1910. As revised in 1911, with little alteration in 
essentials, it remains in force to the present. 
Lono term contracts. Policies for terms of over 
I 
a year were forbidden by tariffs in 1897-98 and 1910, 
in all classes of business. However in 1911 2 year 
contracts were allowed ~rovided the full two year 
premiums were paid in advance, and after 1948 policies 
insuring property under hire purchase could run for 
more than two years. This remains the position in 1962. !1 j I 
1 ,I 
The requirement of payment of the full premium in advance, .i: ! · 
------------~·!'I• (7) Commercial Union Letter Book, London to Sydney,6.4.1906. , ; l ' ! 
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with no discount for interest or expense savings, is 
obviously a serious discouragement to the use of these 
policies. This is in sharp contrastpto other countries, 
where a high proportion of certain classes of business 
are written under long term policies. For example, in 
Canada in 1958 61 per cent of direct fire premiums 
written wereifar contracts in excess of 1 year, . 55.3 per 
cent for 3 year contracts.(S) 
Forward contracts, have always been forbidden 
by Australian tariffs, even though the F.o.c. Foreign 
rules allowed them under certain conditions at the 
beginning of the century. 
"First Loss" policies. Although in common use in 
other countries, these too have always been prohibited 
by Australian tariffs. In the 1950's some pressure 
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(8) Post Magazine Year Book 1959-60, P• 406. i'.i 
to draw up a "~irst loss" tariff developed in N.S.W., 
where stamp duty is charged on the sum insured. The 
principle of the nfirst loss" policy is that the sum 
insured covers the estimated maximum loss at a single 
location, rather than the full value of the entire 
property, as is ne~essary under aver~ge conditions when 
I 
. l 
I 
l 
• I r l , 
single policies cover.more than one risk. The move was 
opposed on the grounds that: (1) the extension of the 
issue of single hblanket" policies could lead to 
carele~ in underwriting (2) the rate would look 
higher when expressed as a percentage of the estimated 
. 
maximum loss, and there would be pressure to reduce it. 
In deciding against the introduction of these policies, 
the Council had the support of the N~S.W. Stamp Duties 
Commissioner, who ruled that in such cases stamp duty 
would be payable on the full value of the property, 
not on the sum insured. 
0 Excess" fire policies~ The "excessP principle 
involvess cover of losses in excess of a certain sum 
only, smaller losses being either not insured or 
insured under a separate policy •. Although widely 
used in other parts of the world, and in Australia 
for accident business and reinsurance, such policies 
have never been permitted by Australian tariffs. 
Marine policy and clauses. The basis of nearly 
all marine insurance. contracts in Australia is the 
traditional Lloyd's "S G• form of marine policy. 
This was printed as the First Schedule to the U.K. 
Marine Insurance Act of 1906, as a permitted form of 
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contract, and in 1909 the English Act was substantially 
copied by the Australian Marine Insurance Act.(9) 
In practice the standard form of c~ver is 
modified or even replaced bt clauses attached to 
the policy. One of the principal rea$ons for the 
formation of the I.L.U. was the standardisation of 
clauses in use in the London market, and since its 
formation nearly all clauses in common use in Australia 
have been "Institute6 clauses. These include, for 
.. 
example: 
Institute 
•• 
II 
" 
.. 
" 
cargo clauses (F.P.A.,W.A., 
replacement clause. 
war clauses. 
strikes and riots clauses. 
Hull clauses • 
Yacht clauses. 
and All Risks). 
Also clauses for special interests e.g. frozen meat, 
livestock, fruit, corn, timber, flour, were drawn up 
in London. 
State Marine associations keep supplies of these 
clauses for members, and most changes are simply made 
by the I.L.U. and adopted in Australia as a matter 
of course. The reasons for this situation can be 
summarised as follows: 
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---------------------------------------For~details of Lloyd's marine po~icy,and marine 
clauses see Victor Dover; Analysis of Marine an.9. 
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{9) 
other Insurance Clause§..~London 1960. 
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(!) U.K. companies operating in Australia find 
it natural and conveni"ent to use clauses to which they 
are accustomed elsewhere. 
(2) From the 19th century Australian marine companies 
have done business in London and were accustomed to London 
procedures and contracts. 
(3) Much Australian marine business is written in 
London, and it is important to have a certain degree of 
uniformity e.g. among policies 
on the same shio • .
covering interests 
(4) British marine insurance law was followed in 
Australia even before the 1909 Australian Act. In England 
the"S~" policy, although in many respects admitted to be 
clumsy and outdated, has never been changed,an important 
reason being that it has " •.• generations of legal 
interpretation hanging almost to every word, and almost 
certainly to every sentence."(!) Institute clauses are 
also drafted with close attention to legal decisions and 
have proved as relevant to Australian as to English law. 
(5) The actual work of drawing up, revising and 
printing a large number of complex clauses is extensive 
and it was natural for companies in Australia to look to 
the I.L.U. as a convenient central drafting body. 
(1) Ibid. p. 10 - quoted from Lord Chorley. 
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For these reasons there has been very little 
significant control over the marine ttproducttt by 
Australian tariffs. On the occasions when Australian 
tariff compamies attempted to take an independent line 
pressure from London has usually caused it to be 
abandoned1. For example, the 1883 and 1885 Marine 
Conferences adopted a uniform hull policy intended 
principally for the insurarance of smaller hull risks on 
the Australian coast. This policy was revised at later 
conferences, and eventually embodied in the 1898-1900 
tariffs. In 1909 the N.S.W. Marine Association complained 
to the I.L.U. that London companies, contrary to the N.s.w. 
Hull Tariff, were insuring N.s.w. coastal vessels under 
Institute Time Clauses, which gave wider cover than the 
N.S.W. policy. The I.L.U. wrote in reply as follows: 
" ••• In this large market embracing not only members 
of the Institute but all Lloyd's Underwriters as 
well as numerous agencies of foreign Marine 
Insurance Companies, there always have been, and 
probably always will be a few Underwriters who 
consistently decline to sacrifice their liberty of 
action ••• Even if all Companies were brought into 
line you would always be exposed to th: powerful 
competition of IJoyd's and, as the Institute Hull 
Clauses are now so generally adopted all over the 
world, they believe that owners will presently. 
bring overwhelming pressure to bear on Underwriters 
abroad to adopt them.q (2) 
(2) Sydney Marine Association file: Tariffs and Observance 
bv London Underwriters, 1909. 
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The N.S.W. Association then wrote pointing put that 
the London ,off ices of its own members were using the 
clauses; but n?thing was done by the I.L.U. In 1910 
the Association altered its tariff to allow the use of 
the Institute Clauses, and in 1927 redrafted its hull 
policy to conform more closely to them.( 3) 
During World War I there was a marked tendency 
in London to include "extraneous perils~ in marine 
policies, not normally covered by the normal F.P.A. and 
W.A. clauses. These included such risks as theft and 
pilferage, short delivery and non-delivery, sling and 
hook risks, mud and oil damage, freshwater damage, 
damage by other cargo, mould, mildew and vermin damage, 
and sweat damage. In addition to specifying such 
extra risks, covers of "all risks whatsoever" were 
J lll 1ml:, _.,., -
l '('.1 I' l 'i W •I i I ' l ~ ! If ll . II i I 1 I ( ! t" 1 ') I t I 1 l ! 
J I I' I '1; 1 ti I 1 ~ 1' ; : I I I ' 
; ' ' I j r ; 
l I I ' 1 J . I ~ : l Ii f:I~ 
J\ 1', J J I c f j I l I . 
l I • l 1 f i 
! ' ! '.' l 
J 
~ 
l 
I 
l 
I 
i 
I 
l 
I 
l 
l 
1 
! 
~ 
t 
' l i l I 
! 
I ! , f ; ; l q I I 
I ! 
I 
I I 
J : ~ 
i r " 
r , 1 
t t ~ 
.i l q 
1 · ,~ ; h 
' { ~ 
I J 'l 
J ' ! • ~ I . Ii H : I ~ ! i ·• 
, t [1L; 1 
( i t i ~ l 
l t'. I' : t tf l !1 . l l ,. 'f . 
I : l i. 
lj t' 
t I t I 'l 
I I J ,. 1., 
'. 'I/ I t: \ 
l ' c - ~ i 
' ' l ' . 
: j I I I i . 
1 ! L i I 
! ! , 
: I· i i i 'i: : j l': 
111 : 1' t ! j: 
I ~ l I ~ 
! I t !' I ' \ · \, I ! 
1
· ; '1 
I ( I~ l \ ~I 
\ 1 I j t' I } I I 
1
•1 j f j ( ! ' I 
: ·i 11· ' f ! i : I ' ~I 
I II ; ' 
) 1 
11 
I 
1 11 f ~ 
I ' i 1 • , '
1 ! t l 
----------------:-:---:--:---:--:-'.:---·---------!I ! I ) : ! ' z (3) Annual. Reporis, Sydney Marine Association. . , : , 1 :! 
( 4) Examples are agreements concerning theft and. pilferage j' !l 1 
developed. From time to time agreements were come to 
in the London market in order to prevent or limit the 
spread of these wider covers, but few were maintained 
for.any significant period. In every instance the 
Australian associations adopted the London agreements, 
but dropped them when they were given up in London.(
4
) 
in 1920 (abandoned 1922) and sweat, fresh water and ! · ! I 
heating risks on hides and skins. (Agreed 1928, · j / ; 
abandoned 1929) l 
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In this way innovations in cover developed in the 
London market were quickly written into the Australian 
tariffs, and so became available in Australia to the 
clients of tariff companies. However, it is more 
difficult to judge whether their actual ~spread as 
quickly. Marine contracts andclauses are highly 
complicated, and the concessions won in London probably 
owed much to the pressure o.f brokers. The absence of 
brokers from the Australian tariff market until 1957 
would suggest that ' changes were probably rather 
slower. This, however, would not necessarily be true 
for large interests such as the com~odity pools and the 
steel industry, which took the trouble to search for the 
best terms, both in Australia and London, nor to firms 
contacted in Australia by Lloyd's brokers·. 
f!o.t,or vehicle policies. As mentioned already, the 
form of the early motor vehicle policy was influenced by 
the necessity to reach agreement with Dalgety and Co., 
who commenced issuing the Lloyd's backed nRed Cross" motor 
policies in Australia soon after this first of Lloyd's 
motor syndicates was formed in December 1907.(
5
) 
(5) For an account of these developme·nts in Englar:d see Dinsd~le op. cit. pp. 206-7. In 19l~he business o: 
this syndicate was xaken over by the rther..n., a tariff 
company in Australia, and it does not a~pear tha~ 
oalgety and ca. made new arrangements with Lloyd s. In 
l912 the name of the syndicate policy was changed to 
0 Whi te Cross''. 
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In the years -1~13-15· a .motor vehicle tariff, large! y 
. . 
~nfluenced by the Lloyd's policy, was agreed in England, 
and this was closely. followed by ane~ tariff in operation 
in Australia ·from May 1916. The s·cope ·of cover given 
under this tariff was al~eady very wide; as well as 
. . 
0 accidental damage·" ,.it included damage by fire, lig~tning, 
~ . . 
explosion, self 'ignition, burgl~ry,. theft and trarisit, 
. . 
and gave thi.rd 
a c c i doe ri t . ( 7. ) 
party cover of· up to £1000 for one 
It. appears that this cover was ~omprehen~ive 
enough to cause further extensions to be of little 
. . significa~ce alongside changes in rates, id~ rio really 
·important· alterations were made when the tar:lff was . . 
• • • • • # 
revised in 1927 "~nd 1952. However· in some minor :r:espects 
the Australian tariff -policy is less liberal than policies· 
available in the U.K. For example~ the U.K. F.o.c. 
" . 
policy since 1947 has covered passenger's lugga~e; also 
numbers ·of· risks which form_ part of U.K. policies and 
' so~e non-t~riff policies in Australia, are not covered 
unl~ss the p~licy is specifically extended and an 
appropri.ate ex~~.a premium paid (e.g. trailers, employe.r's 
a~d employees~ ind~mn~ty, other persons drivi~g, personal 
· ac.cident .benefits.) 
(7) AIBR .1916, P• 514.· ·· 
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§.ummary. It is evident the tari·ff "product" since 
1910 has ·been relatively flexible and that many new 
and extended forms of cover have been adopted. The 
examples cited mostly relate to· fire, marine and motor 
vehicle insurance, but it is felt that these are 
sufficient to illustrate generalisations which are 
also trµe of other miscellaneous insurances. 
Against this long run flexibility must be set 
the foll?wing considerations: . 
(1) There is not a single instance where the 
tariff market has taken the initiative in introducing 
new covers. 
(2) Defence against non-tariff competition and 
pressure from Government Offices have been the principal 
.mot: .. ·es behind nearly all important innovations. 
(3) In nearly all cases, the policies, wordings 
etc. adopted have followed those already in use in 
England •. The Australian market has !l2i pioneered forms 
of cover or procedures which are peculiar to it. 
(4) New policies introduced have lagged behind 
their introduction in the U.K., and as a result at 
range Of Choice available to ane any given time the 
insured in Australia has been considerably narrower 
than in England. 
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(o) Often, when tariffs came to recognise new 
policies, there were restrictions on their issue or the 
requirement that the 6ouncil on the state Association 
should approve of each case. Also, the tariff attitude 
towards many extended covers, was that they should only 
I l ' ! 
be granted when necessary in order to defend a connection. 
A sign of this reluctance was the fact that many 
extensions were listed as permissible additions to policies, 
rather than incorporated in policies themselves with 
provision for reduced premiums if deleted. 
(6) Certain forms of cover in common use in other 
countries, have never been introduced and remai.n. forbidden 
to tariff companies in Australia. In these cases it is 
probably felt that existing provisions are sufficient to 
meet non-tariff attack e.g. a3(a)2 discount to meet the 
offer of a "first loss" policy by a non-tariff competitor~r 
2. Selling ~osts~ 
The main areas of control over selling costs, 
incorporated for the most part in the "Discount, Brokerage 
and Agency" agreements and summarised above(B) are nON 
brieflv discussed in turn. 
I 
The changes described relate 
mainly to N.S.W. and Victoria, but closely similar 
. . . 
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(a) Discounts. Over the 50 years in fire, accident 
and marine insurance the basic rules were not changed. In 
1962, as in 1910, the maximum discount allowable in fire 
and accident business was 10 per cent (~o compete with 
bonus companies), 15 per cent in marine business. 
However, as described above, a number of new discounts 
most requiring Council approval, were introduced. These 
included 3(a)2 discoumts, fleet discounts, and various 
discounts in workers' compensation insurance. As regards 
bonus companies which joined the tariffs, the Council 
was able to obtain certain important concessions. For 
example, in 1916 'the £hamber of Manufactures agreed: 
(1) To follow tariff rules as regards rates, 
agencies, reinsurance etc. 
(2) To allow bonuses only to "bona fide 
manufacturers ... 
(3) To notify proposed bonuses in 
advance to the 
Marine 
. t• (9) 
FAUA and the Assoc1a ion. 
{ 4) To pay fire bonuses triennially 
only. 
To re insure locally with tariff 
companies, 
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In returr tariff companie s agreed that discount 
competition with Chamber bonuses would not exceed the 
bonus rate, and would also be allowed only to 0 bona 
fide manufacturers". Similar arrangements were come to 
with the Manufacturers' Mutual, the Cooperative and 
the State Government Off ices. 
{b) Brokers. Except in marine insurance, over the 
period there was very little change in the essentials of 
these agreements. However, P dause which appeared in 
some of the early fire agreements, that only one new 
broker would be registered for every four retirements, 
was not put into effect. On the other hand, except in 
Victoria, few new brokers were registered; in N.S.W. in 
1950 there was still about the same number as there had 
been in 1910.(l) In Victoria a relatively large number 
of new brokers were re~ognised,so that in 1957 there 
were over 80. 
::._: ,·In·l.a11 states, but particularly Victoria, 
the principal business of many registered brokers was 
not insurance; insurance broking activities were carried 
on as a sideline by estate agents, chartered accountants 
1 About 40 in 1910, 42 in 1939, 38 in 1950. Later list 
not available. 
' , t I. 
l I 
' I 
I I 
' ! 
l 
I 
l 
l 
i 
j 
I I 
I 
liJ 111 ,! 
, I I 
i! l 
, I I 
. '' 
\. ' ~ 
l ' 
1 j l 
11 ' 
.I • 
' i 
: l' 
;. 
{ \ 
I • 
' ' 
I> 
1. i 
,I 'i 
I 
' d 
~ 
519 
importers etc.( 2) In 1957, in order to tighten its 
control and with the support of the nprofessionaitt·brokers, 
the Council created a new class· of "Associate Broker ... 
All the. existing.brokers registered were reclassified as 
"Registered" or JIAssociate" brokers, with the professional 
brokers and other-~rokers handling a relatively large 
volume of business being.classed as "Registered". It was 
resolved that in future no further Associate brokers . _....,_..,.._ 
would be elected. The annual subscription for Registered 
brokers was made much higher than the corresponding fee 
for Associates. (3) Brokerage rates remained the same for 
the two classes, except that fi~e brokerage to Registered 
brokers was increased from 10 to 15 per cent. 
Although the brokers pressed for better commission 
terms from time to time,notably in the early 1930's,few 
changes were made over the period. The comrnission rates agreed 
for 
(2) 
(3) 
In N.S.W. ~n 1950, 12 of the 38 brokers had other 
occuoations as follows: 
4 
Real Estate 6 
Accountants 3 
Shipping Agent. l 
General Agent 1 
1 Importer 
Detailed lists not available in other States. 
· t d brokers, £105 p.a.; Associate 
Annual fees: Regis ere 
brokers, £3 p.a. 
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accident busiriess, under the pre-1910 accide~tariffs 
were·, for .all classes, 15 per cent (first £100 of premium) 
and 5 per cent {all premiums over £100). In 1910 
new rates were set by accident classes, and these, with 
the addition of new forms of business (e.g. CTP} and 
a reduction in Workers' Compensation commission in 
1957(4) remained in force in 196~. Thus: 
Class 
Fire 
MV, M.Cycle, Wind,Hail 
Boiler, Engineering 
CTP 
Other accident 
Commission rate 
per cent 
15 
10 
7~ 
5 
15 
W.Comp.:!First £100 prem. 5 
~Second £100 11 2~ 
~Over £200 n l~ 
All the other restrictions regarding brokers(
5
)remained 
in.force; in addition registered and associate brokers 
were required ··to agree not to handle reinsurances' nor 
were member companies allowed to use them in this capacity. 
d .. 
I ; . I 
-------------~-------------:---------------------------------- . I l . ~ I · : I' , , i 1 ( 4) Previous! y ·10 p~r cent• · .. L · l 1 ~ . 
(5) see Ch. IIA, seC:n. 4 • · .. ! 111.· · 
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It will be recalled that one of the most 
significant features of the 1898 marine agreements 
was that there was no provision whatsoever for brokerage 
on marine business. Th~ contrasted with the abortive 
marine tariffs ~f the 1880's and 1890's, which had 
allowed brokerage of 5 per cent, and of course with the 
fire and a~cident tariffs. The prohibition was 
confirmed in all later tariffs until the 1950 1 s, except 
in Queensland. The Queensland Insurance Act of 1916 
set a maximum marine brokerage rate of 10 per cent, and 
it was announced that the Government Office intended 
to pay this rate. Accordingly the tariff was altered 
to allow brokerage - maximum 5 per cent - on business 
for which it was thought the GIO was most likely to 
compete; viz. policies issued in Queensland on 
Queensland coastal and interstate risks.< 6l 
The marine commission restriction was of course 
a very serious one for brokers but evidence availal1e for 
the period 1896-19Ql, and for later years does not 
suggest great concern on their part.(?) In this 
connection four possibilities must be considered: 
( 6) At the same ti. me the ma xi mum discount on these risks 
was reduced from 15 to 10 per cent! 
( 7) 1!elbourne Insurance Broke:• s Ins ti tut e. Mi nut. e B oaks and 
IJet ter Books 1896-1911. In poesession of P1 .. ice 'Porbes 
Leslie Pty. Ltd., Melboupne. 
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(1) That bro~ers had satisfactory arranoements 
in London; 
(2) That because of lack of experience, expertise 
etc. they did not particularly wish to handle marine 
business; 
{3) That the marine prohibition was regarded as 
part of an overall deal in which they were well treated; 
(4) That the prohibition was in fact evaded. 
Unfortunately there is no evidence which would allow an 
assessment of these possibilities, beyond rumours 
reported at Marine Association meetings or in the AIBR. 
Thus the Chairman of the Sydney Association spoke to 
the 1922 annual meeting as follows: 
I have heard from business friends of mine, not 
insurance managers, that Brokerage is being paid 
on all classes of business. I do know of such 
appointments as Special Agents at 15 to 20 per 
cent Commission ••• Some brokers have arrangements 
for placing marine insurance at Lloyd's or in 
London to the detriment of our interests here. 
I know that this question is a thorny one. but 
it seems to me that it must be tackled and some 
solution found. Brokers are controlled by our 
Fire and Accident Associations, and to my mind 
it is becoming essential that Regulations be 
adopted and Commissions agreed upon .•• (8) 
It is not clear from this statement whether the 
reference is to registered brokers or to non-tariff 
operators such as the Lloyd's agent Bennie s. Cohen and Co. 
1921-22, Sydney Marine Association. (8) Annual Reoort 
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However in later years such outspoken criticism was 
never heard, and indeed at most meetings of both the 
Sydney and Melbourne Associations satisfaction was 
expressed with the functioning of the tariff rules. 
The changes briefly foreshadowed in 1922 did 
not come until the 1950's. As mentioned elsewhere(9) 
during the 1950's numbers of influential London brokers 
set up branches or subsidiaries for the first time in 
Australia, in some cases becoming registered under 
the fire and accident brokers agreement with tariff 
companies. In London they had been accustomed to 
dealing freely with both companies and Lloyd's in marine 
insu~ance, and it became clear that they were anxious to 
offer the same service to their clients in Australia. 
The Council therefore had to seriously reconsider its 
long heid objections to marine brokerage. Against the 
fear of stiffer competition, perhaps leading to broker 
domination of the market on the London pattern, were 
the possibilities that the drain of premiums from the 
Australian tariff market to London would be accelerated 
and the Australian non-tariff market strengthened. 
(9) Ch. II• seen. 4. 
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Also it was considered that Association members would 
have difficulty in resisting the temptation to pay 
brokerage, especially when the broker already placed the 
non-marine lines of a particular client,. Allowing 
brokerage, on the other hand, might bring business to 
Australia previously placed in London. It was recognised 
• 
that often the new brokers had been in contact for many · 
• 
years with Australian clients in London, and the opening 
of Australian branches was to some extent.intended to 
cement old relationships as well as to cr.eate new ones. 
Accordingly, a special Committee of the Marine Council, 
having considered these arguments, recommended a form of 
agreement with brokers, to come into force from July 
1957 - The Marine Jg:okers. Aqr,eemem_, while allowing 
brokerage for the fi~st time (Hulls 5 percent, Other 10 
per cent), attempted to limit the fumctions of brokers and 
so prevent the development of the much feared London 
pattern. Thus brokers agreed to matters including: 
(1) Nq rebates to insured, monthly settlements, 
separate insurance bank account. 
(2} No remuneration in connection with losses. 
Insurer always to have right of direct access to client. 
(3) While broker not to act as Director, Chief 
Representative, Agent, Adjuster, canvasser 
or in .fill:L capacity in connection with insurance. 
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(4) Registration terminable by Council or broker at 
one month's notice. 
The agreement also contained a clause forbidding 
registered brokers from accepting commission from 
insurers not members of the Council. In November 1957 
this clause was deleted and since then these brokers have 
been free to place business with the non-tariff market. 
hl Chief Agent.s. The importance of "chief agency., 
appointments was that there was originally no tariff 
control of remuneration or terms of appointment. Hov1ever 
this was later modified and maximum commission rates were 
set for certain business classes. Current N.S.W. maxima 
are: 
Class 
W. Comp. 
Engineering 
CTP 
Hail 
Max. Commission ;.;.;,;;;.,:.-;..:..,_.::;..;;;.;.:.;;.;.;.:;.~.-
5, 2~, l~ (as for brokers) 
7~ 
5 
10 
10 Combined Fire and Hail 
As regards the list of prohibited appointments, "farmer" 
was removed and "mining companies" introduced, but no 
other important Change was made. The mar:fne~ tariffs had 
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not specifically allowed for "chief agents", but when 
the 1916 Queensland Act provided for the recognition of 
t tt • fl wo managing agents in Queensland the tariff was altered 
so as to allow an overriding commission of 5 per cent 
-· . 
to managing agents", of whom one could be appointed for 
Central and another for Northern Queensland. 
(d) Agents •. Although the restrictions on the number 
of agents allowed to each company were at first sight 
relatively rigid, a number of exceptions made at the time 
of the original agreements somewhat mitigated their 
effects. Thus in most States the original fire agreements 
allowed the continuation of appointments in excess of the 
tariff maximum, provided they ware made before a certain 
date. For example in Victoria 180 excess appointments 
on 21st December 1896 were allowed to be continued.Cl) 
Again, bythe London agreement on acquired companies, 
appointments in excess of those in existence at the time 
of takeover and made before 28th May 1906, were also 
allowed. The numbers involved are not known, but it 
seems unlikely that they were very great, as only 7 
absorbed companies came under the ruling.(
2
) 
(l} 
(2) 
FAUA. Records, Melbourne. Details of excess appointments 
in other States not available. 
Also, the practive was to deposit.details of all . 
"absorbed eompany" appointments with State Associations, 
!n sealed envelopes. The en~elopes were to be opened 
only if the Association decided that there was need for 
investigation. To the present these envelopes are 
treated as confidential. 
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A third and more important source of "excess· appointments" 
was the integration ·of the ·accident and fire· tariffs 
in 1909-10. Until this time some of the most important 
accident companie s had· been outside· the tariffs, and in 
any case the accident and fire agency rules differed. 
For example, the Victorian Accident Underwriters' 
Association allowed each member· company two agents in each 
country town, compared with one only allowed by the Fire 
Association. In general, the solution was to assimilate 
the accident to the fire agreements, and this meant that 
a large number of agencies had to be eliminated. In 
protracted negotiations at early meetings of the Council 
about 1000 cases were considered individually. Most of 
these :were "excess appointments 0 , but some "prohibited 
personsu or "excess commissions". About half were allowed 
to be continued for two years, the remainder for the 
lifetime of the agent only. 
After 1910 the agency limits remained unchanged for 
many years. However ~ ~~ the maximum number allowed in 
Melbourne suburbs ~ex company was increased from 120 to 
150 in 1928, and in 1958 the Sydney Suburbs maximum was 
increased ·from -·100 to 150. In Sydney, at the same time, 
the limit of, 3 :agents per suburb was removed, and acquired 
companies were· also allowed to expand suburban agencies 
by 50 per cent. 
fi 
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· In, ot_ her.r.espects ag 1 
· ency ru es were changed very 
~ittle. Commissi6ns set:in 1910 (and later for new. 
·. ·. . . 
classes) ,rema.ine·d unc~anged ·except for wo·rkers' · 
·compens~tior:i .'(~~.duc,e.d in .1957) , and ·combined fire· and 
hail policies o~ _gr?wing crops (originally 20 per cent : 
reduced,to .10 pe~ cen~. in 1948) •. Also.farmers (but not 
' . 
pa~tor~lisis) wete removed from the list of prohibited 
.appointments. 
. 
The degree of tariff observance of the agency 
provisions; is again difficult to assess. 
. ' . . 
Certain · 
amendmen~s suggest that comp~nies tended to read the 
~ules literal1y rather ·than in their obvious spirit. 
For example, the or.iginal clause setting maximum 
·commission rates w~s supplemented by the following clause: 
Wherever in this Agreement any prohibition or 
limitation in respect of appointment or 
registration or of paying or receiving commission, 
brokerage, or other allowance in respect of any 
Premium, is imposed upon any person, employer, or 
·employee, ·every such prohibition or limitation 
shall apply also to the mother, wife, daughter, 
sister, and to the employer and employee of any 
of them~ whether entitled to receive commission 
or not~ and to the father, husband, son, brother, 
and to the employer or employee· of any of them.~~ 
Again·, it was found necessary to write into the acquired 
companiasf:.agreement that only agencies at the time of 
the Ereliminai:y agreement could be·continued by the 
__ ._ ..... _..,....;... . __ ;::: .. waa. L A 
(3) 
e son or this more accurate absorbing company. The r a f 
definition is made clear by the following comments of a 
London manager, after the absorption of the 
Australasian Plate Gla b th ......,..-...-..-..;...--.=..;;;;;--.;;.....:...:..;:;~...;:::~~s~s y e London and Lancashire in 
1910: 
Some of the members doubted whether the Plate Glass 
~ompany could possibly have such a list of agencies 
in out-of-the-way places, in many of which they had 
never heard of plate gl~ss at all! (4) 
However, an agreement on acquired companies was never c0me 
to in marine insurance, although the possibility was 
discussed between 1914 and 1917. This was an advantage 
to t~e larger group companies as regards agencies, and 
was probably one reason why numbers of absorbed companies 
commenced marine insurance in Australia. Thus in Victoria 
13 companies subsidiaries of others already in the State, 
took out licences to write marine business and joined the 
Marine Association between 1919 and 1930. 
(e) Directors. Over the period no changes were made 
in the numbers of local boards or directors allowed. The 
... . 
original fire and aecident agreements had provided for a 
fixed fee remuneration only, 'but because of variations in 
the fee according to premium volume "influenced" these 
payments were in fact : ,. <·: regarded as commissions in 
In 1923 an attempt was made to limit such many cases. 
. , . { 4) London and L~nc a sh ir~ Letter Book , London to Me lboum e , 
30.9.1910. 
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payments to the range £25-£200 per annum (except for 
directors elected by shareholders), but the provision 
never came into force. Instead it was replaced in 
1927 by the open recognition of commission, up to a 
maximum of 20 per cent. This maximum is still in force. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the current D.B. and A. 
Agreement contains the only exception, but a most 
important one, to the basic "no-rebating" rule. This is 
that insurance directors could share their commission 
with .Q.!.ORrietary companies of which they were pat.tners, 
employees, directors etc. Introduced in 1950t this would 
appear to be a realistic assessment of an actual 
situation. 
As do ~11 the agency rules, the directorial rules 
are subject to the acquired companies' agreement i,,e. only 
those directorships in existence at the time of 
preliminary takeover agreement can be continued. 
Fortunately som~ details are available of directorship~ 
involved in takeovers in N.s.w.( 5) These show that 
between 1897 and 1960 55 companies were absorbed by others 
also in N.S.W., and that 217 directorships were 
registered with the FAl»\ at the time of takeover. 
Excluding six pa~entt companies which subsequently failed 
(5) FAUA Records, Sydney. 
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or withdrew, this added 195 directorships to the 
number available in N.s.w. in 1960. The N.s.w. limit for 
a single company is 6, and so the total number available 
to 70 independent tariff companies in 1960 was 
approximately 615. Of these, certain companies had the 
right to make relatively large numbers of appointments; 
the outstanding cases were: 
Commercial Union-North British : 58 directorships, 
of which 52 by 11 takeovers. 
Royal-London and Lancashire : 48 directorships, 
of which 42 by 9 takeovers. 
Other companies also increased their potential 
strength, but not nearly to the same extent as did these 
two. 
The discussion so far has referred to fire and 
accident business, but the rules regarding marine boards 
are similar. The chief difference is that the acquired 
companies agreement is not applicable, so that absorbed 
companies may appoint local directors up to the limit 
alJowed bv the marine tariff. Also there is no limit on 
. 
the remuneration of directors. However it is probable 
that few directors are appointed to purely ~ine boards, 
on account of marine business only. Unless this were 
so such directors came under the fire and accident 
I 
regulations. 
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(f) Qt.her appointments •. Over the 50 yeal"s there 
we:re very few changes in either the categories of 
·1llowable speciAl appointments ori in t.he terms on which 
they could be made. The only alteration of significance 
wos an increase in m?.ximum commission to building 
::iocieties fr0m 5 to·· 15 per1 cent. As explainea above, 
0nly firms or persons approved and listed bJ State 
rAUA 's could be a:ppoin ted. IJ1he Associa t.ions treat these 
lists as confidential, but it seems unlikely (with t.he 
possible exce9tion of building societies) that 
ap~ointrnents are not very extensive, in view of the low 
~ommission terms allowed. 
{g_}. Reinsurance. The D. B. & A. Agreements set 
maximum exchan13e commissions for local reinsur·ance 
transo.c ti ons between tariff companies. In 1962 these 
were: (per cent) 
Fire 20 
w. Comp. 15 
En~ ineePing 12~ 
CTP 10 
A 11 other accident 20 
over the 50 years only one impor tR nt change was made, 
an increase of tb.e'rnaximum fire commission frum 15 to 
20 ;)er cent. 
It is evident that these rates were set at levels 
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which are less than, or a 1; the best barely cover, original 
commission and expenses.. (Compare Table III.?). This of 
course is the intention : if local reinsurance were 
exchanged at ve~y high commissions, there would be a 
s t.r0ng inc en ti ve for companies t.o increase tl1e volnme of 
t~eir direct writing, and in particular to take large 
lines on heavy risks which might otherwise be shared. Low 
commissions, on the other hand, both discourage the d1.rect. 
\'1riting of large lines, Find increase the pressure for 
reciprocity in local reinsurance. However, if overseas 
treaty reinsurance were Rvailable on high commission terms 
neither of these results would necessai-1 ily follow. In view 
of this it seems likely that the main effect of the 
pes tric ti ons may have been to fui"' th er discoUJ'ae,e the 
development of a market for reinsurance within Austmlia. 
(h) Advertising. The tariffs never crzrained 
detailed regulation of advertising as such, but all 
~Jdveri ti semen ts are i,equired to conform to the 
fundamental rule against suggestions that any special 
qdvantages attach to insuring with one tariff company 
rather than others. Companies are also not to advertise 
the fact that under certain conditions they may offer 
(6) St.ate fire tariffs no longer in force, Except some early 
which set maximum sizes for street signs. 
j 
policies or terms not normally available e.g. 
Peplacement v~lue fi~e policies and various discounts 
'3nd bonuses. In accordance with this policy a form of 
institutional advertising in fnvour of "tHriff insurance" 
is carried on by the Public Relations Department of the 
:5'.4UA Council. Apart fpom this, the general feeling 
spreArs to be that advertising is of limited effectiveness 
in comparison with direct approach by agents, and 
~1I'obablj' for this reason even non-tariff and Government 
offices have used the principal media - newspapers, radio, 
television etc. - harclly at. all in Australia.(?) 
(i) Summar~. Over the 50 years after 1910, few 
significant alter-at.ions were made to t.he D.B. fe A. 
ABreements. If tariff companies had been able to limit 
rhe numb el" of nerr entrants it would perhaps be possible 
to infer a serious restriction on agency services 
available. For example, between 1911 and 1958 the 
nopulation of N.S.W. increased by 126 per cent and non-
life premium income in real terms (1911 ~rices) by about 
11 times; yet until 1958 there had been practically 
no change in the agency force allowed individual tariff 
companies. New entrants and the allowing of agencies of 
( 7) importance has been attached to "prestige'' However some 
l
·n t'ne central t_)arts of the cities and towns. 
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abs·orbea. companies to be continued alt.er this impression 
considerably.· The following are est'irmtes of maximum 
numbers or· allowed a~pointments of tariff companies, 
,, 
assuming that absorbed companies at the· time of takeover 
1)ossessed maximum agency organisations. 
Population - N.s.w. 
Population Sydney 
Metropolitan· 
a:rea 
1:r.s.w. - Non life premiums, 
1911 prices (£ 1 000) 
Ho. of Independent ~ariff 
Cos. 
- Sydney Metropolitan 
area 
Agents - Rest of N.S.W. 
Chief A gen ts 
Local' Di'r ec to1.,s 
Brokers 
1911 
1,646,734 
629,503 
. . A 
1 ,202 
44 
6' 150 
83,000 
50 
300 
40 
? 
1958 
3,725,686 
2,016,620 
13,818 
70 
1h,637 
203,000 
119 
615 
'? 
' 
'? 
Iner. 
per 
cent 
- . 
126 
220 
1049 
59 
138 
145 
138 
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Notes: Rough estimates only. Country agencies ; r ·l 1. 
es'!Jimated by multiplying number of t~riff ·' .; '.11}· 
companies (including absorbed companies) by ' V i '11 
Other Appointments 
number of non-metropolitan post offices 1 :,· ! · 11 
("official" and "semi-official"). The latter \I 1· 
was assumed to· be 2/3 of the total n';1ltlber. of L 1·: ! 
. post offices. 'rhe t:iumber of post offi?es increased ; ; , 
by e.bou t 3 pe1" cent only oveP the period. l; '! 
Sources: N .s. W. Tariffs and Commonwealth Year Books. .1 . 'J 
A 1916. Earliest year available. 
If ac;:cpunt is taken of non-tariff companies these 
figures suggest. that there was pPobably no serious overall 
restriction on the supply of agents, especially in 
country areas. Indeed in most country tovms it wuuld be 
r:ws t unlikely that every t.ariff comnany woulc1 have an ( 8) ~ ~ 
at?ent and either informal sha.rting ar.rangements o.r 
"illegal" bidding 1JP of commiPsions seems likely. 
Des-pi te this the tRrifi's i1riobably did inhibit t.he 
exr1ensi0n of indi vidua_L taPiff cvmpanies, unless 
exnsnsion were by takeover. In this respect companies 
wi ~:i 1·1rge resources vrePe probG.bly Rt qn Bdvantage. 
rrhe fact t.hAt the exDr1nsion of' existinR compsnies 
w~s to some extent restricted w~s probably an 
rn~our--igemet? t to new entrants, bu th tariff' n nd non-tar lff. 
In<leed the initiative fo.r intr0ducing new companies in 
~50me cases came from exis'"ing tRriff comp:1nies,. which {9) 
~oped to benefit by Rctinc as managing agents. To this 
extent the market may he.ve become more fragmented than it 
)f-herwise would have been. 
The lists of "prohibited appointments" probably 
climinR t,ed acents whose services may have been convenient 
(8) 
( 9) 
In manv nos t-off'ice places this would be impossible, 
since 'there are fewer inhabi t:ants than aeency 
ariuointments allowed! A;~ also by augmented voting strength on tariff bodies; 
see ab0ve. 
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e.g. cooperative societies, banks, trustee companies, 
solicitors. 'l'he commission terms allov1ed them if 
'1pnui n ted under the special tartff lWOVis ions ( 5 per cent, 
except building societies) are probably not sufficient 
to encourage them to act as they rirobably would in a freeri 
msrke t. 
'rhe tariffs imposed very sir,ni ficant limitations on 
the activities of b~Jkers, and except in marine insurance 
little change has been made. 'rhe removal of these 
limit~tions would probsbly be the most, important single 
ste~ towards a freer market in both direct insurance and 
r>einsurance. 
The most impor1-Hnt. ljmitations on appointments 
di.1J'i ne the period wer•e with resuect to Chief' Agents and 
"Local Directors", since cornriission allowed WAS 
unlimited (Chief Agents) or relatively hich (Directors). 
Since there was no nrovision in the agreements f'oP special 
- -
hir:h commissions to defend agencies against non-tariff 
approaches, these were the only methods legally available. 
However, in N.S.W. theJ' could onl..:i. be applied in Newcastle 
(Chief Agents) and Sydney (Directors). For this reason 
the obsePvance of tariff maxima in country 1~0vms seems 
especially doubtful. 
. - ,;;.. 1! !!1 l' 5 i$ {i - l i : II\. J 
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It is evident. that the onl~r conclueions that can ; ' I 
be drown from the present evidence are very tentative, 
·1nd need to be suppl<?menf~ed by a detailed exmnination 
.__if the te11 ms and natuPe of actual ap-puintments. Without 
. 
rrnch a study, there does seem to be n 11rima facie cnse 
f\_1; 1 believinr. th3 t thP D.B. & A. Agreement.A hRVe 
r>unstit.uted a re9.l riE'striction of effective com1Jetit.ion 
: f!tween t'1riff componies ~ by r:.chieving their main 
..-.-1~·-nose Jf controlling indL.,ect rate compet.ltion; and 
;"VP also protected to some extent the est:J.blished 
, 0sitiuns of 23ents, b11 JJ..i~eps nnd comFJnies. HoVTevep 
evidence l)f t.he nono.Jobse1.,vonce of the 11nles. snd 0f the 
.JD•rn. tions c:r non-tariff insurers may m~ke it necessnry 
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'•J 1nodif~' these vierm t0 some extent. 
~ Conclusions. 
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J l 
It vras lluinted ou1: rd: the end of section A that 
in 1910 the tariff structm.,e V1as exf·remely comprehensive, 
~i~h nearly All farms of cove~. All pqtes nnd all 
· a .. ecided from tlie cen1·re by a Gouncil (' ,,-111:1iss 10ns 
r1 JHJi na ted by British companie~ • over the followin~ 50 
t 1 , mon ..... 1 1• H11· ~ s true ture did not persist. t!iis a:!:'1renj ~ i v- - ... 
, · er "'a~ circumscribed Fi!'S t, its decision maKlDB pow H .., 
b;1 the need to tske account of c0mpeti ti on. 
This came 
Rnents in 
f 
. d pendent A.us tralian comr>A.nies' -
rum new in e · 
' I 
-~;@.JI !I 
b :r n 11 Ii 11 lJ (.! II  I . (1 I 
1 '' 
·, n::: h~ '11 ia for- t.he IJloyc1 's nr.Pkis t, ov sr s e'l s non-tor iff 11 
II I ' 
,.. ) m,.,nies, Government insur .. 1nce offices, self-insur·1nce ' l 
c·chemes, '1DC mutual CO!Tl!_"H1nies whir.h join8cl the tnriff. I 
.'-11 efforts t.o PPevent or cliE:conr•o.ec tile erowth of this 'I I 
J11~side mar•ket iwoved futile. sno." f .-, '1 l•rne e t'°'nt ', · V• :_L, x~;;,
'(iis was so becnuse of ""he willinrness of profession'l.1 
c:01:1~•anics tn Au~stro.lia. 
S ef' ond l?, · impor tsn t :;1• eas uf con 1-r ol \"/el" e ~u~{en 
r·vn~·rol over !'P.. tes f0n nll clnoses in C:,uecnsland, and 
0Ve' C7P nnrl 1.'ioPkers' Curnnensnti.vn in other states. 
t:::L:;u<?ia ti0ns, 11nd '3.malge.m'l.tions 11mcng old~P camp:..·mies 
r·0·11~ened, cit. les.st ;:-iotentinll;·, fhc -.... penominant position 
u 0 ,_he Bt'i tish com1')s.ni.en. ,....hesP h'ld b~en the pPincipnl 
,. ··s f- em , ~ . , . 
Ovc;r the TY riocl there WRS n considernble degree of 
:·:i. ex i bi 1 i t:1 in !'"! t.es o nd ":pr or1.uc f-" but- lesn in Df! ency 
.!n brok'2.re.ge rules. However ne~~I' l~r '.J. ll chG.nge-s were mqde 
Ln res~onse to outside pressures. '11he tBriff rr.srket never 
foJl( t.he offP.nsive 9.nd theri::. is Jittle noubt th~.t es a 
~.-~·1;lt the sriread of 1owei., rHtes and innow~':ions in cover 
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·,r is s lowed down. If the iiiqrket was "workably" 
CtJDJpe~i tive, this was in S'ni te of the ta""'i"'f t 
...., ,_ l. sys :em, 
n 1t: because of it. 
'T1he usual juet:ificntion of' tn:riff cornr)nnies for 
t·:1eir ne1~eements is t!v:t t.hey a1 ... e necessn"y in the interests 
of "stability", solvency, c.nd foj 1 the 11 Pnt.1onal 11 or 
"en.11it:able" settinP_ of' r•roit..es. ""he Aus.i. ai1·a f ·fr d i.rc _ n :er l s o 
not ap11eeP to heve advnnced the rnarkef· in any of these 
r)irecti0ns, except th1:1 t. they have r>ePhaps 11 s·t-,;.bilised 11 
t·~e establi~hed posit.ions of t.he principal compnnies and 
.i.·1e s.gent.s and br~oker•s recognised by thew. In some ways, 
... .r1 the 0the11 hand, the;)' have lead dipect.ly to occur:rences, 
e~-:i~'ecia lly the e9.X1 ly 11 e. t.e v1ars in Queensland_ riinsma.nia, 
8:JC 1:Vesrern Aust.rali.I:?. which fF1 e i.ncJmnatihle with thFse 
. . 
~hese and the later sPve~e diecriminstoPy rate 
r,)t. anneat1 to be in t'1e inh:~res ts of the solvAncy of Sl"'.'1'1.11 
... 
0,Ti-r~"'"1nies, nor v1ould they be lilr:Al~r to occur in P.. tn::i.rket 
ln •;:hich b1 .. okers WePe T:'IO!'S 1.nfluential and hn(i fuller 
~reedom of action. Finally, f:he fnc t thn. t, nearly all 
. 
., · t t · ratP-~ "'ler-ae made in response to competition, 
.- rJ. 21Js .raen s ~ n _..., " -
d th t h C~m~et,, 1·tion was not felt rnteo were left ~~ n a - w er e v u 
t:.nsltered (e.g. bP.sis fire rates, HH rates) seems to 
c Jnt.radict the claim that. aereed t::n ... iffs I'f:l the.r than 
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cJmuet.ition are desirable for R "rational" rat.e structure. 
\lJ these are considerations which a thoroueh enquiry 
into the industry, v1hich the writeP believes to be 
~eoirable~ should not neglect. 
t 
I ( 
l 
l 1 
! \ 
' I I I I 
! ~ 
I 
l 
' 
t 
I 
I 
! 
'' 
• I j ' 
i 
I 
I 
PART C : ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
CHAPrER XII 
~A,RLY POLICIES, DEPOSITS, AND SOLVENCY CONTROL 
1. ~arlY Policies 
I 
~a) Pre-199..Q. During the 19th and 20th centuries, 
although all S'tates except N.S.W. passed legislation dealing 
with life insurance( 1) there was no special legislation · 
dealing with fire or marine insurance. No official statistics 
were collected on a regular basis until 1907.( 2) The only 
statistics available resulted from contributions made on 
fire premiums or amounts at risk, in connection with the 
support of fire brigades. 
In Victoria, under the Stamp Duties Act of 1879, 
companies were required to take out licenses and pay a 
tax of 1~-per cent on net premiums, but no conditions were 
laid down for obtaining a licence, and the Government under-
took no responsibility for any kind of supervision. 
The rirst important sigps of political interest 
in non-lire insurance came towards the end of the 
1890's with the ~stablishment of th~ tariff system, 
and the example set by the Seddon- Government in New 
' .... 
i / 
; I 
. ' 
' 
'l 
' 
. 
> • 
• r' 
I ' I I I 
J' r 
I ·' : I ' , r 
I I !1 ) ' 
I ! ' .j ' I '. 
J •' j i ,~ I 
'I I I I 
t I I , 
( 1) 
(2) 
. .. 
Tasmanift- ~1874, f!.P. .• 
' i : i ~ 
1882,· w_,.A. 1889, Vic. 18971 Qld. 1901. 1 1·i ~ 1 I 11 II 
... "'r" . l i 11 i lo., I 
,. ~ 
In Victoria. 
" 
- it ' ll ~ 
~ c 
I I 
'I ( ! 
It~ p ~ I I i ! 
\ . l t L: 
Zealand. In New Zealand in 1896 a Bill was 
intr.oduced to establ1"sh a G overnment Fire Insurance 
Off ice.~ • The Bill owed some of its ideas to 
arrangements in Swiss Cantons, under which fire 
insurance was compulsory and Cantonal offices were 
set up to do the business. It was defeated in 1896 
and 1898, and became la~, with the compulsory 
provisions removed, in 1905. 
The New Zealand e~periment had a considerable 
influence in Australia. Here, towards the end of the 
1890's,similar ideas involving State control over and 
participation in ins~rance were widespread. In 
Victoria there was much support for what was termed 
nmunicipal insurance", and the idea gained momentum 
when the new tariffs came into operation in 1897. 
Thus in Melbourne a special conference of 
representatives of municipal councils met to c9nsider 
the question and the Chairman was reported as follows)
3
l 
The Chairman•~·thought that the work of insurance· 
should be undertaken by the municipalities themselves. 
The increases in the rates amounted in some cases 
to nearly 400 per cent, and the co~?anies had formed 
a· ring to maintain them ••• He would suggest that 
they should go as a body to.the a~ting Pr:mier.at 
once and ask him to bring in a bill dealing with 
the question .•• Municipal insurance was. beiog 
adv,ocated in Great Britain, Canada and New Zealand., 
The scheme would be very simple ••• · 
(3) AIBR, 1897, P• 416. 
I• f 
After this meeting a deputation saw the acting 
Premier, and presented him with the motion carried 
by the Meeting: 
That.this conference wait today upon the Acting 
Premier an~ a~k that the Government appoint a 
Roy~l.Comm1ss1on to consider the question of 
municipal or State fire and life insurance. 
The A~ting Premier promised that the resolution would 
have the Government's "earliest and earnest 
consideration" and that a Royal Commission would be 
appointed, but in fact no action was taken.( 4) 
In 1898 matters were taken much further by a 
Bill introduced in South Australia based on the New 
Zealand Bill. According to the version of the AIBR 
the agitation for the bill appeared " ••• to be 
confined to a section of the mercantile community 
which, during the past year or two, has reaped the 
benefits of excefsive competition by getting warehouse 
risks covered at lower rates than are paid elsewhere 
for private dwellings. 11 ( 5) As in New Zealand, a 
Off ice 
Government Fire Insurance/wa$ to be set up, and 
provision was made for compulsory district insurance 
after a poll of the ratepayers. However, following a 
(4) see AIBR 1897, pp. 403-4. Editorial: Municipal Fire 
Insurance, and ibid. pp.4'16t 41-1. 
(5) AIBR 1898, P• 627. 
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General Election, the Governemnt (which was returned) 
allowed the Bill to lapse. 
In these years, beyond the two moves described, 
there was a good deal of interest in "anti-compact" 
legislation in the United States. The AIBR, for 
example, carried regular reports of U.S. insurance 
affairs, and these inevitably had something (unfavourable!) 
to say about the activities of the Insurance Commissioners 
in the various States. 
In view of all this it is not surprising that the 
new Commonwealth Government was given specific power 
over insurance in the Constitution. 
{b) Insurance_ and the Constitution. 
Early drafts of the Constitution made no reference 
to insurance, but a clause was introduced at the 
Adelaide Convention in 1897 under Seen. 51, "Powers of 
the Parliament". As it was eventually determined, the 
clause read: 
Seen. 51 (XIV) 
Insurance, other than State insu~a~ce; also State 
insurance extending beyond the limits of the State 
concerned. :, ) 
The Convention debate was confined to the exception 
made of "State insurancett not extending beyond State 
· · but even here there was little opposition. 
oorde~s'; ; , 
(6) Off. ·a1 Report of the National Australasian Con~~~tion Debates. Ad~1aide 1897. pp.779-782. 
(6) 
The substantive.reasons for giving the Commonwealth 
such specific power·were not indicated, but it 
seems reasonable to· infer the following factors: 
{l) Insurance companies, life and others, almost 
without exception, operated in more than one State. 
(2) Life insurance legislation differed in five 
States already. 
(3) Many companies operating in Australia -
life and non-life - were also established in the U.S.A., 
and were already acutely aware of the duplication and 
complexity of independent State legislation. 
(4) It was obvious that State legislation would be 
ineffective in some respects, unless similar legislation 
were enacted in other States. 
As is explained below, comprehensive legislation 
on non-life insurance has never been introduced by 
the Commonwealth, but there seems little doubt that 
it has very wide powers if it chooses to exercise them. 
Thus a recent legal authority writes: 
Legislation u~der this.power w?u~d extend to.and. 
include proviS:ions relating. t? di v1dends, publ 1cat70~ 
of accounts value of policies, standards of polic~es, prescribing'investments~ ~equiring d:posits in 
money or in bonds, co~f1n1ng th: bu~i~ess.to 
corporations, preventing rate discr1m1nat1on, 
limitation of risk, and any and all other 
regulative conditions. 
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This view is supported by reference to cases involving 
the Life Insurance Act of 1945. (?) There also seems 
to be no Constitutional barrier to the setting up of a 
Commonwealth Insurance Office. 
(c) The 1908 Royal Commission. 
Although it was later said that the general 
expectation that there would be uniform Commonwealth 
legislation at an early date, accounted for the 
relative lack of State legislation, (S) nothing was 
done until 1906. In this year a private Bill which 
would have made a special clause compulsory in fire 
insurance contracts was briefly discussed, but 
shelved when the Govc-rnment said that it would prepare 
a comprehensive measure to deal with insurance.<
91 
During !907 the Government made enquiries in the 
U.S.A. concerning fire insurance legislation and 
received information including draft copies of proposed 
legislation. (l) Again nothing was do~~ until a motion 
was moved in September 1908 (a) for a Select Commmittee 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) (1) (2) 
w.A. Wynes : Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
Powers in Australia. Law Book, Go. 1956. 
Commonwealth Hansard 1932, Vol.133, Debate on 
Insurance Bill, 1932. Commonwealth Hansard 1906, Vol.32, pp.2592-2608. 
Ibid. Vol. 47, P• 337. 
By King O'Mal]Py. 
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on "Fire, Life and Industrial Insurance Companies~•. 
The Government accepted.the idea of an enquiry 
but suggested that it should take the form of a 
Royal Commission. Although other factors entered into 
this decision, what seems to have been an important 
one was expressed as follows: 
We ought not to give an inquiry of this kind any-
thing in the nature of a parliamentary complexion, 
seeing that amongst honourable members on both (3) 
sides are many directors of insurance companies. 
In the event the Commonwealth Statistician, Sir George 
Knibbs, and J. H. Hood. of the Victorian Supreme Court, 
were appointed Commissioners. They presented their 
report in October 1910. 
During the debate on the proposed Royal Commission 
the Minister said: 
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(3) H. Mahon, Hansard 1908, Vol 37, p. 341. D~ring 
this debate one member (Wilks, p. 341) said that 
all "except a few" members were ins~rance 
directors; but this was denied by W~lson, who . 
claimed that 0 not one third" we:e directors •.. This 
whole question is obviously an important political 
factor, especially in regard to the Upper.Houses of 
the various state Parliaments. However, in the 
absence of complete lists of di~ectors, age~t~ etc. 
it is not possible to say anything very definite. 
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We have.to consider ••• whether we should have 
~ superintend~nt of life,marine and fire 
insurance business to examine on behalf of the 
peop~e the reports that are presented to 
Parliament by those companies, and to report 
~n them •.• The position in regard to fire 
;nsura~ce is unsatisfactory, and I find it 
impossible t? obt?in satisfactory statistical 
returns deal1nrg with that business It 
appears desirable, both for the pu;pose of 
safe9ua~ding the public and also for valuable 
statistical purposes, that the principle of 
~ublicity should be enforaed. (4) 
The terms of reference of the Commission were 
extremely wide; they were: 
To enquire into ardreport upon the law relating 
to and the methods of operating Fire, Life, 
Industrial and other Insurance in Australia. (5) 
The Commission did not make a very complete study; 
in particular it deliberately refrained from examining 
rates, profits or financial structure. There was no 
compulsory calling of witnesses; the Commissioners 
noted that appeals through the press for evidence met 
with a response which 11 was practi~ally nil in so far 
as the bushess of Fire Insurance is concerned.n 
Evidence was collected by sending a written questionnaire 
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(4) Hansard 1908, •101. 37, PP• 337,338. :.1 \ 1 
to the principal companies. As concerned non-life 
insurance~, the Report seems to have been written from 
these replies plus unspecified general considerations. 
{ 5) Re Oort of the Royal Commission on Insurance. ~art I I - l; ! ' ·l ·'D~ir~· Insuranc~~1~tli~.~a·r-r\-Papers.1910 vo1.rr. 1 • 1 I I l I ! . ; ]J,111 
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Its recommendations were nevertheles$ concise. 
of the more important were: 
Some 
l. A deposit with the Commonwealth of £20,000 should 
be required. 
2. There should be a Commonwealth Insurance 
3. All companies should be licensed with the 
~y ~hould annually make a return of 
a revenue account and balance sheet, distinguishing non-
5. Th~ Commissioner should have powers of inspection. 
6. The Commissioner should collect statistics of 
fire premiums and losses by classes, and these should be 
the basis for standard rates. 
7. Fire loss assessors should be registered by the 
Commissioner. 
8. All policy forms, conditions, proposals cover 
notes and receipts should be submitted for the 
Commissioner's approval. 
9. Fire Brigade charges on insurance premiums should 
be abolished. 
10. Government or municipal insurance schemes should 
not be organised; Governments and municipalities sho~ld 
insure. 
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id) 1•Non-Enthusiasm"? 
Before the Royal Commission made its report 
legislation requiring deposits and publication of 
accounts had been brought down in England. (6) 
Despite this·, no attempt was made to legislate in 
Australia until 1912. The Bill then introduced 
followed the recommendations of the Royal Commission 
almost entirely; but in addition it extended to 
specifically include accident and employer's liability 
insurance. The principle of the £20,000 deposit and 
the submission of detailed accounts followed the 
English precedent, but the other recommendations 
concerning regulation by an Insurance Comrnissioner were 
patterned on American laws. 
In one important respect the Bill went beyond the 
Report by providing that all rates should be "reasonable 
and justtt; the standard rates computed from statistics 
collected by the Commissioner were to be evidence of what 
was "reasonable and just". Moreover " .•• companies 
entering into combinations to fix~ rates that are 
unreasonable and a detriment to the public are guilty 
( 7) 
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(7) Cl.80 _ see Debate, Hansard Vol, 76, pp.3268 ff. ~ 
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Before this Bill could be considered Parliament 
was dissolved for a general election. It was re-
introduced in the Senate as a private measure in early 
1914, but again dissolution intervened.. Finally, 
again with Government support, it was read a first time 
in April 1914. During intermittent discussions between 
1914 and 1916 many details were settled in Com~ittee, 
but once more it was allowed to lapse.(B) 
After 1916 nothing was done with regard to insurance 
in the Commonwealth Parliament until 1932. The measure 
had never been attended with much sense of urgency, and 
after 1915 most of tha States passed laws requiring 
deposits in various forms. (9} As most of the foreign 
companies operating in Australia were English and came 
under the Act of 1909, it was also felt that, in so far 
as the U.K. provisions regarding publication of accounts 
were effective, Australian policy holders were to some 
extent safeguarded. Moreover attitudes to the Bill were 
far from clear cut. In particular, some Labour party 
members thought it too conservative; it would do n~thing 
.. · 
to eliminate the "extravagant" operating expenses of the 
companies. Suggestions were made that a Commonwealth 
rs) Hansard Vol. 16, p.10,030. 
(9) See below. 
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Office should be set up and collect premiums through 
the Post Office. Ideas that were i'n the air concerning 
"national insuranoo1 were also considered to be relevant, 
particularly to the question of Workers' Compensation 
insurance. This view was supported by a Royal Commission 
which reported on National Insurance in 1925.(l) 
In its report it commented on the great diversity of 
existing insurance schemes in Australia and claimed that, 
as a· result: 
••• there is a considerable overlapping, duplication, 
unnecessary competition, waste of effort, and very 
apparent lack of coordination and uniformity, together 
with numerous resultant anomalies arising from 
unscientific methods. 
Although its terms of reference did not include Workers' 
Compensation insurance, it had this in mind when making, 
its recommendations on the subject of accident benefits. 
The desirable object of a system of National 
insurance is the conubination of all provisions 
for assistance to the waqe earner during all 
circumstances of incapacity to work ••• your. 
commissioners ••• recommend ••• that the question 
of including workers' compensation legislation 
under the National Insurance fund administration 
should be fully considered. (2) · 
The Commission thus anticipated what was done in the 
U.K. in 1946. 
Tf·)·_F_i_r_s_t_P_r_o_g_r_e_s_s_::'Re_p_o_r_t;--:o:-f~~t:;::h:-:e-nR::o::y:-a'l1.-:St_o;::;;m;;m;i;;s~s~n ...... _o_n __ _ 
National rns.uranceL 1925. Cwlth. Parl. Papers 1925 
Vol. 2. 
{2) Ibid. 
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(21..State Legislation. As mentioned above, the 
first Government measures taken in Australia in the 
direction of Government regulation were state laws 
requiring deposits for permission to operate. The 
~ 
purpose was primarily the protection of policy holders 
against insolvent companies. To achieve this deposits 
ir. the form of Government bonds seemed administratively 
simple, and moreover, an easy method of raising loan 
money. The principal features of the State Acts are 
set out below. 
1914 Victoria~ Workers' Compensation Act, 1914. 
Minimum paid up capital £25,000. Deposit £6,000; 
£3,000 if an acquired company. To be in 
Victorian Govt. securities. Any company under-
·.cutting rates ~xcessively or paying 1•excessive 1' 
commissions" could be called upon to increase its 
deposit. Applicable to Workers' Compensation 
business only. 
1916.Queensland. Insurance Act, 1916. If premium 
--- income in Queensland l~ss than £10,000, deposit 
required £5,000. If greater than £10,000, 
deposit £10,000. Amended in 1923 : £5,00~ 
additional deoosit for every £10,000 premium 
income in excess of £20,000 - maximum deposit 
£20,000. To be invested.in Queensland Gover~ment 
securities. For all business except workers 
12..18 
compensation. 
westarn Australia. Insurance Companies ~ct, 1918. 
All companies to deposit £5,000. To be in W.A. 
Treasury Bills. Applicable to all classes of 
business. 
1924 Tasmania. Insurance Companies Act, ~924. All. 
companies to deposit £5,000 •. To be in Tasmanian 
Government securities. Applicable to all classes. 
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1924 South Australia. Insurance Companies (Deposits) 
Act ~924~ Deposit £2,500 plus 25 per cent of annual 
premiu~ income in the State. Companies not 
established at time of the Act : £5 000 plus 25 
per cent of premium income in the State. To be in 
Stat~ or Commonwealth Government Securities, 
Applicable to all classes. 
1926 New South Wales. Workers' Compensation Act, 1926. 
~hen ne~ workers' compensation annual premium 
income in the State less than £10 000 deposit 
£6,090; if greater than £10,000, depo~it £10,000. 
Acquir:d and parent companies counted as one company. 
To be in State or Commonwealth Government securities. 
Applicable t0 Workers' Compen~ation business only. 
It will be noticed that in N.S.W. and Victoria, the 
deposits related only to Workers' Compensation business~ 
Only in Victoria was there mention of supervision; it was 
intended that this should be carried out by the Insurance 
Commissioner (i.e. the manager of the State Accident Office). 
Since there was no definition of what constituted 
"excessive" rate cutting or commissions, no provision for 
returns by companies of commissions, non-workers' 
compensation business, or any balance sheet information 
\ 
whatever, it can hardly be considered a serious attempt 
at detailed solvency regulation. Similar remarks apply 
to the provision in most State Workers' Compensation Acts 
that insurersshould obtain licenses. In view of the large 
number of companies holding licenses which became 
insolvent, it must be concluded that most were granted and 
renewed automatically without any attempt to assess 
fina~cial status if the required deposit or li6ence fee 
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were paid. This may be illustrated by companies 
licensed under the N.S.W. Workers' Compensation Act. 
By Seen. 28 of the Act the N.S.W. Workers' Compensation 
Commission ha~ power to suspend licenses, but the writer 
is info~med that a licence has been cancelled on one 
occasion only (due to lateness in making a return). (3 ) 
On the other hand, licenses have been issued to and 
renewed for at. least 13 companies which at the time were 
in a weak financial position and were eventually sold or 
liquidated. A few of these companies are listed below: 
Company 
Federal Building 
Ass • Co • (Syd • ) 
Commonwealth 
Traders (Syd.) 
Community General (Syd.) 
~ 
When 
Licensed 
1928 
~ } 1926-29 
) 
1926-30 
United Service (Syd.)1926-27 
Mercantile and 1928-30 
General (N.Z.) 
Motor Traders (Syd.) 1938-59 
Nottinaham {W.Comp.) 1953-57 
... (Syd.) 
Comments. 
Compulsory liquidation.of 
both in 1929. 
Compulsory liquidation 
1930. W.Comp. license 
lapsed in May 1930 aft~~ 
winding up order made. Had 
issued about 1000 w.comp. 
policies. 
Compulsory liquidation 1930. 
Sold out to ~ in 1932. 
Voluntary liquidation 1958. 
Voluntary liquidation 1958. 
("3) Letter to the writer.from the Registrar, Workers' 
t
. Commi·ssion of New South Wales, dated Compensa ion • 
1 August 1961. 
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Vanguard (Syd.) Heavy losses 1955-57. Taken over 
~y 8_s~icurazioni Generali (Trieste) 
in 1957. · 
Unfortunately no details are avai"lable · · concerning possible 
deficiencie~.1 in Workers' Compensation claims as regards these 
companies,nor as 
drawn on. (4 ) 
to the extent to which deposits have been 
The only State where some attention appears to be paid 
to financial status is Queensland where licences have been 
required since 1916, and from 1960 granted only to 
companies complying with solvency standards based on the 
U.I<. rules described below. Here again, no licences have ever 
been cancelled on the initiative of the Commissioner, but the 
Commissioner attributes this to the fact that o:rlginal 
applications are carefully examined before licences ar.e 
granted. In addition: 
The accounts of all insurers are carefully examined 
each year, and when there is oocasion to query 
anything in,them the necessary·action is taken. over 
the years many applications have been refused, or 
not pressed by ~he applicants. (5) 
In other States there is no similar examination of accounts, 
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(4) When the write,r wrote to the Commission regarding these , .· -11 'f 
matters, he was referred to the liquidators of the ' · " J , !! 
but even in'Queensland companies of· dubious.financial 
strength e.g. the Vailgua·rd, have been allowed to operate. 
(5) ~~~~=~it~ i~~c:rt~; from the Insurance Commissioner, ' ·._!_!~_. Queensl•rid~d~ted 1 August 1961. The 1960 Insurance Act 
required that companies should ~ave (a) more.than 20 
members (b) minimum paid up capital £50,0~0 if already an 
insurer, £75,000-if not (cJ total assets in ~xce!s of ·~ 
total liabilities by £50,000 or l/l0 1 of premium inc~me, Special provision was made.for Lloyd s brokers. 
(b) The Insurance Act, 1932. The non-life 
insurance companies originally were entirely opposed 
to the idea of deposits, but with the coming of State 
legislation it seemed that it would probably be 
preferable for there to be one central deposit for the 
whole of Australia rather than deposits under various 
Acts in each State. The AIBR accordingly consistently 
recommended Federal deposit legislation on most 
occasions when the matter was discussed after 1914. 
In the 1920's an important new development was the 
promotion of companies to write both life and general !l 
insurance, to which reference has been made in Chapter !;?;3C; 
N. s. W. was the only State which did not have ·legislation 
dealing with life insurance; in particular, no 
separation of life, non-life or other funds was required. 
The Companies Act itself was based on the English Act of 
1862 and was, as understated by the AIBR n ••• of a 
somewhat primitive type 0 • ( 6) As described in ChapteriV.f, 
numbers of these new flotations were fraudulent from their 
commencement, and with others, failed badly in the late 
1920's, involving serious losses of life funds. 
(6) AIBR 1923 p. 141. 
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The failures in N.s.w. at last brought some 
action from the Commonwealth Parliament. A Bill, based 
on the recommendations of the 1908 Royal Commission, but 
dealing only with life insurance, was introduced in 1929. (?) 
Before it could be passed, Parliament dissolved. In 1930 
it was reintroduced as a private measure in the Senate, 
passed its second and third readings, and was placed on 
the Notice Paper of the House of Representatives : again 
there was a dissolution. In the meantime,drastic measures 
were being devised by the Lang government in N.S.W. In 
1931 a Bill was introduced which would have required 
large cash deposits from all companies - life, fire, 
marine and accident. The sums originally proposed for 
non-life companies were reduced by the Legislative 
Council, but 11 compromise't amounts suggested by the 
Government were still large.(B) 
7 
8 
1929. Life Insurance Bill, 
Companies in N.s,w. 
at the time of the 
Act 
Net non-life orems. 
!n N.S.W. (£1'-00]r' Deposit £'000. 
Companies openin~ 
in N.S.W. after the 
commencement of the Act 
0-10 
10-25 
25-50 
Over 50 
Australian 
British 
Foreign 
For details see AIBR 1931 pp. 415, 
Cos. 
520, 1074. 
10 
15 
25 
35. 
35 
40 
50 
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The Bill was finally defeated by the Legislative 
Council in December 1931, but was proposed again in 
l q32 following the 'n stackingn of the Upper House with 
Lang supporters. 
The question now suddenly became an urgent one for 
the Commonwealth Parliament; a Bill was hurriedly 
introduced requiring deposits from all companies, and by 
virtue of the Constitution overridina all State 
..J 
legislation. During the debate the Minister said:(9 ) 
..... 
The Honourable Member for West Sydney a$kS why 
this measure was being treated as urgent •.• My 
reply is that it is because ·of what is being 
done in New South Wales •.• it is necessary to 
take steps to protect the interests of 
insurance companies which hold sucfu a large 
proportion of the savings of the people of 
Australia. 
For non-life companies, the deposits required under 
the Act were as follows:(l) 
(1) Companies carrying on business in Australia at 
the commencement of the Act : £1,000 for every £5,000 
of premium income; minimum £1,000, maximum £40,000. 
(2) Companies not carrying on business in Australia 
at the commencement of the Ar,t: 
Australian companies: £5 000 plus £1,000 for every 
£5:000 of net annual premiums 
British companies: 
Foreign companies: 
s.M.Bruce,Cwlth. Hansard 
The Insurance Act, 1932. 
exceeding £5,000. Maximum 
£40,000. 
£50,000 
£60,000 
1932 Vol.133 pp.863,4. 
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The deposit requirements were to be administered 
by the Commonwealth Treasury. Although the 
desirability of further legislation along the lines of 
the Royal Commission recom~endations was frequently 
referred to in subsequent years, nothing was ever done, 
and the 1932 Act as amended remains in force at the 
present. By the Insurance Act of 1960, the required 
deposits are as follows: 
ComR~uies estd. in Aust!_~lia before 1932~ 
Australian: 
Foreign: 
£1,000 for every £5,000 of net prems. 
Min. £1,000, max. £80,000. 
£1,000 for every £5,000 net prems. 
Min. £1,000, max. £100, 000. 
Comoanies estd. in Australia after 1932. ~~.=.:..:..:::.=..=.-:::..::::..=-::;..:......:~..;..;.;;;;..;;;.,.;;;.;;;;...;.~,.;,;._---.____-• ......--
Australian: 
Foreign: 
£5,000 plus £1,000 for every £5,000 
of net prems. exceeding £25,000. 
Max •. £80, 000. 
£100,000. 
The Com~onwealth Act in one respect is far more liberal 
than the State Acts which it replaced. The latter 
required the deposit to be in State only, or State or 
Com~onwealth, securities. The list of approved 
securities under the Commonwealth Act is by contrast 
extensive. It includes:(2) 
~~~----·--~------------------~------~-------~---
(2) The Insurance Act, 1932-1960, Seen. 3(l). 
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Australian Commonwealth or State Secur't' UK Govt sec 't' i ies ~of any Stateur1 iesf or Government securities, 
Queen's Domi~i~~~tt~ any other part of the 
Approved Municipal securities 
Approved Australian debentures 
Approved Australian fixedceposits 
Approved Bank guarantees 
Approved Australian freehold titles 
Approved.first mortgages on freehold land in 
Australia. 
"Any other securities approved by the Treasurer.u 
Under section 14 (a) of the Act a parent company and its 
subsidiaries are counted as a single company. Whereas, 
under the N.S.W. and Victorian legislation, Workers' 
Compensation policy holders had preferred status, this is 
no longer so under the Com~onwealth Act. As was typical 
of the State Acts, no supervisory responsibilities beyond 
ensuring that.all companies make deposits up to the 
prescribed amJunts, are laid on the Commonwealth. For the 
purpose of calculating the deposit required, returns 
of net premiums within Australia must be made within three 
~onths of the end' of the annual trading period; however 
by the 1960 amending Act companies with the maximum 
deposit were no longer required to furnish these returns. 
The £100,000 initial deposit required of a new 
foreign company might seem at first glance to constitute 
a significant deterrent to new entrants, but it is in 
fact easily avoided by the formation of a fully owned 
Australian registered subsidiary. such a company is 
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counted as "Australian" for the purposes of the tct. 
In addition special provision was made in 1932 for 
Lloyd's brokers. According to Senator Thompson, 
introducing the Bill in the Senate for the Govern~ent, 
when Lang's Bill had beentefore the N.S.W. Legislative 
C ·1 " , ounci ••• a strong attempt had been made by the 
(3) Association to exclude Lloyd• s from J-\Ustral i.a 0 , by 
requiring a substantial deposit from each broker. (4 ) 
l~der clause 6(2) of the Act provision is made for a 
single deposit by persons acting in association in the 
Commonwealth on behalf of 0 one insurer or a group of 
insurers" outside the Comnonwealth, e.g. Lloyd's. However 
overseas ~omganie~ are excluded from this concession : 
this would appear to somewhat limit the effectiveness of 
brokers placing Australian business in the London and 
overseas markets.( 5) 
Since the Act is the principal solvency control in 
Australia, some comments regarding its adequacy are justified: 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
Presumably the N.s.w. FAUA. 
Cwlth. Hansard, 1932, Vol.133, P• 252. 
If the provision is in fact observed! It might also 
be asked whether the provision does not put 
considerable power in the hands of group: of.Lloyd's 
brokers if they were to refuse the application of 
new brokers to join them. 
I 
t ! i 
l I 
I 
4 ) 
\ 
I ! 
I I ! 
~ 
~ 
'\ 
' 
1 I 
t ' ' 
" I \ I I . ~ 
Ii I 1 I 
(1) No restraint is placed on rate cutting, since 
the deposit varies with premium income. Low rates would 
produce low premiums and so a relatively low deposit. 
(2) The maximum deposit of £80,000 for Australian 
and £100,000 for Foreign companies means tra t the required 
ratio is well below 20 per cent for companies with annual 
premium incomes in Australia exceeding £400,000 and 
£500,000 respectively. Some effective ratios in 1961 
for larger compan1es whose premium figures are available 
are: 
Commercial Union of 
Australia Group 
Mercantile Mutual 
Queensland 
Ajax 
National and General 
Net Prems. 
1961 
£' 006. 
8117 
6343 
5651 
4071 
3495 
Chamber of Manufactures 3059 
Reauir~d peposit ~ 
12ercentage .of Net •. 
Prems. 
--
0.99 
1.26 
1.42 
1.97 
2.29 
2.62 
Was recognl·sed by Bruce when the Bill was This limitation 
introduced:(6 ) 
f uiring a deposit to be lodged I~et~u~~~~:c~ p~~{cyhold:rs ag~~~sio~~I~~ ~~ 
unsound insuran~e comp~~t~s~annot be regarded 
even a substantia~ dep licyholders in a large 
as ensuring security to po 
-
____ :c~o~n~c:e:r~n~·~:--;Li:~~--;;;;;r-Vd:'"-r3'3-P:-1~5':--------~-----------r 6} S.M.Bruce,Cwlth.Hansard Vd.. 133 P• 670. 
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In reply to Opposition criticisms along these lines 
he said:(?) 
I hope th~t, at a later date, a complete measure 
dealing with the whole subject may be submittGd 
to homourable members ••• 
(3) Net premiums for the purpose of calculating 
the deposit are net of all reinsurance, including, it 
would appear, overseas reinsurance; and moreover the 
definition limits the premiums to those "on account of 
insurance business in the Commonwealth."(S) Under 
this interpretation a company reinsuring substantially 
.. 
overseas and obtaining reciprocal reinsurance would ue 
required to make its deposit on the basis of Australian 
premiums less the overseas cession. There is no attempt 
to protect overseas insurers insuring with Australian 
companies, !lQ.!. Australian insurers against the failure 
of overseas reinsurers. 
(e) u.K. Legislation. (9) 
In view of the importance of the connection between 
the London and Australian insurance markets, it is of 
interest to examine the British legislation relating 
Until 1909 there was no British to solvency standards. 
1 · speci"fi"cally concerning non-life compani~s, legis ation 
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(7) Ibid. p. 862. 
h I a ce Act 1932-1960, (8) 
(9) 
Regulations under t e nsur n 
Regulation 10 Fo~m 6. some extent on: H.E.Raynes:_A Histr0r.;Y_ 
This section relies t~h XX o.E.W.Gibb,Lloyd's of London, 
of British Insurance, • · 
Ch.19. 
ii 1~ ' : I ~ . lI . = _ l_ 
ti ' . " ~ ~J:w~ 
The Life Assurance Comp . an1es Act of 1~70 provided for 
the separation of life from non-11·fe funds where one 
company wrote both classes of business, and such 
companies were required to k ma e separate returns in 
statutory form of their fire, mari·ne and other business. 
As in Australia, the extension of regulation was to some 
extent occasioned by thP. comino_ of Workers' Compensation 
legislation and a few obvious and notorious cases of 
fraud. (l) The Act (The Assurance ComQanies Act, 1909) 
was based on and incorporated the Act of 1870, It 
applied to all companies carrying on the following classes 
of business in the U.K.: 
Life 
Fire 
Accident 
Employers' Liability 
Bond Investment 
Marine was a noticeable omission from this list, but 
motor vehicle and aircraft insurance were made separate 
classes in 1930 and 1936 respectively. (2) The principles 
of the Act were that a deposit of £20,000 should be made 
in respect of each class of business, that separate 
statutory returns should be made, and separate funds kept. 
However the effectiveness of these principles was severely 
restricted in practice by provisions that fire or 
accident companies in existence before the passing of the 
(!} Raynes op. cit. p.359. (2) Road Traffic Act 1930 Seen. 42: Air Navigation Act 
1936. Seen. 20. 
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Act need make no dep~sit for non-life business, and 
that a deposit for any one class was sufficient for 
all. Even more significant, an amendment was accepted 
which stated: (3) 
Provided that nothing in this section shall 
require the investments of any such fund to 
be kept separate from the investments of any 
other fund. 
Again, a detailed statement of assets wa$ required; 
but m~rely the fact of deposits in other countries 
as security for foreign policyholders needed to be 
stated, not the amounts. 
Not long after the passing of the act its 
inadequacy became manifest with the failure of many 
companies writing marine business duriQg 1921 and 
after. A Departmentai Committee was set up in 1924 
to consider desirable amendments. The Committee (4) 
made three main recommendations: 
(1) Separation of assets as well as funds was 
necessary in certain cases, especially the assets of 
the life fund. 
(2) All marine business should be included; 
also sinking fund and capital redemption business 
(also previously exclude~). 
·-----'=--------------·----
(3) Assurance companies Act, 1909, Seen. 3(1) 
(4) •tt It Known as the"Clauson Commi ee 
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(3) The powers of the Board of Trade were not 
sufficient to·, compel winding up, and should be increased. 
There was no action on these recommendations until 1933 
and 1935, when the Assurance Companies (Winding-up) Acts 
gave the Board of Trade greater powers in these respects, 
including the obtaining of information and rights of 
inspection. The legislation was again directly occasioned 
by company failures, this .time of motor vehicle insurers 
involved in third party liab~lity claims. By ~his time 
too, there was much support for the view that the method 
of 11 deposits plus publicityn was inadequate.as a 
protective device, and that there should be a system of 
solvency supervision to be enforced by the Board of Trade 
along the lines of the Committee of ·Lloyd's supervision 
of its members. As it is expressed by Gib~:( 5 ) 
The returns were of little value and the deposit 
was uniform ••• To demand a nam~d deposit as a 
company's·birth and on the strength of that., 
deposit to give it a ncar.te .blanche", allowing 
it to write as much as it liked, grow.to any. 
size that it liked,· bowl away as merrily as it 
liked until the day of its admitted insolvency 
that had been proved a failure. , 
In order to consider these views another Departmental 
committee was set up, and in 1937 in fact made 
------------------~~-----~------------
(5) Gibb op. cit •. PP• 337, 338 • 
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recommendations (for the classe f b . . . s o us1ness w1th1n 
its terms of reference) which involved licencing and the 
maintenance of specified solvency standards. (6) In 
1~46 these recom e d t• ~ n a ions were carried out for ~~ 
classes by a new Assurance Companies Act. The 1946 Act 
was replaced by the Insurance Companies Act 195~, which 
is at present in force and does not differ 
substantially from the 1946 Act. 
Under the Act, insurance companies are no longer 
required to make deposits provided they meet certain 
solvency standards set out. For life insurance, this 
takes the for~ of a compulsory actuarial investigation 
!J69 
at least once in every five years, th~ results of which 
are to be reported t~ the Board of Trade together with 
specified annual returns.(Secn.5). For non-life business 
the provision is as follows: (Secn.13) 
" ••• a company which carries on general business, 
shall be deemed, for the purposes of section two hundred 
and twenty-two of the Companias Act 1948 (which 
authorises the Court to wino up a company unable to pay 
its debts), to be unable to pay its debts if the value of 
(6) Report of the Committee on Compulsory Insurance, 1937. 
C d J c:.i::.29 The ncassell Committee". The Committee's m . • ;.,1.,J • f. d t " 1 u investigation was officially con ine .. o compu 7ory ~ 
• (• e at the time motor vehicle and a1rcraLt insurance, 1 • • . k ' t · ) third party risks, and coal mi~es war.er~ compensa ion 
but it was in fact far more widely ranging. 
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its as sets: does not- excee· d. ·.the amount of its liabilities 
by whichever is ·the greater of the f l o lowing amounts, 
namely -·. · .. · ' ' ~ ' . ... · ' 
(.a~ fiftx thou.s·and. pounds; or 
(p) one. :te,nth of the .genera.l premium income of 
the cqmpany in its la$t p~eceding financial 
year;" 
Section 14 ,gives the Board of Trade powers of investigatirn 
' . 
and,. if ne~d be> compulsory inspection; under section. 
15~ the Board c~n apply to the relevant Court to have 
compani.es wound uo. 
'. ,l 
Companies must deposits accounts 
and statements with the Board of ·Trade within 6 months 
of the close of the annual trading period (Section 8(1) ). 
Lloyd's underwriters continue to work substantially 
under provision~ for internal audit agreed in 1909, 
but fdllowing the 1946.Act _certain_ limited statistics 
of their operations hav.e been. published .by the Board 
·. ' . .. .· , . 
of .. Trade. The compahy statistics required are in a 
standard form set out in Regulations under the Act, 
and are as fo~lows~ 
Revenue ~ccounts: for 
"I '• 
"d t 
. ACCJ. en . '• ' 
· Bond Investment capi~al Redemption, Sinking Fund etc. 
Fire ·, · ,. 
Life and Annuity . 
Maririe Aviation and Transit 
Miscelianeous (including Employers' Liability) 
Motor Vehicl.e 
J 
Profit and Loss Account 
Balance Sheets 
Miscellaneous Statements, in respect of Life 
Assurance. 
Although the deposit requirement was abolished by the 
Act, companies not registered before 1945 are required 
to have a minimum paid up capital of £50,000 (Secn.2). 
Special provision is made for companies registered 
under Acts relating to friendly societies or trade 
u~ions (Secns. 1(5) and 1(6) ) and for mutual associations. 
(Second Schedule). 
The effectiveness of the British regulations are of 
direct interest to Australia because a high proportion 
of all overseas compdnies in Australia operate in the 
U.K. and come under the U.J<. Act. Moreover a number of 
Australian companies operate in London, and a large 
number of others have reinsurance relations with London. 
For these reasons the following weaknesses in the 
U.K. Act should be noted: 
(1) Many countries require substantial deposits, 
and the investment of funds in local securities. To the 
extent that companies' assets are fully tied to specific 
local liabilities, a dissolution could conceivably affect 
unprotected policyholders more than in proportion to the 
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total loss. This complication was recognised by the 
1909 Act, and ~rovision has since been made that the 
place and amounts of these deposits should be specified. 
However fire, accident and employers' liability insurance 
are excluded from this requirement: " .•• it shall be 
sufficient to state the fact that a part of the assets 
(7) 
has been so deposited." In the absence of this 
information with regard to a major portion of the non-
life companies' business, it is impossible either for 
the Board of Trade or outside observers to assess the 
significance of this factor. That it may be important 
is suggested by the large number of countries which do 
have such legislation, the typical rule being that the 
company should hold the whole or some specified 
proportion of its local liabilities in local assets. (S) 
In this connection the evidence presented to the 
Cassell Committee by H. A. Van de Linde is of interest. 
An accountant, h~ listed for the Committee 34 insurance 
companies which had failed in England between 1920 and 1935t 
T1) 
(8) 
Insurance Companies (Forms) Regulations-;-1958. Third 
Schedule, Note 1. . For details of legislat1on in different c?untr1es see 
E. Finke, editor: HaQdwQ.£,terbuch q~ ~e_£?1cherunqswesens 
op. cit. and Gregg"15.w. and M~Gill D.M.: W?rld Insuran~~ 
Trends - Proceedings ~f .:t..he First Internat!.Q_n~l 
fnsurance Conferenc~, 1957. 
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of these at least 24 were liquidated under his direct 
supervision. Du · th ring e course of his evidence he 
answered the foll · ( 9) owing questions: 
lgue~.t.iol) 5367. "Have you found in the course of the iqu1dat1on of insu ! 
are tied up abroad for ~~~c~ec~~panies, th~t funds 
policyholders?n- Yes, definit~ly~t of foreign 
9uestion 5368. "And has the result of that b 
that in some case~ foreign policyholders have had een 
20s. in t~e £ and British poli:yholders have had to be 
content with less?" - Yes. 
Qµes~ion,r5373. "They got the surplus funds back 
from ~er1ca? - Yes, after a great deal of trouble 
and dispute. 
Question 5374. "Am I right in saying that delays 
up to ten years might occur?" Yes. 
(2) The 10 per cent margin required is on premiums 
after reinsurance, including reinsurance w]th companies 
not operating in the U.K. and so not coming under the 
provisions of the Act. As in Australia, there is no 
protection against the failure of such a reinsurer. 
In his 1936 evidence, Van de Linde gave reinsurance 
treaties as one of the causes of failure in 11 of the 
34 cases. He mentioned "bad arrangements", losses 
under, and inability to collect under reinsurance 
treaties. In 3 furt~er instances contributory causes 
were inability to collect funds due to political 
factors, and losses on exchange transfers. 
T9lcommittee on Compulsory Insurance.Minutes of Evidence 
taken before the Departmental Committee appointed by the 
Board of Trade ••. London H:M.S.O. 1937. Memorandum and 
Evidence of H.A. Van de Linde, pp.269-85. 
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(3) There is no detailed control over investments. 
Unlike, for exampleJmost u.s. State laws, where "admitted 
assets" are carefully specifi"ed and are subject to 
investigation and verification by Insurance Commissioners, 
all balance sheet assets are counted, including agents' 
balances, outstanding premiums, establishment expenses 
etc. The only requirement is that a certificate must be 
signed, stating that "the assets set forth in the Balance 
Sheet are in the agg~egate fully of the value stated 
therein". (l) In this respect insurance companies are in 
~privileged position, -together with shipping companies 
and banks,as regards the U.K. Companies Act of 1948. 
Under the Eigth Schedule of this Act all companies are 
required to disclose the estimated market value of their 
assets. The principal argument used for exemption, and 
accepted by the Cohen Committee in 1945 (2) was that a 
buff er of secret reserves is necessary to maintain 
confidence, especially international confidence, in British 
insurance companies. This matter was re-examined by the 
Jenkins Committee in 1960. The ooint of view of the • 
Sritish non-life companies was put by an insurance witness 
as follows: 
Tf) Insurance c~mpanies (Forms) Regulations, 1958. Third 
Schedule, Note 3. (2) Report of the committee on Company Law Amendment, 1945. 
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The bene~it is ~ot an exemption from making the 
calculat~ons which, as we have said, we do for 
our own internal records. We must do them to 
see what the profitability trend of the business 
is: that i: ob~ious and prudent management. 
!he exemption is against publication and disclosure 
in the accounts, and that is where the benefit 
arises. I think the ~ery high volume of non-life 
business which is received from and ceded to 
overseas te~ritories has been overlooked, and if 
we were compelled by statute to the restricted 
b~sis of the EighthSchedule, the impact that full 
disclosure could have upon our receiving reinsurance 
from abroad might be quite high, and that is one of 
the dangers, in our mind. We always publish 
accounts which show the compamy as stable; we would 
wish not to have to show the width of that stability. 
We feel we are entitled to ask for margins because 
we are dealing with ave ragas.{ 3) 
If this position is accepted, it is obviously 
difficult for Australian insv_rers op reinsurers to 
judge the r ela ti v e re ser.ve· strengths of different 
~ompanies. MoPeovet>, as mentioned above, companies 
ar.e allowed six months from the end of their trading 
period before having to deposit the required statement 
with the Board of Trade. This is eighteen months from 
the beginning of the trading peraiod, and there is a 
further delay before the accounts are published in a 
convenient form. (4) In this time, ee g. due to under-
writing losses combined with a fall in stock exchange 
values, a great deal may happen, especially if trends 
in previous years have. been hidden by the absorption of 
undisclosed reserves. 
(3) 
(4) 
company Law committee: Minutes of Evidenc?, 
16th D 1960 u. 577, H. J. Henderson-Smith • ec. • . t. 
for the British I!nsurance Associa ion. 
+ 
In the Board of Trade "Blue Book" Summary 
of Statements • • • op. cit. 
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(d) Tariff Oreanisatio~s 
Tariff companies in Australia take as their 
motto the words 'Security Eau1· t s 1 ' · ·. ' - ·Y , er v c e and in 
view of this it might perhaps be expected that the 
FAUA:-and Marine Councils would pay some attention to 
the financial standing of thei" members. H '" oweve:r, as 
hRs been shown t11 C!1 fr, r 1 I,€ the record of failures 
among tariff companies in Australia has not been 
markedly better than among non-tariff companies. Some 
companies which were members of Tariff organisations 
while their financial position was such that it would 
not have been tolerated, for example 1 by any U .s. 
Insurance Connnissioner, are listed below: 
Australian Amicable 
Australian Federal Life and General 
Australian Group and General 
Australian Insurance Co. ~imited 
Australian Provincial Assurance 
Commonwealth General 
1912 - 1916 
1923 - 1929 
1924 - 1931 
1920 - 1929 
1912 - 1923 
1921 - 192.5 
1924 - 1931 
1925 - 1928 
1922 - 1926 
1914 - 1932 
1927 - 1929 
1923 - 1930 
1910 - 1922 
1928 - 1930 
1924 - 1930' 
1951 - 1957 
Commercial of Australia 
Commonwealth Traders 
Empire Life and General 
Farmers and Settlers 
Federal Building Assurance 
Fire Office of Australia 
Insurance O ffice of Australia 
Property Ins. Co.· 
United Service 
Vanguard 
Port of Manchester (U.K.) 
National Benefit Life & Property. (U. K.) 
Companies such as the Southern Union 
- .} 1921 - 1924 
1929 - 1931 
1912 - 191.5. 
- ( 1917 - 1922 
( 1921 - 31) 
and the standard ( 1874 - 1961).., which were absorbe~ 
or liquidated in the first year of their financial 
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weRkness have not been included in this list. The 
criterion used is failure to pass the Board of Trade 
test viz. that assets should d l excee iabilities by 
more than 10 per cent of annual premium income.(5) 
For this purpose assets such as "establishment account" 
h~ve not been included. All the companies listed, 
except the last t\·10, nre Australian. The list is by 
no means complete, owing to the difficulty of finding 
information concerning many companies. 
The nature of the Australian tariff organisation 
is such that it cannot be expected to provide an 
effective guarantee of 'security'. There are no 
regulations on the matter in the agreements, and it 
is likely that any attempts to introduce them would 
fail, because 1 t \Vvuld inevitably involve some scrutiny 
of assets, a move which would certainly be resisted by 
British companies. The Associations are also constantly 
f'1ced w1 th the temntation of 9.llowing relatively weak 
• 
comps.ni es to join in the hope that in this way they 
might be strengthened and also not embarrass member 
companies by cutting rates. Despite these points, 
the tariff record does seem to have improved since the 
1920 18 when even fraudulent or semi-fraudulent companies 
0 r notoriety, (notably the Australian Federal Life and 
General)(6) were members.(?) 
(5) 
(6) 
The Board of Trade £50,000 minimum was not appl~ed. 
Estd. in Sydney in 1923 for both life and non-life 
cont •••• 
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( e) Conclusions 
It has been suggested that Australian attempts 
~t solvency supervision have been less than enthusinstic 
and that existing regulations of the States, the 
C0mm0nwealth, and the industry itself, are not adequate 
to prevent serious failures. Mor•e0ver, less and less 
reliance can be placed on the British legislatiun, as 
an increasing proportion of overseas companies have 
headquarters in other par ts of the wo1 .. ld. Also, the 
relative absence of large scale loss in Australia in 
the past does not mean that there is no danger in the 
f1J ture. Indeed the increasing competitiveness of the 
Anstralian m'.3.rket, and the grov,ing influence of the 
nevi brokers, could lead to mol"e serious failures and 
deter overseas companies which in the past have often 
bought out weak Austre:ian companies as a convenient 
method of en try to a market VJhose long-term prospects 
~ere viewed optimistically. 
The present Comnonwealth Deposit legislation is 
tr.~sed on principles which were long ago recognised as 
inadequate in the United States, Great Britain and in 
(6) 
(7) 
~~~~~ess. Absorbed four weak comp~nies in 1928. 
In 1927-28 non-life premiums £42,300. Compulsory 
liquidation in 1929. Member N.S.W. FAUA 1927-30, 
joined Vic. FAU.A 1928. . t 
Tiowever the ability of certain.clolmib)anifes. ot .. t' 
~urvive' the 1961-62 recession w1 e o in ,er es• 
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nearly all other countries with a privately owned insurance 
industry. There is a serious case for the establishment of 
a Commonwealth supervisory authority, along the lines of the 
present Life Insurance Commission, and for the adoption of 
solvency rules as used by the U.K. Board of Trade or by 
State Insurance Commissioners in the U.S.A.(8) The 
Commissioner should have powers to examine companies and to 
take action to liquidate them where necessary. His 
department should also act as the chief statistics collecting 
and processing body for insurance in Australia. All these 
measures would be especially important if proposed 
Commonwealth restrictive practices legislation were to 
include insurance within its scope, and would remove the 
principal argument of those who support tariff agreements 
in insurance. 
(8) t f Govern
ment supervision in the U.S.A. 
For an accoun o h d· 
see Albert H. Mowbray anddR~lpht~~eBi~~h!ru~ited 
Insurance. Its Theor ~ 1:80 3 
I ... ·-· -~--.~~----
' r· 
.1 
' i 
':, 
,, 
,, 
~ i 
·: ;; i r 
l ,t !1 . I' 
I 
' 
l , ' 
, ! . f'. 
' \ t . l 
. ' 
I 
l ~ 
\ . ' 
l;; 
' ' 
CHAPTER XIII 
RATE CONTROLS 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, impo~tant ~· areas of the market 
are subject to direct Government controls. How have these 
controls operated in practice, and with what effectiveness? 
With a view to answering these questions, the principal 
cases are now briefly discussed. 
(a) Workers' Compensation.(9) L~ N.s.w., South Australia 
and Western Australia the general principle of Workers' 
Compensation rate fixing is that the proclaimed rates are 
maxima only, and may be undercut as desired by competing 
companies. In Victoria and Tasmania "control" takes the 
form of consultation between the local FAUA's and the managers 
of the Government Insurance Offices in the setting of rates. 
These are tariff rates only and may be exceeded, or undercut 
by non-tariff insurers or tariff-recognised bonuses or 
discounts.( 1) In Queensland, since 1916, when all Workers' 
Compensat,ion business was taken over by the GIO, rates have 
been decided by it alone. 
The effectiveness of direct rate regulation obviously 
depends to a large extent on the frequency and 
principles of revisions, both with respect to differentials 
(9) 
( 1) 
.,.. . 
For dates of State Legislation see Ch.SI:, P·~?&· 
tion in Victoria was that the annpunced 
The original inten t Office should be approximate 
rates of the Governme~ t 6 mentioned elsewhere, 
minima in the sense t a ' ~ or licenses cancelled in 
deposits ~ould b~v!~c~~~:~cutting (AIBR 1914, p.1009). 
cases of excess ~~ ffectively enforced and from 
The provision was nev~. e d 1916 the GIO took the lead in granting bonuses an 
discounts below its published rates. 
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and the general level. As regards rating structures, nearly 
all were taken over with little alteration from previously 
existing tariffs, and there were long delays before 
systematic periodical revisions were attempted. Thus 
tariff differentials were adopted by the Victorian GIO 
in 1914, but it was not until 1951 that comprehensive 
class statistics were collected to assist decisions about 
alterations. In N.s.w. the schedule of maximum rates first 
gazetted in 1945 was not comprehensively revised until 1954. 
Since then revisions have been at three yearly intervals 
only, relying on statistics of the preceding three years. 
During these delays the implicit assumption is that 
direct rate competition or retrospective discounts bring~ .. 
relative rates into line with claims experience, with 
under-rated business flowing to the GIO's in the States 
where statutory maxima apply.( 2) 
In the determination of the general level of 
Workers' Compensation rates the co~panies ha~e been able 
to persuade state rate fixing bodies and the GIO managers 
that claims ratios of 65 or 70 per cent ought to be aimed 
at, leaving a margin of 35 or 30 per cent to cover 
management expenses, commission and taxation. In Victoria 
(2) However under the Acts applications in support of 
increased rates in particular cases are allowed. 
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65 per cent is the .appro~imate ratio .assumed by the state 
manager in discussion with tariff companies.(3) In N.s.w. 
an attempt was m~de to formalise a 70 per cent ratio in the 
so called •Fixed Loss Ratio Scheme" introduced .in 1945.( 4) 
Under this scheme insurers in N.s.w. make annual returns 
of their w. Comp. business to the •rnsurance Premiums 
Committee" set up under the Act. The Committee then 
calculates the cla~ms ratio at •tariff" rates( 5 ) on the 
combined business of all insurers. If the ratio is less 
than 70 per cent, the Committee orders the difference to 
be rebated to employers and/or paid into a special 
"Equalisation Reserve". If the ratio exceeds 70 per cent 
the Committee may allow the deficiency to be met, wholly 
or in part, from the Equalisation Reserve. 
{3} Interview by writer with General Manager, Victorian State 
Accident and Motor car Insurance Offices, 1959. 
(4) The New south wales Workers' Comeensation Fixed Insurance 
Premium Rates and Fixed Loss Ratio Schem~.' 1945. 
Introduced unde'r the provisions of the Workers' 
Compensation A~~' 1926-45. 
(5) I.e. statutory maximum rates adopted by tariff 
companies as minima. 
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It is evident t~at the assumption of "appropriatett 
claims ratios ~s in N.s.w. and Victoria is an extremely· 
crude method of controlling rates and profitability. One 
obvious weakness under the N.s.w. type of scheme is that 
if rates are such as to produce a·1ow •tariff" claims 
ratio, after the'application of the compulsory rebate the 
surplus over claims on premiums net of the rebate will be 
considerably greater than 30 per cent. (6) 
(6) E.g. a rebate of 25 per cent gives a margin over claims 
of 40.per cent on tariff premiums less the 25 per cent. 
This was important during 1946-55 under the N.s.w. scheme. 
tariff loss ratios (L) rebates (R) and equalisation 
reserve appropriations (E) during 1946-60 were (per 
cent of tariff premiums): 
L R E L R E 
1945-6 63.8 5.0 1.2 1953-4 49.8 20,0 0.2 
7 62.7 5.0 2.3 5 62.9 1.0 0.1 
8 52.9 5.0 12.l' 6 66.2 3.0 0.8 
9 47.l 15.0 7.9 1 74.2 - -4.2 
1949-50 44.5 25.0 0.5 ~ '64.4 5.0 o.6 
1 40.5 25.0 4.5 9 72.8 -2.s 
39.3 25.0 5.8 1959-60 68.8 - 1.2 
·2 
3 38.4 ·30.0 1.6 
~ · 1 · rts N S W Workers' Compensation $ource:_Annu~ ij@P0 -' t·add.to 70 o due to rounding. Commission•· ~,...Rows may no • · . 
It should be noted that insurers may credit.any th 
· b etc already allowed against e discounts, onuses {F.• d Loss Ratio Scheme op. cit. 
compulsory rebate. ixe 
Clause 5(2)(iii) ). 
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More fundamentally·,~.as suggested 1e ctrnper 111,P!-there 
is probably .. considerable variation between.the expense 
ratios of. individual companies, and a claims ratio which 
' 
allows SUffici~nt for the expense. and commission ·Costs 
of small .or. hi'.9h-·cost ·companies may give a· margin as .. 
great as·!0-2!0 per cent to larger companies~ Margins of 
this order are very high indeed if; as seems to be the 
ca.se, relatively, l~w S.F./premium ratios are con~idered 
. appro~riate for Workers' Cornpensation busines·s. ( S). 
Fbr these reasons a. great deal must again depend .on the · . 
ope'ration of effective competition between companies' as 
in fact was necognised by the operation of Government 
. ' 
Offices in this fi~ld. in al~ States exc~pt South Australia. 
(b) mP insurance • Next to· Worke·rs • Compensation 
. CTP insurance is ~:the most. important line subject to 
(7) Pp. 374-380:. 
(8) E ~g. the Chamber of·Manu'fa~t'ures, a· company ~~ich 
.. - · ·11·,ses .;'n w comp insurance,. operated w1 th a spe.cia • • • · . '·1 o' 
ratio of about 30. prer cent in the, 95 s. 
.· ', \ 
.. 
.f 
i j 
l 
I t: 
i 
. i 
I. 
' 
i 
~ 
~ 
··1 
~ 
i 
~ 
' 
' 
.:; 
; 
i 
' 
.. : 
" " I 
' 
" 
:! •· 
.. 
! . . .. 
1::. '. I i .~ ( l 
" 
~ 
!1 ' l 
:'I 
' 
" f ( 
' :· 
--------
Government' rate control. State Cfp legislation was 
introduced between 1935 and 1944, and maximum rates were 
prescribed Li'n:l~ail~ c·ase.s .c(~Jm. { 1 ) 
/ Under these Acts 
private insurers were permitted to write the business, but 
in Western Australia after 1948 the sole insurer became 
a single pool in which existing companies shared 
according to their business in 1948. 
In setting rates under the CfP Acts the D1otdnal 
objective has again been claims ratios which would produce 
"appropriate" margins to cover expenses, commission, taxes, 
and profit; in N.S.W. and Victoria these have b~n 70 per 
(1) JJt. ~ 
cent. On the evidence mentioned in Chaper l3:t" ~ it is 
again obvious that claims ratios of this order leave very 
(9) The relevant Acts were: 
Tasmania: Traffic Act 1935 
585 
Queensland: Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 
South Aust: Road Traffic Amendment Act 1936 
Victoria: Motor Car (Third Party Insurance) Act 1939 
N.S.W.: Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insura~~~) 1942 
w.A.: Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) 
1944 . . Act 
Under all the.Acts insurance was compulsory. 
(1) See M.G.C.Ooke (General Manager, N.S~W. GI9): ~ 
Practical airffculties of Motor Vehicle Third Party 
Insurance in New South Wales. Journal of the Incorporated 
Australian Insurance Institute 1954/55. Also Report 
from the committee of Public Accounts on the State 
Insurance Offices,p.9. (Victorian Parliamentary Papers 
1956-57). 
(;») Be• i, C '3(r1) P$f'Ae » p 
I 
wide potential profit margins fo 1 , r ow-cost companies, and i \ 
' 
so by implication these arrangements t 1 , oo, re y on 
competition. In the early years of CTP insurance it 
, 
! 
. I 
claims and in most years claims ratios were greater than 
loo per cent.(4) Th bl · h e pro em since t en has not been one 
of avoiding excessive profit, but of raising rates quickly 
and far enough to offset the rising trend of claims. 
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For various reasons State Governments have not been 
enthusiastic about granting increases. One of these is 
that (unlike Workers' Compensation rate-) changes in CTP 
rates have an immediate and obvious effect on individual i I 1 t 
voters. Another is the realisation that other branches j(l\ I 
of insurance have been extremely profitable. This makes , ! 1 
' i ! , 
private insurance companies reluctant to press grievances ' 1 ~ 1 1 f f ' I ~bout CTP rates too far, since they do not wish to provoke n · f : l I i I 
enquiries about the rest of their business, particularly ·1 \I 1 
-~ :-~-e-::..::_:.:....:_n_:_e.:..:-0-~-ei :-:-· e-~-9-:-;-~-4-~n-; c-:-:-:-·-:-: ~-=) ::2:::~:-:::--,-:-:::-:n '.1'::-y-. c_a_s_e_w .. _h_e_n_t_h_e ____ : .1 l 1 ., ,• l1 . 
( 4) Ibid. I ·' I I ' l 
(S) Tariff companies, alt~ough req~ested, ~id nc:>t pr~duce 11 ill : !! 
evidence regarding investment income to a VJ.ctor1an ... ! · 11. i 'J 
Ro al Commission in 1959-60.·Report of the Royal w co~iSsiOn on MOtor car Com ulsor T ird Part •Insurance, :1 ·I! 1 
0 
I , :.1 
1959• • I! ' 
/ 
.. 
business was unprofitable ma • ny private comparies left the 
field altogether, and the Government Offi·ces carried the 
bulk of the heavy losses.(6) Since it was felt thatcon 
the whole these losses inhibited the activities of the 
GIO's in other directions opponents of Government 
participation in insurance, both within the industry and 
in Government circles, were not particularly concerned 
about them. Finally, there were administrative delays 
involved in the obtaining and processing of statistics, 
consideration by advisory committees in some States, and 
by State cabinets.( 7) 
\6) See p. ~ ·77., 
{7) The Victorian Public Accounts Committee commented on the 
Victorian system as follows (op. cit. 1 p.11): "The system 
makes the possibility of prompt premium adjustment remote ••• 
Thus the recommendations adopted by the Committee on 
1st November, 1956, were based on results for the three 
years ended 30th June, 1955; they were not adopted by 
the Government. In the meantime rates recommended on 
15th July, 1955, which were based on results to 30th 
June, 1954, were proclaimed on 1st October, 1955. and 
are still in force." /4 Dec. l 95i/. See also comments by 
M.G. Cooke (op. cit.Ton the N.s.w. system. In South 
Australia there is further delay due to the fact that the 
Third Party Insurance Premiums Committee investigates 
premiums once every two years only. At the investigating 
Committee level there is the further possibility of delay 
due to disagreement between i~suranc~ and.otre~ 
representatives. The pattern 1n N.S.w., Victoria, South 
Australia and Tasmania is that an equal number of 
insurance company and motoring representatives are 
presided over by an independent chair~an. Frequently 
recommendations have been p~ssed against 1th~ vot~s 
of tne motoring representat1v7s e.g. N.s.i. increases 
announced in 1959 (Canberra Times, 4 Nov. 1959). 
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(c) . fil.zte Purtchase .Moto~ Vehicles 
I t' was .. m~nti,oned in Chapter. I that in 1959 
. . 
and 1960 l~g~slation was. passed in all States dealing 
in part with t.he insur.a~ce of vehicles under hire 
purchase contracts. .One of the most important sections 
of this legislation reads as follows: 
"An o\vner shall not require a hirer to 
insure snycll)'ch risk with any :particular. 
i nsUI' er. " 
The intention of this clause was to b1•ing .at least the 
possibility of rate competition to this field by 
attempting to nullify clauses tying the insurance to 
y~r.ticular insurance companies. In practice it has been 
of dubious value owing to the requirement of most hire 
purchase companies that the insurer should issue a 
"letter of indemnity" covering the equity of the hirer 
on very wide "all risks" terms. The cover. required is 
usually. "all risks whatsoever" or broad enough to embrace 
normally excluded risks, such as war, drunken driving, 
alcoholism, drugs, unlicensed driving etc. These very 
wide covers have not been popular with many insurers, 
and to write them successfully·· a fairly large volume of ·· 
business ·1s considered· necessary. The ad van tag~ 
( 8) · N .s.w. Hire :Purchase. Act'., 1960, Seen.: 20 {20) 
Identtcal provlsiops in other state Acts. 
' ! 
of the hire purchase insurance subsidiaries or 
associated companies has been so great in terms of 
convenience and probably ignorance of alternatives on the 
pa.rt of hirers that it has been difficult to prise 
significant volumes away from them. In addition the 
rates of the hire purchase subsidiaries and of tariff 
companies have been identical, and since the former 
constitute an important segment of the non-tariff market 
lower rate alternati~es have been confined to relatively 
few instll.1ers. This is the kind of situation which would 
be less likely to occur if brokers were freer and more 
influential. However, even in the absence of strong and 
unrestricted brokers it is to be expected that opportunities 
would be presented to non-tariff insurers if the profit-
ability of this business were to reach very high levels. 
Thus the legislation probably does put a ceiling on rates, 
but the height of the ceiling depends on the degree of 
(9) 
effective competition. 
In addition to section 20 (2))1n N.S.W. an amendment in 
1957 to the previous Hire Purchase Act gave the government ( 1) 
t t aximum rates This it has in fact done power o se m • 
( ) fits of the principal hire purchase 9 In t~e 19~0a pro in fact quite high, ranging between 
subsidiar es we~~t on shareholders' funds after tax. 
15 and 20 per c ot take into account the possible 
These_ profits do1 n ff of insurance profits to parent indirect siphon ng 0 
companies by wa.y of commission. 
(1) Incorporated in the 1960 Act as seen. 23. 
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and has also specified that "p.tio-rata" proportions of 
maximum annual premiums should be maxima for shorter or {2) 
longer periods. 
Similar provisions were not adopted in other States, but 
the efficacy of the N.s.w. maxima is in any case rather 
doubtful. The reason for this is that the Act does not 
attempt to control the form of the policy, and it is a 
simple matter for insurance companies to in effect 
regulate the claims cost of policies by insuring them 
subject to specified "excesses", i.e. clauses by which 
the insurer agrees to pay only those claims in excess of 
a certain sum. In N.s.w. in 1961 the minimum tariff excess 
on hire purchase cars was £25, compared with £10 for ovmed 
private cars. 
(d) Other 
Outside W. Comp. and C.T.P. business there 
has been some degree of government rate regulation in 
Queensland, and during 1942-48 as part of Commonwealth 
war and post~war price cont~ols~ 
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In Queensland, under the Insurance Act of 191 ' 1 t was , I I! . f, 
I •i 1 ! l l 
pruvided that no rate was to exceed the gross tariff rate ~ t ·'ii ~:' !i 
l l J 11 • i 
on 1 July 1916, unless special arrangements were made with 
1! ! 1 ;'. 1f 
I• ! '! ! 
the insured. At the same time power was gi ~en to the 11 i i i i . 
( 2) Re ulations under the Hire Purchase .Act 1 60, ; : ; ~ e. S• 8 w Government Gazette No. 75, i 'f Seen. 3 ' N. • ~er the tariffs and also in the l · 
24 Jun
1
e 19Gfo.theuhnire purchase subsidiaries there was l ! pract ce o 'i 
i al .L-oad1ng on hire purchase premium payable i : _ a spec (cont.••) ~l; l J : ~ 
___..... ~·.I .:1, L 
... 
r-· 91 
Insurance Commisaionel' to declare standard ra tea for all '-' ·• 
classes of risk. These were to become minimum rates to 
be charged by the G.I.o., and rates in excess of these 
on the classes of risk on which they were declared had to 
have the approval of the Commissioner. In deciding the 
level of standard rates the Commissioner was required to 
consult with a representative of private insurers; 
disagreements were to be referred to an Actuary appointed 
by the government. The Act provided for returns of 
statistics by insurers, and these were to be the bases 
for the standard rates declared. 
Before the first statistical returns had been sent in and 
aggregated, the G.I.O. made several large reductions 
which were followed by tariff companies. In 1917 a 
discount of 2o per cent on all tariff rates was allowed, 
in 1918 increased to 40 per cent (fire, private dwellings) 
and 28 per cent (all other risks). In 192l)broadly 
speaking, these were confirmed as the "standard ra testt 
required by the Act. However after this time few changes 
were made, and both "standard" and maximum rates were 
1 h in most Years than effective rates considerably h g er 
( 0) Or discounts (tariff after renewal bonuses G.I • • 
( 2) cont... 1 the second and third year; see in ~dvancet d~~g N 8 w. tariff loading was in Ch.X J ii I"· 680 · e • i952 and July 1956, the ~f~~;r~;~w;;rw~;~e;~;~mber 1955 and July 1956. 
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companies). No real tt a empt was ever made to enforce 
a detailed system of rate regulation, and reliance.was 
placed almost entirely on bonus competition from the G.I.o. 
In the first years of the Second World War insUl'ance did 
not comerunder direct price control, but the Council 
Committee agreed to inform the Commonwealth Prices 
Commissioner of all major changes in rates. From the 
15 April 1942, however, existing tariff rates became 
maximum rates and no increases were to be made without 
consulting the Commissioner. During the period from 
1942 until the lapsing of Commonwealth control of prices 
in 1948, the Council made every effort to ensure that 
these maxima were observed by member companies. In a 
ci!'cular to State Associa t1ons 1 t insisted that applica tiona 
to the Commissioner for increases should be minimised, 
and should only pass through it. It pointed out that he 
would not only require full information in examining such 
requests, but would probably look into profit margins 
over the whole industry. "Rationalisation under government 
supervision is something that should be avoided at all 
cost~.n( 3) However, again, the relevant question was 
not the observance of tariff rates as maxima, but the 
(3) FAUA Council Circular, 8 October 1943. Council 
Records-, Melbourne. 
,I 
I ' 
: I 
! l 
; l 
.. 
l 
1 
! 
l 
l f 
' ! ' 
I t 
~d 
' ~ 
'' i ' I 
I I ' ' 
. I 
, I 
( ! 
• l 
, i 
' I 
. ; 
= 
degree to which competition operated to push effective 
rates below tariff t ra ea. Favourable trends in loss 
experience and the "p 1 egg ng agreement" described b 1 e ow in . 
fact produced unusually high margin 1 1 s n near y all 
lines over this period and it is d bt.P...·l ' ou J.u whether the 
?omrnonwealth contl'ol was ev·er more than a ceiling which 
may have affected a few unusual cases only.( 4) 
( e) Conclusions 
In all ceses so far discussed it is evident that 
the attempted control of rates bas relied in practice 
almost entirely on the existence of the government 
offices and /or competition within the privately owned 
section of the market. Only under the statutory monopolies 
in Queensland ~nd Western Australia are the proclaimed 
rates effective without producing other distortions. 
Apart from these, statutory rates have been either too 
low or too high in most cases. Where they have been low1 
as in C.T.P., private companies have withdrawn from the 
market and the built of the business has been underwritten 
by the government offices. Where they have been relatively 
high even under the N.s.w. Fixed Loss Ratio Scheme it has 
). 
been necessary to place great reliance on competition 
to control both the average level and structure of actual 
rates. (4) The Prices commissioner had a h~nd in only.one m:jor 
reduction of tariff rates, the petrol rationing 
discounts for WI policies granted in 1941/2. See 
Queensland GIO, A,nnual Report, 1949-50. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
GOVERNMENT COMPETITION 
1. Political Attitudes 
In view of the importance of competition, even in areas 
subject to Government rate fixing, it is interesting to 
consider the performances of the Government Offices and 
schemes which exist in all Australian states. In doing this 
it must be l,ecognised that much has depended on the political 
complexions of State Governments and the blocking abilities 
of conservative Upper Houses. Where possible, Labour 
Governments have set up offices with full powers to compete 
for all classes of business. Anti-Labour Governments have 
either taken no action, or established offices with only 
limited powers; but it is notable that in only one case has 
an already established office been seriously curbed or 
disbanded. This was the N.S.W. GIO, which, on a change of 
Government, was directed to leave the private insurance 
field between 1932 and 1938. (5) Changes were made in the 
arrangements for the Queensland GIO :in 1960 by a new non-
Labour Government, but these appeared to strengthen rather 
than weaken its competitive potential.(6) 
(5) 
(6) 
N.s.w. GIO, Annual Reports 1933-1939. 
tion of the fUnctions of State 
Notably the separa d General Manager of the GIO, 
Insurance Commissionertan my in investment policy. :~ ~~:t~r:!!:m~~ta~n~~~ance Office (Queensland), 
.Annual Report, 1960. 
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As mentioned in the first section of the present 
chapter, labour attitudes towards non-life insurance have 
been confused by disagreement whether Government 
competition (pei.,haps supplemented by some form of 
regulation) or nationalisation is the more appropriate 
policy. In the 1920 A.L.P. "Fighting Platform" the 
following objectives appear: 
"2. Nationalisation of Banking and Insurance. 
15. National Assurance, including Sickness, 
Accident Life and Unemployment". 
On the other hand Labour leaders have frequently supported 
the establishment of a Commonwealth Insurance Office on 
(7) 
the lines of the N.s.w., Queensland and Tasmanian Offices. 
At the State level limited "nationalisation" has in 
fact been carried out only in Queensland with regard to 
Workers' Compensation insurance. Other attempts to 
establish similar compulsory pools have not been made by 
Labour Governments in N.s.w., Queensland, or Western 
Australia, but Bills to "nationalise" CTP and Workers' 
Cornnensation insurance were defeated in 1943 in the 
... 
Tasmanian Legislative Council. At the Commonwealth level 
it appears that the Chifley Labour Government decided that 
(7) E.g. J.H.Scullin: Labour Policy for the Commonwealth, 
p.9. Pamphlet containing policy speech dated 
4 October, 1928. 
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non-life insurance should be nationalised after banking~, 
for it was excluded from the supervision of the 
Commonwealth Insurance Commissioner by the Insurance Act 
of 1946. Moreover, although a clause in the Act provided 
for the setting up of a Commonwealth Office to undertake 
both life and general insurance, no action was taken. (B) 
In the event the b?nk nationalisation pPoposals were 
defeatedr:and neither policy was j)ut into effect. Under 
present circumstances it appears that the most likely 
action of a Federal Labour Government would be the 
establishment of a Connnonwealth Office and supervisory 
Connnission. (.2.) 
~ Purposes. Considering now the State Government 
Offices, it is important to recognise that motives for 
their establishment have been various, and that the 
. 
objectives of a competitive-market and low rates have not 
.. 
necessarily predominated. Thus the Tasmanian GIO has 
worked closely with tariff c•.:>mpanies with the apparent 
purpose of maximising profits: 
" ••• Tasmania would greatly benefit if Tasmanians 
would give their whole hearted support to their own 
office, which is the only insurance office in Tasmania 
in which all the profits belong to the st:.te, instead 
of becoming the property of shareholders. (9) 
(8) This clause has since been removed by the succeeding 
Liberal-Country Party Government. . (9) Tasmanian Gove.L'Llment Insurance Office, Annual Report, 
1928-29. 
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Again, a major objective in most cases has.been the 
winning of control over insurance .funds. rt is also 
possible to distinguish three further p~incipal 
purposes: 
(1) To underwrite Government controlled insurances. 
' (1) ' 
This was an important factor ~n·a11 States; for 
example, the N.s.w. GIO, officially established in 1927, 
was really a continuation of a pool for Government ·risks 
admin'istered by the Treasury from 1912. Government 
Offices or schemes uhi·chihave this as their o,ply or 
principal function are: 
State Savings Bank of Victoria Insurance Trust Fund,· 
estd. 1920. Fire or comprehensive insurance on 
buildings mortgaged to the Bank only. 
South Australian Government Insurance Office, ~ 
eatd. 1924. Very small amount of Government business 
only. 
Commonwealth War Service Homes Insuranpe Trust, 
estd. 1921. Insurance of Commonweal th \Var Service 
Homes only. 
( 2) T() und.erwri te Government ere a ted compulsory 
insU??ance. Here the view was that if insurance were 
compulsory a Government insurer should be created in 
case :private cornp~nies declined risks or· cha1-!1ed 
• 
excessive premi\UDS· South Australia is the only State 
(1) But not for the commonwealth, which does .. not insure 
Commonwealth property. 
I 
vthere this principle has not been put into eff.ect, 
but in Queensla~d (mentioned above) and Western Austnal-ia 
statutory ·momopolies were created. The Motor Vehicle 
: Insurance"Trus t of Western Australia was set up in 1948 
to.write all C'fP insurance. It is backed by insurance 
companies (mostly tariff membe·rs) in Western Australia 
in 1947, holding shares according to their business 
in the year preceding its establishment~ 
(3).To compete with private insurers as a means of 
controlling rates or to carry out other policies. The. 
follovling are the areas in which "open market tt 
. (2) . 
Government -cornpeti ti on is to be found. 
N.s.w. W.Comp. 1926-32, 1938-
All other 1942-
. . 
Victoria w.cornp. 1914-
CTP and MV 1941-
A 11 except W. Comp. 1916-
s.Aust. Nil. 
W Aus. t w. Comp. !926- . · • • 
MV 1944- . 
·All classes 1919-
J 
(.,Xj Ma!'ket Shares. I 11 
- n a States in which they 
were established the Government Offices soon came to write 
significan;~Y hig~ VOluples o~ business. As Table II.7 
shows (p.:tee:) the share of Government Offices and schemes 
in total Australian· :Premiums was about 15 per cent at the 
. . 
end of the 1950's, accounting for more than a third of 
•• the non-tari~f share. Shares'in individual States are 
7R. 
given in Table II.9 (p •. ~). However it is significant 
· that tne bulk of this· business was w. Comp. and CTP: less 
impression had been made~in the highly profitable fields 
•of fire and related lines, marine,' miscellaneous classes, 
77 
or in motor vehicle insurance (Table II.8, p.~). To 
some extent this is explained by the limited franchises 
of the Victorian and West Australian GIO's, but the State 
R'!arket shares of the N.S.W., Queensland and Tasmanian 
Offices w~re also somewhat lower in these lines. Shares of 
State premiums are shown in Table V.1 below. 
It is evident from this Table that the Queensland 
and Tasma~ian o~fices were the only ones t~ have achieved 
significantly high shares in fire and miscellaneous 
5~9 
' insurance; only the Queensland·Office had made much progress 
in marine insur~nce. All Offices had important but not 
in Comp.~ehensive motor vehicle dominating positions • 
insurance, but in CTP and w. Comp. in every case they had 
J -- ~-
' I I 
t 
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Table· V .1 
Government Inswance Offi Total State Pre~iums by ~e~ : 1Pe~centage Shares of ' - r nc pa Lines,1957-58. 
N.s.w. Vic. ld. S.A •. W.A. Tas. Aust. 
Fire etc 3.3 
Marine o.6 
MV 9.1 
OTP 79.6 
w.comp. 11.1 
Othel" 1.7 
Total 14. 8 
Sources: 
Notes: 
I 
1.1 13.0 
6.6 
4.1 9.1 
24.0 38.5 
20.0 100.0 
-
7.1 
9.9 
1.6 
4.7 9.6 
100.0 19.2 
31.5 13.9 
7.4 
16.6) 10.4 
+ 8.8 
CBCS Statistics and Reports of 
Government Offices. 
x GIO share excluding w.comp. 
3.4 
0.9 
6.5 
49.2 
28.0 
1.3 
15.7 
+ GIO share excluding CTP. , 
Excludes business of Cwlth. War Service 
Homes Insurance Trust Fund, and South 
Australian Govt. Ins. Office. The W.A. 
statistics exclude Govt. and Semi-Govt. 
business written by the GIO. 
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very large or dominating she.res. As pointed out in 
Chapter II GIO shares of CTP increased greatly during 
the 1950's, as private companies either withdrew from 
the market or turned business away. 
In interpreting GIO market shares it must be borne 
in mind that a large part of their business is 
Departmental, and if account is taken of thts shares 
in fields competitive with the private market were 
considerably lower. No statistics are published which 
would indicate the importance of this factor, but the 
wri teP is informed that in 1958 the following 
percentages of N.s.w. GIO premiums came from the general 
public and public servants: 
MY Fire etc. 
General public 28.4 36.8 
Public servants 39.7 23.5 .. 
68.1 60.3 
The importance of "directed" business has probably varied 
t States In all cases over time, and differs be ween • 
it includes Departmental bUsiness, and may or may not 
include insurances such as: 
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Public hosJ.)1 ta ls' ambulances etc 
Buildings etc. financed by State.Banks 
State Commodity Boards 
Contractors to the Government 
Uni versi ti es 
Statutory corporations e.g. State electricity, 
gas, and other undertakings. 
Whatever the exact position, it is obvious the GIO 
business is likely to be considerable ·before even 
beginning to compete for "outside" insurances·, so that 
shares of State premiums less than, say, 5 per c.ent, 
suggest that GIO influence in these lines may be small. 
~ J.la tes. ·· Next, it may be observed that there are 
no obvious dtfferences in underwriting margins between 
States, which could perhaps be attributed to the 
cornpeti ti on· of. Government· Offices. This rray be seen by 
comparing the statistics of N.S.W., Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia presented in Chapter IE'. In fire, 
during 1942~60 Queensland margins were the most 
coosis.t.ently high even· thoug~ there was GIO competition 
in Queensland but none in either Victoria or South 
178 
Australia- (Table:II·.19 p;~). In marine insurance 
Queensland margins. were somewhat lower thamr.margins. in 
the other statei:»·'but still high in absolute terms and by 
' . ~~ 
comparison ~with ,U.K. ~companies (Table II. 21 :P•• ~ 
:rn. N.s.w., wh.ere.·there was also QIO com:peti tion,. margins 
were as exceptionally hi~h as in Victoria and South 
Australia. In "Miscellaneoustt there was little 
difference between N.s.w., Queensland (both with GIO 
competition) and South Australia (no GIO competition). 
,_ 
However ~ictorian business (no GIO competition) was the 
!Cf/ 
most profitable (Table ~I.25 p.~). Workers' 
Compensation surpluses in N.S. w., Victc~.r:ia and South 
Australia did not differ greatly; indeed surpluses 
in Victoria were the highest on average (Table II.23 
1&1 
p.~. Statistics of combined MV and C~P business 
show heavy losses in N.s. w. and Victoria (both with 
GIO's) but Queensland (GIO competition) and South 
Australia (no GIO competition) did not differ greatly 
J8q (Table II.24 p.-~. On total business (Table II.28 
196 
p.1§3") Queensland surpluses in the period 1921-35 wer·e 
relatively low, but there were also low surpluses in 
N.s.w. during 1921-25 (no GIO) and 1926-30 (GIO w.comp. 
only). After 1946 the total figures in N.s.w. and 
Victoria were heavily influenced by low GIO profit margins 
or underwritins losses (the latte~ ~n N.s.w. especially) 
but despite this average margins appear to have been as 
high or higher than in South Australia, where there was 
still no Government competition whatsoever. With the 
GIO statistics removed results in all three Government 
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Office States -.N.s.w., Queensland, and Victoria - were 
markedly better than in South Australia. Finally, in all 
-
States, both for total business and individual classes, 
there was a general downward trend in tm.rPins whether 
GIO 's were opera ting or not. 
The suggestion made so far is that the Government 
Offices have had little influence on profit margins in the 
private sector of the market. If the intention was to 
keep down rates and profit margins, their influence 
(in so far as it can be assessed by such extremely crude 
comparisons) has been outweighed by other factors. For 
this reason it is of interest to ~xamine their policies 
a little more closely. 
Broadly speaking, the Government Offices adopted 
tariff policy forms, procedures, commissions and rates. 
In general, although not formally joining, they have 
contributed to the support of the various Tariff 
Associations and agreed tv follow many of their rules. 
The two important reservations are that they quote 
s:peciali:concessional rates on Government business and to 
public servants, and in general have adopted a policy of 
renewal bonuses. only on three occasions hac tnere been 
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cut ting of ini t· 1 ta rates in competition with the pri v~ te 
market. This occurred 1 Q n. ueensland with respect to fire 
rates over 1916-1918 (as menti d ) one above , in Victoria 
(in 1916 and. 1918) and N.S w (1926 27) Th. V • • - • e ic tor ian 
State Office made 1(3,e reductions in Workers' 
Compensation rates, but the initial tariff rates were 
es ti ma tea only without any basi· 8 · (4) l n past experience. 
A similar .consideration was also important in N.S. w. (5) 
(3J State Accident Insurance Office (Victoria) Annual 
Reports 1917, 1919, 1920. ' 
(4) The 1914 Workers' Comnensation Act was the first 
in Victoria. 
(5) The 1926 Workers' Comoensation Act in N.s.w. was 
indir ec~ly, the genesis of the GIO. The Act mad~ 
Workers Compensation flnsurance compulsory for the 
first time and considerably increased the amount 
and scope of benefits. Private companies claimed 
that they wereunable to estimate their liabilities, 
and a number ceased writing the business altogether. 
The remaining tariff companies announced !'ates 
approximately 150 per cent higher than under the 
1916-20 Act, and a-special additional change of 40/-
per cent on all policies to cover compensatable 
diseases. The Treasury insurance branch, which had 
until then underwritten GovePnmen t risks only, 
thereDipon began to accept War leers' Compensation business 
from the public. From 1 July 1926 it reduced the 
diaease rate from 40/- to 20/-, and all rates by about 
one third from 1 October; in 1927 it paid a 20 per cent 
bonus on policies which had been in force during the 
previous year. Similar reductions were made by tariff 
companies. In 1927 its actions were confirmed by the 
Government Insurance Enablin and Validati Act, 
which constituted the Treasury branch as the 
Government Insurance Office. The office remained under 
the control of the Treasurer until its powers 
were expanded in 1941. 
.. 
l I I 
I I 
I 'I 
i . f ! I\ I 
' i I 
: 'l 
i I 
.. 
\ 
I 
I 
l 
j 
l l 
I I f I 
t ' i 
I I 
. "I 
Ill l I 
' \ ' 
. l t 4 
' r • I 
'1 ' ' 
I \ , 'I 
' , l I II : ) 
'' I 
I\ I ~ ~ I I t 
' ' !! ii ii . : 
l f t l I I 'I I j ' 
j 1 ,I ii f , ~1 
l ! ' ~ ' . 
'i ! t r 1 11 
I : ! I\! 'I 
I \ 
l I t t ~ 
l ' 
! ~ I 
' ' I 
I l 
Some of the renewal bonus es of the Government Offices 
a~pear substantial, but if GIO and market loss ratios are 
compared it appears that tla1e has not been much 
difference in effective rates. To illustrate, the bonuses 
and loss ratios of the N.s.w. GIO are given below. From 
the first year of full openations to 1960 bonuses have 
been (per cent of tariff premiums): 
Marine (Open policies only) 
1942-49 Nil 
1950-56 10 
1957- 15 
Fire etc. 
1942 Nil 
1943 15 
1944 20 
1945 25 
1946 30 
1947- 331 3 
w.conro. 
1942 nil. 
1944-48 12t 
1949-50 16 _g 3 
1951-53 25 
1954 30 
1955- 20 
Miscl. 
1942 Nil. 
1944 5-15 
1945 5-20 
1946 10-25 
1947 10-30 
1948- 10-30 
MV £ 1000 cover, cars not under hire purchaseff. I(nitial 
.:.... . about 15 )er cent less than tari no premium a1·· bonus es -
compulsory excess ' then renew ~ 
1942 nil. 
1943-44 10 
1945-49 15 
1950 12~ 
1951-52 5 
1953 10 
1954 15 
1955 20 
1956- 15 
~ 
1942- nil 
Hire purchase vehicles: 
tariff rates. 
l 
' l I 
' Ii 
I 
; I 
t 
l 
' ~ 
l ! i 
l l 
: I I 
! : ' l 
! l 
l 
' I 
l, 
! 
' I '. 
l 
' ! ' 
r 
I 
Claims ratios of the N.s.w. GIO and claims ratios of all 
insurers (including the GIO) 
the same period: 
Claims and E 
All All 
Cos. GIO Cos. GIO 
-
Fire etc. Marine 
1942-45 28.9 27.3 24.9 14.3 
1946-50 39.a 30.0 37.7 43.8 
1951-55 30.0 23.4 44.8 72.1 
1956-58 32. 7 21 .• 8 40.6 43.4 
W.Comp. Miscl. 
1942-45 71.1 94. 0 38.2 18.2 
1~1!~6-50 65.2 73.9 43.1 40.4 
1951-55 63.4 71.8 42.6 31.7 
1956-58 81.5 78.9 4510 42.7 
on N.s.w. business were, over 
N.s.w. i 
All 
Cos. 
MV 
-
53.7 
72.6 
65.9 
71.5 
All 
GIO 
-
Cos. GIO 
- -
CTP 
43.8 49.2 68.7 
89.1 106.2 110.7 
70.1 127.8 128.6 
72.8 102.6 106.1 
Total C 'ssion + Exps. 
26 .1 1o.8 44.6 75.4 
54.0 82.3 29.4 1a.4 
55.9 94.0 28. 9 12.1 
62.6 91.5 27.5 8.5 
Sources: Statistics made available by N.S.W. GIO, 
and03CS statistics, N.s.w. 
Notes: All percentages are to earned premiums 
assuming 40 per cent premium reserves. 
They refer to total claims in each 
period divided by total earned premiums. 
~he rate levels implied by these ratios suggest that GIO 
rates may have been lower than effective market rates 
only in w.Comp. (1942-55), MV (1946-55) and Marine 
(1951-.55 only~. o~herwise its rates appear to have been 
ab0ut the same or higher (e.g. fire 1946-.58, 
J 
! 
' ' ! ' 
I I . 
t' 
I 
! '. l 
! ' I 
i ' I : l 
fl 
; j 
l ' f 
I I 
I 
l 
' ' j 
l 
1 I 
t 
> 
j • 
\ 
l ' 
I , 
. ' 
t 
f 
: ! 
l I I r' 
I ' 
o I 
t ~ 
ii I, 
o I ' 
miscellaneous 1942-45, 1951-55). The high relative claims 
ratios an total business were due almost entirely to the 
large proportion of CTP business written. 
In considering these implied rate levels it is 
interesting to observe that GIO exPensea were considerably 
lower than the State average, which meant that a~simil:ar 
claims ratio for the GIO and other companies left a greater 
underwriting surplus for the GIO. Commission plus expenses . 
as percentages of earned premiums are shown in the Table; 
by principal lines in 1956-58 they were as follows: 
All Cos. GIO 
-
Fire etc. 38.7 31.9 
Marine 24.7 23.9 
MV and CTP 21. 5 6.8 
W.Comp. 22.3 9.7 
Other 35.0 14.6 
Total 27.5 8.5 
UnfortunateJ:y~it was not possible to subject the 
accounts of the other Government Offices to similar 
detailed examination, but such information as was obtained 
showed average or relatively low claims (6Sios 
except CTP, and W.Comp. in some periods. 
in all lines 
GIO in fire and marine (6) Claims ratios of the Tasmanian (cont.) 
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€i} General remarks. It has been suggested so far that 
the State Offices have not always built up significant 
market shares in all lines, nor adopted particularly 
• aggressive rate policies. In the pr es en t sec ti on a 
number of factors are listed which have probably 
inlibi ted. :more aggressive tactics and quicker expansion. 
(1) Concern for the solvency of small insurers, in the 
absence of any State orCommonwealth supervision. 
(2) Taxation. All the State Offices pay State taxes 
such as fire brigade charges, licensing fees and stamp 
duties. The N.3.W. Office is required to pay an amount 
r 
equivalent to Comnonwealth income tax to the State 'll:easury, 
but none of the others pay Commonwealth taxes. Although at 
first sight this may appear to be a distinct advantage, 
managers have probably been inhibited by the fear of 
provoking criticism. 
( 6) cont. 
kably low· the fire ratios were: insurance \vere remar ' 
GIO Tas.-
- All Cos. 
1942-45 14.5 ~g·g 
1946-50 15· 1 27.8 
1951-55 11• 3 23. 7 
1956-59 12·9 bl·s~ed accounts mainly arose 
The difficulty of ~1~1i~d !eparation by lines, and because of lack of e atment of bonuses. The 
uncertainty as to the J~g, 8 also make use of "internal Queensland and N.S.W. i 1 lines It is difficult to 
:>einsurance"between t&f~n~tfi:r than the obscuring o~ 
see any purpose inTheN S w GIO figures used were its 
published. results. d ; 0 ·were fairly closely actual CBCS returns,an t state statistics. 
comparable with aggrega e 
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(3) The Victorian and West Australian Offices are at 
a disadvantage in not being allowed to extend beyond 
W.Comp. and motori insUPance. In Western Australia Bills 
to extend the franchise have been regularly defeated in (7) 
t.he Legislative Council. 
(4) The policy,especially in early years 1 of building up 
reserves out of profits. None of the Offices were provided 
with initial capital, it being argued that their policies 
were Government guaranteed. Temporary loans were made in 
some cases but soon repaid. Most managers, probably fearing 
cr1 ticism from political opponents of Government insurance, 
tried to avoid the possibility of having to call on the 
Government f-0r funds. 
(5) Heavy losses on compulsory insurance, particularly 
CTP in the 1950's. There is no doubt that other lines 
have been expected to offset these losses as far as poss[~ye. 
Thus the manager of the Victorian GIO explained in 1956: 
'As the operations of the State Motor Car Insurance Office 
have not been pro1 itable owing to the adverse results of the 
Compulsory Third Party Motor. Insurance Section,i t h~s not 
been possible to return any ~amount by way of bonus • 
( 7) 1: .• rg.. in 1946, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1957, 19.58. 
(8) Victcirian GIO Annual Report,1956. See also the comments 
of the 1957 Vfctorian Parliamentary .Accounts Committee 
R epo11 t (op. cit. ) ,p.13. 
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This has also been a J?S.I' ticular ly important cons1dera ti on (9) 
for the N. S • W. GI O. 
(6) "Direct wri tingu. Except in Queensland there has been 
reluctance to build up large branch or agency organisations, 
the emphasis being on direct business and low expenses. 
As explained by the General Manage!' of the N.s.w. G!O: 
Profit Bonuses have, for many years attracted new 
policyh9ldera to the Office in ever increasing numbers, the 
majority approaching the Office direct and thus assisting 
to keep the percentage of expenses to premiums at a very 
low figure comrred with other Insurance Compsniea 
generally. ( 1 
In all States tariff commissions or lower were adopted and 
informal agreements not to exceed them ma.de with tariff 
organisations. The Queensland and N.s.w. Offices started 
with large potential agency netwoeks, because Country 
G l 1 
Clerks of Petty Sessions (in N.S.W.) and Public Servants . 
eenerally (in Queensland) were authorised to act for the~ani 
to accept commission, but in N.S.W. no sustained attempt 
was made to develop beyond this, notably in Sydney suburbs. 
(9) However the General Manager pointed out to the writer 
that the large volume of CTP business was a cheap 
method of making contact for other classes of 
( 1) 
insurance. 
ort 1961 p.4. see also Victorian N.S.W. GIO Annual Rep c' itt~e Report (op.cit.) p.14. 
Parliamentary Accounts th om~ 8 w aro appeared to be By 1960 the policy of e t. i i96o only one branch 
changing in this regarf·hu~ (inLismore, 1949) but one 
office had been establ 8 e ) another in 1961 
was opened in 1960 (Wollong~~!d'for a third (in Wagga). (Newcastle) and plans annou 
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The result ·of these policies is that most success has 
been achiev_ed wit~ "pri'ce consciousu business, much less 
' ., .. . 
where direct contact and "servicett ·are rel~ ti vely more· 
important. 
. (7·) Investment nolic1"es. J:-' The Victorian GIO (as w:is the 
.N.S.W. Office before ~941) has been considerably 
}?.andicapped by ,,the fact.that al~ its funds are held on 
._deposit w1 th the Treasury. In 1957 the Public Accounts 
Commit.tee ·comment.ed unfavourably on. 1.:his, ·pointing out that 
the GI9 was. losing both investment income (the Treasury 
credited it ·w1 th only 1~ per cent per annum) and the 
opportunity of influencing insurances, but no change '1/aa 
(2) . 
made. The Victorian Commissioner also claimed that 
iacl\: of autonomy in this respect contributed to serious 
:3.ccommodation difficulties in the 1950's 1 which i .. esu.lted ·~3) 
in deliberate curtail:ing of MV business. In N.S.W. 
from 1941 and in the other States the.general rule is that 
funds may be investecl in Australian Government 
securi·ties or other secUri ties subject to Treasury 
approval. In fact many loans have beem made with the 
' . 
. ' 
~ 
j ' ~ 
. 'i . 
•-------------~----------------------; I f'J: ; , .i .. I -- i ,.,,_, ~ , I ~f.', ~ } 
( 2) op. cit~ p.14. 
. t Vic GIO, 1952-1958. ( 3) Ibid. p. 13, and Annual Repor B' • 
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pu_;1pose of influencing insurances, particularly to 
1.:unicipal Councils and semi-Government organisations (4 ) 
( 5) • 
In 1960 the new Act in Queensland considerably 
strengthened the hand of the GIO by removi:ng the need for 
'PreasUt'y approval •. Both the N.s,,w. and the Queensland 
Offices have benefited from substantial funds available 
from life insurance, but the investible non-life funds 
of the N.s.w. GIO have been reduced by accumulated OTP 
trading losses. In 1961 these represented 14.1 per cent 
of its total non-life assets. 
(8) Public service l"Ulea. The staffs of all the 
Government Offices are public servants in the States in 
which they work and subject to the rules and authou.Lty of 
Public Service Boards. Depending on the attitude c1f the 
j (6) 
Boards, this is potentially a serious disadvantage. 
(4) E N s W GIO Annual Reporti955, p.4: "The calls for s~~h fi~n~e ha~e been very heavy ••• and the Off~ce has ••• 
found it necessary to restrict loans to those Shire, 
Municipal and County Councils wh~ch ?ave pla~edfal~ or 
nearly all of their lnsurances with it, as, in ac d 
'"he majority have done. 11 T~e N.s.w. GIO has also ma e 
such loans to building soc ie ti es• 
(5) The Insurance Act,1960, seen. 19. 
. i Commissioner,see Public (6) As claimed by the Victor ta( op cit.) p.14. Also Vic. 
Accounts Commit tee Repgr • ·"The difficulty of 
GIO, Annual Repor__t 19?6,dP·{~ff with the necessary 
securing adequate trainel ~ge under Public service 
technical insurance ltnow e ble tt 
Regulations is almost insupera • · • 
I 
' I l 
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(9) Reinsurance. In all States there has been an 111-
defined policy of keeping premiums "within the state". 
At the same time it has been necessary for the Government 
Offices to reinsure substantial portions of their fi.re 
and ID9.rine business. In accordance with the general 
policy, at least in fire insurance, this reinsui-.ance has 
been p~aced with companies opera ting within the state 
concerned. According to Annual Reports of the Tasmanian, 
N.S.W. and Queensland Offices reciprocity has been 
requested but in no cases fully received; it seems likely 
that high exchange connnissions have been paid instead. 
One result is that the Offices have not obtained the 
spread of risk beyond their own States that could be 
expected from the excha~ge of treaties with overseas 
companies or insurers in other Australian States. Another 
is that information about GIO terms, rates etc. has been 
provided to locally competing companies. Even on its avn 
grounds the logic of this policy is difficult to understand, 
as a high proportion of the local re~nsurances are in any 
case underwritten by the local branches of overseas 
companies. 
(10) Related to the point made above, none of the State 
Offices have extended their operations to other states or 
foreign countries. This has probably particularly 
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615 ·'~ 
hindered the development of marine insurance, Also, as 
far as the writer is aware, there has been no underwriting 
cooperation betweer- the GIO's by way of reinsurance 
exchanges or in other respects,(?) 
(11) Finally, as suggested in Chapters J and DI, the 
Government Offices, with other insurers, have met severe 
discriminatory rate cutting on any attempt to expand rapidly 
beyond their own "special market" areas. The discount 
provisions of the tariffs were framed to operate against GIO 
as well as other non-tariff competition, and they have 
undoubtedly disco~raged GIO competition for large 
insurances. 
., 
-
(7) Although the Managers meet periodically. 
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CHAPTER XV 
OTHER POLICIES 
1. Taxation 
As regards Commonwealth taxes - payroll tax and income 
tax - non-life insurance companies have been taxed in a 
similar manner to other companies and no special discussion 
is required.(B) However State taxation has been of 
considerable importance. The State taxes are charges on 
premiums to cover the running costs of fire brigades, 
stamp duties on policies, and "licence fees" on net 
premiums. The main weight of these taxes has been 
concentrated ·'on fire and marine insttrance, and in some 
States has probably had serious effects on the development 
of competition in these areas. 
(8) The rinci al complications have conc~rned treatment 
of r~insur~nce and premium reserve adJustments. 
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The State fire brigade organisations, as mentioned 
JZ1I 
in Chapter .,,, developed from the ear~v company supported 
and volunteer brigades. When originally established 
they were supported by finance derived in equal 
proportions, in most cases, from insurance companies, 
municipalities, and State Governments. However the 
burden has been shifted more and more towards the companies 
by Governments in need or funds and conscious of high 
insurance profits. At present current expenses of fire 
brigades (including interest and depreciation) are met 
in the following pro1x;rtions. 
Ins.Cos. Municipalities Govt. 
N.s.w. 75.0 12.5 12.5 
Vic. Metropolitan 66.6 33.3 
Country 66.6 33.3 
Qld. 71.4 14.3 14.3 
.5.5. 6 22.2 22.2 S.A. 
.5.5. 6 22.2 22.2 W.A. 
50.0 25.0 25.0 Tas. 
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The bulk of these charges is levied 
. (9) on insurance companies 
in fire and related lines. The 
combination of falling rates, expanding fire brigade 
services, and increasing insura 
according to premiums 
nee company proportions, has 
meant that the charges cons tit t . u e a significantly high 
sales or turnover tax. I 1 6 n 9 O approximite percentages 
to net fire, HH and LP premiums were: 
N.s.w. 13.2 
Vic. 9.1 
Qld. 12.3 
S.A. 6.2 
W.A. 9.6 
Tas. 5.4 
Aust. 10.7 
The Australian percentage had increased from 6.4 per cent 
in 1941. 
Stamp duties or "licence fees" are either related to 
sums insured or charged as pe1"centages of annual premium 
income. The "licence fee" method is used inVictoria and 
South Australia, and stamp duties in the other states. 
Stamp duties in particular represent relatively ngh 
Percentages of premi~s in fire and marine insurances, as 
for other forms of policy there is usually a sing le small 
charge regardless of the sum insured. In N.s.w. in 1960 
19) Net c.··r·"·reinsurances with contributing companies. 
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the fire and marine duty was 9d. per £100 of cover. This 
may have been as high as 30 or 40 per cent of' the total 
premium charge for some fire policies,and on average was about 
10 per cent of total State fire and marine premiums. rt 
represented 15.B per cent of the minimum tariff premium for 
general marine insurance to the U.K. In other States, these 
charges are not as high as in N.s.w., but the tendency is 
undoubtedly for them to increase. Moreover, if fire and 
marine rates continue to fall the percentages of stamp duties 
to premiums naturally rises. 
In imposing both fire brigade and other taxes State 
Governments hava had no other purpose than the raising of 
revenue. However, particularly in fire and marine insurance, 
r ' 
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the effect has been to impose a fairly heavy fixed charge ~ ,: 
t . b t 20 ~ I ,} II on each policy, in N.s.w. represen ing on average a ou l i l 
per cent of fire and marine premiums. {l) It seems that j[ · i·; j 
!!l f, : ,. 
this may have inhibited rate competition to some extent as · ~ l I i 
; ' 
it is clearly not possible to quote such large percentage ' '. J I i r i l I 
discounts if these charges must be met. Mofe important,· in ;',I t : i . I 
1960 UaK. stamp duty on marine policies was reduced to 6d. 
1 
: '. •
1
: 
1 I 
P,.er policy only. on average, therefore, on this ground alone, :' \J 
---------------------·---~--:----:---:-·-- .• : ; :,1 ( 1) However the Victorian and South Australian "Licencing fees" · ~ ! l ,
1
1 
are Of COUrSe not Uf ixedll in this Sense• , 1 q 
. ' ! 
• j •• 
• 
I 
insurance in the London market should cost about 15 per 
cent less than in N.s.w. Property of N.s.w. residents 
' 
in N.S.W. or in transit to u.s.w. comes under the Act, 
but it seems probably that the tendency would be for 
imports into N.s.w. to be sold c.i.f., exports f.o.b.: i.e. 
for marine i nsU?."ance to be arranged outside the state. 
The same is true, to a lesser degree, in the other 
Australian States. 
2. ~ Queensland legislation. Reference has already been 
made elsewhere to various aspects of Legislation in 
Queensland, in regard to the provision of statistics, 
deposit3requirements and rate policies. The relevant 
measures were introduced by a Labour government in 1916. 
The first, the Workers' Compensation Act of 1916, did not 
di ff er very greatly from the 1914 Vic tor ian legislation, in 
that it made insurance compulsory and set up a.State 
Accident Insurance Office to write the business. As in 
Victoria the Act provided that insurers wishing to write 
W. Comp. business would have to obtain a license from the 
Government. The all-important difference arose when no 
licenses were issued exc:ept to the State Office. The reaction 
of the private companies to this move was violent; a 
sustained campaign was carried on against the Government 
in pamphlets, in the press, and in the Courts. Appeals were 
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carried to the supreme Court d an eventually to the Privy 
Council, but in each case the position of the Government 
was upheld. 
Probably precipitated by the vehemence of the tariff 
markets' reaction, but also in accordance with Labour 
policy, even more extensive legislation was passed laten 
in 1916. Under this Act (The Insui1 ance Act, 1916) the 
State Government Insurance Office was conati tuted to take 
over the State Accident Office from 1 February 1917, and 
empowered to enter all ~ields of insurance as well as 
run the Workers' Compensation monopoly. In addition the 
manager of the new office was designated State Insurance 
Commissioner and given various powers over insurance 
activities in the State. This remained the position until 
1960, when a Liberal-Country Party Government separated 
the offic·es of Insurance Commissioner and General Manager 
. . 
of the GIOf and on the whole strengthened the positions 
(2J 
of both. 
Since Queensland is the only Australian State to 
have passed legislation involving some degree of general 
supervision by an Insurance Commissioner, it is of 
interest to b~""iefly examine some principal aspects. 
(2) By the Insurance Act. 1960. 
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First it may be noted that the Commissioners' powers 
are extensive and that he has probably been able to 
effectively enforce the requirements of the Act 
areas. His mos t imp or tan t po1ver 1 s undoub tedl~ 
refusing, suspending or cancelling licenses. (3 
in most 
that of 
Under the 
1916 Act he was given power to investigate breaches, in 
(4) 1960 reinforced by rights of entry and search. 
For the renewal of licenses a ta tutory declarations are 
required that the provisions of the Act have been observed. 
Penalties for breaches apply not only to individual persons 
and companies, but to all officers in Queensland of any 
. (6) 
company committing a breach, and to its directors. 
With this formidable statutory backing, the 
Commissioner has been able to ensurie that most reforms have 
in fact been carried out. Some of these have been minor 
in character, but neverxheless useful and of a kind that 
c0uld well be emulated by the Commonwealth or other 
State Governments. 
(5) 
(3) Subject to aupeal to the Supreme Court. However, 
1923 and 1960 this power was with the Treasurer. 
between 
(4) 
(5) 
The Insur.ance Act, 1960, seen. 18. 
Annually from each license holder until 1940. From 1940 
the Chief Representative in Queensland of each insurer 
could sign a single statutory declaration on behalf 
of his agents. 
(6) The Insurance Act, 1960~ secns. 5(a) and 20• 
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1. Insurers must be ·solvent.(?) 
2. Limited statistics for rating purposes and of 
1 (8) re nsurance transactions collected. 
3. Actions against foreign insurers to lie in (9) Queensland courts. 
4. Tariff rule against coinsUI'ance with non-member 
companies declared illegal. 
( 1) 
5. Broke.l's and agents to be "of good fame and 
character" and competent in their business. 
6. Issue or use forbid_den of "any prospectus, 
proposal form or policy of general insurance· 
unlesa ••• a copy ••• has first been ludged with 
(2) 
the Commissioner." 
Aside f~om these measures, easily the most important 
aspect of the Queensland controls has been the 
regulation of commissions and the licensing of agents 
and brokers. Here 1 t appears that little rigorous 
thought has been given to the objectives of the policies 
pursued, and the result has been the enforcerne~t of 
•,. 
( 7) 
(8) 
( 9) 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
See above P• *511. 557. 
See p. :te 11arn' I ;ji - 591. 
Most companies (but not all) voluntarily make such 
arrangements in Australia. 
The Insurance Act 191Q seen. 23. Repeated in 1960 Act. 
Insurance Act 1960, seen. 21. Not in 1916 Act. 
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rules that tariff ~ompaniea have always considered 
desirable, but Probably in a more effective manner than 
they V'iere ever able to achieve. It is difficult to 
discover any clear statement of underlying reasoning or 
motives but they appear to have been roughly as follows: 
(1) "Rebating" of commission and "own business" 
commission are in some sense unethical. 
(2) High commissions are unethical. 
(3) Low commissions mean a correspondingly low total 
cost of insura nee. 
In accordance with these apparent views the 
legislation provides that an agent must intend 
''actively to solicit business on behalf of any 
insurer and insur.•ers and that the agency is not 
primarily for his own insurance business. · (3) 
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Professional advisers such as auditors, medical officers and 
solicitors are expressly prohibited from receiving (4) 
co~mission unless licensed. As in the tariffs a (5) 
comprehensive definition of "cormnission" is Pl"OVided. 
Limits on cormnission, mostly below tariff, are prescribedJ 
thus: 
(3) Insurance Act, 126Q,_ seen. l4(b). 
(4) Seen. 17(1). 
(5) Seen. 17(7). 5?. I 
(6) However, as noted above, (p.~) marine brokerage of 
1 o per cent (not be:f'or e allowed in Australian tariffs) 
was set in 1916 and paid by the GIO. 
(6) 
1f t I 
•• 
Agents 
Managing Agents 
Chief Ag en ts 
Brokers 
Dir ectorsr 
Local Reinsurance 
Maxinnun C'ssion 
Queensland 
1 O :per cent. 
15 per cent 
(Two per Co. 
only) 
No limit. (One only 
per Co.) 
10 per cent. 
Min.£50, 
max.£100 p.a. 
15 per cent 
Tariff Maxinnun, 
other States 
Various up to 15 
per cent. 
Not applicable. 
No limit. 
Various up to 15 
per cent. 
20 per cent. 
20 per cent (1962) 
• 
In adopting the first two arguments menti'oned above 
the legislators accepted uncritically widely held views (7) 
in the insull."ance market, without recognising that the 
basis. for them was the typical businessman 'a dislike of 
rate or ttp.t11ce" competition. As has been shown in 
XlIT_ 
Chapter ~ the tariff commission and agency rules were 
regarded primarily as necessary supports to a policy of 
rate fixing. Given a tariff system, there was certainly 
some ground for the view that the rules sheltered 
privileged positions, but there was little logic in 
attempting to introduce price competition via the GIO and 
at the same time buttressing restrictivn8 wihich were 
(7) Abd in other trades! 
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intended to inhibit such competition between tariff 
ccnnpani::es. Moreover, the wishes of the ta1--iff market have 
been followed in the acttial administration of the Act. 
The following is a broad statement of poliay set out by 
the present Commissioner: 
•
1Whils t the Fire and Accident Underwriters Association 
by its rules limits the number of agency appointments it may 
make in any one area, such rules cannot be recognised by me 
if an application for a licence is received and recommended 
by a licensed insurer. 
In practice, however, all applications on behalf of 
Tafiff Offices are made through, and vetted by the Fire and 
Accident Underwriters' Association and licences are not 
granted without the Association's r ecommenda ti on. 
This does not apply to Non-Tariff insui1 ers nor to the 
State Government Insurance Office but the latter Office in 
general honours the Association's rule.,. ( 8) 
On the remaining principal argwnent in favour of the 
commission and agency regulations the Insurance Commissioner. 
has written as follows: 
.1The J.imi ta ti on of briJkerage and commission has pro~ed 
an important factor in keeping down procU!'ation costs ••• · (9) 
This contention is perhaps true if "procuration cost" 
is defined to be commission only. It can be seen from 
rrable v. 2 below that commission percentages in 1958 were 
lo~er in Queensland than in other States. However if it is 
( 8) 
( 9) 
. t from the Insurance Commissioner, Letter to the wri er ig61 
Queensland, dated 1 Aug~s~ ·I ance in Australia, Cecil A• UrimEy: Superv1s ion of nsur 
Journal of---fnsurance, December 1960. 
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Table V.2 
Percentages of Commission and Management 
Exoenses to Written Premiums, Australian 
Sta tea 1958. 
Commission Qld N S W V' S A 
• • • • ic. • • Tas. W.A. 
Total 
Fire etco 
M 
MV & CTP 
w.com:p. 
Other 
Exoenses 
Total 
Fire etc. 
M 
IvW & CTP 
w.comp. 
Other 
Commission 
:elus 
Expenses 
Total 
Fire etc. 
M 
ll'lV & CTP 
W.Comp. 
Other 
5.4 9.9 
7.6 15.1 
7.3 10.8 
6. 7 10.3 
3.5 
9. 6 13. 3 
19.6 
23.2 
21. 7 
16.4 
8.7 
23.7 
25.0 
30.8 
29.0 
23.1 
8.7 
33.3 
16.4 
22.9 
13.8 
11.6 
17.2 
19.1 
26.3 
38.0 
24.6 
.20.5 
20.7 
32.4 
1o.6 12. 5 13. 9 1o.2 
15.6 16.2 15.1 14.1 
6.7 8.3 8.8 8.7 
11.4 14.1 8.6 
5.4 9.6 11.8 3.9 
13.2 14.1 16.7 15.9 
14.2 19.7 20.5 19.7 
17.} 22.4 25.9 24.6 
15.7 16.8 10.4 20.1 
12.8 17.4 18.2 14.7 
12.0 19.0 19.1 19.8 
15.8 28.2 20.8 23.7 
24.8 32.2 34.4 29.9 
32.9 38.6 41.0 38.7 
22.4 
23.1 
17.4 
29.0 
25.1 
28.8 
28.6 
42.3 
19.2 28.8 
32.3 23.3 
30.9 23. 7 
37.5 39.6 . 
Sources: CBCS Statistics. 
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recognised ·that an important element of "procuration Cost" 
may be included in the salaries and other "management" 
expenses of an insurance company, the statement would 
appear to be both incorrect in principle and not 
supported by the statistics. In principle, if an 
insurance company expands to a new area, it has the choice 
of a:ppointi_ng agents, or of using its own employees, 
e.g. paid traveller, inspector, branch and branch manager. 
If it chooses to appoint an agent it presumably does so 
because this is the cheaper method. The connnission 
limitations in the Queensland legislation restricts the 
range over which this choice - in effect a choice of the 
most efficient selling "input" - can be made, and so ( 1) 
leads to higher, not lower, costs. In practice, (as 
Table V .1 shows' for 1958), commissions in Queensland 
have been considerably lower than in other States, but 
in most lines this has been at least offset, and sometimes 
outweighed, by higher management expenses. Although 
comparisons of such ratios must be made with caution, the 
evidence does not suggest that the commission control has 
made any clear cut difference to Queensland expenses. 
1 
d that it is preferable to replace 
It may be argue. t 1th "professional" 
relatively unskille~fagent~ wcost involved should 
insurance men, but 1 so e 
be ·recognised. 
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3. ~s World war II. During the second War the 
insurance companies were requiredtto release substantial 
. (2) 
proportions of their pre-war staff. In order to carry 
out an increased volume of business with a reduced and 
less experienced staff, numbers of important changes were 
made. One of these was an increase in the working week 
from 38 to 40 hours (as allowed by the Award) and 
eventually to 42 hours. Other reforms, carried out and 
proposed, throw an interesting light on some aspects 
of the market. 
First, two important changes suggest that the pre-
war market was greatly lacking in competitive vigour, 
because they brought such obvious savings and were 
retained without question after the War. They were: 
( 1) The introduction of "Master Policiestt for large (3) 
risks involving numbers of companies, 
(2) The "bordereaux" reinsurance system, (4~ich greatly 
simplified local reinsurance transactions. 
1 1 bowed the extent to Second, other policies c ear Y s 
the l. ndustry are absorbed in "selling", which resources in 
2 .. authorities was the. t 45 per ~h~.a~m or~~he.manpowe~a~f should be released, and that 
cent 1 of p.re-,warema..J.e 8 . should be 80 per cent of' ~he overall staff .rettient~o~ere approximately achieved. 
pre-war. These ob Jee ve 
See P• ~ J./.q'l. · ingle monthly "bordereau.x" J:eplaced 
Under this system a 11s t note" tttake note" a?d 
the procedure of 8 ~:~¥~~sly useci' f oi e'ach~ i'ndividual 
reinsurance policy P . ~ stone and Cox 
f ltative reinsurance cession ... ee ~~---------~--··~' 
acu t Fi nd Marine Insurance Year Book,1958-59, Acciden re a 
pp.1263-5. 
J 
( I ( , ..
t ( i : : I , i 
l l I 1, l , 
1 I 
I I I 
I ) ' 
' i ! 'l I 
' ' 
I I I 
'i 
l 
\ 
1 
' , I 
i 
I I 
I 
I , 
1.; 
! 
, I ' 
' j ; 
' I , 
I I I 
I j 
Ii I LI ! ' 
! , I 
I 
( I I I 
I 1 J 
( i I 
' ! I t ! 
( 
: ' 
' , '· 
·•j1 \ 
and providing the serv.ices of: ·information, convenience 
etc. and in the coinpeti tive transfer of business froll 
company to company~: ' ' 
( 1) The "pegging agreement", in force between October· 
1942 and May 1945·. The text was as follows: · 
''That the undersigned agree for the duration of the 
war to :efrain from accepting or influencing, seeking or 
solici t;z;.ng either directly or indirectly in any v1ay or 
thruugh any channel_ the <transfer of Fire, Accident. or 
Marine business on the books of· any other signatory Office, 
and for this purpose undertake to instruct their staffs 
not to attempt, in any circumstances, to secure transfers 
from the holding office.~· 
The agreement was -intended to embrace alJ. cases 
except transfers due to changes of ownership, new 
mortgages or liens, and C~P business. It was first 
sugges tea. by a sub-Committee of the FAUA Council, and 
signed by all tariff and nearly all non-tariff companies. 
All Government. Offices, Lloyd's brokers and other non-
tariff insur_ers. 8:greed to obser•ve it, even if they did not 
sign. It was .introduced by the Council with the explici.t 
purpose ~f saving the manp.Ov1er i..tand resources used up· by 
competitive inter company. transfers. 
(2) suspension or,. press. adver~ising •. This was. readily 
' ·, • 1 • 
agreed to when it was suggested by the Commonwealth 
authorities. 
(3) The closing of sub-branches and resident 
b 1942 the number of tariff inspectorships. In Novem er 
inspectors was 317,compared with 823 in September 1939· 
.... _J__~-----· 
. 
Next, a number of "ra tionalisa ti on" policies were 
seriously considered by the FAUA Council, some of which 
may well have been carried out had the pressure from the 
Department of War Organisation of Industry intensified. 
The Council was willing to go to considerable lengths to 
avoid "ra ti onalisa ti on" under the direct supe1,vision of 
the Government. 
(1) Establishment of claims settlement bureaus for 
use by all or groups of companies. 
(2) Establishment of central accounting and 
statistical bureaus. 
(3) Integration of subsidiaries with parent company 
organisations. 
(4) Central inspection bureaus. 
(5) Amalgamation of branches in country areas. 
(6) Mail order system for country insurances. 
(7) Central Australia~wide reinsurance pool. 
The objections to these proposals were largely related 
l.·n terms of the dovetailing to the cos ts of changeover, 
and the familiarisation of staff with of existing systems 
The nroposal for the integration of new procedures. J;;' 
G31. 
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subsidiary with parent compani es was also 
argument that many functions w 1 ere a ready 
met by the 
(5) 
integrated. 
Ip Sta tis tics. 
At many points in the piiesent study f,,""the"" \.C.1.- .1. progress 
has been impeded by lack of adequate statistical or 
financial information. In insurance the collection and 
publication of extensive statistics is of special 
importance: 
As a guide to the setting of rates by companies and 
statutory rate fixing bodies. 
As an indication to brokers and companies, both new 
and established, of the areas of high and low s~pluses. 
To enable superviBory bodies, brokers, agents and 
companies to judge the financial soundness of companies. 
To provide information to the authorities concerned 
with overall f'iscal and monetary policies. 
In all these re~pects there is much room for 
improvement in the Australian statistics. They suffer by 
comparison with nearly every important country with a 
privately owned insurance industry. 
G32 
The reinsurance scheme was brought forward in the hope 
that it might forestall any Government-sponsored 
insupance or reinsurance pool. In early 1943 a Council 
survey of tariff companies revealed that in 1942 local 
reinsurance cessions amounted to £1.2 m.,or about 10 per 
cent of total tariff pren1iums. It was considered that rnuch 
labour and expense would be saved if such inter-company 
transactions were replaced by a single pool.It was 
suggested that the pool would be able to cover single 
losses up to £500,000, with an excess treaty 
overseas for larger sums. 
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The most obvious defects 11 1 e n the published accounts 
of Australian companies. Some corrnnon ones, remedied in 
1960 by new Companies legislation, were: 
(1) No consolidation of parent and subsidiary company 
accounts. 
(2) No indication of names or existence of overseas 
subsidiaries. 
(3) Provision for income tax either nut separated from 
general expenses, or included with other taxes such 
as stamp duties and payroll tax. 
(4) No indication of market values of securities. 
Important defects which remain include: 
(1) Class composition of business not stated - all 
companies except GIO's. 
(2) Premiums not stated - a few companies only. 
(3) Provision for outstanding claims not shown- most 
companies. 
(4) Commission and management expenses not separated -
nearly all companies. 
(5) Taxes (fire brigade charges, stamp duties etc.) 
not separated from management expenses - nearly 
all companies. 
(6) No infornation on r•einsurance - most companies. 
(7) Reinsurance commission not shown - all companies. 
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(8) Investment income not clearly defined. Most 
companies do not indicate whether this item is net 
of expenses, property taxes, or income tax. 
(9). J.;ack of detail in balance sheet statements of assets -
most companies. 
(10) Unexplained changes in unexpired risks provisions -
many companies. 
(11) Overseas and Australian premiums not separated:- all cos. 
Uore important than these aspects of published accounts, is 
that branches of overseas companies and Lloyd's agents 
publish l1Q information regarding their Australian business. 
It is probably unreaiistic to expect that all this 
information should appear on a unifor~ basis in published 
accounts. However, with little difficulty the CBSS 
statistics could be expanded to embrace them. The present 
series of official statistics was commenced in 1942, and 
consists of State and Australia-wide aggregates of written 
premiums, claims incurred, commission, management expe(6)s' 
fire brigade charges, taxation, and investment income. 
From the viewpoint of clarity of definition and uniformity 
between states, the present are a considerable 
improvement on the 1942 statistics collected by individual 
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states, but their scope is little greater than the 
Victoria commenced publishing as early as 1907. 
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statistics ! i 
J i 1 · , Moreover, 
some useful information was abandoned in 1941 as a 
temporary wartime "economy" and never revived.(?) Directions 
in which the statistics could well be expanded or improved 
are now listed; some or all of this information m included 
in official or other publications in most other 
Western countries.(S) 
(7) E.g. the N.S.W. serle-s··of-amounts at ti'Skon fire 
policies; see N.s.w. Statt~cal ~egistert 1922-41. 
(8) E.g. 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
France 
Canada 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
Switzerland 
Insuran~e Companies Act,195~. Summaries ?f . 
Statements_of Insurance B~~l.o.ess ••• deposit,g_q 
with the Board of Trade. 
State of New York, Reporis of the 
Superintendent of Insurance. Alfred M.Best Co. 
Inc. ~.st •.s. :r.12,su:r;_a.n.c.Lf1.eP.:9-'.F..t.§. and BeJ.t~Lll.t!t 
.s_nd .casualty Aggregates and Averages. 
Ministere des finances, St~~istigues.e..i . 
etudes financieres :1 RaPQ.Ort sur la Sl tuation. • • 
d' assurances' dE!_c:a..Rltalisation et des autres 
enterprises... ~ 
Editions de l'Argus: Annuaire des Societies 
d'assurances. 
ReRort of the Sugerintend~nt of Insuranc~ 
for Canada • Vol.I.: Abslfact of Statements 
of Insurance CO:mpanies in canad~ •. 
Report on the Insurance Sta~~stics of New 
Zealand (N.Z. Govt.) 
Office of the Registrar of Insurance, 
Annual Report. 
Fede.ral Bureau of Insurance. : !&§.. 
enterR~~es d'assur~nces erivees en Suisse. 
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(1) At present no balance sheet information is collected. 
Statistics of principal assets and ltabilities in Australia 
should be published. 
(2) No information regarding reinsurance transactions is 
collected. Rei~surance ceded and received, recoveries, claims 
paid and connnissions should be shown separately. 
(3) Provisions for outstanding claims should be shown 
separately by lines. 
(4) Income tax provision should be shown, rather than 
income tax paid during the year. Provision fiX1 income tax, 
payroll tax, stamp duties and licence fees should be shown 
separately. 
(5) Estimates of "earned" as well as "written"premiums 
should be shown for each class. Consideration should be 
given to the adoption of more accurate measures of "earned 
p~emiums" than the assumption of fixed adjustment factors. 
(6) Estimated changes in market values of assets should 
be published. 
(7) The statistics of individual companies should be 
]ru.blished. The accounts of P?rent and subsidiary companies 
Rhould be aggregated, or at least there should be some 
indication of which companies are associated. "Companies 
11 
here also refe1, 8 to agents for overseas insut'ers,especially 
Lloyd's brokers. 
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(8) More detailed breakdown of ., 
management expensestt 
should be considered i e.g. nto salaries, depreciation 
' other expenses. 
If a Commonwealth Insm•ance Commission were established it 
would be preferable for it to take overj~~llection and 
compiling of statistics from the CBCS. 
~ Conclusions 
:x 
In Chapter W it was pointed out that the influence 
of Tariff associations had been diminished by the 
intervention of Governments in important areas of the 
market. On closer examination this intervention has not 
always proved to be pa1•ticularly effective, and in some 
respects has wo~ked in favour of tariff objectives. 
The setting of maximum rates has been an exceedingly 
blunt instrument, and in practice much reliance has been 
placed on competitiun to keep overall profit margins down 
and to adjust class differentials. 
Government insurance offices have had no obvious effect 
!lilJ;r 
~ 
(Ji)7 
on underwriting margins. Despite bonus declarations their own 
effective rates have usually not been lower than ratesiin the 
rest of the market. They have operated under many handicaps, 
including lack of suprort by unsympathetic Governments on 
some occasions. Especially in New South Wales, large CTP 
loeses have inhibited the development of their business in Sotne; 
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dir ec ti on s. The Gove.t'nment Offices thema elves have 
discouraged development towards a freer and more flexible 
market by following tariff brokerage and agency policies. 
State Governments in search of funds have taxed 
fire and lll:lrine insurance increasingly heavily. In post war 
;·ears it is likely that these taxes have been borne by 
~9) 
the companies, not the insured. Companies have not been 
in a strong position to resist increases as long as profit 
m~ 1 gins have remained high. The taxes have probably 
inhibit~d rate competition in some areas and in marine 
insurance have caused locgl insur1 ance in some Australian 
States to become less attractive than in London or other 
overseas markets. 
Insurance supervision in Queensland has introduced some 
useful reforms. but the desirability of commission 
limitation and the suppo~t of tariff agency rules is 
doubtful. 
Proposed "rationalisation" of insurance during the 
Second World war showed that industry executives themselves 
recognised that many resources are used up in competitive 
Lransfers of.business between companies, in the provision of 
the services of advice, information and "selling", and 
by a relatively large number of because the market is shared 
t 9) Sugg ea ted in Chapter IV, PP· ii®' Sl!El. lrCJ) 1 S"3 · 
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small units. If the industry wishes to counter the strong 
arguments in favour of ~~)eral or (more realistically~ 
partial nationalisation it should encourage the growth 
of competition in these respects. 
639 
The development of a mol"e competitive market would 
require the giving up of tariff restrictions, especially those 
cuncerning rates, policy conditions, commissions, ~gents, 
brokers and reinsurance. However the Underwriters' Associations 
would continue to pe1"form tha r present inspection, policy 
drafting and statistical functions. It is probable that the 
demand for these services would grCJN, because increasing 
competitive pressure would cause companies to depend. more 
and more on the cent~al l~ge scale performance of many 
functions. 
A prerequisite for the development of a more competitive 
environment is the establishment of a Federal authority, 
responsible for solvency supervision. This authority should 
also be responsible for the collection and publication of 
statistics of a more detailed and extensive nature than those 
at present available. 
(1) Of State-run pools for the I.e. the setting up 
compulsory business classes. 
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APPENDIX A . 
Tables and Notes on Statistics 
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1. Tables A.l to A.J.O. 
~~ ~otes on Tables. 
3. Notes ·on Charts. 
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Table A.l 
Underwriting SurEluses on Earned Premiums. Australia ,, '• ' ,, 
u.K. C0moanies, and u.s.A. 1910-1960. Total Business. 
Year N.s.w. N.s.w. and U.K. Lloyd's U.S.Stock and Vic., Vic., ex Cos. Fire and all Cos. G.I.0.'s Casualty 
Cos. 
J ( 1) 1> (2) (3) ( 4) ( 5) (6) 
1910 5.7 
l.5 11 
2.0. 12 
13 9.5 1.0 
14 9.0 
-3.3 
15 11.9 2.7 
14 •. 8 12.3 0.6 16 15.1 
0.8 17 15.2 .. ·· 15.2 10.2 
18 25.6' . 25.6 19.3 ~.3. 
19 16.9 16.9 16.9 5.2 
1920 16.0' . 16.o 6.6 -2.5 
l 11.0 11.0 5.7 -1.9 
2 12.1 12.1 2.6 0.6 
3 8.6 8.4 5.2 -0.9 
4 - 0.4 - 0.5 4.5 -3.6 
-4.0 5 6.1 5.5 6.5 
-3.2 6 4.9 4.2 5.2' 1.6 
- 11''7 6.5 7 ,.,2r,o ... . 6.4 3.7 -.: .. '• 6.9 8 6.9 
5.8 1.7 9 7.2 6.9 5.5 -1.3 1930 7.2 6.3 2.9 -0.7 1 12.0 13.9 4.4 -0.2 2 11.7 11.l 7.5 5.1 3 16.4 16.8 7.9 4.6 4 16.4 16.5 9.0· 6.4 5 15.2 15.0 8.6 5.0 6 9.2 9.0 8.0 5.6 7 14.3 14.3 8.4 6.4 8 16.2 16.4 9.3 5.8 11.2 4.3 9 11.3 13.3 9.4 3.0 1940 13.2 16.0 13.8 3.4 - 1 15.7 10.0 24. 7·· 7.4 2 23~1 28.0 18.5 3.4 3 28.9 28.7 14.9 1.5 4 32.8 19.8 11.2 5 25.0 
Year N.s.w. 
And Vic., 
all Cos. 
(1) (2) 
1946 25.9 
7 17.8 
8 10.0 
9 15.2 
1950 18.7 
---- l 14.9 
2 9.9 
3 13.3 
4 12.5 
5 10.5 
6 7.7 
7 7.5 I 
8 10.1 
9 11.7 
1960 8.5 
N.s.w.and 
Vic., ex 
G.I.O.'s 
(3) 
22.7 
20.0 
13.3 
18.8 
22.6 
18.8 
13.1 
17.3 
19.2 
15.2 
13.C 
12.7 
14.l 
16.8 
13.2 
U.K. 
Cos. 
( 4) 
7.7 
5.3 
10.1 
11.7 
10.7 
7.9 
8.1 
8.8 
8.0 
6.6 
2.4 
2.0 
3.1 
Lloyd's 
(5) 
12.5 
12.5 
7.8 
9.0 
8.9 
11.3 
7.2 
5.1 
1.0 
1.9 
3.2 
u.s.stock 
Fire and 
Casualty 
Cos. 
(6) 
-5.8 
-1.4 
5.0 
9.5 
4.0 
0.2 
3.1 
5.0 
5.5 
3.5 
-1.8 
-4.3 
-1.1 
0.7 
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Year 
( 1) 
1913 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
ig20 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1930 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1940 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Table A.2 
~nderwriting Surpluses on Earned Premiums. 
Australia and U.K. ComEanies, 
1913-1960. 
N.s.w. U.K. 
and Vic. Cos. 
Fire Fire 
( 2) 
13.2 
16.9 
25.6 
9.2 
13.7 
9.1 
8.6 
2.5 
-2.2 
5.7 
-4.0 
-8.l 
3.6 
0.8 
4.4 
7.3 
15.9 
22.1 
24.4 
23.4 
6.8 
16 .4 
19.8 
7.7 
13.7 
20.4 
30.l 
31.7 
35.1 
26.7 
36.3 
(3) 
10.5 
5.2 
11.4 
11.5 
8.5 
14.l 
13. l 
8.5 
4.7 
5.2 
7.8 
8.2 
8.9 
7.6 
12.0 
10.4 
7.9 
6.3 
6.6 
5.6 
10.5 
14.6 
14.4 
12.3 
13.6 
11.7 
10.8 
5.9 
11.6 
11.6 
13.3 
9.8 
9.7 
8.7 
Fire and Marine. 
N.s.w. U.K. 
and Vic. Cos. 
Marine Marine 
(4) 
18.8 
44.0 
32.9 
20.6 
32.6 
36.0 
6.1 
23.9 
25.6 
28.5 
35.0 
23.2 
27.l 
32.2 
-8.6 
31.8 
25.5 
26.6 
27.2 
36.0 
36.8 
44.8 
39.B 
18.9 
34.4 
55.2 
70.4 
58.4 
69.2 
( 5) 
16.3 
5.1 
-1.0 
-7.0 
16.4 
36.2 
12.8 
-0.6 
17.6 
16.2 
-5.5 
-3.7 
-0.9 
-5.1 
-4.5 
2.3 
7.1 
17.7 
11.0 
19.3 
13.l 
9.5 
10.1 
-2.8 
-4.7 
10.9 
12.l 
26.1 
-10.2 
32.8 
53.4 
34.2 
'L.7.7 
U.K.Cos. Lloyd's 
"Fair- Marine 
play" 
Marine 
(6) 
12.2 
16.2 
19.4 
12.3 
15.6 
17.2 
10.0 
1.6 
2.3 
5.0 
0.9 
0.7 
0.3 
5.2 
1.2 
4.3 
4.4 
9.4 
12.6 
11.5 
9.9 
10.0 
7.9 
1.6 
4.2 
9.B 
15.5 
15.7 
21.1 
4.6 
19.6 
(7) 
t 
{ l 
I 
\ ' 
{)ft ~t 
( 1) ( 2) (3) (4) . ( 5) (6) ( 7) 
51.5 11.4 
34.2 14.8 
41.9 19.6 
32.2 18.0 
27.8 13.9 
20.4 9.8 
-22.9 11.0 
43.5 17.0 
39.9 14.3 
39.6 7.5 
35.2 5.2 
33.4 !+. 3 
42.2 8.3 
37.4 
16.7 
18.0 
15.7 
10.9 
9.8 
12.4 
12.4 
6.1 
2.2 (3.6~ 
2.6 6.1 
4.4 7.5) 
5.8~ 11.5 
1947 32.2 4.1 
8 13.1 11.0 
9 20.9 11.8 
1950 32.0 9.9 
1 27.6 12.7 
2 21.6 12.8 
3 24.2 11.3 
4 29.8 8.0 
5 29.9 8.2 
6 26.5 3.6 
7 27.3 3.0 
8 24.9 5.5 
9 25.6 4.2 
1960 28.l 
6£15~ 
l 
Table A.3 i t 
I 11 ! Underwriting Sur2luses on Earned Premi.1Jms. ' > 
--Australia and U.K. ComEanies, 
!_913-1960. 
','/orkers 1 ComRensation and Motor Vehicle (incl. CTP) 
-
Workers' Comeensation MV and CTP 
N.s.w. U.K. I ~ear N.S.W. N.s.w. N,s.w. U.K. I ! and Vic., and Vic., Cos. and Vic., and Vic., Cos. All ex All Cos. ex Cos. G.[.0.'s G.I.O.'s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1913 13.2 
14 17.7 
15 18.7 
16 21.4 18.4 31.7 
17 24.8 20.2 13.0 
18 10.7 20.5 11.6 
19 5.8 18.3 10.2 
1920 5.6 18.6 4.6 
1 8.7 28.5 -1.9 
2 7.9 20.4 -9.8 
3 10.2 9.8 -4.9 
4 0.1 7.9 -15.0 
-6.9 -8.2 5 6.0 4.7 12.2 
1.9 1~5 6 ··9.0 8.4 8.9 1.3 -1.2 7 -14.5 -24.8 9.7 0.7 -1.2 8 7.2 -3.3 10.0 
7.9 6.2 9 10.5 10.4 9.3 10.1 8.8 1)30 12.8 9.4 10.3 13.5 0.6 , 14.l 10.l 11.l 14.0 15.8 4.0 ... 8.4 16.5 2 0.4 -5.0 14.2 4.0 ' I 14.9 3 -9.8 -12.7 3.2 l] • 7 10.2 1.3 4 
-9.3 -11.9 2.5 1.1 2.8 1.5 I 5 
-5.7 - 8.9 
-0.8 -1.5 4.1 i I ' 2.9 'I I 
' 6 -6.2 -9.0 
-2.4 3.1 . 
-1.9 • 7 
-1.7 -4.0 2.4 
-1.4 -1 .• 5 3.6 ! , 3.7 7.1 1.4 2.9 I ' 8 4.3 1.4 8.2 6.7 3.2 8.4 i 9 8.8 3.,3 l 1 140 8.4 8.3 2.4 6.5 6.5 5.6 I 6.8 I 1 2.7 1.5 10.2 9.8 16.3 9.1 17.6 ;; 2 7.9 6.7 18.4,, 18.3 ~ 
") 11.9 15.2 2.~ 20.7 22.6 11.2 1 2.6 ' ' 
..,,; 6.3 21"6 I ' 4 16.8 13.2 22.1 1\ 1 5.5 
' l 5 16.6 16.4 ~ ~ 
' 
,,_ l f 4 ~ ~ \ ,, u_, 
-
( l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1946 10.2 8.7 9.1 4.6 7 -1.7 -0.7 9.2 
-18.1 
-3.8 
-7.1 8 
-16.0 9 13.5 10.5 
-11.5 lJ50 21.5 18.7 
-10.8 1 22.6 19.7 
-18.5 2 19.1 16.9 
-13.7 3 21.3 18.0 
-5.5 4 4.8 4.7 
-2.3 5 -7.7 -9.4 0.1 6 -7.5 -10.4 
-5.4 
7 -4.4 -2.9 
-4.l 3 3.1 0.8 1.6 
9 5.0 4.3 
-0.7 
1960 ~4.3 3.3 
-1.0 
I 
6lt6 ... 
(6) (7) 
2.8 
-7.0 
-17.4 
-5.2 
-15.l 0.9 
-8.7 2.1 
-6.8 0.9 
-16 .2 
-4.4 
-9.7 -1.4 
-4.2 4.1 
4.1 3.8 
1.3 0.2 
-3.7 -5.3 
-3.5 -4.5 
1.3 
2.0 
1.8 
I 
1 I 
I 
I 
I I 
{,I 
! 
IJ I 
1 
. 
' I 
I I 
I 
I I 
1 
I I 
I 'I 
1 
If 
t w i 
• I 
I I I 
I 
r. ¥ 
,} 
'l 1 j 
l 
; 
~ ( 
"' ( 
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Table A.4 
Underwriting SurQluse~ on Earned Premiums. 
Australia and U.K. Companies, 
- 1912-1960. 
Miscellaneous Classes. 
Yea.r N.S.W. and N.s.w. and U.K. U.K. U.K. Vic. . Vic. Cos. Cos. Cos • 
{ 1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) . ( 6) 
1912 4.1 
13 3.Q 
14 7.2 
15 9.1 
16 23.3 4.4 
17 -46.4 5.6 
18 12.5 9.8 
19 23.5 3.0 
1?20 10.1 1.0 
1 7.2 3.4 
2 19.3 -0.9 
3 20.8 3.4 
4 20.7 3.6 
5 5.5 5.7 
4.5 6 26.2 
2.8 7 16.7 . 
3.7 8 12.1 3.9 9 25.5 4.2 1930 23.7 
-10.6 l 18.7 
-0.2 2 19.0 
3.2 3 17~9 5.0 4 17.8 8.3 5 23.6 8.5 i . t' . ,./ .~."" 35.7 10.5 -.. ' .. · .. rJ~-- ....... 6 
' \ .. ~ .• ~· ... , <'···;....,._··· 7 38.4 12.0 '.,_ ., ' "'.. ,,. .. 8 38.5 12.9 . ,. 
9 24.8 12.5 
1940 17.1 13.4 ·, , 2?.0 11.5 ... 
13.6 2 
3 37.2 13.3 
4 27.8 10.4 
5 32.4 7.5 
6 28.8 6.3 
9;5 28.2 7 
24.8 11.2 8 
9 22.3 
I 
' . 
r • J 
:.: I s 
. ~.: 
' . 
. i 
. ' ; 
. i ' •. 
' 
•'\ '; 
i 
·' ~! 
j 
' . ,'. '. ! 
I : ! < ! l 
i ·- ' 
~ ' i 
: I·; : _' ! 
. ' ~ 
~ ; ·; " . .· . ' 
(I•! j ; : . 
! ; ·. l 
! ·, ; •• 
~ i 
1 \ ~ 
t .. ~ t 
~ .- ~ 
·;: 
; l 
G ft R ( l) (2) (3) (4) { 5) '6) \ . 
1050 23.0 
J 5. 0 1 24.4 
6.9 ') 27.3 
7.5 
'-
3 25.2 
8,5 ) 
I i 
4 18.8 9.8 5 23.7 9.6 /.. 23.5 7.1 
v 
7 23.9 5.9 18.2 5.5 I 8 I 18.0 ! I 9 I 
I I 
1960 ")(I 4 ~ . .,, 
I 
l 
' I 
I r 
' ..... 
• •. r, 'ir 
.... ~ ... hf zi.-~· 
.................... t~' j 
' 
! 
I - -- --------- i. I 
Table A.2 Git9 I . 
' Australian Com~aniesi Profits and ~ SFiarefioioers' .. unas §,79-r90I • 
t Year No.of frems.: S.F.: U•writi~g- Theoret- i Int.: U'writ- Profit: Cos. Earned Prems. Surp. : ical S.F. ing S.F. (£'000) per . Prems. Profit: per Burp.: per cent. per cent. Prems. cent. S.F. cent. per per 
cent. cent. 
( 1 ) (2) (J) (4) (5) (6) (7) (S) (9) 
1878-79 8 2$4.8 256 26.43 31.10 6.32 10.35 16.67 
1879-80 9 320.0 229 29.00 35.4? 6.93 12.63 19.57 l I 1 14 423.5 208 22. 13 2?.50 6.43 10.65 17.08 2 15 485.8 216 18.44 22.72 5.84 8.56 14.40 3 16 560.9 220 14.51 16.97 5.32 6.61 11.93 4 19 723.S 196 2.86 5.65 5.58 1.48 7.06 1884-85 20 741.2 179 
-7.38 
-.3. 09 6.60 
-4. 13 2.47 6 21 641.5 200 10.48 15.07 6.43 5.22 11.65 7 23 539.8 229 7.08 i3.aa 6. 71 3.12 9.83 8 26 569.9 246 9.07 15.56 6.63 3.69 10.32 9 25 574.7 237 3.34 8.60 6.22 1.41 7.63 
1889-90 23 570.9 208 2.82 7.71 6.38 1.32 7.70 1 22 569.5 186 2.46 7.30 6.60 1.33 7.93 2 20 596.1 183 -2.63 1.53 6.24 -1.41 4.83 3 17 519.9 223 17.58 21.41 5. 71 7.89 13.60 4 17 494.1 244 20 • .a1 20.35 4.97 8.58 13.55 1894-95 16 465.7 250 14.95 18.79 4.61 5,97 10.58 6 15 459.7 255 8.05 11.31 4.22 3.21 7.43 
7 15 468.5 256 10;93 13.06 4.07 4.26 8.33 
8 13 460.0 225 -4. 11 -1.41 lJ,. 19 -1.82 2.37 
9 12 458.4 205 -9.62 -7.68 4.07 -4.70 -0.6.3 
1999-
16.61 17.29 3.52 8.56 12.08 1900 11 476.1 193 
lJ.61 13. 71 3.70 6.95 10.65 01 12 5ll.3 197 
I 
Tnb~e A.6 
Gr;r ' • . ~ ' I I 
' ~ 
l 
l 
I 
Fi~JL-L../iY.stralia_~Qd U.K~-92.ITIPa~~~!t.l[Z.4-1917~ 
Unde:r:writino Surpluses ~Q_Earned_~ium~i..J:er Cent 
4 U.K. 5 U.K. 20 U.K. 4. Aus tn. Aus tr- Commercial 
--
Cos. Cos. Cos. Cos. alian Union 
Alliance Aust. Vic.& 
I ' Tas. 
I I I (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) I (1) 
I 
I 1374 30.5 
22.2 5 
36.8 6 16.2 
52.6 68.0 7 10.5 
58.9 71.4 s 20.8 
4.3 29.6 9 16.5 12.0 28.9 26.7 ~361J 7.1 
17.4 21.2 l -0.7 3.5 
13.9 7.. 7 ? 2.2 
3 8.3 5.8 -17.2 
4 4.5 19.7 4.0 -36.l 
s 12.9 8.4 1.0 -31.l 
6 12.6 20.9 15.7 1.4 
7 8.4 11.3 23.8 
8 10.2 20.l 
9 6.3 4.4 
L90 7.2 9.2 
1 4.9 9.0 
?. -4.6 22 .1 
3 -0.l 22.3 
4 10.7 22.0 21.1 
s tll .4 16.7 27.0 
17.9 20.8 6 12.7 
26.3 11.3 7 11.9 
-2.0 34.0 8 6.7 
22.9 32.2 
20.7 2.8 31.0 
0 
24.3 
32.4 35.5 
/ 
4.5 1100 
15.8 40.7 41.9 
, 3.0 
20.4 48.9 42.5 
.. 
11.5 2 
19.3 32.3 24.5 3 16.0 22.3 33.7 35.8 <1 2.7 13.4 32.4 34.6 5 18.4 14.7 24.0 6 -23.l 16.2 33.6 7 14.8 7.4 34.2 11.4 ., 8 
'.J 7.4 
'i 
I ' 
I 
( 
~ (1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 910 15.0 
41.3 8.5 ll 
40.9 11.7 . ,, lL 43.4 10.9 
32.0 
13 
5.9 13.0 
11 
l '.) 11.4 38,6 , , 
39.2 
.... o 
47.9 17 
x Vlc toria - A 11 Cos. 
I 
G51_.. 
(8) « 
25.0 
21.3 
1.5 
6.7 
- 7.3 
19.1 
18.6 
33.6 
' I 
I 
I: 
I ' 
! 
I l 
I 
l ' 
• i 
! ] 
l ! J. 
t 
! 
~ j 
~ 
> 
' I .. t 
L .U 1 
] 376 
7 
8 
9 
lSSO 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Q 
,_ 
0 
~~90 
'') 
, 
0 
7 
8 
() 
, 
l )')J 
1 
2 
a 
/ 
1110 
l 1 
~ -
12 
l3 
l ,, 
~6 
17 
U3 
'T'able A. 7 ~-------...... 
Ef-1RINE : AUS'11RALIA and TT.K. Cmnnnnies. J876-1Ci18. 
----·--·-----------·- -----------~ --- -Underwr!_~ing Sur-121_11s<2.~___!_0_ P~:!._1:!_ms, 2er cent~ 
British & Selected Austn. Commercial 
Foreign Br.Cos. Cos. Victoria --UniQ.n __ _ 
(1) 
29.3 
20.2 
17.2 
20.1 
19.2 
14.0 
5.8 
15.5 
18.5 
8.8 
8.9 
5.1 
14.3 
4.3 
1.7 
2.1 
14.5 
12.0 
11.0 
-3.2 
4.1 
2r t.. 
-6. ,, 
-7.9 
7.1 
I 
(2) 
10.7 
13.1 
2.9 
/ 
12.3 
7.3 
-4.2 
-0.2 
3.7 
-0.4 
0.9 
8.9 
14.4 
10.3 
3.7 
4.9 
-1.9 
-2.8 
-0.6 
-2.0 
-5.2 
6.9 
9.7 
7.6 
12.2 
16.2 
19.4 
12.3 
15.6 
17.2 
(3) 
11.4 
17.8 
36.4 
24.7 
18.5 
2.8 
14.6 
22.0 
24.6 
7.9 
37.0 
12.0 
-13.1 
-6.3 
-20.6 
-14.3 
(4) 
(-12. Lf) 
n.a. 
(12.1) 
I' l.o 
-14.3 
40.4 
43.6 
38.5 
25.2 
- 6.6 
43.7 
57.4 
(5) 
39.6 
9.6 
-41.8 
9.8 
32.4 
Lt 7. 5 
7.2 
21.2 
26.9 
13. 8 
7.3 
-37-4 
11.1 
-·6~2 
4.1 
27.6 
5.7 
32.3 
31.6 
44.2 
35.4 
49.7 
' l l ; I ' I I' 
' , I 
• I i 
i I I < 
~ I ~ J! " ' { I 
I 
i 
" 
l' 
~ 
I 
' I 
' l 
l· 
' 
' ' , !· 
1 
) 
I i 
' i 
' 
' 
' ' 
•I 
TahJe .;.8 G51 I 
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5 Australian Insurance Companies, 
;l 
1, 
1890-1960. j I 
? 
I 
y:iar Premiums Share- Uncalled 
E<-:rned holders' Capital Profit Capital 
Funds Profit 
( l) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) 
l8f9-90 177.3 266.9 750.4 29.7 91 189.8 291.9 695.1 n.a. 
92 204.2 324.3 664.5 28.2 3.7 
93 204.l . 338.2 660.1 51.8 -2.0 
94 207.7 350.9 655.3 
70.6 5.2 
60.6 
95 209.6 364.3 655.3 -19.2 49.5 
-2.3 96 207.8 361.4 655 .3 37.0 
-7.4 17 221.7 363.0 6,~7. 8 42.1 
-1.3 
9b 234.0 306.6 647.8 
-17.l -d2.6 q9 242.4 333.3 647.8 35.8 7.8 
l ~ :Y)- • 
l~OO 264.5 335.5 644.l 46.4 18.5 
1 282.6 345.7 644.l 53.0 -3.0 
2 298.4 373.3 644.3 61.6 -0.9 
3 297.3 402.7 636.8 65.6 0.2 
4 290.3 432.9 620.7 70.0 1.1 
5 296.0 470.2 552.l 62.4 1.1 
6 305.0 495.4 565.8 66.6 0.2 
7 331.4 536.5 565. 8 54.7 30.8 
8 361.l 535.8 565.8 44.9 0.1 
9 373.6 548.5 565.8 62.3 -4.3 
!)19-10 400.4 567.0 565.8 58.l 2.0 
11 438.2 653.0 565.8 91.8 41.8 
12 512.0 683.8 593.3 82.l -1.3 
13 582.6 749.l 584.6 100.3 11.3 
14 622.2 774.7 599.6 87.1 1.1 
15 690.3 893.9 599.6 129.6 -2.2 
16 755.6 949.7 594.7 136.5 0.2 
17 814.9 1010.2 574.7 174. l -6.2 
18 846.1 1186.6 501.3 198.3 76.0 
1_ 9 960.9 1274.7 461.2 172.5 18.0 
1 •• 
~jl'J-20 1070.0 1456.7 441 .. 2 270.0 -9.7 
21 1147.8 1682.1 491 •. 2 221.8 36.9 
22 1170.6 1774.8 517.3 240.8 -0.2 
23 1187.3 1883.8 542.3 225.l -0.1 
24 1289.2 1991.2 548:6 206.6 56.9 
25 1420.0 2078.6 561.l 254.6 -5.9 
26 1588.1 2132,3 586.l 224.8 -5.6 
27 1758.6 2319.l 599.l 248.0 67.5 
= 
! L· 
I 
j 
• ! ' 
~ 
!; 
I 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
1927Y28 1859.4 2421.7 646.2 279.Q -~~1 
29 j6 i~~~·t ~~98.0 599.0 294.9 6.9 1
. 9 - 6 • 34. 3 610. 0 206. 2 -1. 9 
31 1 48.0 2713.6 610.0 218.9 -9.6 
32 1326.9 2856.2 610.0 252.4 -2.3 
33 1196.2 2938.7 610.0 223.3 -1.8 
34 1211.8 3019.8 610.0 281.2 -3.0 
35 1225.4 3156.4 610.0 235.6 52.0 
36 1286.6 3214.4 598.0 233.7 -4.7 
37 1414.2 3308.3 598.0 223.8 -20.1 
38 1559.6 3409.6 598.0 261.7 23.2 
>. 39 ---:;l;-;:6:-;::5"0--~3"":-4~91:;;-----~5;..;9~8--=.::~3..;..68'<'----6~------
1939-40 1661 3584 598 285 -5 
41 1748 3679 598 283 ° l 
42 1840 3789 598 298 '-7 
43 1851 3928 598 341 -14 
44 1880 4066 5,98 321 9 
.. ~ \. 
45 1920 4232 598 374 -17 
46 2053 4355 598 340 -27 
47 2386 4452 I 598 329 -29 
48 3302 4584 612 401 -43 
49 3549 4943 612 412 202 
~ l C)49-50 4153 5428 '" 480 :«{ 597 -11 
,' I ~f; 51 5119 6163 875 574 20 -~- .~ ;t 52 6584 7028 1125 694 253 
)\., •\••c. ~ 53 7477 8061 750 : 1060, -26 ~~ ; .., ,~r ,, '34 s140 sso9 622 ,) io26 _, i1 ~· ,~, '~J·~ ( 55 9213 10157., 1144 336 ~"i'i':/ ' ' 56 10256 11625 ~ 527 1053 577 
f <:u~' 57 11170 12661 ~ 1169 -32 ;~ ~~ 58 12227 13738 ·~· 1273 376 
': .(.'~~-- ,,,~ 59 13722 14527 1558 -65 
\ ' '''\'"- ''··~ ! 1611 1251 t i59'.'.:.6Q 15141 17210 - r '~ 
ri..-.-,L t,.'t i~ ~'\'Vfl ":§ f~)., ~'> .,.._ I-°') .. ' ') r 
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t .'-,~'/:!"-' ,~-; 7" ll ..
< , 0 J. 
-" -"'i 'fl((o<' ~~ '\ l" .... •t<_ 
(1. ~-I" 
" ~':I;~ "'r \\i 
f'1~, ~ 
\ ·\ {~~l 
' .. 1~\ ~ ,;. .. 
\V ~.._~~ 
.• ;s.. "" 'ic 
1 
)' 
-'>-
. 
r 
~} 
) ' 
I I I 
I l 
t I 
' ~ 
I f 
' I 
I 1 
\;t ·~, 
•.,. 
• .. 
-~·:;):· . 
·:::::,,~:~>: 
.. 
\~~: 
table A.9 
5 A.ustralian. :r. nsurance Comp: a '. · 
. .. . . . . . . . . _ nJ.e s, 1'890-1960. 
$ ~·F ;:-;:: .· Profit: The or- Profit: 
P.Perns. Pre,ms., etical· s.F. 
per per . Profit: per ce~t · cent Prems. cerit 
(2). (3) 
.. 
151 . 16_;75 
154 14°.86 
159 25.36 . 
166 34.59 
169 29.18 
174 23.61 
174. 17.81 
164 18.99 
131 -7.31 
138 14.77 
12.7. 17~54 
122 ·18.75 
125 .. 20.64 
136 22~07 
149: 24~ 11 
159 . 21.08 
162 21.84 
162' .. 16.'51 
149. 12~43 
147 •· 16~68 
142 14. 51. 
149 20~95 
134 16 .04 . 
128 17.22 
125 14.00 
130 18.77 
126 18.07 
124 . 21.36 
140 23.44 
133. 17.95 
136 25.23 
147' 19.32 
per 
cent 
(4) 
10.72· 
8~69 
19.00 
27.98 
23.25 
18.27 
12.61 
13.71 
-11.24 
10.48 
l3.31 
14.08 
16.15 
16.85 
18.05 
15.41 
16.00 
10.80 
7.17' 
11.27 
9.14 
15.34 
10.29 
11.86 
8.69 
12.91 
11.61 
15.12 
16.25 
10.62 
L6 •. 83 
1
.8.69 
'· 
(5) 
11~13 
·9.66 
15.97 
20.88 
17.27 
13.59 
10.24 
11~60 
- 5.58 
10.74 
13~83 
15.33 
16.50 
·16.29 
16.17 
13.27 
13.44 
10.20 
8.38 
. 11. 36 
10.25 
14.06 
12.01 
13.39 
11.24 
14.50 
14.37 
17.23 
16.71 
13.53 
18.53 
13.19 
Bond Net· Caoital 
Yields Profit: P~fit: 
S.F.· S.F. 
per per. 
cent cent (15)-
( G). 
(6) 
. ( 7) (8) 
n.a.x 7.13 n.a. 
n.a.x 5.66 1.26 
· n.a.xll.97 o,.62 
n.a.x16.88 1.54 3.50 13.77 -5.47 
3.07 10.52 -0.63 
3.00 7.24 -2.05 
3.22 8.38 -0.36 
3.00 
-8. 58·.-10.63 
3.12 7.62 2.34 
3.15 10.18 5.51 
3.67 11.66 -o:s1 
3.58 12.92 -0.24 
3.86 12.43 0.05 
4.07 12.10 0.25 
3 .. 58 9.69 0.23 
3.60 9.84 0.04 
3. 52 6.68 ·5. 75 
3,55 4.83 0.02 
3.68 7.68 -0.78 
3.80 6.45· 0.35 
3.76 10.30 6.40 
4.30 7.71 -0.19 
4.16 9.23 1.50 
4.26 6.98' 0.14 
4. 53 9.97 -0.25 
5 .• 14 9.23C 0.02 
5.04 12.19 -0.61 
5.12 11.59 6.40 < 
5.52 8.01 1.41 
6.17 12.36 -0.66 
7.26 5.93 2.19 
(9) 
2.92 
2.86 
5.24 
7.07 
. 5. 99 
'4.86 
3~64 
4.14 
-1.79 
3,64 
4.72 
5.35 
6.05 
6.27 
6.54 
5.72 
6.36 
4.96 
4.08 
5.59 5.13 
7.53 
6.43 
7.75 
6.34 
8.68 
8.83 
10.98 
11.75 
9.93 
11.52 
10.21 
i 
l 
I 
., I 
! I 
,. : I 
., . I 
·, if l 
! : ' ; I I 
; i I 
.• .·.I I 
- ;,; i i l 
' i ~ 
r I i '. :.. ! 
· .· l. rr: l >,.: · 
' ..• ~ ~) ! 
· · : ~s r 'i :~ 
, : ~; ~I ·~ . 
+ l U I ... 
m 
.;~~:.f~~ ... / :;~fi-;(t,~· 9 
t'< · '';··9 ~'"SO 
. ~!{{: 9 
j:)·I 60 /'{(:J-
::~'. :~:·~ 
·;i:~~>::J 
(2) (3) (4) 
152' 20~·57 ... ll .34 
159 18 .95 10.60 154 16.03 4.41 146 17.93 l0.44 134 . 14.16 7 .11 132 14.10 6.97 130 15.00 7.94 141 16.00 
.8.63 143· ' . 11.22 
.2 .. 89 165 13.28 0.84 215.- 19.02 8.91 246 18.67 
. 9. 35 249 23.21 14.90 258 19.23 9.90 250 18.16 8.27 234 15.83 7.05 219 16.78 8.60 212 22.30 13.88 216 17 .16 10.05 210 16.19 9.55 
' 206· 16.20 9.51 212 18~42 11.56 
216 17~07 ' :10.05 
.220 19.48 12.29 
212 16~ 56 9.64 
187 13 ~ 79 .. 7.92 139. 12~14 7.78 
139 11.61 7.24 
131 14~37 ·10. 26 
120 11~21 6.99 
10.7 10.54 ,.5:60 
108 14.18 9.35 
108~ 12.60 ?:so 
110 12.42 .. 7 :42 
113· 10:27 4;21 
113: 10~47 
.·. ' 
. 4-. 75 
112 10.41 .4.85 
106, 11~35 6.18 
11,4 10.64 -5.03 
. ' 
/ 
I ' ,' . ' .·' ~ .. 
. ' J • ~ 
Table A.10 
-- ... 
5 Australian.Insurance Companies, 1890-1960. 
· f~::(/~ar U1writing 
Surp, 
£ 1000. 
( 1) (2) 
J.889-90 14.2 
;~~}.!;;:(./ 
1 12.1 
2 35.6 
3 53. 7 
4 43.8 
5 32.7 
6 20.9 
7 25.3 
8 -31.3 
9 23.7 
Int.' 
£ 1000 
(3) ' 
15.5. 
16. 1 . 
16.2. 
16.9' 
16.8 
16.8. 
16, 1 
16.8 
11+.2 
12.1 
12.9 
13.5 
15.9 ' 
16.3 
18u2 
18.9 . 
20.6 
21.3 
22.0 
27.S 
25.0 
28.0 
30.8 
35.8 
41.3 
. 46.9 
5$.0 
64.0 
77.5 
87.7 
.98.B. 
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146.6 
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Surp,: Prems. 
per c~nt. · 
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9. 78,, 
',' .. j 
12.67 
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4.37 
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6.43 
·;; 
. ~ . ·,.: 
. ._ .. , i ,;~·1 :'I 
U 1 wr~ ting , :'!·Interest: 
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4.14 
10.97 
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12.48 
B.9B 
5,79 
6.97 
-10.21 
' 7. 11 
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5.52 
. 5.00 . 
5.00 
j 4.79 
,.;: .: 4.61 
4.45 
4.63 
4.63 
3.63 
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ll.42 
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t ~~;)_ 949:::.50 345 
,:,:;,-. .JG 6 463 ·:~g·"·'.,,, ·i:t 7 562 
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U'writing 
Int. S'..irp. :Prems. 
£·1000 p~r t 
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U'writing 
Surp.:S.F. 
PEr cent. 
Interest: 
S.F. per 
cent. · 
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5i{;~). c 1 (2) 
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i.y !~r·.:.1.::· 
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l t!_,~_ll\ . 
. -~' ·~-.·. . . ~:·· . 
·'I . : • H~;·;:~:·,. :.1;; ::::: ! 
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'·t· 
,!'.' . :~ :,:.:~~;:< .. '. '~~'.'./· :·:~~~;: 
,_'.-'./··.. )~t Col. ( 4) • 
\·~:~~J:i' .'·"S'.·~;(" 
. . il.121.e A .1 
S?urce~: N.s.w. Statistical R~~isters and 
Vf7ctor1an 'f!la.r Books. Prior to-1942 the N.s.w • 
'' ! 
l 
'"! 
. igure s are net of. re insurance 0'in Australia . . 
and· New ·Zealand, and excludina Treaty arrange-: : · me~ts." · The V~ct?r'ian figures are net· of i 
reinsurance uw~th1n Austral~sia.·u. During 194?. . , ( 
and. after premiums are net of .. ~•local" <:'~' ":•·cr-.:;~(:t~-~'.):·~~; .. 
fac_ul tative reinsurance o_nly· __ ·'.- '·•_·rn· r·T s_'w ·'_:·::_:%?' . . '.·:_({}E_:~.j~: .. :~'.\._ .. _ .. ,:;::: · • 
e ~. I 0 ,., .. , ... «·.·~·~'a.· 
'premiums are net of bonuses and rebates oaid .,,.,, ,• ·: ~.·· i du:sin~ the year, ·during the .entire period; , · · 
' 
th.is lS·the case in Victoria'for 1942 and ,<.< 
after, _but it. is not certain (al though proh-~hle) 
whether bonuses were deducted be.fore 1942 .. '-.\-;, . 
"Earned" premiums have been .·c.~lc:ulated On .. the"~.,.,.: 
assumption of a 40 per ~ent..·.P:r~rnium .:reserve ., .){: 
adj us tme n t • · · :/<-'. · •:::'.'i=,;.,;;:'~i:'i:.~;,::;;.;V,;'<,:t:::&,::.:: .. ,!; .. ·N-.:\:'· \;:,, ':.~:/'/i~i'. . 
"Underwriting surplus" . is .. caI'2''i1~·afed"" ~y '•;t:;::};~/Jr;~'.'i.it'•:_·,:.: 
. : j 
·deducting from earned prerriiu111s · c_lai~s ,. inc\1I-r~.c:l' 
commission, management expe.f1ses;•·'and ~·ire·-,::r:;.·.··::::;;.: .. :~., 
,brigade changes~ Prior to 1~4? taxation (not_..,,. 
shown. separately in the returns) is also . 
deducted. Inl942 and after nunderwriting 
surplustt is before taxation-, includi~g stamp 
"· 
.. • . 
duty, licence fees, payroll tax and income .. 
· . tax• . . . [ '.'f . , . . .. ~:;; ,liJJc•,;,. .J, ... >~t{j 
As for col. (2) with the corre'spondin'g. st,at,}~:tics · · '· 
of the Government Insur~(l,ce Qffices. rem~,Yi;&;,: ;.: .. ;; '.j •. ·. ·; ..••.. j 
~tatistics from: ".: .... , . ·· ,," , · ·"· ""'.• '- . "1<} ..... ;;:.j .:; ~ 
'Annual Reports, s~ate Accident )nsuranc.~ Pf fa~,cT.' .· ( : 
Victoria, 1916~19o0. . ' · ,_, .... .,. -~'!·: · ;"·' <; 
Annual Reports, State M~tor Vehicle In:s_,~:~~;~i~~i"~~~:t.',:~· -H. 
Office. Victoria, 1941-.i.960. ,, , ........... ,.-.. · /J Inforrii~tion supplied by Go~e~~:~~~n!nf~~~~i~60. ;. 
Off ice of N • S • W • ,c:.,overi..~g g ~::; ... ·.:·'.v.•: ,\"}if;}·',::\'{ . \J .... ;,;,%~" .. J;. 
. '. '· <\ ' . ;-.·:. '.,, . ' . ·;·;,;-.:.:''?//.(;).:~ .. : ..... ~.::;~0;:,:. ' . . . \ ! 
Obtained by aagregating:, information . in . P<:;,-.·~ '·i 
. ~~Year Book 1912-1947, and in Post Magazin_ · 1949-1958. ' · · 
Board of Trad~ Summara~i~~ 6asis of comp~riies' 
"Earnedn. premiums t . ,. 
. . " . ks reserves, excep ..• 
own unexpired ~is(. 0 er cent assumed_ 1912-21,, 
uMiscellaneousd • · 4. tP1. ng surplusn is before, · 1938-39) • nun erwr1 . . 
' ( ' . ·~ , 
··.··,: 
. : .~.·-. 
'il<, 
. ~ : 
1 ' ,. 
-~ " 
. I 
U.K, compan~ ~ax ~ dt'.f~~~~~~;'.,~~;·j~f~f . 1! f't r 
expenses which m nb a~y miscellaneous .. ~ :; ·• ! i 
and Loss Account ay e included in Profit : . ., 
outgo" in th s or under ''miscellaneous · ~ :~ • ! 
.. · 
1 e revenue accounts. :. 't i 
Qol .• ( 5 ) • ~ource: ~oard of Trade Summaries ( ( :I i f 
p~~~~Gati~n of "underwri"ting bal~ncen and ·' ' .. ' > r !; I 
. ~ m or. completed underwriting years ·>., .. i;:'.:i:·>.' . J; ) · ' < J 
! ~d ~~~~~/~~~~~~is Marine Aviation and Lr.e 11 S iJG.:.• l i ! .. ··:· •... _';····.:.i.l_i·i._ .• _ . ' . • :;•.• .·~:·.·: ..-·.·.:····.:~ .  · 
Col • ( 6 ) • ;~~ r~ ~.! r~q! ts ,' s l 9F6iroe.· a nud • Sea. s Sutaol ct Yk AF_9i.·rq re ;a~n~~df ~7.!J~~.j·:·;··.:_:.1;;,·'':.···.'..:_ ... • .. ·.l ...~.i'. ..·:·· .. ·.: •. '.( .. l.•.:,'.1 ! i . ' 
Casuafty Cos: "Underwr1"t1'ng surplus" 1· 5 · 0 >~~;1f~~_-\t1;Ni~:~.;];J..'·1.'~ f:f:i d . . - ,, .. ,,,;·<"·"' """""'""'""•:"· .. _.. .\ . ·\-~ ·~ eri:rect. by deducting losses .. ·incurred/'' ·,~;'.%\f:t;?'>>/·.;-..',:;'.~;' l :>':J 
~~~~!~sions. and management :expenses;from .}'ti·' ,:, I '. j 
:·t~;i:;e::.-;:::~~: ~)}~;. . .. 
"·,, 
:·· ·:.:y:.~~ ...... 1'.:.:·. .. '.{' 
As·· for 
fire only. 1942-60 includes···Fire,:-.H6.use-, ....... ·.·i;'..:'"'··.·· -
holders' Comprehensive.,.·. Spr~nkle~ .. '..Le'oka_ge"; : ·" 1:.-~; .. · · .. ( Loss of Profits and Hail. ..;:, ... 1 .. \\; .... :/;;(_ ... ),2· · ·:""'!-}..::: .:;;:t; 
) · . .: - "" ... ;·: .. :,,;:·:: .;f If.L·~,::.;"~;.:'.:,'..}i:~;.f .. ;i;;:~;~.: '.·;:. ,;: .:5£:.¥.'."":~r.:~ ... :J:~~/~~i~.;:. 
Col. (3). As for Table A.l. col. (4) ... Ib>1s"·'.'r1ot·,;?-!;:·,;,1.:~.~~,·h\: 1";:}~ .. ·;·:~;.;;,;-;::.:.:'.:.'.:: 
certain whether re'! ate d".: cl a:~» s·e,..~'i/s\:1'c h ta·r·::.f:~f· ·: :." "\:id>·.Y>::·: 
.. ''· loss of profit s;?~~~l;;;,~i~:i;~;:~:s:::~ f \§i~~f::~d;;~,j~~·-~Xt, "''.}, , 
··.··.·, ..~.;_:.-.;}i~f.,_:;_~.'.~.'.·.: .. Col. ( 4) • As for Table A .1 •.. but "'to·:···hiake··. c.omp·a"raole :~ ~li'th'}~:\~1:·>. '!; 
·- u .K •. figures commis~i'ion· fras·: t»eerl.'.de{iliqt'e'.d':·,+;;:Hf~~::9~fiZ~~<.:«f 
from· premiums; 8. 0% commi,ssion assuined in · · t:J 
Victoria 1923-33 (n.a. in Year Book'). 
Piemiums have been adjusted by assuming 
60-25-10 per cent pre'mium reserves,· .·i.e •. 
against claims a~tuallypaid in any year 
rttn are set premiums as.fqll;ows: .. .... :.:;.,.:-:::\: ...... 
j . 
' 
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. fhe method, accordingly givris ·.'! Weighted average ; ' ; i 1 · 
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Col. ( 4). 
Col. ( 5) • 
Col.(6). 
Col. (3) • 
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Col. ( 6) • 
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U.K! Ins. Cos., Employers' Liabilit ~~~tness. Companies' own premiu~ r~serves • 
. · er 1947 not shown separate! y. 
~pf~r !able ~.l. 1942 ·and after. includes 
usiness in both N.s.w. and Vic. 
A~ for col. (5) above, "1ess"~.s.~.' arl~ . 
Vic. Government Office business. 
~ource: a~ for. Table A. 1. Before ··19~1 ·:_/;;}-;:'.h:/:::·,,.·. , 
included in nmis.cellaneous". Probable . hut· ·J> .. · :: ' 
not certain, that includes MV .Th'.ird ·p·~rty > .. :··:,:;··: .. (.' · :·::'.;:' , 
' : '.'~:;'.;~~j{,,·,;Jf ;: ' .;/)" ; ' 
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.) · gble A. 4. •\/· .. 
Sources: 
Personal Accident, , Pub.l ic Risk, : Plate.·.·c1as·~ ~ ... ··· .. .-:;:::,~;·' 
Boiler, Live .Stock,'·Burglary, Fidelity ·,·,.>) ·,;:-:- · ,,., 
Guarantee, Elevator, ·Baggage,.· ,Epgineering, 
Loss of Profits, Hail, · Sprinkler\Leakage, ·· 
Household Comprehensive, an.cl ~-1~ :Ath~_r, .... c~~ss~.s ~ ... 
·· < :·: . :· • .:.:,,:;:_r· :L'.t::~:I:~;n;ff::, '..';·:·::/<?:~§tff/~:;::::·•··. · · · 
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Iab~--'k.1 (continued) 
Source: London T_, ~-m-~_§_ surnrnarie s 0f B •t• I • ---. ri~1s~ marine insurance cos. for 
underwriting years. Prems. net of 
Published in AIBR. · 
results of 
completed 
c amn1i s·s ion. · .. ·· 
'.·.,-·.·,' 
' ' Marine bt1siness of Australian companies, 
extracted from 1\IBH .u.nnual Sumrnarfe s 0f . 4::.:'~~r,_::-,><:':.· 
Australasian insurance .. Expenses n0t shown t\~:~i~nt~?:::;::·· ,ass~med to be 15 !)er cent of pi:-emiums. MarJ~'~;);(~{~'.'b 
ous1ness not seoar"Jted in oublished AustralTah;:,d,;,;:'..~:>. 
accounts a ft er i 898. · . ,\U\.;:;},~\it:~ '> 
Victo:-c i an Ye a:r Book; ma r1ne 'J'l.ts ine s s 0L·.311: .. ,<)_,'<~:fr·> ~ · · 
companies in Vict0r"ia. The 1907 and· 1909 su.rpJYs .. e,s .. :. 
(bracketed) ere before ildjustmsnt .of ''remi0ms /';'/> < .i 
for unexoired risks. Otherwise 40 per~cent premiµm , 
re serve a~, ume ~·:'. . . • ; : >·\/N(r: .· ci1w .. ;~0:>Jl~~\X'i, . j , ; 
C:>mme ;re ial iJOiOn Xe cords' London'·' BBfj[Jl tS q') .~V''Y... . . i .•. 
marine btlS fn-es~\v:r it ten 'r.i.t, ~: 6u~J.~ ~~):a. D)~ .. b.r al),S t:·e s .··:\ :~;L··)/.; . • ;; 
and ::inencia~, 1Rqp_·)2•·'n0t:,::avi:Jilable'~·:>:: ... ,··.,:.:·,:._: .... _:·~·.>:·~'~:';,: : ... _.. 
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. ·· \'ouo·JSueC~·o 1 ··- •. ·. 
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Table 1• 8 r .· ' ----..:.~ ,contir.ued) 
Sha re h o.lde:rs, F 1 . 
. . . unc.s def 1ned to incl1.J·d~'·.·· 
Paid u9 caoital 
Gi::nei--~1 r · . "' 
· -:Ci eserves .- ... 
' ' 
: ., 
•' ·,., c[?nt1ngP.ncy reserves '··,;:.~ 
)1 v j d d ' ~ .' ,. ' 
'· · · •en e ou al is :-. t · · · · , . · ." :· · · .. 
Reserves f,..;r . '·'-« 1 ?n reserves " 
Prof1' "· .. d .... oe9rec1ation of inveq·f·~"ents ~, c r I 0 ,.. s .. 3 . . . . : , ... 11 . r:: x c h a n ' ,.
1 
~ · .;:, / c c m,m ·c. t) a l a r1 c :":; s · · "· : " ~ oa 1"' 4 . ' • . ~--· . ' ·~ ""- ' ' 
· · :~--· "'., u_c ·~uat~_pn ··re.s0.rves · · 
ExcludPd 
-·-_-::.___ were: ;_ '.• :\ •. · ·,1 ,_,. '·,,· 
~ r o vi. s i 0 n s for 'Jr~ o a id 
Staff pension f~n~s • f i rial dividends ·~ .. 
,.·' 
· .. ". \ 
.... , 
•,,_ 11 ... ·1 J. • 1 . i 1eore ,~1ca_ or'Jf1t": .'r'< .· •. 
Govt. bonds x·s.F. . ,._.; 
From L:im!:.-.?rton, ;),;,kL.: Securitv.:·?rices and Yields 
lf:.._?_5_:-1955, Sydrn:;y 19:S. · T~ cd.v0s<"";ovt. Bond.~- . 
yield~ 1E75-l·21?3. Includes br:i~h s·r.ort.an<f:1ono 
.i.erm ,,·i
0
ld" ''1' 0 ]..l.:. I- ,.·.· ... ·f · .. ·]:·.:·.· .. · "' •. - r --~ - ~..,. t .t .. ·-'-'s l.?.. en a:rr. as· . or: .. une" . {1875-1899} and December (1.000-·~:!25).>'·:~:, •.· 
. SQ.Y§..f..DJ"'~e nt _~ec'ufj_:t_y yieJ:.ds 1 l9?-6-1951 (same author, 
· unoubl. tshed, nivAs v:ields on 10w;i term 
Government bonds;· )1.ine vield~,~~~d~-A°dditi,.,n,:l 
t ~ -' ·t · ]. O' ? 1 qr t1 "i · ·. · '1 · b 1- · · ' s al-1.s ics. <J. - .. _,).; mnc.e ava1 .. a ... :::' oy court.esy 
of t:he author. >: · · · 
T ~ ·o J e '1 1 O ·"'· ' "·. · 
..:.."-'. ·- .•. . .·. '·.'. 
urce: as for ·;-ables ·1-..9 :'Ind .fl..J_o·~ T\e ·,'d5.st.inct~i an between 
> >1:-lervn:-itino surolus and investmF.nt inc'.)me m11_st ~& ···~': 
.. , nter\)reted ·with caution owing t'.) di.ff.erinci .methods of . 
_:·}.}0c2t:tn0 exnenses and taxation, both as b~tween cornpanies ... 
;-;i.j by t 1ie same companies ove"r. time . 
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Be~ore ~omrnencing the .·· ~ .c'·'· ".· 
t·'.) compile an index· o.r:· c . .st~dy it was found nr.-icr:issa"" ... h-d · · L omoan1es h' h - - ~Y 
. ~-.- . ct. ?!Jerated in Australjia . ~ w ic wer~· _operatinc;' 
c0nta1n1ng adenuate inf t~ since no complete list· ,,...~ + t' , . orma Jon AX1' t d .~~n .. ury ne only com!)lete l·i~". ·: .. 5 e • For the .. 20th 
._,o::lnonweal th Treasury ( . . . ts are held by the ,,. 
ln,t0) . .J...·. f · · · since ]93"') ;~nd th CBC · ( 
· .. •"-~- ' OUl. vn·.ortunatel' 'th'"'- _, e · S ,since 
·: ·v::ilable to the .· 't Y nei_ er 'Jf these we.re made 
i_1se a laroe ~;numbe~r~ferG. It was therefore necessary to 
_. :>OllrCP s but th. . 
. ::;ny case for vears befor . i93ri. ,, lS l/JaS neces~ary in ~b0ut ~qo;_·cards was compi~ed ·'"-· E:renti~ally a; index. of .r~0m the ooening of the f' t~· covering the entire oer1od 
1831. ~s~r· eo~rc~s e-ach .1rs_ .company in Australia' in 
.,,- - - · _,._, ~ . comoany ; f · .1 • • 
-,<-:.; ncluded, as far as possihl~: , ' -n orm~ c10n ccillected 
. ~-: ·".,~.:' •· ·" 
Year established~/'.: 
y '•: ' 
- ear com'l1enced j.ri'' Austrelia' by 
classes of busine . .ss. 
year w0~nd up, ab?6rbed etc. 
dead of r :Lee. · 1· "' Su~sidiaries in Ausfralia, with y~~;s 
o.. purchase. · . . ;v;·:·. 
Tariff or non-ta:riff; and '-/ei:lrS of>.: .. ::..; 
.. , membership 0f Tariff or(;::ini_satjon:~,,:;;.;:::\/'i~ 
1 Representation in ~ustraiia bv br~~c~~, 
or agency : names nf Ch :Lef Agents. ·.• 
. !~'¥, Non insurance affiliat~f~~· .. ,fi.li:z'~·ic ' 
~;. ··i:.t:1:t~~;r::":compiling the· index one of the most difficult oroblems 
· ·-~_.;.<;X:J·s find ins 0ut connections between comoanies. /·>In 
.. ,if;;}:;1f t:icular a large number of "Aust:ralian" companies 
. · .. ·,~'.;;~S::.:r;red out to be fully owned subsidiaries .. P:f·:,overse·as 
{;-"-" ·r ·~;~S::~'.'.i(n9anie s ~ but this was not advertised and/::ff was not ~ .. · .. }:;:r§"sy to. track dovm dates and details of taP)Jov<Jrs. > · 
t :{·'.·::1wever most of the inf•)rmation reouired was r:!vent11aJ.lv 
' . • . • . . • ·. • J 
· .:,/·11md in. the AIBR or by direct enquiry vlith_overseas 
· .. ",·~tc:'.1'l!nanies. · As reoards amalaamations etc. betwaen 
·:::.-.. :._)~ft~'.:~Prseas companie~ lists ?ublished in the .. Post_.}Aa-9.§~i!l~ 
·:it·" --·--~153~/ear Book oroved useful. ·· · · 
·,,,\ ::#;.~~,;~_-;:-·------···' . . . : ~! _...,. :-ir~~t T!le resulting card index is neither complete i~?r 
.... entirely ·ac-curafe. For exam0le, in the 19th ~entury it 
.r: ...... i/:.:1s difficult to discover whether some companies were '>sm·~·oresent"ecl in Australia for underwriting or for mar~ne :::L·oo·:c:·~~~jT0ttlino only. Also it is possible that companies listed 
. :\;·.·. . . '.•:: ~-:~- . . _,. 
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under. It iOSUJ.'onCe ". in VariOtJS direCtf'lrie S may have been 
irf)llc1es 0nly T'at··1er than underwriters ~n their ovvn 
1cco1ints. .A.gain, esp 0 cially :in the 19th Century it is 
1rooable that some small local compan)es have be~n 
'Y'1i L ted al to~e ther. 
DAsnite these deficiencies the index was of c~nsiderablc assistance in the present thesis, and it is 
1,,,,,ed that it may be of use :in further research. The 
~,ill l i.st is not rerr1duced here exce9t for the oerjod 
i ~l-1877. 1877 was the year of commencement of ~he AIRR 
,. t as a result following yeaxs are far better 
,cu~ented than the earlier period. Sum,aries of s0me 
1cr)ccts of the full index will be found in Tables II.15 -
7 T.18. Before nresentin0 the 1831-1877 list principal 
iu:ces are descr~bed. 
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N .s .. 11f.,_.J:Q.?_LQf.U:ce D~cto_£y_, 1934- • 
·Lis~ of ~om~~~ies with fire risks in Sydne 
Metropol1 ~anr,/\;.ea, 1884:19?8. Published y 
.2nnually in N.:,,).w~ §.~t1st1caJ. Reoister. 
-----·----... --..__ -~,.., ... 
~oard of F~r: Comrnis s ioner~~ cr J·T. s. w.' 
fillnua-l_ Heoor·cs 1910- • Gives list<; of 
contributing insurance cos. 0nd firms. 
R~gistrati¢ns under the Companies' Act of 1824, 
1831-J.900. ;,ucr0film in Business Archives 
Collection, Australian Nat.i~mal IJniversity. 
Y._9t~,§__5:_,'"1q _ _p_i:,9_9e ~d.J_Q.9.§. of the Le 9is1 eti VP C')UnC Ll 
of N.S.W., 1832-74. Contains ~roce~din~s and 
re~orts 0f select committees on various Bills 
.concerning insurance C')mpanies and fire brigades. t~ .r; c t.".r: i ..£!.. 
... \, 
~,. 
~' .· .~\·.:. 
:·/~l-: 
:;l,.. i'. Various directories or "AJ.men2cks
0
, pre 18~)8. 
Sand 1 s Melbourne Direc_+~'l!:Y., 1854-82. 
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Lists of c~mpanies licAnsed to.write fir~, 
marine and fidelity gu.ci:r.antee insurance in 
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Victoria.n Government Gazette and P.IBR. 
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c~~ll Fire .. a.nq Melrin,7 __ LLnunceston7 
FM. Absorbed ny Colll.~_rci_a_l _llD_i.2_11 (U.K.) 1898. 
I •·1 l · i. §.Y.cil"l~-¥-J:i~ . .1.D.§-!..._f2_._ /_Sydney] F. Mutual Co~ {~}~·h · :;! I : ~~f ;~~~~t!~nk~~~~ ~~~:..::._t~~~dt~~5. Wou)d\:ic~'0:iff:.:·J , ; :', . '· .. · ! ; .• .. f · .. ; I 
Sg_~J.l.)~U§.t.rali~Jl ... M .. arine and Fire and.Li.fe··:·,f~'.i:i:~::~.'.2~<y···· c. ·:· ., .~ 
7 1 d 1 'd·;:Tr_F\~L -- ·~ ·---r;:;--r-·-··-·-·~----·-·--·-- ~ :..J• e _a 1 §..! rrq • Wound up J.RIJ.G 1,? 1 • . ·.:': -«-:":·: .. ·;,..,,:·>::.":::-:.: ·.. . l 
·. . . . .. ..,::: :.Y.\'.\~'/.;,·/:{'Y,>:::.;::, . . ,i i. ·l SmvtJ1.~ ·Ma t,i_Qe __ :~D .. ?l~r_a 1l~L9..f.J i£~. (_$.ydnei/ .... ;,'.·)/::'· .. ;.:.: .. ?·(/:'..~~">··· < ·1.i. 
M. Run by Sam H. Smyth from 1847 whO, ,<:~c.t,e·9.i::,~·~ .. \agen't 
for a number of Sydney mer chants eng,aged·:·(i'h"'p·~-~.'/f!:te.· ... · 
underwriting. Became the ?vdney_J•1~rJ~n.~--A~_s_~~·.CQQ..~)1n'_'~,--:;· .... ·,· ·'I 
1851 
· . . , . . ..· • ;: : • :I•)i?~!if .\ilt%\:fz~;~· '.> ·• : . ! 
South Australian In~. Co~ l\~ci~'_nd.de7··f:tX>·-,:·<.\bs6i~~)~d ·· ·:.:·"·'. ·~ 
: ' 
Victoria F5. re and Marine /Mel 6611riig,7 .. FM. ' i:.'ame · .•. > · . . : I • \ J 
---~---·-7 --;:·-cr·--~-;-;:;- r s - -c'.') , ·I td. ·:·in 1880. :Jn.'·:::'.'<"\:":.':" . , , 1 : · . ~ Chcinoed L.0 .1c r.J ... 1a n •. ._. _ _,_.:::_ __ ._. ·.: · ·"""· · ·· .... "'',· --. 1 .. , , . · · \ 1 .•,· J ·~-q_, .-. ···1-c---·-·--t-,:;-;--TJ;c·t')ri·.=l'T~.Je.'dnd GP.nerG_ · "·. · · .. f 85 .-:,sc:.,.,c 1 .;itec .'1., ,,.t: · ... •· .... ·~-:...;--·-···--·-···-··-··-·-·---- ...... ··. .. . ... 1 · , • . ..,. '· : ·. ~ ·· T t · t·. 't . ,.. o ;-me (f"'.·-~:Yi-1 is ' di cl,) i.f.~. ;' ;., .. ·.\ <>T·<;: ;,_,. . ,:_ 1
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! .. · ~ 
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-;:-·;- ;---.- ··- __ ...... ---- ·t "'nd r.:i j ncqra nc 0 . :r or th€.:'.->' :~·::":·;J.,:::'c·?J: .:.::._-;'. . ' 1 r, ao l, tv 01pr~n eQ' a,' . ,.. . ,·.. . . . .. .>· ' ··,·' .•· '.>·, ........ • ... , .,.. .......... 'i . i ~; ~~::r~: ~ F~r~ ~n~ Mati_n~- /J1~~::t:~~·,~~i · •;,,:;:'.::~~~~:~,~~10~' '\ · ·: •  ·l ·~~~ r by A~ (r_a lf€:!ifli_ il n:-~~'l'\1 ~ .: •• l;,•cl+~.tr '.~( {Q+{:. '/)f {~rw l . ; q 
1 ,_. e and Marine L:Gee1ong, :li.cJ ... Fiv.. .. :_.!·' ... :·:· .. ··":·,.::·:.· .... ' ! , · · ·· 1 
(?) ~J?-~_..Q.!J.9._r-11;_--,-"--·-j:~fso referro,d. t.0 .. as.'::9,e~~o~a ... ·: .... ··.:>·. 1 '.11. tN~und uo 12<>6\?;. . d ''arine·:·· .... , ...... :,.::,,·, ··:·,, ..... ;.·.... ·. 
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N. S • W • ~:-i:e ·;.. r.~?..!...·-;-i4·~-rm. Absorbed. D'{.QQJ:QIT}_e,~:_c"7-:~J-.,.'..· .. :··.~ .. ·.::·· ~~ ~ ~,__d;~ ~ ~~)31-'ig.E-c2~_L - ' ; .·. · · ·•· · ··•.· · ••·.·. ••· , • < :'~¥0°:J~Wl'.•t . 
---·- r ;.-s, dnPv7 M. successor Jq·::;::.{ 
SvdnPY Marine Ass· .'6!..• -:: .. f · ·--5 ... ~ smvt~1: fi'rst · <.:·>,'<: . 
__ ...,.· ~ -;-- r c nf f, ce. · , :.; ", , · ) 188'~ ·· · .· .. Sryiy_:t;~s_J~L~r 1 ~-,:::·rk~b~{1if~iicJLJi~tiS!.~-. (U~'K • :~ .·. o.i .:., · ... · 
manager. J..bsorb_.d y -- '·:~" .··. i .· ... ·. '-'' .. '·' 
, . • r,.., ISvdnei/ M. ~Aetaalfe .·.· 
; .. 'i:itcalfe 's Marine In~. ~~· J-0, --nd insurance broker 
.. 1~ ' , - cn1po1nc C.\ I ~· ) ip-1 
w a s adv e rt i. s l n 9 a 5 ab-~ s n ~ 1 t. h _, R r i t.:_i s h \ M • z.. .1. ·-· / • 
,. . 1848 '-'bsorbed y __:;;_'-~-----·.. i TJ'.'Offi -· ·' ~ • 
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f\ustralian :Uliant"'e ;;:; _ 
business of Peli.--::..- tJ~1elbr:nrrne 7 FML Too'· 
· "l .uourne F · 'E.I ~ • r over 
on formati0n:--:.=:Esoib-;ct/3=.£.e _and "'1~in_g_ (estd. 1849) 
estd. - 1857) i;i 1870 ~~-tr~las_J.:.~n. (M.:ilb. 
(Melb. estd ]~8· 1) .... , 1 rnd .§.9uthern Llovd's • ('\ ln s9- --- . - . -.J .
. an_g__~incashire (lf v ). 1 ~. ii.bs0rbed by Lnnd'm ·-;;;...;;;;.~..:..- • r.. onq -- . ·~- . 
- ,;- ... 
1-1.ustrali -.:in Ll/'"\vd'" r,-; ,, ~7 
-----;-----: . "' ' L_i\le.to0urnfu' M. Private 
unae rwr1 t J ng ~rrrn!". N'Jt ind up 1897 • 
1 
• 1<S (?) Ac_g_icl~ .... :_tr-J_J_n i urv Ins. -~-·- LNe lb~urnvA. ,, 
Wound up 186 if?)-:· - · --
1 
·r.; 7 (?) Ennita_bk__~~\~~s. C". Ltd. 'A°delaide7 F 
\Nound up 18<.)0. - --~- ---·- Lti.' ':E.I • 
,~..:_'"'(?) l-' .1..• • ' 
• •
1r . , 21..l"n.:;J. f.l2r1'1(l Jnc;. Co. of S0uth .\11st..,..2lia / Z\dela-idV'If.-~fo-un-d· u·p ·1sso.----~- ------
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, r1 FA. , .. \cquired Bendi...,IJ l:ire _In_~ __ C.0_. (estd.?)in 
1879, ..: .. ustralia Felix (Melb. estd. 1878) in 1883 • 
. l\bsorbed by London and Lzncashire (}I.K.) 1894 . 
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i\let:_f'_qpoli tan :/1utual f_ire @el'oo urne7 F. \ 
f\bsorbed by 0)fn __ mercial_ Unj._q_Q. (U_.I<. T J P91J.. 
Mercantile i\1arine and Fi rP "If South Al!s.(ralia , 
ZAdelardij Flvi. -.O:bs8"rb'e-dby Commerc i~-1- Unj9Q_(U .K.) 
1890. 
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k.ixe~:t:P_9._QJ __ ~D-~ Lond0n !_-L·i~·vr-a 1 g· 1-octd a~ L' ---···-·--·~··- .ro00 estcl lP.36 1::' 
--'-' • '" i.vernoo 1 b ' . J • ·--" • ,. • 1847 L · ;--·· -·:-"~-:.:-.:.' ecarne i_:i.:_Yf:.~oo1 and· Lond. · 
, -1Y..dJ2..2.Q.·~ Lond··m (l nrJ (~, l -;- -··Tp-£ ~--- .. __ on_ .in 
Sydney and Melbo- .....:..._ - -~o)e in ·" .,o4 • 
!v\onarch ( L · · u:ne "b:ranche; _ 1853- ·• Absorbed ', 
..---·----·- ondon, :i.n r.ust ] P:J::.> ) • 1 .-,.- 7 Un:itv Fire (L d . ~ :· .. u - 1n 08 , and 
/:· :=--'-.---"-,- on on, 1n P.ust. 1858- ) ; 1 Pf)'? 
.·.osoroed oy ll.q_y_~J_ (U.K.) 1919 • · .. n .. ··• ,, .. , 
.l 
Qy_e._~.1l~ID.s_!.. Co. &1:indon estd. 
Melb. agency 1861-66, branch 
by B.Q.y_al. 1891. · 
18~)77, F. · . 
1866-91. • /\bs6rbed 
' . ' 
bg_nj_?_Q.~~Q.<L,1. ?...Q. c_ ~~biF~ Lto n don e std ~ 186 J] F • iv;e n c ie s Sydn~y, Melb0urne, Hobart, Ade~aide 1862- • 
Melbour.ne branch 1868-•• Absorbed by R_oy_al, 1961 • 
~.;.~J ~~al~nd.Lf.ucl;~an·d,.,;e·s~d. <.1~527·FrX.·' Me~bourn~", · · 
Sydney· and ;\del210.e ::>.s;,nc:e.s·)t??- · .. · ~eft0,;ydney 1869-74. Sydney branch 1874- , r,Ja J.00tP ne._.·nranc:: l8c.P:- • 
' .' . .. ' ' ~ ' . ' !~ 
t-forth B1·itish ·and 'i:.ercar:Ytil_L· 4'ondon 2n~ Edinburg': estCf~,-1so2j'-F: sydiley c.md Ji.dela~.de agenc1.es 1862_:67. 
Reopened·l878- , with bra~ches,in.Sydney and. 
Melbourne. · ·· ' ..... 
. •, 
680~ 
12; :Che~ :and_~~Qcii . .<~_J;L€1..t:.Ln.L~Qq J_i_2:,Ei. .iB.citavi a, f1 std .18 J 
ruL i-.Llb • ana Sydney i'1t_:::c:irits 1861-84, J 889-1901. 
1 .~63 ~~:i_tJ.~~-~-2.-12.Q.t~_J!lari.r.!_<L_ l[tv~rpo()l, es l:d. 18637 
'}· Sydney ~c_;ency 1863- , i.lolbourne 186'1-. - . 
. ~bso:rbed 1Jn1y_p~a_l_.!.!1.r._~n_e_ (U.K.) in 1803, 
.::>outhE]_:;JJ. (Sfdneyf in JR98. !\hs0rbed by ili?.Y..al in 1909. 
1~6.1 COft1'J.e_r_c_t_aJ__l.~Qi_?_n_:·.\s~_f~_·zr00d"..-., nstd. J.P.6J] Fi.'i. 
Sydney agency 1864-67, 1875-1880, hrnrch JRAO-. 
r18J bourne ac:;ency 187?-J 881 /bran.ch 1881-. · 
.\bsorbed Sy:dnev Fire (18EO), !\.S.W. llurine (J881). 
0_0..l.Q.ni<~L-2.L)!~e:\~z =~e_a_:~~n.d _ ( 189Ir,-§.{i:a)~t.s~ ~Fj._i:_e_ (Sin0nr111re-
189d), !1ietroool i tan l\1Jtual (1~\elb. - lRo;i), 
C0_r~.~la)l (i::a'lmceston:--fff98). l.11 these v1ere operating 
in :-.. ust.ralia. 
l'.6ll. Un_i.'-:_e_~:_s_a).J.i21:tn_~ [London, estd. le6Q] f,i. Sydney, 
lv'telo01JJ."ne, f\delaid8. W0b'1rt ugencies lf'64-1B93. 
nbsorbed bv British and =orei0n lb93 • 
. --·- ... ----·-·-"""""• ----
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Er.3..udulen.t.._~- .. -5.e.rni.-::.f--...r:.a.Ltdu.l.e nt Comoa nie s. 
. ' ' . - ' . ' ··-... ---.. --- ... ··-· .... _ .. _~_ ........ _ 
4. 
Th~"se .. are not :igidly define.d~ They are selected 
nn the oasis of. articles and accounts in financial· 
jriurnals; ·principally· the AIRR. The followino were· 
c0nsidered· to be orima facie· evidence of "semi-fraudulenten 
,:1 t 1 east: ··-- --··---·-- c~ , · L:·,. r-: , !'~ 
;Trading or paying dividends with t§.r:10,ibie 
assets less than liabilities. 
Com!Julsary.liquidation. 
Criminal oroceedinas aoainst officers or 
· directo~s. J ~ 
,,• 
1Q?4 
10':4 
1?24 
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S?u_j:he_~ S!_~:r:. _F_:\.f~-'-~~scident <lrid General Ins.Co.Ltd. 0\lel~ourr; ! e 5-l-,rl. 1 Q'Jv FG-:-· Very hish·-irProm6Tfon ~ - . 
and. r l D1:a c 1on account 11 f r0m first year. Fire 
b11c;iress b0u...,ht by§ .. ~. (U.JC) in 1931. 
~J..?.n) .:J..l E..t..<2.YJ_ci~n_ t-;, Li}_g__?.._IJ.9 Ger.e_;~.L ]115_. __ ~_o.!b tcl_. 
L,.vydney, '3std. 192;1. C0111menced Tire in l.<?25. 
In O.ct: 192? paid up ca~;j t2J £41, 511, 
estanlJshmPnt Rxpenses £38,d64. Liquirt:ted 1927(?). 
f_~j-~ra]._~J L_cJ).ncL.E~~..::c;_._,g_o". __ Lj:_q., LS;rclne y, e c; td. ]. ?2§] 
HJAL. J\c,.11i -rr.:1d by .. 11c;+-r.~l i ::in t:9rle,...Jl Lif~ arid 0.e.n.~.t-~..l in J 9~9; both 1 5 C!ufda"fe·d· -i-9-:'f9.- -·csn- ·a·c-coL1nts 
and c'">rnruls0ry liquid:.iti-:in see AI~Pl J9~9 p.111-7, 
19311. p. CS6~. 1\lembn r I'-'. S. W. FVA 1927-30, Vic. FUA 
1928-30. 
C0m_,tn.un:ijY.__Ge!Jf.t'ci.J. A~-~9· Ltd!. {_Sydney, estd. 19227 
Princip2lly ~.Comp., also 8~. Compulsory 
liquidation 1930 (AIBR 1931 p.645). n.s.w. 1N.C0mp. Jicer.s~ c~ncelJed in May 19~30 af..ig__~ liqnidation order 
made (See 1£E..~Jl_<;_]Jl'{.G_s_t.rn_e_ri_t __ Q.~~ s~i l 930, 1931) . 
Prooerl~y Ins. Co_Jt.!.d. ffielb')UJ'nG, estd. J.Q2§/' F. 
i·\ember r .S.·U. and Vic. FUA' s 1928-30. Fraudulent 9~omotion: prom0tot convic~ed 1930 (.\I8R 1931 ?.995). 
Leo al and Co'1irnerEJ2..l _Ins .. ~-C!..?_!...J:._t_q •• {.5ydney, e std. 
1929{?)7-:FA.-C'JmDUlsary liquidation 1929 
( .'.IBq l 92q p .1010) • 
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'APPENDIX c. INSURANCE TERMS ~;/i~':',',,\i[; The list given below is inteilded to assist 
" 
.y : .. :{.'r.eaders who may be. unfamiliar with technical 
· _.,:~nsurance terms. The· defin'itions are impressionistic 
::'.:::·only; 'J or<·more precise definitions and further 
........ /:::,::~discussion· other books should be consui ted e.g.·. . . 
}.'· •<·.:<$tone and Cox: Accident 1 Fire. and Mard.ne Insurance .. 
;·.,· .. ··ilYYear Boo~E, (London annually) ,C. E. Golding: The Law and 
,,),\.;Practice of Reinsurance (London 1948), s. J. Lengyel: 
::'L/i:}:Insurance Comoanies' Accounts, (London 1947) ~ . 
. ~?~?:/· 
. broker· 
..................... _. 
to cede 
claims 
-incurred 
An intermediary between insurer and . 
insured. May or may not possess 
agency powers from the insurer. Paid 
by commission from the insurer. 
~:.1:> 
To transfer the risk or pay premiums 
in ~ reinsurance contract. 
.. •' ' .: ,.._ , (. /''{ 
. : . . ~· . '
-~···--~-· .. G 8'5 
't : 
: u l 
·1. ' 
1 .. ;L 
·• ( ~ . 
•_.', 
earned~. · .· 
gremiums 
·: 1',: •··. 
excess of loss 
exchange 
commission 
facultative 
--reinsurance 
line 
local 
reinsurance 
quota share 
· rate 
~ 
()··86~ 
Pie~~ums.re~e~ved again~t which.the 
c aims 11ab:lity has expired •. One half 
of ~he premiums paid on a 12. months 
~olicy .on 30 June (;ire ttearned" on· 
1 December. .. . :·· . 
A 7einsurance contract Un::r.whic~ the 
re1nsure~ agrees td·pay ~laims arising 
from a single· occurrence in excess of 
~· named sum. 
Commissi~n paid_ by a reinsuring company 
to ~ ceding company. Usually expressed 
as a percentage of the premiums ceded. 
As opposed to ••treaty". reinsurance, 
each reinsurance contract is 
separately arranged, usually by 
personal contact. ' 
A particular class. of rnsurance, Also 
used.to refer to a company's retention. 
Reinsurance with companies in the 
viciriity. May be facultafive or treaty. 
Claims incurred but not paid du.~ing 
an a~counting period •. 
Also known 'as ''~nearned premiums 
reserve" (or provision) or "provision 
for unexpired risks'•. An account· .. 
related to oremiums received during 
~a period against which liabilities 
have not expired. .. .. , 
A form of treaty re'in.sur anc~<·tin<l~f 
which' the reinsurer.agr:e? to bear ifi~ed perceritagesc of original losses. 
The "price" of insUranCe, usu~ily ,; '· ·· 
expressed as a sum per £100 of cover 
a. 5/- "rate'' means that 5/-~;~~ium must be paid for every £100 
of cover granted. 
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,·i 
u : ,, 
reciprocity 
reinsurance 
retention .. ,, 
risk 
stop· ·loss 
treaty_ · ... 
surplus 
treaty 
.JI;'•> . treaty 
t.~;~, .. 
•-· t:r;~}'•f  £.·· 
~· ,.· 
l:!:'-1.,;·: ... 
,•· .· 
·\·. · ~:t;}~~U:;,.;::·r·:·.··"·'· 
.. - .· 
Re~nsurance. received in exc:hange for 
reinsurance ceded or "given 1of f". · 
I~surance. of ··i~suranc~ ii.abilities 
with other insurers. · 
The.part of the total liability 
ret?ined for its own·account by a 
ceding company i.e. not reinsured. 
The prop~r~y, liability etc. insured. 
J l I 
"" ' :J; ) { 
,r I i 
A form of trea~y rei~surance under r I J 
which the reinsure:t agrees to pay :i •. I { 
claims. of the ceding company in excess ·~ i j 
of a certain. percentage of its.. :;( :·I { 
premiums.· ··• . · .· . . . . ., r' f 
A t~at~ r~insurance unde!L' which only ;[ : · I ·~ the portion of the original risk . ·i. :~ i I 
beyond the ceding company's retention ·d ·.·.,. 1 
is ceded. ·rhe re insurer.:: then · ·· l 
becomes liable for a proportionate · r •. l 
share ·oft he whole risk. Several . \ ·.·· .\:<·\.:I 
surplus treaties may be arranged, . <,,. · ··: .... ·, 
but the secohd, ·third etc! surplus ... . : ". 
treaties do not operate until the· ·''2 
shares of preceding treaties have, · .. ~een ... 
exhauste 1~. • .. ·. ' '. · · ·.,· ~:\:.V:::.':(''.°:~,~i\::·;~;.;~;t?:'.·t~;;!1ig~::. ·. · -. , 
A form of reinsurance agreemenf .. ·which · ·.· ..... · 
holds over all designated risks.for.a',, . ·· 
fixed period. Two impo7tant .. !eat~~.es,· .. ·., .. ,li 
in contrast. to f acult~tive ~eins.ur.ance ', .· :· ·. Jf ,.,., .. ,. f 
are that re insurance is .. ob.l.J.gato,i:y :. . " . . \' µ '.}~!'~\·. 
on both ·sides, arid that.·.~~e ' . ..f.ein.~.U.::S .. ~.~~-7.,, . : J ,ilt ::.~~\~;: ! 
operates simul taneousl Y .I/Vi th )th7 .:·: .. ·,:;:.::·;tT·> ... ' .. "· · .. l:;·. ·;\\\··:'.' 
ssumption of the ori9in~l 11.~~~! i,tX,,,;' .. ;;;+ Ji' •••.l .. '..~.!.1_!.,i .. :: 
:y p:::~.~e:~:g~::j~::y 1'r~~~t~,~~~:·~.~I!~~.~)1:;'~t··1tt·. -~r~· 
own behalf, or on behalf of o.ther ·/i;:?!!:t'.\~ ·'</:: ~ :•:··~H:1 ·: :\ 
an insurance. company7 .. f9F .... ··.:r·.,- :. :'/:>-· .J l :,; . · ~~ ~~~n~n~~re d ••...... ( :r sf t,J.i:;:i·';'.·§~.'.!~':1.'..'.:1 ..l.~.:~.~~~'?; <,:~''.l ' .•... _ ... _.· 
. " .. :~:·:·"·~- : :\ 
" . ':~ :1) 
· '.:.(,\;.;:<·. · l I 
. . . i .: l 
-·:· ···· .. , ::r··\ 
l ·i ' t 1. :i . 
,- .. 
_ .. ;..CB. 
to underwrite 
underwriting 
(marsin · 
(2rofit 
(surplus 
unexpired risks 
i· 
To assume liabilities as above; 
.also usually carries the connotation 
of assessing and selecting risks 
and.estimating appropriate premiums. 
The surplus over earned premiums '"·· 
after deduction of claims, . . . . 
commission, expenses and tax~s 6th~i 
than income taxes. · ·· · 
'',, .. ( 
·'. ...... ·.: 
' • ' ! ~ 
reserve see uPremium reserve". (2rovision) 
written 
pre mi Urns 
'. '""' 
Premiums actually re ceive.d . during 
' d . ti in contrast to 'earne pr~m_1~~S.:• 
.. ···· .... ···.-, .. 
. ' o:~0l*i~f,il);i,!~f ;~?~t> •.. 
. :: .·.·· 
. . ( :.J:<~~~f i~~··-~~~[,;~. . .. 
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In the follo1.v~ne list, manusc:ript sources a:re referPed 
_, 11nc1e:r t.he organisations b~r which they are held. In the 
· ;C:es of bot.h con;panies anrl tar·iff associations access was 
r:
4 
ricted in vaPying a.egrees. lftost comnanies v1ere 
· luctant t~o m~ke available material Pelatine t.o the i1e1,iod 
'J er·: 1910. Wi. th one exce°!")ti on BPi ti sh companies were also 
·v1illinp to give t.he v11,i't.er access to detailed 19th centur~r 
;_ n"nciP-1 1'1ecords. Access to tariff riecords vms complete 
·nti 1 1911. but ,.thereafteri restricted. 'Phe most im11ortant 
, J1i"'~eS \'fhfch it WUS not possible to l1Se fop this reason \"Jere 
l'~e Uinutes of the various Council o.nd State Associ9fion 
")t1H1i 1·tees, and of Council and Associntion annual meetings. 
Holdings of insurance literaturie by t111stpaliRn public 
.; 'yr>'"' Pies :=u•e small, incomplete nnd wideJ.y }:;cntt.e.red. 'rhe 
., •ious Insurance Ins1·itut.e lihyanries '1re nloo quite 
~ n· .deonSl te except with res-pee t t.o more narPovlly technical 
·m:Jjects. Wher•e a publication, is not av'1ilnble in 
'1i.3""r'1li9.n librElries this has been indic·-1ted, but rn-1ny other's 
. ..,.., .. ~ nut consulted at nll for this reason. 
I. BOOKS /! lrn !1111i1I<;LE§ 
----
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cif• ff' I . , 
t .e -e~, r~ing. 1..~.011-9.§ . .J!nd EconJmi.c "Pheorv. 
R1cho.iia. D. Ir·l"1in Inc., Illinois :f~5b.~ 
·~nynes; Harold E. Er.inciples of BPitish Insur::mce. 
Pi tmnn, London 1953. · --
, }~·1ynes? Harold E. A Histo~of °Bl"itish Insupance. 
Pl.tm=tn, revised edn., LoncfOt11950. 
qeede, A.H. Ad~a_cy of v/01"'~£m~ns Comnensr ti on. ' Harvard 
Uni ver si t;y Press 1947. - '-~ 
Sie~el, Sidney. 
Sciences. 
Nq12uaJ>ametric Statistics fox• the Behn_vtoPf!.~ 
1.1cGraw Hill, New Yo.Pk 1956;--
Si 1i t}1 , James (Edi tor). C~c- 10}2'2._~rli~ef_Vic to~tJ ... ~, J.1 elbour ne 
1905, 3 vols. Article 0n InRu~nnce. 
:a lJ • Ar t:hUt"' E. Ponula t• Pallncies vii l h Rer1:Lr'd tu Pi.r :-
. Inslu1s.nce. Fami1hlef i3uhlished in !,feJ btJur.ne in 1911. 
Copy in AustJ~alian Tro.fionnl Lib1><1r:,r, c·:.nberra. -
Aus trali '111 InsuPance. Prnnphls t l)Ublir:.hed 
in MelbouPne~- i923:--·-cl)1)y. in !.fitchell Librar:r, S:rdne~7. 
Via 11 w~s rhe Aus tr•a lian wnnn;ieP ;JJ' the Li ve~.l:Q(Jl, 
London and Gl0be. Both nam~hlets are in defence of 
Tari fi' i nHu1·nnce c\,rnrpnni eo. 
· ;;1 eclrn•i ~ht, E. IJ. Own eP nhi n a ncl _'2.Q1J.!~Q.1.._q:( _~_12.c~ t_raJ):.~1:2..­
Com1)a.ni. ~ Sydne,v, T1nw Boot Co. 1957. 
/11itnev, Simon H. Anti~f- PQ.lic~es_!__._~]1Je-:t_c:.an E.r;_ePis!;ce 
i;_rj'lwentY. Indl!? __ tI•ies.
1 
1Ter1 Yo1"'kt, rriwent1eth Cen•l.11''/ t'Und, 
1958. 2 vols. Ch. 21 'Insupance . 
... ; 11 ·...., "' "' 11'Y'ILhur> Jp Price Discr•imt_n:~'ion in P1:~-~;y I~- l ._rn,.) o l...10 JiJ. r l o ------;---. t .c> r"• • OC L p OQ,... 
"·.,. · b' li' i..,, r·1.-.uri""11ce Fn1veP~l v 0.1. ,.1nt1 ..... ~01:1 r,~,,.-,, 'tn(l .t1\§__L ',v -'.....:--· •• • ... • , 
1959. 
l 
·: i J s on LS i ri Arin 0 1.9:.Z a d I L--
2 vols. Oxf'Ol.'d Uc n J~VJ! J- HJ ITQ..PkD1~n1-J' Cornnensa ti on 
n1ve.r s1 '•Y Pl'ess' 1941. --- ·-·- - --
P J. ' c:. -,l. ·1 e an., C 1 t A · 
I 
' 
~ ~--,7--£~_t __ _g_ asua ,u __ '}2r~~s and Ave.•ss.~l:l. ... l\lfPcd 
i.1. Best Cl.1., Neri ~orlc. Annually since 1939. j:fot in 
Aust~alinn libnsr~es exce't 19~0 at Australian National 
Unive:.1 ~~iJ-~, IJib11 at"Y· , , ,, 
' ,, 
:'10 ir_}2l_~~ .. Port.nipht.l~r since 1896, 1mblished in TJondon. Not 
in AuBtr11.lj_~n 1ib~ai•ies, excent. /;ust:•alicm Hati0n2l 
Li hrary, 192lt i,o date. Annual nmraine insuPA.nce numbe.r• 
consulted. 
' 
' 
I 
::Y~ . .J..D?_~_ra_nce BuyeP. Jotu•nal of ,the /nm tl'alian Societ~, uf' 
Insuraance Buye·•s. 1.fonV·1ly, 'sert. 1958-. 
) "' r l<: ~ 
·rf!S_\l:rqnr,': Di1~ec toJ"Y and Ye~ Bo0Ji_(R9.:s 1· 1.1anazi ne JilJn.qna~-!.. 
Buckley Press, London, lBL~O-. rTo complet.e set in 
Ausirali':ln llbr1a11ieF: buL AustrAlian Uutur;.l Provident 
Society, Sydney, hns 1909 to ~a~e. ReferPed to in text 
qs "Post !.1ago.zine Ye''.." Boole". 
Tn;,urance News and Views. Quarterly 1948-. Published b~r 
·--- the Public Relnti.ons ·Dep~. ~ nonncils of Fire Accir~ent. 
31.1d Hap in e Und.ePwri te1"s of the Comm011rreri.J th. 
, I ' 
71v-·~1·.,~11""e yf'Cj"1 Book of /nIStl1 tllia nnd New zeqland. l:'.VT.CheshirP, 
... · ·- .... 
1 ~ \,.; "-'"'· · -1-91-;_·1-. - C omple J-t, A set not in 
, - - - --fle-fb-6urne.---.:4nnually, • -
Australian libraPies. 
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::__ 0_11s ~n's Inv f;.,fJ tmen t Din est.!.. Sydney; mon i·h l~r, 192 - • 
,~J~1P_nal o:' the Incor-12.Qf..ated.Aus b•alasian Inmir•ance Ins ti tu'"e. 
1919-. Collections of technical nanePs and add1 .. esses -· 
delivered to Insurance Ins ti ~u tes: -
tTJt]Pnal o~ InsuPRnce. Quartei-•ly, 19.33-. Published b~' .4m~r1cs.n Associatton of Universi tv ?eachers of 
Insurance, SoP .... '1e.!:•n Hethodist Uni~·e:rsitv. Dallas. 
'T'1 U ~ A ", . exc. s, • ....., • • 
I 
the 
See 11 Insurr-rnce DL~ector>y and Year 
:'" ,"'J.Ji tml. ,Journal of /n1s traJ ia n Insll!'ance Staff's-Pede.ration. 
-- --1on thly, 194 7-. 
n'.;r r{eview. Published in London f'ortni 0 htly, 1869-. ?Tot in 
------Aush"nli'1n lihrRries except 1877..:1932, Stqte Lib1 .. nPy 
0f Vie! top io. 
·"0--:•1 Book of .£\ust._paltn. Ye2t• Book of hustralia 'Publishin~ 
-.:.--c-o'-:-;-sydney. 1852.:1917. Contnins re}'or•ts on insu.i.,nµce 
ac ti vi ti es for each ;rear after 1884, by States. · ~ 
III G?!-'T ... CIP IJ PUBLICA rrr OTTS . -
'• • Q rrn r TIA COl.1~ :OIHVE.AI/PH f., • ., .1:"1.;..J ' 
P , · 1-:... "'H ""el•_ a t 0,s. 1000-. C m-:rrn on v,rea 11· h _..?r .Lio.men tt.!.:.........·....:.u=..;;...;....-''- _, .... _____ _ 
p· ~ullel-~n Canberra, annually~ 1930-• 
• ' l l1 P:::...11.£§ D . _!:.:!:..,_,_ 
C nl .... si-neP Anl~ual 'Renort.s, 191.;G-. Insupr,nce _,onn .:i v ).:..-;---- ... 
(J1ife insure.nee only • 
P"' t of' t:·r- e Bo&.!."d of Inquiry Appointed t.o Inquire ~.-,nor - · 1 t. cw1 '"'1 
- - ~ nnd CRc:h Ordr->n Svs .ems. - L.l • into Hire Plll"C~~-_;::_,-'-"--..::-.;..-f ~- ~ "' 
Pt:trJ. Papers 1940-43· lfol . .L..!.. • , " 
0 ., Uo o 
o• 
' 
" j I 
I 
, 
"' I 
~ 
I 
\ 
't r 
Reser•ve Bank of Austra~i 
monthly, 1937-. J. a, Stafistical Bulletins, 
Hoyal Commi.ss i'lli.....Q..'Q_ Insui·a nee 1908 
Connnonwealth PaPliamentai .. P _ .. · Progress Renort. 
Reuor t, 191 o Vol ,II. , , Y ape:rs 1909 Vol. iI: .. 
rtoY.~1 Commission 1.:m Hatio 1 I • ... .i. Heuort 1925-Pni .i. .. re _nsuianc~, 11rs•_, Pro~ress 
voi.rr: . . ... nt.cu n C\'.'lt.h. ParL Papers 1925, 
Yesr Ji.q_ok of .i.he f!ommonwealt.'n -,.f' 1~ust1-ia1· -Ann118 1J·!J. 1901-. --------· _v · 1 !,. _ __lQ. ~ • 
' 
"3oP..Pd of FiPe Comn11· ns1· oner~ ,. TT C! ,, A ~ o o.... .' • i). ,if. , ti nnua 1 R enor>t s. 
1910-. PP1·ntJea"' i·n JJ.8.1,·1• p 1· ~=~· .... _-..;.;;.. ~ - v ar iamentary P8~ers. 
novernment Insu!'ance Office o:t~ Hew South "l~les, 
}111nt111 l R el)Ol' ts. 1927-. Pr•i n ted in N. S. W. Pnr liarnentar y 
Papers. 
I §_~~ tts ti cal Reriis ter, S~rdney, annually 1860-. 
r/orakers Compensation Conr:1ission of New South Wales, 
Annual ~euortfli 1926 (-!Io.1)-. 
~u~:EI :SI.:AND 
?.. H. Fields- and B. Kehoe : Re~1opt on Hir•e Purchase. (rro the Queensland Cabinet, 1958).- ~ld. Parl. PapePs 
1958-59. Vol. VII. . 
Insurance Commissioneii, Annuql _R.eP._or ts, 1960-. 
Print.ed in Qld. Parl. Paners. Previously included in 
Annual RepoP ts of '"he State Government Insurance Office~ 
f\ 
) 
State Government Insur•ance Office. f'jueensland. Annual 
Renorts, 1917-· Prin"ed in Queensland PaPli~menta11y 
Papers. ' 
0 ! 
Ye-i1" Book. Brisbane. annually. 1940-. 0 
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Superintendent of Metronolitan Fire Brigade Board, 
Annual Heport§, 1899 (1~0.1)-1909. ", 
1
.Vest: Australian Fire Brieades Bonrd, Annurtl 'Re.:Qo:rts 1910-. 
1 ! C"'T<:D KINGDOM 
Board of Trade. Assurance Companies Acts 1909-1946 . 
. S~naries of S tt:i ~ement13 of' A ssu~ance Business denosi ~ed 
with the Board of 'T1r::=td.e dupinn t.he venr•s ended -
-> " 3ls t. December ... ( 191-~9-1957) and iJnd er• i·h e Insurance 
Companies Act 1958,.~:(1958 t"o date). 'Refer•red to in 
:·ext as 11Board of· rrrade Returns". , - - ; 
Boarid of Trade. Commi tt.ee on Co!!!Qulso11y Insul'ance. 
Hi nu tes of Evtdence tRken befope the Deparo tmental 
Committee a9pointed by the Board of 'T1rRde. London 1937. 
l·!i nu tes of Ev id enc e. Cq~qJ~TI.YM~aw Commi tt:ee, ~o. 
TrI~I"ED smATES .. 
.,. s s t ~he Insti11ance Indus tr;}'.'.. HeaPlngs ~efor. ~ the l1 •• ena;e. .. - c ... 
7 Subcommittee 6n Anf"itrust and Monopoly oI' the omm1,,.ee 
o:.."' the c.Tudiciary, U.S. Senate. Papts 1-9. 1958 and 1959. 
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IV. TARIFF ..A§.§.OCLl\ TION rtECORDS 
-
Council of Fire and Accident T[nder•writers, I1!elbourne 
Circular Lette1,s, 1909-41-
Mi nu tes, Annual General M~·etings, 1909-11. 
C?nstitution and Rules of the Council of 
Fire U nderv1riters Associations of Australia 
and T~smaniR 1 dated 14th April 1899. (Proposed C ounc11 scheme not adopted). 
Minutes of Proceedings of ••. Conference of 
Chief Representatives 29th Oct. 1906 to 
1st. Nov. 1906. 
Minutes of Proceedings of Meetings of Controlling 
Managers, Melbourne, Dec. 1906. 
Minutes of Proceedings of •••• Confer•ences of 
Chief Representatives, 21st. Jan. 1907, 24th Jan. 
1907, 26th Jan. 1907, 4th Feb. 1907, 21st. March 
1907, 23rd. March 1907. 
Minutes of Proceedings of ·~· Conference of 
Chief Representatives •••. held in Sydney, 
8th Oct. 1907 to 11 Oct. 1907. 
Minutes ••• of Conference of Controlling Officers •.• 
to consider the final revis~on of the Draft 
u niform .4ccident Agreements, 25th. J~n. to 30th Jan. 
1909 (Melbourne). 
Minutes.of Conferences of Chief Re9resentatives 
of Fire and Accident Companies, Sydney, 
3rd. Aug. iqo9 to 1st. Sept. 1909, Melbourne 
20 th. s ept. to 29th Sept. 1909. 
~,,,,i; t• of Vict.oria, F~i~e and Accident Underwriters' Ai=;soqia i0n 
,_ 
-;relbourne 
F. e 0 r.eiices Committee of Victoria)' Memorandum a~~ Arti~les of r"-ssoci.ation. (?1891 .. 
,, ·t Association of Victoria: Fir~ UnC1erwr1~;r~iation nnd Discount, Brokerage 
Articles ofAAs...,ornent (Both dated 1st .. March 1897). 
and Agency gree • 
I 
I 
< I I~ ' Ii
: 1 
I 
'l 
l' 
I 
! I 
I 
,.'-.. I ~ 
I < 
I 
and 
Accident . 699 ~ n r 
Articles UofndAel"Wri ~ers Association . of Vic tor) a . t¥···1 ci 
· ssoc1at·· · ·' .:i 
and Agency Agreementl\J~ and·D1scount Br?kerage .. \1 
1st. Dec. igo5• • an. 190 2· as revised :·;~f 
" . ~ ~l- I 
Copies of Early Ta;iffs :· .. ~·I 
( 1) Melbol~ne and .. Sublirbs _ · {1! 
.. ij .. 
1.r1 dated ie67 
1874 
.15.th. Aug •. 1875 
·3rd •. Dec.· 1875 (incl. G eeJ.ong) 
!st.· Sept. 1876 (incl. Geelone} 
29th. Sept. 1879 (incl. Ballarat 
·. and Sandhurst). . ·~ ... 
27th June 1881 - Ivielbou1"ne and 
(2) 
suburbs only · ·: 
YJ.cto~ian Country Districts 
. . . . 
dated 9th •. Mar•ch 1877 
ls t. Feb. 1878 
17th. July1878 
29th. Sept. 1879 
. ( .. ,· 
Mt nu tes of Meetings of Subcommittee~·, Uni t.ed ... . 
Insurance Companies' Fire Brigade Association·.: 
1st .. S ept. 1870 to 2nd. Dec~ 1891. · Referr·ed' .. 
to in .text as 'Vic. F.B~A.:· Minute Book' •. · . < 
Various Victorian Tariff Bo~~s; 1~9'7. to;. d~:.t:.~> 
These contain coriies of, and amenamerffs. to, agree~ . 
men ts inc·luding:· ·· ·: ·""·· ... :: · .:·· .. 
Articles of Association of the Council of'". 
Fire and Accident Underwriters.. ~~/;:;;Ji4f:.: . 
Articles. of Association of ;·the Victorian Fh•e .... · :j/"· ·:· .. · 
and. A cc'ident Und.ervrri ters A ssocia ti on . · ,;:!ft.~i'.N~~(·'·~.· ·:.,::::.·: .. :::;.: 
Discount, Brokerage and Agency Agreement .>·''":;r:,;~;:L~~.: .. \ .. :,:;~·,i~"<:· 
AC gul. red C onma ni es A 12r eemen t · '"·· <r ~;~:.'1:;;~,;i~~'.tgWr:fi··" •i..J 0 : .. . ;: •. ;.~: .... ,.:!';~.;·· ~::-~·."· 
Rules for the Conduct of Fire and Acci.~ent,.~:~};i;-l,~i::<?P"'' .,., ..... 
B usiness ·:··:· · l'"";'1'·F .:·.· 
Various Schedules of Tariff Rates ·:·,'.'-;;;:1f:~:~1;~t.if;:, 
Lis ts ·of Member Companies ··~'·' -.~·l'.·~;:~;{""·: ......... . 
. . ' \,· :';~·~.'.; ~. ::?::~;~~~i-:.' ~<·~~i~·;:.L,, .. 
Accident Underwriters Association, Syane~"·' :·· ·. · · ..... 
.:,:·::;.;~:~; ·,: 
Early.N.S.W. Tarif.~s. · .... ·, 
29th. Jan. , 1891 - - ·. Mftmed r ~s.Ks 
' - . \ ~' 
~' .. 
··:·; <::·' .. ··~:-~~:?~~~:ft~:· .. ':~~-~;~~·: 
within N. S"~·vi. · 
Cont ••• 
H! 
¥i 
·~1 -~! 
J1' 
.· . ;,: I / ~1 f 
:~I 
'·•. ,,f 
:;· :i!';·:··· 
!~ IC '. 
· .. :·r. 
. ...... ,\ 
'· '! 
··;I 
l 
l 
l I a 
v 
15th Sept. 1891 
17th.· Dec. 1891 
3ls t~ ·Dec .• ·1891 
1st. 
. -1st. 
1st. 
1st. 
1st. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Oct. 
Apl. 
Oc.t. 
1892 
1892 
1897 
1900. 
1902 
- Newcastle Fire tariff 
·- Goulbourne fire tariff 
- West and East Maitland 
fire tariff 
- Parramatta fire tariff 
Newcastle fire .tariff, amended 
l~. S • ~{. fire tar~ ff 1 No. ll . ~.s.w. fire tariff No. 2 
N.s.w. fire tariff No. 3 
' > 
<::;\:({;:'.:\;·': .. ~11L.Vic torian Tariffs . 
Sept. 1891 1Fire Rates in Melbourne' 1, ;.i 
(I"0ose-leaf 1 covering 1891- ~'. 1 94) .. ·, ··.:,;':< ·.,:· . .. ·· · ::: I 
- Victorian Fir··e Tariff '.: l 
- Accident U nderwri ters Assoc- '?,I 
Jan. 18.98 
1st. Dec. 1909 
ia ti on of Victoria :- A.rtic~~s:::·:: . ·;!.:····· .. ,:1_~'., ... -.·.'::,:_::;:'·;::· •. ·.-'. ••.  •. ·.::'._,_\··· of Association and ~Qre.~.men"s,+ .. ,,::) .. ~:~~YA~;~~~9o~u~aii~~ i:~i~~s . .. ;"·:'~~:~;;jit;?t1~C •·· !J. · 
1907 - Fire tariff as arnena ea ;\:t)/~~:,- .. · · :: 1 . 
1st. April 1912 - Fi1"'e tariff coprected ln· 
to 30th June 1916 .. · · n: 
Ear 1 y Sou th A uS trS. ii an ~~idf ffJ . }\;Xf'fki~~\'.~J1Ji.i~~;f !>. . 'i I 
July' ·1B94 · · :·\:.~.".fi1i.re Und.eP\'triJer~ .. f,ss·~c~.~t1on ;, / 
. , .. \'.:of So11th. Aus t.ral1a B1.1JE: .. , 
.. . :,;·::Book" ~'~ .. v::i.ri1)US agreements, 
A pril 1903. ·· 'A~\~fu:~:~B~~~,Jc~~tralian. fir,e 
., .~ .. .... t(~r i ·"· . , . . . 
April 1903 . :·:~. south .l\ustrnlian f1r.e,, 
·,.:, .':·-·•' 5"""~' " ..... "; . t d t .... :,:;:;}~Si:':(tariff cor..rec e .. ,O .. :;,, :; .. :·, 
. . . . .·.·•·• (i;'· 17~~;;.~;~;,.:··· 191.~i'~~,;. 'r~?i~j:;s.; 
Earlv queensland Tariffs_,, . . ·~;::·:, _,; ... ·:x .> ·~:; .. ~:,:- · LNov~ 1898 -Fire tariff, inc:lud1ng _ ... 
ls t. . minutes of Conference of 
1st. Feb. 1902 
ls t. Feb. 1902 
17th Feb. 1902 
28th Mar ch 1906 
ls t. Feb. · 1911 
1st. Nov. 1911 
., · Chief Representatives 
~ Fire tariff . . 
_ Fire tariff corrected to 
26th Oct. 1911 . 
- Text of Agreements - ~cc1dent 
Underwriters> Associa t10n of 
Queensland 
- Accident Underwriters As~oc­
ia tion Agreement, as revised 
Fire tariff ("No. l") 
·ff ( '1"""0 2") 
_Fire tar1 -~ • 
I' ~. [ , 
... 
... 
'· 
;·, 
/'· . 
! 
'Q, . 
Various N.s~w., Tariff Book§. 1898 t 
·As. f.or Victoria .. _ o date 
. !_1ir~. nnd Accid_ent Underwriters' A· i t" of 
_:\ust.l'alia, Perth - ssoq a ,ion Western.· 
~il'e Und.e.t'wrai ters A ss.ocia.ti.on of Wes.tern 
Australia, A nnual Renorts 1900 (.Ho 1). 
to 19G6c ,_ • · 
.. ·-;_1' ~omini ttee, Fire UndeI•wri ters t\ssocta tL:m of ·· 
W.A:, Minutes of Meetings, Get. 1898 to 
30 tn. S ep t. 1907 · " 
Minutes of Conferences of Martne Underwriters 
20 - .22 Jrine 1883, Melbourne 
27 - 29 May and l - 2 tTnne 1885, Sydney 
10th Apri 1 1890, Aclela~de 
21 - 23 Y.Jarch, Melbourne 
17 - 27 Jan. 1898, Melbourne 
29 Nov. to 2 Dec. 1898, J.lelbourne 
24 - 28 Sept. 1900, Melbourne 
Federa.1 Counct 1 of Ma:ine ~nderwri ters of_ .. 
A us tralia and Tasmania.. r:temorand~~~ and 
A r ticles of Ass ocia ti on, dated 19uu. 
, ... 
Sydney Marine UndePwritex•s Associat~0n-. 
Notices sent t.o Mernbex•s (one vol. c1.1ver1ng 
1889-93) .:~· 
..· :i 
~ .: 
i 
'·! . 
, ! 
i I 
' .. 
702 
Var io1_1!3 Tariff Boolrn, ..J.898 t.o rl.a.ie_ . 
?onta1n text and amendments of agreements~ 
including: ····'-.,·· .. ~J.:i·x:;>;;;> ... · .. : Articles of A ssocia ti on, Counci 1 of Mnri ne:· _,..... · 
Under\vr•i te1,s of' the CommonV1eal th of 
A us t.i,alia · 
:i',f:?, Discount, Brokerage and Agency Aiireemen e· j}\,~0;\'./cy(_ Various schedules of f;ariff ra tea 
'~(' .';!{if :Ell~ Ma.!'.. i n.e .J!M erwr i ter S ' a nd Sa l v a g e A·j~;:~ ... .i!i~f '.:~i~:d n e_,y 
' ¥(~ii!1Y 
.'' 
•'''. 
· ... _ ..... 
Sydney Underwriters Association, A nriual ··: 
Repor ~s 1877 (No. l) to 1898. Referred 
to in t.ext as "Svdney Marine Association" •. :: ....... . 
.. .·. i; i_:\,;;::::J!t.~·:W;}!:/:,~'.:i{\f:i~·~y~;<'.'.:::, ·· 
Sydne;y M~rine Underwriters and Salv<ige"_'.f/j;;;S{~1;~;~:;;.:;-_:;:/.-;~: Assoc1adt1ot~' .An~J.la~ ,Rep?,~t~ 189:
1 
t?. dat.e.~~ ,:.'.:;:';·;;/\;>,<.:· :h!-_:,,,. 
Referre o in .ex as · yaney 11 a!'.1 n~,, ;-.,:.>;;·;.:-: ... :i\'t:.H:\· .. :,_:· .-::' , .. 
::: : : 
1
::: :;: • Ba ukl e ts':· . . -······, ,~s;f :~E:.;::~\~i\~,~~~~;~ };J~ '· 
ls t ... Jan 1892 Hi nimum Rates of .. :J~i_;,emi;t.1iri .·,. '. .... ·:.;:._':"<:(\.:.' ~ 
,. • cl-i'arged by 1'.1arin·e\tns1.~~£ai1.9~ . ., .. ,/: ,.,'.?F'.:(·'. . .., . 
2~:: i~§? · ~;~::e~' ,.~. ydne[;~111:i~~~il~~i;;!::'J, 
of Fire Commissioners of NewSouth"waies~·::s~/d.'11 ey';~-\ .. '.·:: . ..:.::·:-..:::>F~D ... ·.:·L 
Sydney 
Annual 
• t ' - • 
·' 
·~ 
' ~. ; 
' ... ~· ~ 
••• <; i 
,· .. :, 
... 
... 
v. COMPANY RECORDS 
.. -----
Imperial Ftr e Office L . to A J etters 
,, ··' 
..... '. .. ·' 
f •.. • Wright' Manage.r for Aus tr&lia rom F. Cozens-Smith Head Off· , ,. .· 
L ondon · 'T'h r· ' . ice, 
{_ ·,. t 
1·'.' 
. .· . • - e mperial ;Fire was taken ~:~~"~: i~8o A~;1;~~=m~~r im3 L:'tyer~,. i,';};1:<'!> 
Cit A lltance branch, Melbourne~ ex.~:r,:~· .. ~~~·.:<:f::;/1.:;.·;_:_;:;.::;t;,,i·'..·:"'.: 
··· · ->;;,·:'.:;·y'.·t':\:.'«f:'('::\:·-i\if~~if/\:/ ,: .;,. :·. :_, 
I'mperial Fire Office Copies of . ·. 
letters fr on A. '"T. Wrieh t to .. 
F. ~oze~~-Srnith, G~neral Manager, 
Heaa Of~1ce, London, 1891 -·1002 
examined. at A llinnce_ brarych, MelboUriik: • 
. ·;,;;;:: 1,0naon, Est. 18!52) A 11 i· ecords -e~"'<"f~mfned rt conip·· sh'y':·.-,:~~~r.·::i\::>r:'i'~'.','.':':;i:. :. > ·. ~.\···· ... · d H d 0 ff. ' .. . . . :.' , . '."" .. :~:: ..... ._;::;:, :;;.,..-
· :;: J")n on .ea ice 1 · · . ··"""": ··.''".~:.:,,~ •. ,.'.··.· 
·::· ·; _ • , , L • _ · , · · .• , ; ·;.:.-::.;"h,~<J::i.:/J~;::n0v:Y\r?J.;};;..;~v:;:_1~~!:;:':t;~d3:;0·:%iiT: 
·•· ~ore1gn Lec1,e11 Bo0ksJ_J.863 to :ppet:i"ent;:·.::·.·:,'.·'· .. ·'"~'.'({:i~));':C'.;':2··:,: 
Full set of copies of all outvmr1 rl foreifin .-c-:o~'F'f~s·nond­
ence is .held at the Company Is heud. offic:&;::,·F·~·2{::'i~1frt)::::~:/'. 
J~ondon. ,,..All,..letters to P,i:st:ralia, 1~6'3~19Cu';~: .. :·&\{:_,:·/F~:F 
rmd 190 o-19v9, vrere exmn1ned. Referr•ec;:i·:Jo :->·;:: · ... 
in text as 'Commercial' Uni on Letter, Book/ ;Y'':','/f-~.;i~;:.<>r .. ,:.;<: 
A us tralia to HeB.d Office 'c'..)r resnond.ence :·.Ho.t!,);::'.::'.'?~it/'.:> · · 
kept, either in Australia ··or J,o~dpn.'·,.-,The::+:?:}:j;!:;.:+.~:.:!;:,i:<.::··· 
letters are from the foreign .superintende11f<;:-:;.·;:;:;~':\Y:·::, .. ':":.,.:· 
to agents and managers in ·r.Ie:Lbql.Jrn~.e.;.:.~Y~.ne~~., ~;<\;::.:e~:<~<;:. ·. 
A de 1 aide ' ~ ert~ ~ ?;1:,';:·~r~l:·~'~.:Y:g_:~ .. f .·f ·;"~::::;:.:~J'.;:~!{{:t:;;w;~~;:;;~;:1~1;.\~~i::::f.'.)~.it;~~;~?~iC~~:.> .. : · .. 
Detailed BA lance Sheets,·· 18Z8-1901. ·Ii1clu.de,,,:<·: • ''h .. ~":fi?;'·. 
detailed J.is ts of investments, · incJ,:µcJ.i,ng ·<<)',' · _.: ;{::\.,:· · .. 
1 ~=~: !~~~:~~0 ;~~~~~.~U;f:~,~~i%~~f .1~K%~~t~f J,~'i!f c~:'%l{1t''·«,t·. ·. 
Australian Branch~Revent£e Acco.-g_ti_f!,s, iaz7..:.1saz,· . : · 
~;~;~:7: ~nd n;:::~::~~;:~::::· ~:c:::.r;::·~r!t~~}~~~t:.?>''· 
i.JetteI' of Instructions to E. c. Chapmari';·'·Sydriey:; . · 
dated 26th November 1874, appointing ,~1im as 
N .S. w. agent. ·. 
I ,' ,'' 
'· t' 
,. l, 
··.1 
(Insurance 
~;·,· · ... ::"r· •" ' 
Melbourne InoUJ:'an B k , ."· ... ' ' · ' 
Est. 6th Feb;uar ce ro ers Institute 
after 1911. · y, 1896' apparently defunct 
Letter Books Copi . · f. · ·· ·· ' . 
mainly to I es o. lette1•s from secretary. 
Association n~~ainnce Companies' Underw~i ters' , 
surance Brokers. ·'\ .. 0 "' ., • 
One Vol. 7 Feb •. 1896. to 27 Feb. :i'a97 .. ·~ Minu~~eB~~~~ 8 D_e,e~ .. 1904.:t.:o ~1.April }~07 (. 
· O ne. Vol. 6 Feb• 1896·_· to '26'· Feb~ ~B~)? "' ·~<.• .• 
, On~ Vol. ~ Nov. 1905 ,,to 6 Apnil 1906 
FJxecut1ve Committee Minute Books '\ ... · .. · 
." One Vol. 7 Feb~: 189b° to 17 Feb. 1897 . , . .:'. : .... 
. r·· ., One Vol. 26 April 19,()6 to. 25 .J:"a_n •. 1911 ..... :?':" . . . 
: "i .: 
L~'.~~;l·~s ~~gi) Insur:~ C~ co: .... ~.t~ ·.•.<:.bad,~rf i~~if Y!tJ~i[:i·;~~'.:•'.<:;t,;!·:Jf . : ..•. 
' '\':'o:' Manager s Letter Book, '1832-19-02 Press: cop"i'e's"'.: ,· "" ./ .. ::.· ...•.•.. i.1 ..~ •. :.~, I 
: </·J.~-.::: · of letters. of. Gener~l:Manager, · Charles'Danv;e'rs·; ·:._::,:"·~·"'··· ·/:" 
f .. 
.. _ ....... ':, __ :·:·:···· .• "_:·.·.:_:.:_.:.: .•.• ;.·.:_'._:,·.:·.•:·:.:_._···.'.::·.:·'.·.:····_:.1_~_:::·:·.·•_ • •: .·:_•.-.: • :_~.' ••. •.· i·:··:·.··::':·:.·:· ... _·.:·:·:··· ..•. : ·:···_·~.: •.. ::;··· ·. ~~ :n ~~ :r~ ~~a~~~~ ~ii ·~ 6~~~~ e~ ~d · ~~~s i~i;!~~ n8f .:~··~:~:{·. . ,lj ··ii~( 
. examined at company's': head office, ·sydl1ey. :- .. :·:.)Jr?;.;0~/;'.'i~i:~::'.\">)/ti'.'. ;:1::>;:<.;~:·, 
.. J·;Y:i . . . ·· . ..· · · · · . " : :; · ,,,,*•,·;;:: : / \:: ·::f W!t•,;;firJ:,~~}f.!t~~!'!~~:1t~,tW£d,;i t , if :,;:c; 1 ·
.. Ho;val . :i;r1surance Co. r,td. (Head Off~se_)~iyerp661,·'.'Estd~ ..-:::·i"845) '<.:;<'.. -{:· .. ,._, .. :{ i 
" 
. . . · -. _.·.; ':,.:: ... ,: .. ,\ ·: ·'>··'.·: ::::;l/ .. ;:iD::::~~i'.;:F:,•:<:iiii!fr'.iJ(;}·.:· .. :~«/t~\:.:1{:{Ph;/.(~!J(:.-) · 
Letter Book of "Charles<Salte.r·,, Mahager.,.:·ror "(-'.;·:·/ :·:;'"' !,'<::>.:': ·· 
Australia and New Zealand, ·:'1893:~909:·· ·:.J;?ress,:":;::·.-: .. ·/:',:,:;:}.'· 
copi ea of let. ters .to Head O ··ff ic:e, ·Li verpo~:n·/:::§~:\::,)~:;:.:·.-:.:;:::,:,:;.'. .. 
and· to Australian arid Nevi Zealan'd ;brancl;l,es·".arid:·,?'.'."·'.i'' · · .. \.~·. . 
. -.' agencies. 'From 1893-190Q··~lett,e!1Sc:.:r·eiiu~8.r·./::::;:1~!!~t/t'.·"\:--,..i:'::)<:7>.,: 
but 1900-1909 :1nfrequeq~1·.{~sp~cial1~::.to'_>'.{' : .)i·~;U:'"L\:'.'-·:x>· '· )_ 
Head o. ff ice.· . one voJ.ume, examined at .. <· · "' • '.;::>::-):::·: .:· ·· 
· · · Company's Melbourne Con tr_ol Off~oe. . No o ~he~r:< ""'.:'__/).\:.- ,. 
pre-1920 correspondence kept, .. either i.n:Yc·" .. ,,,,;h:;·i.,\'..=;,}':·~,-;: :;>_ . 
.. . '· ... A us tr a 1 ia or .. ~ t .·· L ~~ ~11) 9~,~;, ,, ).j ·,i\)" \::f cif \M;i.V ;;'''.gr·1f ~~¥i'.~;;. ' . .}; ·· 
F i Powers and Instructions Sey,en:_:bqu11d· :: '·\·: v~~~m~~ covering 1848-18?5· Examined·a t >>.-:.:·:. .. ·: ~ · 
Company''s head office, r,1verpool. ' 
'; .,' : 
. . , '.'Y ~ , . -: ."\·,.; -
:. )'.~-~:1h1~~:·:,.~;~-tish Insu'rance co. Ltd. 0 ffice Auckland, 
·_ .<f..:.~v1,.:Zealand, Estd. 1872) 
... ··;.:?::··:-.:::·.:~>~· ... 
I'"' ·'cg .. Th.e South B.; t · · . · (' U :> .,.._ 
h -~- l l l§h Revi~ . . t>.. boo1:ler. con tainino 
a 
8 ?rt h1~ to1?y of t.he Company. Py. i va te1 v w publ1sh~ in Auckland, 1936. Examined at" 
' .. :·: ... · ..... 
Compa11~1 s branch office, Sydney. 
/{/United Insurance Ca. Ltd.,, (Head Office Sydney, Estd. 1862) 
TPhe United InE-@:.a11_c~ Gaze.t_te~ No. 1, Oct. 1956 
to d11~e, quarte:rly, 1wivate cir•culation only. 
Contains his tori es of the company's head of'fi ce 
ancl branches. Copies made a'1ailable by the 
company's head office, Sydney. 
.;: 
l\ 
S ta temen t. of Pi re Premiums received .~·1ith in L;,i eJ. bour n.Y J 
Metropoli_tf!_n J..~:U"'e Brifwde Area. Gives premiun15 by ·! 
companies, ·1885-1890. Photocopy in writer's :possession. 'I 
........ ··• " ! j 
.. ··• < 'i1cto1•ia Insurance Co. I.t.d. (Head O!'fice Helbu~~e. Est. 1849) ' 
11· records examined-at Melbourne off'ice. · 
;,::·-
/.\.:f ~l:E6~:> . 
. ·. ;~;.~:·.:.;._' ·: · .. ~ 
. ;f ~i~t>··· 
.·.'." 
~' '. : '. ' . ·; ' . , 0 . 
~ecr~_!ar;v 's J,iette1' Books, 1878 to date ... :··.:.~/>;;~;\~:(-. 1
Semi-Of'f'icial' I.ietter Book (one volume) contain's 
press copies of let t:er's ·fr 0m S eci>'e·tary, helbom•n ~ 
ta Aust1~a1ian and HeVI Zealand br•anches and agencies, 
and to I10ndon ngents •. -,YeaPs 187.8-1881 siened .·.'. ·· 
Josenh Collie. 1881-1900 signed CT. L. Archer. ·9a~ 
in letteps 1960-19.JB, t-~:en signed w. I·. 
. i 
·,.)' 
·.· i 
1908-1909, James Haverty 1909-10. .... . ... 
Sec~·ef:ar:t's Letter 3ook (~rie -·voJ..) .;-- . . . ..:<,.. .. ':•· f~tters as above signed W. L •. Ar~he~ .1886~1997~ . ' 
Eai"' lier· co11 r es11ortdence not:.:~e})t, •. :) ... •.::··:<:>: · · " , ; 
. · , · · . . : : :; , ·• ; :.f .: ·. ·, "\(!:X?:~~:~· ~·~·::.-\!,~:::-::· .:: · · ··: Y :.:. ~- · · · .. _. · · ·.·?:;r<· . '. . 
Held Co'lel"'ed ••• · 18Li9-1942 ~· ... ·:-.'11st0ry. o.i., .. ~he .;-::.1.·1·''"·'';':;:.:::-:,.,.. I ~-Insurance co."· pu1~.l_ish.e~ ... :;.:~.p .. ma~~. i:.!'.~S:trr:~':'..'~~}:,::i"·· :.r.: · 
centenary. Booklet w1,.i ~ten ~;nd_.·"PP~~.g~~;~ ...... b~t.":~~~l~~1.~ .. ~.~>/ ".,,:::·c· 
corr• oll: nri va tely publ1she.o.,, ~ .. r.~.t.~';:u,f .. B~./:"19h9. ::'.~::·~~=Jt:'.:'.,.:/},;<'::~. . .__ .. ::: :, l 
· ~· . . . - . ·· '""~: .. ·.i~-<>"·::),~'.:~.1,;:,;";;~~!)j:~~:· ·,:,~~~·~~;~{·6·:e.<. · / ::." · 
Boa pd ~-if nu '-·~s· '18l.!9 to da fe'> .: 188l~'i9'ib"\fxam1 ne.9.'~·>::.~y'.'.· . . . : ... ,,:, 
--
0 
' • • (. 1· .. · "· "·a.·.a:es)<or ·;a11 .. :·:.:. · ~: ·. '.>:. 1 1849-79 contains details inc ~~~:.r.~":·.:·:~:;:;;~iih:/.U~,:p~~-1:~1{<:·:,·: .. s.:·f.'" :·· ,.,,; .:.:= \·: .. 
new insurances Ac~ ~.P ted :. ; :}'~1%;~#)~~!~~~$~~7~f,~~;tt:L J . '; , , 
Hinul-e.., of GenePal Heet.1rn:!S, lo'.)0-18Z9,.\'":/~ ;:-.:::;M:" ~;'.;:·~.;;:.'t>·,.:: .. ··\L.·'t-: .. I 
..... 
1
• •
0 
c.· . .'.: ·:.:: :·:·i·"'·:_~··:.':·"·i;~./~i<\i.:·:ft:~~:f\i'.',s~~t:::/!:r:-. .. /~'.~.:.iij l'·~;t·. I 
B0ok of k-ire B . .riR.ade Association Agreemen_t8,,,~ .. ):,;;.·:·)·<·/.??i~it}/'.~·~;; i~:.".:),:l 
Texts of~ A or eements Amon;:s t Melbo~ ·.\.}j;;?t:tD~t~~\1~:::: .. \_;;/.:::')-::,:::·r:~fi. 1 )r l 
- J..t.::.- .., i... a 41ire InsuI1 ance_ ., .· ::_! •. :;;:."'."':"· .. .' ,,.,., ... :. .. '_;· 'id 1 .:- .... ~' Comnanies Trans"!._Ct,in,. ----:---8-r" 7 ..... JRn~ .. 1874. ··'.:: ·. ·., ·:;i.!.:·,·>, ~~~~~.a.;;.--;_;d~· L't=.od 2nd. April. 1 oo, o(,n - .. .. .. ·;:·... . "fi ;::.: . .-1 
A gr e em en "s ~ ~ - . . . . ,;; . . ~ ;::·'J;,;;;~~~2:,:,}~;~;,i , ;;:~ .. •1.:.1_.:!j: 1.~.i~!\ 
;• ~;-:~=:--=-:~ ' ( . 
'·}'- .. · 
... 
. ·" 
... ,_.•' 
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30th, l.!a:t>ch 1874, 15th May 1874, 3I>d. July 1874, 
6th July 1874, 7th August 1874. Also an 
agreement dated probably 1881 or 1882, signed 
by 40 companies, eiving voting rights of each 
company in Fire Brigade Association. 
Ledger, 1849-1872. 
·'-' 
'. 
Annual Renorts. Bound volumes, 1850 to date 
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